Doyle violation in Illinois

2025Our supreme court has recognized five factors to consider in determining whether a Doyle violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt: - 28 - “(1) the party who elicited the testimony about the defendant’s silence; (2) the intensity and frequency of the references to the defendant’s silence; (3) the use that the prosecution made of the defendant’s silence; (4) the trial court’s opportunity to grant a mistrial motion or to give a curative jury instruction; and (5) the quantum of other evidence proving the defendant’s guilt.” Id. ¶ 82 Here, defendant complains of the prosecutor’s asking whet

2025Our supreme court has recognized five factors to consider in determining whether a Doyle violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt: - 28 - “(1) the party who elicited the testimony about the defendant’s silence; (2) the intensity and frequency of the references to the defendant’s silence; (3) the use that the prosecution made of the defendant’s silence; (4) the trial court’s opportunity to grant a mistrial motion or to give a curative jury instruction; and (5) the quantum of other evidence proving the defendant’s guilt.” Id. ¶ 82 Here, defendant complains of the prosecutor’s asking whet

1999App. 3d at 732 , 700 N.E.2d at 721 ; see also People v. Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d 414, 466-68 , 610 N.E.2d 16, 40 (1992) (Doyle violation can he harmless); People v. Lucas, 132 Ill. 2d 399, 432-33 , 548 N.E.2d 1003, 1016-17 (1989) (Doyle violation was harmless under the facts of that case).

1999App. 3d at 732 , 700 N.E.2d at 721 ; see also People v. Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d 414, 466-68 , 610 N.E.2d 16, 40 (1992) (Doyle violation can he harmless); People v. Lucas, 132 Ill. 2d 399, 432-33 , 548 N.E.2d 1003, 1016-17 (1989) (Doyle violation was harmless under the facts of that case).

2017See id. at 725 , 773 N.E.2d at 779 ; see also Anderson, 447 U.S. at 408 ; People v. Frieberg, 147 Ill. 2d 326, 356 , 589 N.E.2d 508 (1992) (concluding no Doyle violation occurred when the State cross-examined the defendant about omissions in his post-Miranda statement to police where the defendant did not invoke the right to remain silent but omitted significant details to which he testified at trial). ¶ 24 We thus reject defendant’s argument he partially remained silent following receipt of his Miranda warnings.

2017See id. at 725 , 773 N.E.2d at 779 ; see also Anderson, 447 U.S. at 408 ; People v. Frieberg, 147 Ill. 2d 326, 356 , 589 N.E.2d 508 (1992) (concluding no Doyle violation occurred when the State cross-examined the defendant about omissions in his post-Miranda statement to police where the defendant did not invoke the right to remain silent but omitted significant details to which he testified at trial). ¶ 24 We thus reject defendant’s argument he partially remained silent following receipt of his Miranda warnings.

2017See id. at 725 , 773 N.E.2d at 779 ; see also Anderson, 447 U.S. at 408 ; People v. Frieberg, 147 Ill. 2d 326, 356 , 589 N.E.2d 508, 522 (1992) (concluding no Doyle violation occurred when the State cross-examined the defendant about omissions in his post-Miranda statement to police where the defendant did not invoke the right to remain silent but omitted significant details to which he testified at trial). ¶ 24 We thus reject defendant’s argument he partially remained silent following receipt of his Miranda warnings.

2017See id. at 725 , 773 N.E.2d at 779 ; see also Anderson, 447 U.S. at 408 ; People v. Frieberg, 147 Ill. 2d 326, 356 , 589 N.E.2d 508 (1992) (concluding no Doyle violation occurred when the State cross-examined the defendant about omissions in his post-Miranda statement to police where the defendant did not invoke the right to remain silent but omitted significant details to which he testified at trial). ¶ 24 We thus reject defendant’s argument he partially remained silent following receipt of his Miranda warnings.

2011Our supreme court explained: "It would be inconsistent for this court to hold that a trial court's failure to question a venire regarding a defendant's decision not to testify in violation of Rule 431(b)(4) requires automatic reversal, when we have repeatedly held that automatic reversal is not required when a prosecutor mentions a defendant's post- Miranda silence and commits a Doyle violation." Glasper, 234 Ill.2d at 198 , 334 Ill.Dec. 575 , 917 N.E.2d 401 (citing People v. Dameron, 196 Ill.2d 156, 164-66 , 256 Ill.Dec. 274 , 751 N.E.2d 1111 (2001) (listing cases where our supreme court conc

2011Our supreme court explained: "It would be inconsistent for this court to hold that a trial court's failure to question a venire regarding a defendant's decision not to testify in violation of Rule 431(b)(4) requires automatic reversal, when we have repeatedly held that automatic reversal is not required when a prosecutor mentions a defendant's post- Miranda silence and commits a Doyle violation." Glasper, 234 Ill.2d at 198 , 334 Ill.Dec. 575 , 917 N.E.2d 401 (citing People v. Dameron, 196 Ill.2d 156, 164-66 , 256 Ill.Dec. 274 , 751 N.E.2d 1111 (2001) (listing cases where our supreme court conc

2025See People v. Hart, 214 Ill. 2d 490, 518, 520 (2005) (concluding a Doyle violation was harmless where any potentially improper reference “was brief and isolated, and the prosecutor never revisited that aspect of testimony” (emphasis in original)); People v. Lucas, 132 Ill. 2d 399, 433 (1989) (concluding any Doyle violation was harmless where “the prosecutor made no further reference to the defendant’s request for an attorney and it was not argued as evidence”).

2025See People v. Hart, 214 Ill. 2d 490, 518, 520 (2005) (concluding a Doyle violation was harmless where any potentially improper reference “was brief and isolated, and the prosecutor never revisited that aspect of testimony” (emphasis in original)); People v. Lucas, 132 Ill. 2d 399, 433 (1989) (concluding any Doyle violation was harmless where “the prosecutor made no further reference to the defendant’s request for an attorney and it was not argued as evidence”).

2025See People v. Hart, 214 Ill. 2d 490, 518, 520 (2005) (concluding a Doyle violation was harmless where any potentially improper reference “was brief and isolated, and the prosecutor never revisited that aspect of testimony” (emphasis in original)); People v. Lucas, 132 Ill. 2d 399, 433 (1989) (concluding any Doyle violation was harmless where “the prosecutor made no further reference to the defendant’s request for an attorney and it was not argued as evidence”).

2025See People v. Hart, 214 Ill. 2d 490, 518, 520 (2005) (concluding a Doyle violation was harmless where any potentially improper reference “was brief and isolated, and the prosecutor never revisited that aspect of testimony” (emphasis in original)); People v. Lucas, 132 Ill. 2d 399, 433 (1989) (concluding any Doyle violation was harmless where “the prosecutor made no further reference to the defendant’s request for an attorney and it was not argued as evidence”).

2021The Supreme Court concluded that it would be “fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person’s silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial.” Id. at 618 . ¶ 30 Based on our review of the record, we conclude that we need not determine whether the State’s statements concerning the defendant’s failure to disclose her symptoms or condition on the day of the offense constituted a Doyle violation, because the error, if any, was harmless.

2017We conclude the State’s use of defendant’s post-Miranda statement was not a Doyle violation. ¶ 23 In Doyle, the United States Supreme Court held “the use for impeachment purposes of petitioners’ silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, violate[s] the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 619 .

2019In People v. Herrett , 137 Ill. 2d 195 , 213, 148 Ill.Dec. 695 , 561 N.E.2d 1 (1990), during closing argument, the State asked the jury to consider why, if defendant was *836 *87 innocent, he did not explain as much to the police upon his arrest.

2019In People v. Herrett , 137 Ill. 2d 195 , 213, 148 Ill.Dec. 695 , 561 N.E.2d 1 (1990), during closing argument, the State asked the jury to consider why, if defendant was *836 *87 innocent, he did not explain as much to the police upon his arrest.

1989In People v. Miller (1983), 96 Ill.2d 385 , aff'd (1987), 483 U.S. 756 , 97 L.Ed.2d 618 , 107 S.Ct. 3102 , this court considered the issue of when a Doyle violation does not constitute reversible error.

1989(Miller, 96 Ill. 2d at 396 .) In affirming this court’s decision, the Supreme Court noted that since the defendant’s post-arrest silence was not submitted to the jury as evidence, no Doyle violation had occurred.

2008Ed. 2d 222, 226 , 100 S. Ct. 2180, 2182 (1980) (no Doyle violation where questioning made "no unfair use of silence, because a defendant who voluntarily speaks after receiving Miranda warnings has not been induced to remain silent"); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 241 , 65 L.

2008Ed. 2d 222, 226 , 100 S. Ct. 2180, 2182 (1980) (no Doyle violation where questioning made "no unfair use of silence, because a defendant who voluntarily speaks after receiving Miranda warnings has not been induced to remain silent"); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 241 , 65 L.

1992Ed. 2d 91 , 96 S. Ct. 2240 , and Doyle’s progeny, Wainwright v. Greenfield (1986), 474 U.S. 284 , 88 L.

1992Ed. 2d 91 , 96 S. Ct. 2240 , and Doyle’s progeny, Wainwright v. Greenfield (1986), 474 U.S. 284 , 88 L.

2024See People v. Titone, 115 Ill. 2d 413, 423-24 (1986) (reviewing court did not consider whether a Doyle violation occurred in a bench trial because the trial court “ ‘is presumed to have considered only properly admitted evidence and defendant was not prejudiced’ ” (quoting People v. Eddmonds, 101 Ill. 2d 44, 66 (1984))). ¶ 74 The defendant concedes that ordinarily there is a rebuttable presumption that the trial court knew the law and applied it correctly.

2024See People v. Titone, 115 Ill. 2d 413, 423-24 (1986) (reviewing court did not consider whether a Doyle violation occurred in a bench trial because the trial court “ ‘is presumed to have considered only properly admitted evidence and defendant was not prejudiced’ ” (quoting People v. Eddmonds, 101 Ill. 2d 44, 66 (1984))). ¶ 74 The defendant concedes that ordinarily there is a rebuttable presumption that the trial court knew the law and applied it correctly.

2022He further maintains that trial counsel failed to object to remarks that shifted the burden of proof and remarks that relied on the alleged Doyle violation, where it characterized defendant’s alibi as “made up.” ¶ 150 Under the familiar test outlined in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984), and adopted by our supreme court in Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d at 525, defendant must establish both that trial counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional norms, and a reasonable probability that, but for the unprofessional performance, the outcome would have d

2022He further maintains that trial counsel failed to object to remarks that shifted the burden of proof and remarks that relied on the alleged Doyle violation, where it characterized defendant’s alibi as “made up.” ¶ 150 Under the familiar test outlined in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984), and adopted by our supreme court in Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d at 525, defendant must establish both that trial counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional norms, and a reasonable probability that, but for the unprofessional performance, the outcome would have d

2019Id. ("[I]t is also apparent that the rule they set forth does not depend upon whether the silence sought to be utilized occurred before or after a defendant was given Miranda warnings."). ¶ 20 The Doyle rule has been applied even where impeachment is not at issue.

2019Id. ("[I]t is also apparent that the rule they set forth does not depend upon whether the silence sought to be utilized occurred before or after a defendant was given Miranda warnings."). ¶ 20 The Doyle rule has been applied even where impeachment is not at issue.

2018See People v. Begay, 377 Ill.

2017See People v. Begay , 377 Ill.

2017See id. at 725 , 773 N.E.2d at 779 ; see also Anderson, 447 U.S. at 408 ; People v. Frieberg, 147 Ill. 2d 326, 356 , 589 N.E.2d 508 (1992) (concluding no Doyle violation occurred when the State cross-examined the defendant about omissions in his post-Miranda statement to police where the defendant did not invoke the right to remain silent but omitted significant details to which he testified at trial). ¶ 24 We thus reject defendant’s argument he partially remained silent following receipt of his Miranda warnings.

2017See id. at 725 , 773 N.E.2d at 779 ; see also Anderson, 447 U.S. at 408 ; People v. Frieberg, 147 Ill. 2d 326, 356 , 589 N.E.2d 508 (1992) (concluding no Doyle violation occurred when the State cross-examined the defendant about omissions in his post-Miranda statement to police where the defendant did not invoke the right to remain silent but omitted significant details to which he testified at trial). ¶ 24 We thus reject defendant’s argument he partially remained silent following receipt of his Miranda warnings.

2011See, e.g., People v. Rivera, 227 Ill.2d 1, 26-27 , 316 Ill.Dec. 488 , 879 N.E.2d 876 (2007) (determination of whether the improper denial of defendant's peremptory challenge and violation of Apprendi were harmless beyond *626 a reasonable doubt premised on analysis of whether the defendant's guilt was overwhelming); People v. Hart, 214 Ill.2d 490, 520 , 293 Ill.Dec. 290 , 828 N.E.2d 260 (2005) (determined that a Doyle violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when, among other things, there was strong evidence of defendant's guilt); People v. Cortes, 181 Ill.2d 249, 285-86 , 229 Ill.Dec

2011See, e.g., People v. Rivera, 227 Ill.2d 1, 26-27 , 316 Ill.Dec. 488 , 879 N.E.2d 876 (2007) (determination of whether the improper denial of defendant's peremptory challenge and violation of Apprendi were harmless beyond *626 a reasonable doubt premised on analysis of whether the defendant's guilt was overwhelming); People v. Hart, 214 Ill.2d 490, 520 , 293 Ill.Dec. 290 , 828 N.E.2d 260 (2005) (determined that a Doyle violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when, among other things, there was strong evidence of defendant's guilt); People v. Cortes, 181 Ill.2d 249, 285-86 , 229 Ill.Dec

2011See, e.g., People v. Rivera, 227 Ill.2d 1, 26-27 , 316 Ill.Dec. 488 , 879 N.E.2d 876 (2007) (determination of whether the improper denial of defendant's peremptory challenge and violation of Apprendi were harmless beyond *626 a reasonable doubt premised on analysis of whether the defendant's guilt was overwhelming); People v. Hart, 214 Ill.2d 490, 520 , 293 Ill.Dec. 290 , 828 N.E.2d 260 (2005) (determined that a Doyle violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when, among other things, there was strong evidence of defendant's guilt); People v. Cortes, 181 Ill.2d 249, 285-86 , 229 Ill.Dec

2011See, e.g., People v. Rivera, 227 Ill.2d 1, 26-27 , 316 Ill.Dec. 488 , 879 N.E.2d 876 (2007) (determination of whether the improper denial of defendant's peremptory challenge and violation of Apprendi were harmless beyond *626 a reasonable doubt premised on analysis of whether the defendant's guilt was overwhelming); People v. Hart, 214 Ill.2d 490, 520 , 293 Ill.Dec. 290 , 828 N.E.2d 260 (2005) (determined that a Doyle violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when, among other things, there was strong evidence of defendant's guilt); People v. Cortes, 181 Ill.2d 249, 285-86 , 229 Ill.Dec

2005People v. Mata, 243 Ill.

2005People v. Mata, 243 Ill.

1995Defendant improperly relies on People v. Better (1979), 74 Ill. 2d 514, 521-22 , 386 N.E.2d 857 , which extended the Doyle rule to situations where there is no evidence that the defendant had been given Miranda warnings.

1995Defendant improperly relies on People v. Better (1979), 74 Ill. 2d 514, 521-22 , 386 N.E.2d 857 , which extended the Doyle rule to situations where there is no evidence that the defendant had been given Miranda warnings.

1983Ed. 2d 490, 494 , 102 S. Ct. 1309, 1312 , for the proposition that, where a defendant does not receive Miranda warnings, it does not violate “due process of law for a State to permit cross-examination as to postarrest silence when a defendant chooses to take the stand.” The defendant relies on People v. Beller (1979), 74 Ill. 2d 514 , in which this court determined that the Doyle rule, prohibiting comment on a defendant’s post-arrest silence, is applicable whether or not Miranda warnings have been given.

1983Ed. 2d 490, 494 , 102 S. Ct. 1309, 1312 , for the proposition that, where a defendant does not receive Miranda warnings, it does not violate “due process of law for a State to permit cross-examination as to postarrest silence when a defendant chooses to take the stand.” The defendant relies on People v. Beller (1979), 74 Ill. 2d 514 , in which this court determined that the Doyle rule, prohibiting comment on a defendant’s post-arrest silence, is applicable whether or not Miranda warnings have been given.

2010App. 3d 487, 493 , 557 N.E.2d 378, 382 (1990); see also People v. Frieberg, 147 Ill. 2d 326, 355-56 , 589 N.E.2d 508, 521-22 (1992) (concluding that no Doyle violation occurred where defendant’s post -Miranda statement to police was “markedly different,” including the omission of significant details, from his testimony at trial).

1994(See Ridley, 199 Ill.