legal sufficiency challenge in Texas

2026Sufficiency of Evidence A. Standard of Review “In a legal sufficiency challenge, we consider whether the evidence at trial would enable a reasonable and fair-minded fact finder to reach the verdict under review.” Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 658 (Tex. 2018) (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005)).

2025Standard of Review and Applicable Law “We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for JNOV under a legal-sufficiency standard.” Katy Int’l, Inc. v. Jinchun Jiang, 451 S.W.3d 74, 82 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 823 (Tex. 2005)).

2026We use the same legal sufficiency standard that we use in criminal cases: “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 11 the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Stoddard, 619 S.W.3d at 674–75 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).

2026A. Standard of Review We apply the legal sufficiency standard set out in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.

2026“A no-evidence summary judgment is essentially a pretrial directed verdict, and we apply the same legal sufficiency standard in reviewing a no-evidence summary judgment as we apply in reviewing a directed verdict.” King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742 , 750–51 (Tex. 2003); Heirs of Del Real v. Eason, 374 S.W.3d 483, 486 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2012, no pet.).

2026Standard of Review and Applicable Law A no-evidence summary judgment is “essentially a pretrial directed verdict, and we apply the same legal sufficiency standard in reviewing such a summary judgment as we apply in reviewing a directed verdict.” King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742 , 750–51 (Tex. 2003).

2017See, e.g., Maynard v. Booth, 421 S.W.3d 182, 183 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied) (construing appellant’s sufficiency issue as only a legal-sufficiency challenge because appellant requested court render judgment in her favor and did not request, in the alternative, a remand for a new trial). 13 Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328, 334 (Tex. 1998).

2016A legal sufficiency challenge to a family violence protective order may be sustained only when “(1) the record discloses a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; (2) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla; or (4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of the vital fact.” In re Frasure, No. 05- –4– 13-01667-CV, 2015 WL 459223 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 4, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Uniroyal Goodrich Tir

2025This is because factual sufficiency was done viewing the evidence in a “neutral” light, which was in conflict with, and yielded to, deference to the role of the fact-finder: “the required deference to jury determinations of weight and credibility” required the “‘eliminat[ion of] . . . viewing the evidence in a ‘neutral light’ component of a factual-sufficiency standard,’ rendering it ‘indistinguishable’ from the legal-sufficiency standard.” Id. (quoting Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 902 ).

2025This is because factual sufficiency was done viewing the evidence in a “neutral” light, which was in conflict with, and yielded to, deference to the role of the fact-finder: “the required deference to jury determinations of weight and credibility” required the “‘eliminat[ion of] . . . viewing the evidence in a ‘neutral light’ component of a factual-sufficiency standard,’ rendering it ‘indistinguishable’ from the legal-sufficiency standard.” Id. (quoting Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 902 ).

2009Standards of Review “The standard for reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Young v. State, 242 S.W.3d 192, 197 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2007, no pet.) (referencing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 320 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Johnson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex.Crim.App.1993)).

2009“The standard for reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Young v. State, 242 S.W.3d 192, 197 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2007, no pet.) (referencing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 320 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Johnson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex.Crim.App.1993)).

2003P. 166a(i); Moore v. K Mart Corp., 981 S.W.2d 266, 269 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied); Jackson v. Fiesta Mart, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 68, 71 (Tex.App.Austin 1998, no pet.). *132 A no-evidence summary judgment is essentially a pretrial directed verdict, and we apply the same legal sufficiency standard in reviewing a no-evidence summary judgment as we apply in reviewing a directed verdict.

2003Thus, Aa no- evidence summary judgment is essentially a pretrial directed verdict, and we apply the same legal sufficiency standard in reviewing a no-evidence summary judgment as we apply in reviewing a directed verdict.@ Jackson v. Fiesta Mart, 979 S.W.2d 68, 70 (Tex. App.CAustin 1998, no pet.) (citing Moore v. K Mart Corp., 981 S.W.2d 266, 269 (Tex. App.CSan Antonio 1998, pet. denied)).

2016Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778 ; Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex.Crim.App.2007); King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 565 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (en banc).

2015Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778 ; Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex.Crim.App.2007); King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 565 (Tex.Crim.App.2000).

2014Wesbrook, 29 S.W.3d at 111 .

2014Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tex. Crim.

2015However, in a factual sufficiency analysis, all the evidence is viewed without the prism of “in the light most favorable to the prosecution as in a legal sufficiency challenge.” Id. at 129 ; Hitt v. State, 53 S.W.3d 697, 709 (Tex.App.-Austin 2001, pet. ref'd).

2011Compare Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 131 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (agreeing with Judge Clinton's historical analysis of the Court of Criminal Appeals’s power to reverse a judgment for factual insufficiency), overruled by Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 894-912 ; id., 323 S.W.3d at 912-26 , and Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 137-43 (Clinton, J., concurring) (stating that Court of Criminal Appeals reversed convictions during this period based on factual insufficiency of the evidence), with Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 907 (stating that from the time that Texas was a republic in the 1830s until Clewis was decided in 1996,

2025A legal sufficiency challenge “will be sustained when (a) there is a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact, (b) 3 The record is not clear as to how the trial court arrived at the final damages amount, but we surmise that it represents some sort of an aggregation of the jury damage findings and some application of the proportionate responsibility. -4- 04-24-00184-CV the court is barred from rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (c) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or (d) the evidence

2025A legal sufficiency challenge “will be sustained when (a) there is a complete absence of evidence 6 of a vital fact, (b) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (c) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a scintilla, or (d) the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact.” Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P. v. Nat’l Dev. & Research Corp., 299 S.W.3d 106, 115 (Tex. 2009) (quoting Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997)).

2012APPLICABLE LAW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW “A no-evidence summary judgment is equivalent to a pretrial directed verdict and, in reviewing the granting of a no-evidence summary judgment, this Court applies the same legal sufficiency standard as applied in reviewing directed verdicts.” Zapata v. Children’s Clinic, 997 S.W.2d 745, 747 (Tex. App—Corpus Christi 1999, pet. denied) (citing Moore v. K Mart Corp., 981 S.W.2d 266, 269 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied)).

2005The San Antonio Court of Appeals states the applicable standard of review for no-evidence summary judgments as follows: “ ‘A no-evidence summary judgment is essentially a pretrial directed verdict,’ and we apply the same legal sufficiency standard in reviewing a no-evidence summary judgment as we apply in reviewing a directed verdict.” Moore v. K Mart Corp., 981 S.W.2d 266, 269 (Tex.App.-San Antonio1998, pet. denied); see also Hon.

2010In arguing his second issue, Gloede’s brief states we should review his issue based on a legal sufficiency standard, but he then references Johnson v. State, in which the Court of Criminal Appeals discusses how a factual sufficiency standard that is used in civil cases applies in criminal cases. 23 S.W.3d 1, 11-12 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (explaining the application of a criminal factual sufficiency standard), overruled by Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912-13 (Tex.Crim.App.2010).

2010Although less deferential than the legal sufficiency standard, a factual sufficiency review must still “employ appropriate deference to prevent an appellate court from substituting its judgment for that of the fact finder, and any evaluation should not substantially intrude upon the fact finder’s role as the sole judge of the weight and credibility given to witness testimony.” Johnson , 23 S.W.3d at 7 ; Marines v. State , 292 S.W.3d 103, 107 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. ref’d).

2025In cases requiring clear and convincing evidence, the evidence must be such that “a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the matter on which the State bears the burden of proof.” 63 Here, the court of appeals held that some evidence exists to show that Stary committed felony level family violence warranting a protective order lasting longer than two years. 64 What is not apparent is whether the trial court would have prohibited Stary from seeing or 62 See 695 S.W.3d at 430 (“If more than a mere scintilla of evidence exists, we will overrule the legal

2025In reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge, we must decide whether “a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.” In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726 , 741 (Tex. 2022) (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002)).

2023“A legal sufficiency challenge fails if more than a scintilla of –12– evidence supports the finding.” Texas Outfitters Ltd., LLC, 572 S.W.3d at 653 (citing Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 48 (Tex. 1998)).

2022“If more than a scintilla of evidence exists to support the finding, the legal sufficiency challenge fails.” Id.; see Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 48 (Tex. 1998); see also King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003) (more than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence “rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions”).

2025ANALYSIS A. Standard of review In a legal sufficiency challenge, “we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational juror could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim.

2018“Under the legal sufficiency standard, we must review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to decide whether . . . a rational jury could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Hines, 383 S.W.3d at 623 ; see also Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim.

2018King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 750-51 (Tex. 2003); Roth v. FFP Operating Partners, 994 S.W.2d 190, 195 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1999, pet denied.); Jackson v. Fiesta Mart, Inc. 979 S.W.2d 68, 70 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.).

2001P. 166a, Notes and Comments; Roth v. FFP Operating Partners, 994 S.W.2d 190,195 (Tex.App.--Amarillo 1999, pet. denied). 11 Because a no-evidence summary judgment is essentially a pretrial directed verdict, we apply the same legal sufficiency standard in reviewing a no-evidence summary judgment as we apply in reviewing a directed verdict.

2021Therefore, we apply the same legal sufficiency standard in reviewing a no-evidence summary judgment as we apply in reviewing a directed verdict.” Seidler v. Morgan, 277 S.W.3d 549, 552 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, pet. denied) (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 92 S.W.3d 502, 506 (Tex. 2002)).

2021Therefore, we apply the same legal sufficiency standard in reviewing a no-evidence summary judgment as we apply in reviewing a directed verdict.” Clayton v. Walmart Inc., No. 06-20-00035-CV, 2020 WL 7268585 , at *1 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Dec. 11, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting Padron v. Catholic Diocese, No. 06-19-00087-CV, 2019 WL 1548637 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Apr. 10, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.)) (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 92 S.W.3d 502, 506 (Tex. 2002)).

2016We may sustain a legal sufficiency challenge only when (1) the record discloses a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact, (2) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or (4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of a vital fact.2 In determining whether there is legally sufficient evidence to support the finding under review, we must consider evidence favorable to the finding if a 2 See Ford Motor Co. v. Castillo, 44

2015“A legal sufficiency challenge will be sustained when the record confirms either: (a) complete absence of a vital fact; (b) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (c) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla; or (d) the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact.” Ford Motor Co. v. Castillo, 444 S.W.3d 616, 620 (Tex. 2014) (citing Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 819 ).

2024“Proof other than expert testimony will constitute some evidence of causation”—i.e., enough to withstand a legal sufficiency challenge—“only when a layperson’s general experience and common understanding would enable the layperson to determine from the evidence, with reasonable probability, the causal relationship between the event and the condition.” Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 583 (Tex. 2006); see Jelinek v. Casas, 328 S.W.3d 526, 533 (Tex. 2010).

2015Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985). 58615585 12 Because a no-evidence summary judgment motion is essentially a motion for a pretrial directed verdict (Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 581-82 (Tex. 2006)), the Court applies the same legal-sufficiency standard of review that applies when reviewing a directed verdict.

2026Id. (citing Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. 2013)). 13 “We review no-evidence motions under the same legal sufficiency standard as a directed verdict.” Painter v. Amerimex Drilling I, Ltd., 561 S.W.3d 125, 130 (Tex. 2018) (citation omitted).

2020“No-evidence summary judgments are reviewed under the same legal sufficiency standard as directed verdicts.” Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at 248 (citing King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. 2003)).

2026Sufficiency of Evidence A. Standard of Review “In a legal sufficiency challenge, we consider whether the evidence at trial would enable a reasonable and fair-minded fact finder to reach the verdict under review.” Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 658 (Tex. 2018) (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005)).

2025A. Standards of Review “In a legal sufficiency challenge, we consider whether the evidence at trial would enable a reasonable and fair-minded fact finder to reach the verdict under review.” Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 658 (Tex. 2018) (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005)).

2019“If there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the finding, the legal sufficiency challenge fails.” Tischler, 505 S.W.3d at 76 (citing BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002)). - 27 - 04-16-00593-CV “When a party attacks the factual sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue on which [he] has the burden of proof, [he] must demonstrate on appeal that the adverse finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.” Dow Chem.

2019If there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the implied finding, the legal sufficiency challenge fails. –4– BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 795 .

2025Temple v. State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 360 (Tex. Crim.

2024Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979); Temple v. State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 360 (Tex. Crim.

2025A damage award for mental anguish will survive a legal- sufficiency challenge when the record bears “direct evidence of the nature, duration, and severity of [the plaintiff’s] mental anguish, thus establishing a substantial disruption in the plaintiff[’]s daily routine,” or when the record demonstrates “evidence of a high degree of mental pain and distress that is more than mere worry, anxiety, vexation, embarrassment, or anger.” Anderson, 550 S.W.3d at 619 (quoting Parkway Co. v. Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d 434, 444 (Tex. 1995)).

2025“A damages award for mental anguish will survive a legal-sufficiency challenge when the record bears ‘direct evidence of the nature, duration, and severity of [the plaintiff’s] mental anguish, thus establishing a substantial disruption in the plaintiff[’s] daily routine,’ or when the record demonstrates ‘evidence of a high degree of mental pain and distress that is more than mere worry, anxiety, vexation, embarrassment, or anger.’” Anderson v. Durant, 550 S.W.3d 605, 618-19 (Tex. 2018) (quoting Parkway Co. v. Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d 434, 444 (Tex. 1995)).

2020When we consider a legal sufficiency challenge, we “must first examine the record for evidence that supports the finding, while ignoring all evidence to the contrary.” Id. (citing Sterner, 767 S.W.2d at 690 ); see also City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005) (When appellate court considers a no-evidence challenge, it views the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, crediting favorable evidence when reasonable jurors could do so and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not.).

2020When we consider a legal sufficiency challenge, we “must first examine the record for evidence that supports the finding, while ignoring all evidence to the contrary.” Id. (citing Sterner, 767 S.W.2d at 690 ); see also City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005) (When appellate court considers a no-evidence challenge, it views the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, crediting favorable evidence when reasonable jurors could do so and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not.).

2015In conducting a legal sufficiency analysis, the appellate court will "determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the combined and cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007) (citations omitted).

2009See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.04 (a)(3); see also Clayton , 235 S.W.3d at 778 ("This standard [the legal sufficiency standard] accounts for the factfinder's duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. . . . [W]e determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the combined and cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.") (internal quotations omitted); Hooper , 214 S.W.3d at 13 ; Guevara , 152 S.W.3d at 49 .

2010Stanley Boot Co. v. Bank of El Paso , 847 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tex. 1992); Cecil v. Smith , 804 S.W.2d 509, 510-11 (Tex. 1991). [2] Because Sandra’s sufficiency challenge focuses in significant part on expert testimony, we also must consider the difference between (1) a challenge to an expert’s methodology; and (2) a legal sufficiency challenge predicated on a contention that an expert’s testimony lacks probative value.

2010Stanley Boot Co. v. Bank of El Paso, 847 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tex.1992); Cecil v. Smith, 804 S.W.2d 509, 510-11 (Tex.1991). 2 Because Sandra’s sufficiency challenge focuses in significant part on expert testimony, we also must consider the difference between (1) a challenge to an expert’s methodology; and (2) a legal sufficiency challenge predicated on a contention that an expert’s testimony lacks probative value.