Doyle violation in Missouri

2020If a Doyle violation is found, courts have “discretion to review the violation or violations in the context of the entire record.” Brooks, 304 S.W.3d at 137 .

2020If a Doyle violation is found, courts have “discretion to review the violation or violations in the context of the entire record.” Brooks, 304 S.W.3d at 137 .

2023When reviewing an alleged Doyle violation for plain-error review, “the essential predicate . . . is to first determine that a Doyle violation occurred.” State v. Seaton, 628 S.W.3d 424 , 430 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (citing State v. Dexter, 954 S.W.2d 332, 340 (Mo. banc 1997)).

2023When reviewing an alleged Doyle violation for plain-error review, “the essential predicate . . . is to first determine that a Doyle violation occurred.” State v. Seaton, 628 S.W.3d 424 , 430 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (citing State v. Dexter, 954 S.W.2d 332, 340 (Mo. banc 1997)).

2016See State v. Frazier, 927 S.W.2d 378, 382 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996) (finding no manifest injustice arising from a Doyle violation were the defendant's guilt of first degree tampering was otherwise clear because it was supported by evidence that someone saw the defendant driving the car shortly after it was stolen).

2016See State v. Frazier, 927 S.W.2d 378, 382 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996) (finding no manifest injustice arising from a Doyle violation were the defendant's guilt of first degree tampering was otherwise clear because it was supported by evidence that someone saw the defendant driving the car shortly after it was stolen).

2003“It is well established that a defendant’s post-arrest silence or language representing silence cannot be used as evidence to incriminate him.” State v. Frazier, 927 S.W.2d 378, 379 [4] (Mo.App.1996) (citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976)). ‘men analyzing a Doyle violation claim, courts must ‘treat a defendant’s invocation of his Miranda rights not as a statement, but as post-Miranda warnings silence.’ ” State v. Dexter, 954 S.W.2d 332, 338 (Mo.banc 1997) (quoting Fields v. Leapley, 30 F.3d 986, 990 (8th Cir.1994)).

2003“It is well established that a defendant’s post-arrest silence or language representing silence cannot be used as evidence to incriminate him.” State v. Frazier, 927 S.W.2d 378, 379 [4] (Mo.App.1996) (citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976)). ‘men analyzing a Doyle violation claim, courts must ‘treat a defendant’s invocation of his Miranda rights not as a statement, but as post-Miranda warnings silence.’ ” State v. Dexter, 954 S.W.2d 332, 338 (Mo.banc 1997) (quoting Fields v. Leapley, 30 F.3d 986, 990 (8th Cir.1994)).

2021It is true, as Seaton notes, that the Missouri Supreme Court has identified four factors that are relevant to determining the prejudicial effect of a Doyle violation on direct appeal, namely: "(1) whether the government made repeated Doyle violations, (2) whether any curative effort was made by the trial court, (3) whether the defendant's exculpatory evidence is transparently frivolous, and (4) whether the other evidence of the defendant's guilt is otherwise overwhelming." State v. Dexter, 954 S.W.2d 332, 340 (Mo. banc 1997) (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 639 (1993)).4 But the ess

2021It is true, as Seaton notes, that the Missouri Supreme Court has identified four factors that are relevant to determining the prejudicial effect of a Doyle violation on direct appeal, namely: "(1) whether the government made repeated Doyle violations, (2) whether any curative effort was made by the trial court, (3) whether the defendant's exculpatory evidence is transparently frivolous, and (4) whether the other evidence of the defendant's guilt is otherwise overwhelming." State v. Dexter, 954 S.W.2d 332, 340 (Mo. banc 1997) (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 639 (1993)).4 But the ess

2025See State v. Shockley, 410 S.W.3d 179, 194 (Mo. banc 2013); State v. Watson, 391 S.W.3d 18, 23 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012).

2025See State v. Shockley, 410 S.W.3d 179, 194 (Mo. banc 2013); State v. Watson, 391 S.W.3d 18, 23 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012).

2025See State v. Shockley, 410 S.W.3d 179, 194 (Mo. banc 2013); State v. Watson, 391 S.W.3d 18, 23 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012).

2025See State v. Shockley, 410 S.W.3d 179, 194 (Mo. banc 2013); State v. Watson, 391 S.W.3d 18, 23 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012).

2025State v. Billings, 522 S.W.3d 276, 282 (Mo. App. S.D. 2016).

2025State v. Billings, 522 S.W.3d 276, 282 (Mo. App. S.D. 2016).

2023See id.

2023See State v. Gott, 523 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Mo. App. S.D. 2017) (noting the State does not commit a Doyle violation by rebutting an argument to which the defendant opened the door).

2023See State v. Gott, 523 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Mo. App. S.D. 2017) (noting the State does not commit a Doyle violation by rebutting an argument to which the defendant opened the door).

2023State v. Rice, 573 S.W.3d 53, 74 (Mo. banc 2019) (internal quotation omitted).

2023State v. Rice, 573 S.W.3d 53, 74 (Mo. banc 2019) (internal quotation omitted).

2021Seaton concedes that on direct appeal, his plain error claim that the State committed a Doyle violation by playing Seaton's video interview was rejected because this Court found Seaton suffered no manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice sufficient to warrant a finding of prejudicial error. [Appellant's Brief, p. 24, n. 1] Seaton attempts to distance himself from this holding by citing to Deck v. State, 68 S.W.3d 418, 426 (Mo. banc 2002), which held that Strickland's prejudice standard requiring a reasonable probability that but for trial counsel's errors, the result of a proceeding would

2021Seaton concedes that on direct appeal, his plain error claim that the State committed a Doyle violation by playing Seaton's video interview was rejected because this Court found Seaton suffered no manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice sufficient to warrant a finding of prejudicial error. [Appellant's Brief, p. 24, n. 1] Seaton attempts to distance himself from this holding by citing to Deck v. State, 68 S.W.3d 418, 426 (Mo. banc 2002), which held that Strickland's prejudice standard requiring a reasonable probability that but for trial counsel's errors, the result of a proceeding would

2020“It is well established that the State may not use a defendant’s post-arrest silence, or language representing silence, to incriminate the defendant.” State v. Mason, 420 S.W.3d 632, 638 (Mo. App. S.D. 2013). “‘Silence’ extends to a defendant’s request for counsel.” Id. 8 As a preliminary matter, we are unconvinced of Appellant’s assertion a Doyle violation occurred.

2020“It is well established that the State may not use a defendant’s post-arrest silence, or language representing silence, to incriminate the defendant.” State v. Mason, 420 S.W.3d 632, 638 (Mo. App. S.D. 2013). “‘Silence’ extends to a defendant’s request for counsel.” Id. 8 As a preliminary matter, we are unconvinced of Appellant’s assertion a Doyle violation occurred.

2020Having determined that it was a violation of Ellmaker’s constitutional rights to allow Campbell to testify about Ellmaker’s exercise of his right against self-incrimination as substantive evidence of his guilt, the burden shifts to the State to prove that this “federal 17 In affirming the denial of Ervin’s subsequent habeas claim, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit noted that “the crux of a Doyle violation is whether the state was permitted to make specific inquiries or arguments about a defendant’s post-Miranda silence as a way to infer guilt.” Ervin v. Bowersox, 892 F.

2020See State v. Starks, 470 S.W.3d 410, 413 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015) (“To preserve an allegation of error for appellate review, an objection stating the grounds must be made at trial, that same objection must be set out in the motion for new trial, and the objection must be carried forward in the appellate brief.”).

2020State v. Stites, 266 S.W.3d 261, 267 (Mo. App. S.D. 2008).

2020State v. Stites, 266 S.W.3d 261, 267 (Mo. App. S.D. 2008).

2020Having determined that it was a violation of Ellmaker’s constitutional rights to allow Campbell to testify about Ellmaker’s exercise of his right against self-incrimination as substantive evidence of his guilt, the burden shifts to the State to prove that this “federal 17 In affirming the denial of Ervin’s subsequent habeas claim, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit noted that “the crux of a Doyle violation is whether the state was permitted to make specific inquiries or arguments about a defendant’s post-Miranda silence as a way to infer guilt.” Ervin v. Bowersox, 892 F.

2017See State v. White, 941 S.W.2d 575, 580-81 (Mo. App. 1997) (holding evidence of a defendant’s post-arrest silence was admissible to rebut the defendant’s claim that she was denied an opportunity to tell police her alibi defense when the police left the room following an obscene outburst from defendant); State v. Henderson, 724 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Mo. App. 1986) (State’s closing argument that the defendant would not speak with police when asked was.not an improper reference to post-arrest silence, but a comment on the inconsistencies between the evidence and the defendant’s opening statement that

2017See State v. White, 941 S.W.2d 575, 580-81 (Mo. App. 1997) (holding evidence of a defendant’s post-arrest silence was admissible to rebut the defendant’s claim that she was denied an opportunity to tell police her alibi defense when the police left the room following an obscene outburst from defendant); State v. Henderson, 724 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Mo. App. 1986) (State’s closing argument that the defendant would not speak with police when asked was.not an improper reference to post-arrest silence, but a comment on the inconsistencies between the evidence and the defendant’s opening statement that

2016See State v. Wessel, 993 S.W.2d 573, 576 (Mo. App. E.D. 1999).

2016See State v. Wessel, 993 S.W.2d 573, 576 (Mo. App. E.D. 1999).

2016In the context of an alleged Doyle violation, "the factors used in an analysis of a preserved error violation pursuant to the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable[-]doubt standard are the same as those used to determine whether a non-preserved violation is plain error resulting in manifest injustice." State v. Jones, 7 S.W.3d 413, 418 (Mo. 10 App. E.D. 1999).

2016In the context of an alleged Doyle violation, "the factors used in an analysis of a preserved error violation pursuant to the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable[-]doubt standard are the same as those used to determine whether a non-preserved violation is plain error resulting in manifest injustice." State v. Jones, 7 S.W.3d 413, 418 (Mo. 10 App. E.D. 1999).

2011We do not believe that the prosecutor’s comment during closing argument, comprising three lines in a transcript of over 850 pages, deprived Cornelious of a fair trial, particularly when it “was isolated and brief, and was not emphasized by the prosecutor.” State v. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d 831, 851 (Mo. banc 1998).

2011We do not believe that the prosecutor’s comment during closing argument, comprising three lines in a transcript of over 850 pages, deprived Cornelious of a fair trial, particularly when it “was isolated and brief, and was not emphasized by the prosecutor.” State v. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d 831, 851 (Mo. banc 1998).

2011Because there was no Doyle violation, there was no basis for counsel to assert an objection to the questions or the closing argument references. “[T]rial counsel is not ineffective for failing to make non-meritorious objections.” Zink v. State, 278 S.W.3d 170, 188 (Mo. banc 2009) (internal quotation omitted).