legal sufficiency test in Washington

2013"Courts generally do not inquire into the adequacy of consideration and instead utilize a legal sufficiency test" which "'is concerned not with comparative value but with that which will support a promise.'" Labriola, 152 Wn.2d at 834 (quoting Browning v. Johnson, 70 Wn.2d 145, 147 , 422 P.2d 314 , 430 P.2d 591 (1967)).

2004Browning v. Johnson, 70 Wn.2d 145, 147 , 422 P.2d 314 , 430 P.2d 591 (1967).

2013"Courts generally do not inquire into the adequacy of consideration and instead utilize a legal sufficiency test" which "'is concerned not with comparative value but with that which will support a promise.'" Labriola, 152 Wn.2d at 834 (quoting Browning v. Johnson, 70 Wn.2d 145, 147 , 422 P.2d 314 , 430 P.2d 591 (1967)).

2013"Courts generally do not inquire into the adequacy of consideration and instead utilize a legal sufficiency test" which "'is concerned not with comparative value but with that which will support a promise.'" Labriola, 152 Wn.2d at 834 (quoting Browning v. Johnson, 70 Wn.2d 145, 147 , 422 P.2d 314 , 430 P.2d 591 (1967)).

2014Co. v. City of Bothell, 105 Wn.2d 579, 588 , 716 P.2d 879 (1986)). '"Absent a showing of donative intent or gross inadequacy, trial courts should only apply a legal sufficiency test, under which a bargained-for act or forbearance is considered sufficient consideration.'" CLEAN v. City of Spokane, 133 Wn.2d 455, 469 , 947 P.2d 1169 (1997) (quoting City of Tacoma, 108 Wn.2d at 703 ).

1997City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of City of Tacoma, 108 Wn.2d at 703 , citing Adams , says almost the same: Absent a showing of donative intent or gross inadequacy, trial courts should only apply a legal sufficiency test....

2025“We have held that in determining [the legal sufficiency of the claim], a court may consider a hypothetical situation asserted by the complaining party, not part of the formal record, including facts alleged for the first time on appellate review of a dismissal under the rule.” Bravo, 125 Wn.2d at 750 (citing Halvorson v. Dahl, 89 Wn.2d 673, 675 , 574 P.2d 1190 (1978)).

2025“We have held that in determining [the legal sufficiency of the claim], a court may consider a hypothetical situation asserted by the complaining party, not part of the formal record, including facts alleged for the first time on appellate review of a dismissal under the rule.” Bravo, 125 Wn.2d at 750 (citing Halvorson v. Dahl, 89 Wn.2d 673, 675 , 574 P.2d 1190 (1978)).

2026“Hypothetical facts may be introduced to assist the court in establishing the ‘conceptual backdrop’ against which the challenge to the legal sufficiency of the claim is considered.” Id. (quoting Brown v. MacPherson’s, Inc., 86 Wn.2d 293 , 298 n.2, 545 P.2d 13 (1975)).

2025“We have held that in determining [the legal sufficiency of the claim], a court may consider a hypothetical situation asserted by the complaining party, not part of the formal record, including facts alleged for the first time on appellate review of a dismissal under the rule.” Bravo, 125 Wn.2d at 750 (citing Halvorson v. Dahl, 89 Wn.2d 673, 675 , 574 P.2d 1190 (1978)).

2026“Hypothetical facts may be introduced to assist the court in establishing the ‘conceptual backdrop’ against which the challenge to the legal sufficiency of the claim is considered.” Id. (quoting Brown v. MacPherson’s, Inc., 86 Wn.2d 293 , 298 n.2, 545 P.2d 13 (1975)).

2026“Hypothetical facts may be introduced to assist the court in establishing the ‘conceptual backdrop’ against which the challenge to the legal sufficiency of the claim is considered.” Id. (quoting Brown v. MacPherson’s, Inc., 86 Wn.2d 293 , 298 n.2, 545 P.2d 13 (1975)).

2011"Officials may not be recalled for their discretionary acts absent manifest abuse of discretion." In re Recall of Pearsall-Stipek, 136 Wash.2d 255, 264 , 961 P.2d 343 (1998) (citing In re Recall of Sandhaus, 134 Wash.2d 662, 670 , 953 P.2d 82 (1998)).

2011“Officials may not be recalled for their discretionary acts absent manifest abuse of discretion.” In re Recall of Pearsall-Stipek, 136 Wn.2d 255, 264 , 961 P.2d 343 (1998) (citing In re Recall of Sandhaus, 134 Wn.2d 662, 670 , 953 P.2d 82 (1998)).

2011"Officials may not be recalled for their discretionary acts absent manifest abuse of discretion." In re Recall of Pearsall-Stipek, 136 Wash.2d 255, 264 , 961 P.2d 343 (1998) (citing In re Recall of Sandhaus, 134 Wash.2d 662, 670 , 953 P.2d 82 (1998)).

2011“Officials may not be recalled for their discretionary acts absent manifest abuse of discretion.” In re Recall of Pearsall-Stipek, 136 Wn.2d 255, 264 , 961 P.2d 343 (1998) (citing In re Recall of Sandhaus, 134 Wn.2d 662, 670 , 953 P.2d 82 (1998)).

2011The legal sufficiency requirement protects officials from being "recalled for appropriately exercising the discretion granted him or her by law." Chandler, 103 Wash.2d at 274 , 693 P.2d 71 .

2011The legal sufficiency requirement protects officials from being "recalled for appropriately exercising the discretion granted him or her by law." Chandler, 103 Wash.2d at 274 , 693 P.2d 71 .

2011"Officials may not be recalled for their discretionary acts absent manifest abuse of discretion." In re Recall of Pearsall-Stipek, 136 Wash.2d 255, 264 , 961 P.2d 343 (1998) (citing In re Recall of Sandhaus, 134 Wash.2d 662, 670 , 953 P.2d 82 (1998)).

2011“Officials may not be recalled for their discretionary acts absent manifest abuse of discretion.” In re Recall of Pearsall-Stipek, 136 Wn.2d 255, 264 , 961 P.2d 343 (1998) (citing In re Recall of Sandhaus, 134 Wn.2d 662, 670 , 953 P.2d 82 (1998)).

2011"Officials may not be recalled for their discretionary acts absent manifest abuse of discretion." In re Recall of Pearsall-Stipek, 136 Wash.2d 255, 264 , 961 P.2d 343 (1998) (citing In re Recall of Sandhaus, 134 Wash.2d 662, 670 , 953 P.2d 82 (1998)).

2011“Officials may not be recalled for their discretionary acts absent manifest abuse of discretion.” In re Recall of Pearsall-Stipek, 136 Wn.2d 255, 264 , 961 P.2d 343 (1998) (citing In re Recall of Sandhaus, 134 Wn.2d 662, 670 , 953 P.2d 82 (1998)).

2005Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Halvorson v. Dahl, 89 Wn.2d 673, 674 , 574 P.2d 1190 (1978)). ¶33 While a court must consider any hypothetical facts when entertaining a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the gravamen of a court’s inquiry is whether the plaintiff’s claim is legally sufficient.

2005Id. (quoting Halvorson v. Dahl, 89 Wash.2d 673, 674 , 574 P.2d 1190 (1978)). ¶ 33 While a court must consider any hypothetical facts when entertaining a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the gravamen of a court's inquiry is whether the plaintiff's claim is legally sufficient.

1997Adams v. University of Wash., 106 Wn.2d 312, 327 , 722 P.2d 74 (1986); Northlake Marine Works, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 70 Wn.

1997Adams v. University of Wash., 106 Wash.2d 312, 327 , 722 P.2d 74 (1986); Northlake Marine Works, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 70 Wash. App. 491 , 857 P.2d 283 (1993).

1997Misplacing its reliance upon Adams v. University of Wash., 106 Wn.2d 312, 327 , 722 P.2d 74 (1986) the majority asserts "[i]n assessing consideration, courts do not inquire into the adequacy of consideration, but employ a legal sufficiency test.” Majority at 597.

1997Misplacing its reliance upon Adams v. University of Wash., 106 Wn.2d 312, 327 , 722 P.2d 74 (1986) the majority asserts "[i]n assessing consideration, courts do not inquire into the adequacy of consideration, but employ a legal sufficiency test.” Majority at 597.

2021Id. at 834 .

2014Co. v. City of Bothell, 105 Wn.2d 579, 588 , 716 P.2d 879 (1986)). '"Absent a showing of donative intent or gross inadequacy, trial courts should only apply a legal sufficiency test, under which a bargained-for act or forbearance is considered sufficient consideration.'" CLEAN v. City of Spokane, 133 Wn.2d 455, 469 , 947 P.2d 1169 (1997) (quoting City of Tacoma, 108 Wn.2d at 703 ).

2014Co. v. City of Bothell, 105 Wn.2d 579, 588 , 716 P.2d 879 (1986)). '"Absent a showing of donative intent or gross inadequacy, trial courts should only apply a legal sufficiency test, under which a bargained-for act or forbearance is considered sufficient consideration.'" CLEAN v. City of Spokane, 133 Wn.2d 455, 469 , 947 P.2d 1169 (1997) (quoting City of Tacoma, 108 Wn.2d at 703 ).

2014Co. v. City of Bothell, 105 Wn.2d 579, 588 , 716 P.2d 879 (1986)). '"Absent a showing of donative intent or gross inadequacy, trial courts should only apply a legal sufficiency test, under which a bargained-for act or forbearance is considered sufficient consideration.'" CLEAN v. City of Spokane, 133 Wn.2d 455, 469 , 947 P.2d 1169 (1997) (quoting City of Tacoma, 108 Wn.2d at 703 ).

2013"Courts generally do not inquire into the adequacy of consideration and instead utilize a legal sufficiency test" which "'is concerned not with comparative value but with that which will support a promise.'" Labriola, 152 Wn.2d at 834 (quoting Browning v. Johnson, 70 Wn.2d 145, 147 , 422 P.2d 314 , 430 P.2d 591 (1967)).

2013We will "not relieve a party of a bad bargain . . . unless the consideration is so inadequate as to constitute constructive fraud." Emberson v. Hartley, 52 Wn.