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15 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Greer v. Millergreen2 sentences2009For example, in Greer , there was no Doyle violation where the defense counsel immediately objected to a question by the prosecution about defendant's post-arrest, post- Miranda silence, and the trial court twice gave a curative instruction to the jury. [11] Greer, 483 U.S. at 759, 764-765 , 107 S.Ct. 3102 . 2. 2009For example, in Greer , there was no Doyle violation where the defense counsel immediately objected to a question by the prosecution about defendant’s post-arrest, post -Miranda silence, and the trial court twice gave a curative instruction to the jury. 11 Greer, 483 US at 759, 764-765 . 2. | 3 | 5 |
Brecht v. Abrahamsongreen2 sentences2013“Under the rationale of Doyle, due process is violated whenever the prosecution uses for impeachment purposes a defendant’s post-Miranda[1] silence.” Brecht v Abrahamson, 507 US 619, 629 ; 113 S Ct 1710 ; 123 L Ed 2d 353 (1993) (emphasis added).2 This is because it is fundamentally unfair to assure a defendant that 1 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 ; 86 S Ct 1602 ; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966). 2 But, see, Brecht, 507 US at 628-629 (finding a Doyle violation on the basis of the state’s general references to the “petitioner’s failure to come forward with his version of events at any time before trial”); 2013“Under the rationale of Doyle, due process is violated whenever the prosecution uses for impeachment purposes a defendant’s post-Miranda[1] silence.” Brecht v Abrahamson, 507 US 619, 629 ; 113 S Ct 1710 ; 123 L Ed 2d 353 (1993) (emphasis added).2 This is because it is fundamentally unfair to assure a defendant that 1 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 ; 86 S Ct 1602 ; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966). 2 But, see, Brecht, 507 US at 628-629 (finding a Doyle violation on the basis of the state’s general references to the “petitioner’s failure to come forward with his version of events at any time before trial”); | 3 | 3 |
The PEOPLE OF the TERRITORY OF GUAM, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Cesar Celestian VELORIA, Defendant-Appellantgreen2 sentences2001See United States v. Baker, 999 F.2d 412, 416 (C.A.9, 1993), stating that counsel's "subjective intent cannot save his overly broad statements." The majority glosses over the fact that the entire series of questions and answers contrasted defendant's and the other witnesses' degree of cooperation in front of the jury. [6] Apparently, Nancy Kennebrew was charged at one point with possession of the safe's contents. [7] See Moreno, supra at 473-474 , finding error where the prosecutor's question's "natural consequence, if not purpose," was to draw meaning from the defendant's post- Miranda silenc 2001See United States v. Baker, 999 F.2d 412, 416 (C.A.9, 1993), stating that counsel's "subjective intent cannot save his overly broad statements." The majority glosses over the fact that the entire series of questions and answers contrasted defendant's and the other witnesses' degree of cooperation in front of the jury. [6] Apparently, Nancy Kennebrew was charged at one point with possession of the safe's contents. [7] See Moreno, supra at 473-474 , finding error where the prosecutor's question's "natural consequence, if not purpose," was to draw meaning from the defendant's post- Miranda silenc | 3 | 3 |
Fletcher v. Weirgreen2 sentences1990See Jenkins v Anderson, 447 US 231 ; 100 S Ct 2124 ; 65 L Ed 2d 86 (1980), and Fletcher v Weir, 455 US 603 ; 102 S Ct 1309 ; 71 L Ed 2d 490 (1982). [18] When confronted with prosecutorial cross-examination that does not clearly distinguish between pre- and post- Miranda silence, courts have found Doyle error. 1990See Jenkins v Anderson, 447 US 231 ; 100 S Ct 2124 ; 65 L Ed 2d 86 (1980), and Fletcher v Weir, 455 US 603 ; 102 S Ct 1309 ; 71 L Ed 2d 490 (1982). [18] When confronted with prosecutorial cross-examination that does not clearly distinguish between pre- and post- Miranda silence, courts have found Doyle error. | 2 | 3 |
People v. Shafiergreen2 sentences2022A defendant’s right to due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment is violated where the prosecutor uses his postarrest, post-Miranda warning silence for impeachment or as substantive evidence unless it is used to contradict the defendant’s trial testimony that he made a statement, that he cooperated with police, or that trial was his first opportunity to explain his version of events. [People v Solmonson, 261 Mich App 657, 664 ; 683 NW2d 761 (2004), citing Doyle v Ohio, 426 US 610 , 619 n 11; 96 S Ct 2240 ; 49 L Ed 2d 91 (1976).] “A reference to a defendant’s post-arrest, post-Miranda 2022A defendant’s right to due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment is violated where the prosecutor uses his postarrest, post-Miranda warning silence for impeachment or as substantive evidence unless it is used to contradict the defendant’s trial testimony that he made a statement, that he cooperated with police, or that trial was his first opportunity to explain his version of events. [People v Solmonson, 261 Mich App 657, 664 ; 683 NW2d 761 (2004), citing Doyle v Ohio, 426 US 610 , 619 n 11; 96 S Ct 2240 ; 49 L Ed 2d 91 (1976).] “A reference to a defendant’s post-arrest, post-Miranda | 1 | 5 |
United States v. Gary A. Newmangreen2 sentences2009While Veloria was a "plain error" case, the factors it used to evaluate the effect of a Doyle error on a trial are traceable to United States v. Newman, 943 F.2d 1155 (C.A.9, 1991), which applied the "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard from Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). 2009While Veloria was a "plain error" case, the factors it used to evaluate the effect of a Doyle error on a trial are traceable to United States v. Newman, 943 F.2d 1155 (C.A.9, 1991), which applied the "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard from Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). | 1 | 3 |
People v. Colliergreen2 sentences2013But, see, Brecht, 507 US at 628-629 (finding a Doyle violation on the basis of the state’s general references to the “petitioner’s failure to come forward with his version of events at any time before trial”); Jones v Indiana, 265 Ind 447, 451; 355 NE2d 402 (1976) (explaining that there is no difference between a defendant’s continued silence after an immediate postarrest custody and throughout the pretrial period because a “defendant who receives Miranda warnings is advised that he may remain silent; he is not warned that the right continues only while he is in the custody of the arresting of 2013But, see, Brecht, 507 US at 628-629 (finding a Doyle violation on the basis of the state’s general references to the “petitioner’s failure to come forward with his version of events at any time before trial”); Jones v Indiana, 265 Ind 447, 451; 355 NE2d 402 (1976) (explaining that there is no difference between a defendant’s continued silence after an immediate postarrest custody and throughout the pretrial period because a “defendant who receives Miranda warnings is advised that he may remain silent; he is not warned that the right continues only while he is in the custody of the arresting of | 1 | 2 |
Jenkins v. Andersongreen2 sentences1990See Jenkins v Anderson, 447 US 231 ; 100 S Ct 2124 ; 65 L Ed 2d 86 (1980), and Fletcher v Weir, 455 US 603 ; 102 S Ct 1309 ; 71 L Ed 2d 490 (1982). [18] When confronted with prosecutorial cross-examination that does not clearly distinguish between pre- and post- Miranda silence, courts have found Doyle error. 1990See Jenkins v Anderson, 447 US 231 ; 100 S Ct 2124 ; 65 L Ed 2d 86 (1980), and Fletcher v Weir, 455 US 603 ; 102 S Ct 1309 ; 71 L Ed 2d 490 (1982). [18] When confronted with prosecutorial cross-examination that does not clearly distinguish between pre- and post- Miranda silence, courts have found Doyle error. | 1 | 2 |
Grunewald v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2013See, also, Fletcher v Weir, 455 US 603, 607 ; 102 S Ct 1309 ; 71 L Ed 2d 490 (1982) (“A state is entitled ... to leave to the judge and jury under its own rules of evidence the resolution of the extent to which postarrest silence may be deemed to impeach a criminal defendant’s own testimony.”) See, also, Stewart, 366 US at 6 n 13, 7 n 14 (rejecting the notion that a prior refusal to testify can be used to impeach a defendant’s general credibility and explaining that “[i]f the failure to testify at a previous trial were to amount to evidence that testimony at a subsequent trial was feigned or p 2013See, also, Fletcher v Weir, 455 US 603, 607 ; 102 S Ct 1309 ; 71 L Ed 2d 490 (1982) (“A state is entitled ... to leave to the judge and jury under its own rules of evidence the resolution of the extent to which postarrest silence may be deemed to impeach a criminal defendant’s own testimony.”) See, also, Stewart, 366 US at 6 n 13, 7 n 14 (rejecting the notion that a prior refusal to testify can be used to impeach a defendant’s general credibility and explaining that “[i]f the failure to testify at a previous trial were to amount to evidence that testimony at a subsequent trial was feigned or p | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Morenogreen2 sentences2001See Moreno, supra at 473-474 , finding error where the prosecutor’s question’s “natural consequence, if not purpose,” was to draw meaning from the defendant’s post-Miranda silence; Velorta, supra at 652, finding Doyle error after reviewing entire context of improper testimony; Elkins, supra at 537, a “Doyle violation occurs not only when the objectionable comments explicitly refer to a defendant’s failure to answer questions . . . but when the reference to defendant’s silence is more oblique . . . 2001See Moreno, supra at 473-474 , finding error where the prosecutor’s question’s “natural consequence, if not purpose,” was to draw meaning from the defendant’s post-Miranda silence; Velorta, supra at 652, finding Doyle error after reviewing entire context of improper testimony; Elkins, supra at 537, a “Doyle violation occurs not only when the objectionable comments explicitly refer to a defendant’s failure to answer questions . . . but when the reference to defendant’s silence is more oblique . . . | 1 | 1 |
| Monte Pulley v. Commonwealth of Virginiagreen | 1 | 1 |
Cook v. Stategreen2 sentences2001Our decision is also consistent with the holding of the Indiana Supreme Court in Cook, v State, 544 NE2d 1359, 1363 (Ind, 1989), that testimony by a federal agent that there was no further contact with the defendant at a certain point because he “had made a request to speak to an attorney” did not constitute a Doyle violation. 2001Our decision is also consistent with the holding of the Indiana Supreme Court in Cook, v State, 544 NE2d 1359, 1363 (Ind, 1989), that testimony by a federal agent that there was no further contact with the defendant at a certain point because he “had made a request to speak to an attorney” did not constitute a Doyle violation. | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Baccamgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Charles Lindgren v. Michael P. Lanegreen | 1 | 1 |
United States of America, Cross-Appellant v. Gaylene Laverne Stubbs, Cross-Appelleegreen2 sentences2001We note that our conclusion that no Doyle violation occurred in this case is supported by the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Stubbs, 944 F.2d 828 (C.A.11, 1991). 2001Accordingly, we conclude there was no Doyle violation in this case. [ Stubbs, supra at 835 (emphasis in original).] As in Stubbs , the present case involved no specific inquiry by the prosecution regarding defendant's silence or any attempt to use that silence for impeachment purposes. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Stephen Baker, United States of America v. Philip L. Cabangreen2 sentences2001See United States v. Baker, 999 F.2d 412, 416 (C.A.9, 1993), stating that counsel's "subjective intent cannot save his overly broad statements." The majority glosses over the fact that the entire series of questions and answers contrasted defendant's and the other witnesses' degree of cooperation in front of the jury. [6] Apparently, Nancy Kennebrew was charged at one point with possession of the safe's contents. [7] See Moreno, supra at 473-474 , finding error where the prosecutor's question's "natural consequence, if not purpose," was to draw meaning from the defendant's post- Miranda silenc 2001See United States v. Baker, 999 F.2d 412, 416 (C.A.9, 1993), stating that counsel's "subjective intent cannot save his overly broad statements." The majority glosses over the fact that the entire series of questions and answers contrasted defendant's and the other witnesses' degree of cooperation in front of the jury. [6] Apparently, Nancy Kennebrew was charged at one point with possession of the safe's contents. [7] See Moreno, supra at 473-474 , finding error where the prosecutor's question's "natural consequence, if not purpose," was to draw meaning from the defendant's post- Miranda silenc | 1 | 1 |
State v. DiGuiliogreen2 sentences2001See United States v. Baker, 999 F.2d 412, 416 (C.A.9, 1993), stating that counsel's "subjective intent cannot save his overly broad statements." The majority glosses over the fact that the entire series of questions and answers contrasted defendant's and the other witnesses' degree of cooperation in front of the jury. [6] Apparently, Nancy Kennebrew was charged at one point with possession of the safe's contents. [7] See Moreno, supra at 473-474 , finding error where the prosecutor's question's "natural consequence, if not purpose," was to draw meaning from the defendant's post- Miranda silenc 2001See United States v. Baker, 999 F.2d 412, 416 (C.A.9, 1993), stating that counsel's "subjective intent cannot save his overly broad statements." The majority glosses over the fact that the entire series of questions and answers contrasted defendant's and the other witnesses' degree of cooperation in front of the jury. [6] Apparently, Nancy Kennebrew was charged at one point with possession of the safe's contents. [7] See Moreno, supra at 473-474 , finding error where the prosecutor's question's "natural consequence, if not purpose," was to draw meaning from the defendant's post- Miranda silenc | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Grahamgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Barlow v. Brewery Workers Local Union No. 1010green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Doyle v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2022A defendant’s right to due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment is violated where the prosecutor uses his postarrest, post-Miranda warning silence for impeachment or as substantive evidence unless it is used to contradict the defendant’s trial testimony that he made a statement, that he cooperated with police, or that trial was his first opportunity to explain his version of events. [People v Solmonson, 261 Mich App 657, 664 ; 683 NW2d 761 (2004), citing Doyle v Ohio, 426 US 610 , 619 n 11; 96 S Ct 2240 ; 49 L Ed 2d 91 (1976).] “A reference to a defendant’s post-arrest, post-Miranda 2022A defendant’s right to due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment is violated where the prosecutor uses his postarrest, post-Miranda warning silence for impeachment or as substantive evidence unless it is used to contradict the defendant’s trial testimony that he made a statement, that he cooperated with police, or that trial was his first opportunity to explain his version of events. [People v Solmonson, 261 Mich App 657, 664 ; 683 NW2d 761 (2004), citing Doyle v Ohio, 426 US 610 , 619 n 11; 96 S Ct 2240 ; 49 L Ed 2d 91 (1976).] “A reference to a defendant’s post-arrest, post-Miranda | 4 | 1990–2022 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2013“Under the rationale of Doyle, due process is violated whenever the prosecution uses for impeachment purposes a defendant’s post-Miranda[1] silence.” Brecht v Abrahamson, 507 US 619, 629 ; 113 S Ct 1710 ; 123 L Ed 2d 353 (1993) (emphasis added).2 This is because it is fundamentally unfair to assure a defendant that 1 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 ; 86 S Ct 1602 ; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966). 2 But, see, Brecht, 507 US at 628-629 (finding a Doyle violation on the basis of the state’s general references to the “petitioner’s failure to come forward with his version of events at any time before trial”); 2013“Under the rationale of Doyle, due process is violated whenever the prosecution uses for impeachment purposes a defendant’s post-Miranda[1] silence.” Brecht v Abrahamson, 507 US 619, 629 ; 113 S Ct 1710 ; 123 L Ed 2d 353 (1993) (emphasis added).2 This is because it is fundamentally unfair to assure a defendant that 1 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 ; 86 S Ct 1602 ; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966). 2 But, see, Brecht, 507 US at 628-629 (finding a Doyle violation on the basis of the state’s general references to the “petitioner’s failure to come forward with his version of events at any time before trial”); | 2 | 1990–2013 |
Chapman v. California
red
2 sentences2009While Veloria was a “plain error” case, the factors it used to evaluate the effect of a Doyle error on a trial are traceable to United States v Newman, 943 F2d 1155 (CA 9,1991), which applied the “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard from Chapman v California, 386 US 18 ; 87 S Ct 824 ; 17 L Ed 2d 705 (1967). 2009While Veloria was a “plain error” case, the factors it used to evaluate the effect of a Doyle error on a trial are traceable to United States v Newman, 943 F2d 1155 (CA 9,1991), which applied the “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard from Chapman v California, 386 US 18 ; 87 S Ct 824 ; 17 L Ed 2d 705 (1967). | 2 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Lofquest
green
2 sentences1990The prosecutor narrowed his inquiry no further than the month of February, 1982, which included both a preMiranda period (February 13-14) 20 and a postMiranda period (February 14-28). 21 Where prosecutorial questioning has been found to refer to both pre- and post-Miranda silence, courts have found Doyle error. 22 In State v Lofquest, 227 Neb 567, 570; 418 NW2d 595 (1988), the Supreme Court of Nebraska held that prosecutorial questioning and comment which "could be construed as referring to [Lofquest’s] silence from the first police contact through the moment before Lofquest told his story at 1990The prosecutor narrowed his inquiry no further than the month of February, 1982, which included both a pre- Miranda period (February 13-14) [20] and a post- Miranda period (February 14-28). [21] Where prosecutorial questioning has been found to refer to both pre- and post- Miranda silence, courts have found Doyle error. [22] In State v Lofquest, 227 Neb 567, 570; 418 NW2d 595 (1988), the Supreme Court of Nebraska held that prosecutorial questioning and comment which "could be construed as referring to [Lofquest's] silence from the first police contact through the moment before Lofquest told hi | 2 | 1990–1990 |
People v. Solmonson
green
2 sentences2022A defendant’s right to due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment is violated where the prosecutor uses his postarrest, post-Miranda warning silence for impeachment or as substantive evidence unless it is used to contradict the defendant’s trial testimony that he made a statement, that he cooperated with police, or that trial was his first opportunity to explain his version of events. [People v Solmonson, 261 Mich App 657, 664 ; 683 NW2d 761 (2004), citing Doyle v Ohio, 426 US 610 , 619 n 11; 96 S Ct 2240 ; 49 L Ed 2d 91 (1976).] “A reference to a defendant’s post-arrest, post-Miranda 2022A defendant’s right to due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment is violated where the prosecutor uses his postarrest, post-Miranda warning silence for impeachment or as substantive evidence unless it is used to contradict the defendant’s trial testimony that he made a statement, that he cooperated with police, or that trial was his first opportunity to explain his version of events. [People v Solmonson, 261 Mich App 657, 664 ; 683 NW2d 761 (2004), citing Doyle v Ohio, 426 US 610 , 619 n 11; 96 S Ct 2240 ; 49 L Ed 2d 91 (1976).] “A reference to a defendant’s post-arrest, post-Miranda | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Solmonson
green
2 sentences2022A defendant’s right to due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment is violated where the prosecutor uses his postarrest, post-Miranda warning silence for impeachment or as substantive evidence unless it is used to contradict the defendant’s trial testimony that he made a statement, that he cooperated with police, or that trial was his first opportunity to explain his version of events. [People v Solmonson, 261 Mich App 657, 664 ; 683 NW2d 761 (2004), citing Doyle v Ohio, 426 US 610 , 619 n 11; 96 S Ct 2240 ; 49 L Ed 2d 91 (1976).] “A reference to a defendant’s post-arrest, post-Miranda 2022A defendant’s right to due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment is violated where the prosecutor uses his postarrest, post-Miranda warning silence for impeachment or as substantive evidence unless it is used to contradict the defendant’s trial testimony that he made a statement, that he cooperated with police, or that trial was his first opportunity to explain his version of events. [People v Solmonson, 261 Mich App 657, 664 ; 683 NW2d 761 (2004), citing Doyle v Ohio, 426 US 610 , 619 n 11; 96 S Ct 2240 ; 49 L Ed 2d 91 (1976).] “A reference to a defendant’s post-arrest, post-Miranda | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Dennis
green
2 sentences2016Cf. People v Dennis, 464 Mich 567 ; 628 NW2d 502 (2011). 2016Cf. People v Dennis, 464 Mich 567 ; 628 NW2d 502 (2011). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Allen
green
2 sentences2015People v Allen, 201 Mich App 98, 103 ; 505 NW2d 869 (1993). 2015People v Allen, 201 Mich App 98, 103 ; 505 NW2d 869 (1993). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Carbin
green
2 sentences2015Even if defendant could show that defense counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable for failing to object to the alleged Doyle violation, defendant has failed to show “the existence of a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 600 ; 623 NW2d 884 (2001). 2015Even if defendant could show that defense counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable for failing to object to the alleged Doyle violation, defendant has failed to show “the existence of a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 600 ; 623 NW2d 884 (2001). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Neely v. State
green
2 sentences2013But, see, Brecht, 507 US at 628-629 (finding a Doyle violation on the basis of the state’s general references to the “petitioner’s failure to come forward with his version of events at any time before trial”); Jones v Indiana, 265 Ind 447, 451; 355 NE2d 402 (1976) (explaining that there is no difference between a defendant’s continued silence after an immediate postarrest custody and throughout the pretrial period because a “defendant who receives Miranda warnings is advised that he may remain silent; he is not warned that the right continues only while he is in the custody of the arresting of 2013But, see, Brecht, 507 US at 628-629 (finding a Doyle violation on the basis of the state’s general references to the “petitioner’s failure to come forward with his version of events at any time before trial”); Jones v Indiana, 265 Ind 447, 451; 355 NE2d 402 (1976) (explaining that there is no difference between a defendant’s continued silence after an immediate postarrest custody and throughout the pretrial period because a “defendant who receives Miranda warnings is advised that he may remain silent; he is not warned that the right continues only while he is in the custody of the arresting of | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Stewart v. United States
green
2 sentences2013See, also, Fletcher v Weir, 455 US 603, 607 ; 102 S Ct 1309 ; 71 L Ed 2d 490 (1982) (“A state is entitled ... to leave to the judge and jury under its own rules of evidence the resolution of the extent to which postarrest silence may be deemed to impeach a criminal defendant’s own testimony.”) See, also, Stewart, 366 US at 6 n 13, 7 n 14 (rejecting the notion that a prior refusal to testify can be used to impeach a defendant’s general credibility and explaining that “[i]f the failure to testify at a previous trial were to amount to evidence that testimony at a subsequent trial was feigned or p 2013See, also, Fletcher v Weir, 455 US 603, 607 ; 102 S Ct 1309 ; 71 L Ed 2d 490 (1982) (“A state is entitled ... to leave to the judge and jury under its own rules of evidence the resolution of the extent to which postarrest silence may be deemed to impeach a criminal defendant’s own testimony.”) See, also, Stewart, 366 US at 6 n 13, 7 n 14 (rejecting the notion that a prior refusal to testify can be used to impeach a defendant’s general credibility and explaining that “[i]f the failure to testify at a previous trial were to amount to evidence that testimony at a subsequent trial was feigned or p | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Neely v. State
green
2 sentences2013But, see, Brecht, 507 US at 628-629 (finding a Doyle violation on the basis of the state’s general references to the “petitioner’s failure to come forward with his version of events at any time before trial”); Jones v Indiana, 265 Ind 447, 451; 355 NE2d 402 (1976) (explaining that there is no difference between a defendant’s continued silence after an immediate postarrest custody and throughout the pretrial period because a “defendant who receives Miranda warnings is advised that he may remain silent; he is not warned that the right continues only while he is in the custody of the arresting of 2013But, see, Brecht, 507 US at 628-629 (finding a Doyle violation on the basis of the state’s general references to the “petitioner’s failure to come forward with his version of events at any time before trial”); Jones v Indiana, 265 Ind 447, 451; 355 NE2d 402 (1976) (explaining that there is no difference between a defendant’s continued silence after an immediate postarrest custody and throughout the pretrial period because a “defendant who receives Miranda warnings is advised that he may remain silent; he is not warned that the right continues only while he is in the custody of the arresting of | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Jones v. State
green
2 sentences2013“Under the rationale of Doyle, due process is violated whenever the prosecution uses for impeachment purposes a defendant’s post-Miranda[1] silence.” Brecht v Abrahamson, 507 US 619, 629 ; 113 S Ct 1710 ; 123 L Ed 2d 353 (1993) (emphasis added).2 This is because it is fundamentally unfair to assure a defendant that 1 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 ; 86 S Ct 1602 ; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966). 2 But, see, Brecht, 507 US at 628-629 (finding a Doyle violation on the basis of the state’s general references to the “petitioner’s failure to come forward with his version of events at any time before trial”); 2013“Under the rationale of Doyle, due process is violated whenever the prosecution uses for impeachment purposes a defendant’s post-Miranda[1] silence.” Brecht v Abrahamson, 507 US 619, 629 ; 113 S Ct 1710 ; 123 L Ed 2d 353 (1993) (emphasis added).2 This is because it is fundamentally unfair to assure a defendant that 1 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 ; 86 S Ct 1602 ; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966). 2 But, see, Brecht, 507 US at 628-629 (finding a Doyle violation on the basis of the state’s general references to the “petitioner’s failure to come forward with his version of events at any time before trial”); | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Borgne
green
2 sentences2009For these reasons, just as the Doyle error in this case does not support a finding of prejudice under the Carines plain-error standard, id. at 196-198, 768 N.W.2d 290 defendant cannot show that he was prejudiced by counsel's errors under the Strickland standard. 2009For these reasons, just as the Doyle error in this case does not support a finding of prejudice under the Carines plain-error standard, id. at 196-198, 768 N.W.2d 290 defendant cannot show that he was prejudiced by counsel's errors under the Strickland standard. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
People v. Carines
green
2 sentences2009PLAIN-ERROR REVIEW The Doyle violation in this case is an unpreserved, constitutional error. 13 This Court determines whether this type of error warrants reversal under the plain-error standard of review articulated in People v Grant, 445 Mich 535, 547-553 ; 520 NW2d 123 (1994), and People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 765-766 ; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). 14 1. 2009PLAIN-ERROR REVIEW The Doyle violation in this case is an unpreserved, constitutional error. 13 This Court determines whether this type of error warrants reversal under the plain-error standard of review articulated in People v Grant, 445 Mich 535, 547-553 ; 520 NW2d 123 (1994), and People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 765-766 ; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). 14 1. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
People v. Grant
green
2 sentences2009PLAIN-ERROR REVIEW The Doyle violation in this case is an unpreserved, constitutional error. 13 This Court determines whether this type of error warrants reversal under the plain-error standard of review articulated in People v Grant, 445 Mich 535, 547-553 ; 520 NW2d 123 (1994), and People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 765-766 ; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). 14 1. 2009PLAIN-ERROR REVIEW The Doyle violation in this case is an unpreserved, constitutional error. 13 This Court determines whether this type of error warrants reversal under the plain-error standard of review articulated in People v Grant, 445 Mich 535, 547-553 ; 520 NW2d 123 (1994), and People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 765-766 ; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). 14 1. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| cluster 458985 green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| State v. Wells green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| United States v. Havens green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.