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13 California opinions name it 3 courts 1946–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Mowergreen2 sentences2015(Mower, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 480 .) “The most prominent [such defense] is the defense of entrapment[] [citation] . . . 6 [which] „is not based on the defendant‟s innocence . . . [but rather is designed] . . . as a control on illegal police conduct “out of regard for [the court‟s] own dignity, and in the exercise of its power and the performance of its duty to formulate and apply proper standards for judicial enforcement of the criminal law.”‟ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Since such a defense does not negate any element of the crime in question, and is in place for policy considerations apart from a 2015(Mower, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 480 .) “The most prominent [such defense] is the defense of entrapment . . . [citation] ‘. . . [which] is not based on the defendant’s innocence . . . [but rather is designed] ... as a control on illegal police conduct “out of regard for [the court’s] own dignity, and in the exercise of its power and the performance of its duty to formulate and apply proper standards for judicial enforcement of the criminal law.” ’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Since such a defense does not negate any element of the crime in question, and is in place for policy considerations apart from | 1 | 4 |
People v. Neidingergreen2 sentences2015(See ibid.; Neidinger, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 76 .) Mower held a defendant need only prove the defense in its case—obtaining or using marijuana for medical purposes upon the recommendation of a physician (Health & Saf. 2015(See ibid.; Neidinger, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 76.) Mower held a defendant need only prove the defense in its case — obtaining or using marijuana for medical purposes upon the recommendation of a physician (Health & Saf. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Dennisgreen1 sentence2021(See People v. Dennis, supra, 177 Cal.App.3d at p. 873 [“Since the burden is upon the defendant to prove his claim of ineffectiveness of counsel, the choice whether to present evidence or to remain silent is also his. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Adriangreen2 sentences2007(People v. Tewksbury (1976) 15 Cal.3d 953, 963-964 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 135 , 544 P.2d *571 1335]; People v. Adrian (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 335, 340-342 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 506 ]; People v. Noble (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 184, 189 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 918 ]; see also People v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 479-480 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326 , 49 P.3d 1067 ].) In contrast, when the defense does not directly concern an element of the crime but exonerates the defendant as a matter of public policy, there is no constitutional impediment to requiring the defendant to prove the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. 2007(People v. Tewksbury (1976) 15 Cal.3d 953, 963-964 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 135 , 544 P.2d *571 1335]; People v. Adrian (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 335, 340-342 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 506 ]; People v. Noble (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 184, 189 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 918 ]; see also People v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 479-480 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326 , 49 P.3d 1067 ].) In contrast, when the defense does not directly concern an element of the crime but exonerates the defendant as a matter of public policy, there is no constitutional impediment to requiring the defendant to prove the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Noblegreen2 sentences2007(People v. Tewksbury (1976) 15 Cal.3d 953, 963-964 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 135 , 544 P.2d *571 1335]; People v. Adrian (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 335, 340-342 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 506 ]; People v. Noble (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 184, 189 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 918 ]; see also People v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 479-480 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326 , 49 P.3d 1067 ].) In contrast, when the defense does not directly concern an element of the crime but exonerates the defendant as a matter of public policy, there is no constitutional impediment to requiring the defendant to prove the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. 2007(People v. Tewksbury (1976) 15 Cal.3d 953, 963-964 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 135 , 544 P.2d *571 1335]; People v. Adrian (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 335, 340-342 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 506 ]; People v. Noble (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 184, 189 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 918 ]; see also People v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 479-480 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326 , 49 P.3d 1067 ].) In contrast, when the defense does not directly concern an element of the crime but exonerates the defendant as a matter of public policy, there is no constitutional impediment to requiring the defendant to prove the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Condleygreen2 sentences2007(See People v. Tewksbury, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 964 [defendant must prove entrapment defense]; People v. Condley (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 999, 1009-1013 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 515 ] [defendant must prove necessity defense for offense of escape from prison].) Typically, the prosecution has the burden to prove a defendant did not act in self-defense, because self-defense negates an element of the offense. 2007(See People v. Tewksbury, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 964 [defendant must prove entrapment defense]; People v. Condley (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 999, 1009-1013 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 515 ] [defendant must prove necessity defense for offense of escape from prison].) Typically, the prosecution has the burden to prove a defendant did not act in self-defense, because self-defense negates an element of the offense. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Tewksburygreen2 sentences2007(People v. Tewksbury (1976) 15 Cal.3d 953, 963-964 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 135 , 544 P.2d *571 1335]; People v. Adrian (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 335, 340-342 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 506 ]; People v. Noble (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 184, 189 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 918 ]; see also People v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 479-480 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326 , 49 P.3d 1067 ].) In contrast, when the defense does not directly concern an element of the crime but exonerates the defendant as a matter of public policy, there is no constitutional impediment to requiring the defendant to prove the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. 2007(People v. Tewksbury (1976) 15 Cal.3d 953, 963-964 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 135 , 544 P.2d *571 1335]; People v. Adrian (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 335, 340-342 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 506 ]; People v. Noble (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 184, 189 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 918 ]; see also People v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 479-480 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326 , 49 P.3d 1067 ].) In contrast, when the defense does not directly concern an element of the crime but exonerates the defendant as a matter of public policy, there is no constitutional impediment to requiring the defendant to prove the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. | 1 | 1 |
Haft v. Lone Palm Hotelgreen2 sentences2003(Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel (1970) 3 Cal.3d 756, 772 [ 91 Cal.Rptr. 745 , 478 P.2d 465 ].) Similarly, in design defect cases, the plaintiff must produce evidence that his or her injury was caused by the design of the product, before the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to prove the design of the product was not defective. 2003(Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel (1970) 3 Cal.3d 756, 772 [ 91 Cal.Rptr. 745 , 478 P.2d 465 ].) Similarly, in design defect cases, the plaintiff must produce evidence that his or her injury was caused by the design of the product, before the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to prove the design of the product was not defective. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hutchinsongreen2 sentences1992(People v. Hutchinson (1969) 71 Cal.2d 342, 349-350 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 196 , 455 P.2d 132 ]; see Evid. 1992(People v. Hutchinson (1969) 71 Cal.2d 342, 349-350 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 196 , 455 P.2d 132 ]; see Evid. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Graygreen2 sentences1986(In re Gray (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 614, 616 [ 176 Cal.Rptr. 721 ].) Since the burden is upon the defendant to prove his claim of ineffectiveness of counsel, the choice whether to present evidence or to remain silent is also his. 1986(In re Gray (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 614, 616 [ 176 Cal.Rptr. 721 ].) Since the burden is upon the defendant to prove his claim of ineffectiveness of counsel, the choice whether to present evidence or to remain silent is also his. | 1 | 1 |
Consolidated Reservoir & Power Co. v. Scarboroughgreen2 sentences1946Co. v. Wood, 113 Cal. 482, 486 [ 45 P. 809 ] ; Consolidated R. & P. Co. v. Scarborough, 216 Cal. 698, 702 [ 16 P.2d 268 ].) While the statute of limitations ordinarily is an affirmative defense and the burden rests on the defendant to prove such defense, yet in an action for fraud which is commenced more than three years after it occurred the burden is not on the defendant to show that knowledge of the facts was brought home to the plaintiff but is ■ on the plaintiff to prove that he did not discover the facts constituting the fraud within three years prior to the commencement of the action; a 1946Co. v. Wood, 113 Cal. 482, 486 [ 45 P. 809 ] ; Consolidated R. & P. Co. v. Scarborough, 216 Cal. 698, 702 [ 16 P.2d 268 ].) While the statute of limitations ordinarily is an affirmative defense and the burden rests on the defendant to prove such defense, yet in an action for fraud which is commenced more than three years after it occurred the burden is not on the defendant to show that knowledge of the facts was brought home to the plaintiff but is ■ on the plaintiff to prove that he did not discover the facts constituting the fraud within three years prior to the commencement of the action; a | 1 | 1 |
Lady Washington Consolidated Co. v. Woodgreen2 sentences1946Co. v. Wood, 113 Cal. 482, 486 [ 45 P. 809 ] ; Consolidated R. & P. Co. v. Scarborough, 216 Cal. 698, 702 [ 16 P.2d 268 ].) While the statute of limitations ordinarily is an affirmative defense and the burden rests on the defendant to prove such defense, yet in an action for fraud which is commenced more than three years after it occurred the burden is not on the defendant to show that knowledge of the facts was brought home to the plaintiff but is ■ on the plaintiff to prove that he did not discover the facts constituting the fraud within three years prior to the commencement of the action; a 1946Co. v. Wood, 113 Cal. 482, 486 [ 45 P. 809 ] ; Consolidated R. & P. Co. v. Scarborough, 216 Cal. 698, 702 [ 16 P.2d 268 ].) While the statute of limitations ordinarily is an affirmative defense and the burden rests on the defendant to prove such defense, yet in an action for fraud which is commenced more than three years after it occurred the burden is not on the defendant to show that knowledge of the facts was brought home to the plaintiff but is ■ on the plaintiff to prove that he did not discover the facts constituting the fraud within three years prior to the commencement of the action; a | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Simmons
green
1 sentence2025(See generally Quintero, at p. 1060 [addressing the merits of RJA claim as a claim of ineffective assistance notwithstanding forfeiture by trial counsel’s failure to object]; People v. Simmons (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 323 , 336 [same].) Even if we had the legal authority to consider claims under the RJA as part of this appeal, subdivision (a) of section 745 places the burden on a defendant to prove a violation by a preponderance of the evidence. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
National Council Against Health Fraud, Inc. v. King Bio Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
green
2 sentences2016CACI 420 is a correct statement of the law. "[I]n negligence per se actions, the plaintiff must produce evidence of a violation of a statute and a substantial probability that the plaintiff's injury was caused by the violation of the statute before the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to prove the violation of the statute did not cause the plaintiff's injury. [Citation.]" ( National Council Against Health Fraud, Inc. v. King Bio Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1336 , 1347, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 207 .) Appellant argues that the instruction on negligence per se was confusing becaus 2016CACI 420 is a correct statement of the law. "[I]n negligence per se actions, the plaintiff must produce evidence of a violation of a statute and a substantial probability that the plaintiff's injury was caused by the violation of the statute before the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to prove the violation of the statute did not cause the plaintiff's injury. [Citation.]" ( National Council Against Health Fraud, Inc. v. King Bio Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1336 , 1347, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 207 .) Appellant argues that the instruction on negligence per se was confusing becaus | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Galanek v. Wismar
green
1 sentence2003(Galanek v. Wismar, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 1427 .) As another example, in negligence per se actions, the plaintiff must produce evidence of a violation of a statute and a substantial probability that the plaintiffs injury was caused by the violation of the statute before the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to prove the violation of the statute did not cause the plaintiffs injury. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Martin v. Ohio
green
2 sentences1990The statute was found consistent with due process in Martin v. Ohio (1987) 480 U.S. 228 [ 94 L.Ed.2d 267 , 107 S.Ct. 1098 ], Martin distinguished In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 368 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , which “declared that the Due Process Clause ‘protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.’ ” (Martin v. Ohio, supra, at pp. 231-232 [ 94 L.Ed.2d at p. 273 ].) Similarly, In re Winship is inapposite here. 1990The statute was found consistent with due process in Martin v. Ohio (1987) 480 U.S. 228 [ 94 L.Ed.2d 267 , 107 S.Ct. 1098 ], Martin distinguished In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 368 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , which “declared that the Due Process Clause ‘protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.’ ” (Martin v. Ohio, supra, at pp. 231-232 [ 94 L.Ed.2d at p. 273 ].) Similarly, In re Winship is inapposite here. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
In Re WINSHIP
green
2 sentences1990The statute was found consistent with due process in Martin v. Ohio (1987) 480 U.S. 228 [ 94 L.Ed.2d 267 , 107 S.Ct. 1098 ], Martin distinguished In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 368 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , which “declared that the Due Process Clause ‘protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.’ ” (Martin v. Ohio, supra, at pp. 231-232 [ 94 L.Ed.2d at p. 273 ].) Similarly, In re Winship is inapposite here. 1990The statute was found consistent with due process in Martin v. Ohio (1987) 480 U.S. 228 [ 94 L.Ed.2d 267 , 107 S.Ct. 1098 ], Martin distinguished In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 368 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , which “declared that the Due Process Clause ‘protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.’ ” (Martin v. Ohio, supra, at pp. 231-232 [ 94 L.Ed.2d at p. 273 ].) Similarly, In re Winship is inapposite here. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
People v. Costello
green
2 sentences1953(People v. Costello, 21 Cal.2d 760 [ 135 P.2d 164 ]; People v. Marshall, 59 Cal. 386 ; People v. Agnew, 16 Cal.2d 655 [ 107 P.2d 601 ].) Moreover, this erroneous statement of the law was given special emphasis in the argument to the jury. 1953(People v. Costello, 21 Cal.2d 760 [ 135 P.2d 164 ]; People v. Marshall, 59 Cal. 386 ; People v. Agnew, 16 Cal.2d 655 [ 107 P.2d 601 ].) Moreover, this erroneous statement of the law was given special emphasis in the argument to the jury. | 1 | 1953–1953 |
People v. Marshall
green
1 sentence1953(People v. Costello, 21 Cal.2d 760 [ 135 P.2d 164 ]; People v. Marshall, 59 Cal. 386 ; People v. Agnew, 16 Cal.2d 655 [ 107 P.2d 601 ].) Moreover, this erroneous statement of the law was given special emphasis in the argument to the jury. | 1 | 1953–1953 |
People v. Agnew
green
2 sentences1953(People v. Costello, 21 Cal.2d 760 [ 135 P.2d 164 ]; People v. Marshall, 59 Cal. 386 ; People v. Agnew, 16 Cal.2d 655 [ 107 P.2d 601 ].) Moreover, this erroneous statement of the law was given special emphasis in the argument to the jury. 1953(People v. Costello, 21 Cal.2d 760 [ 135 P.2d 164 ]; People v. Marshall, 59 Cal. 386 ; People v. Agnew, 16 Cal.2d 655 [ 107 P.2d 601 ].) Moreover, this erroneous statement of the law was given special emphasis in the argument to the jury. | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.