12 Connecticut opinions name it 2 courts 2002–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Danforth v. Minnesotagreen2 sentences2019Id., 62; see id., 63–64 (noting that ‘‘although this court . . . will apply the Teague framework, we d[o] so with the caveat that, while federal decisions apply- ing Teague may be instructive, this court will not be bound by those decisions in any particular case, but will conduct an independent analysis and application of Teague’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); see also Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 , 280–81, 128 S. Ct. 1029 , 169 L. 2019Id., 62; see id., 63–64 (noting that ‘‘although this court . . . will apply the Teague framework, we d[o] so with the caveat that, while federal decisions apply- ing Teague may be instructive, this court will not be bound by those decisions in any particular case, but will conduct an independent analysis and application of Teague’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); see also Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 , 280–81, 128 S. Ct. 1029 , 169 L. | 3 | 6 |
Rhoades v. Stategreen2 sentences2024We have applied the Teague framework ‘‘more liber- ally than the United States Supreme Court [might] other- wise apply it . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Casiano v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 317 Conn. 64 ; see also, e.g., Rhoades v. State, 149 Idaho 130, 139 , 233 P.3d 61 (2010) (because comity concerns do not apply to state court’s review of state convictions, Idaho courts are ‘‘not required to blindly follow [the United States Supreme Court’s] view of . . . whether a new rule is a watershed rule’’), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1258 , 131 S. Ct. 1571 , 179 L. 2024We have applied the Teague framework ‘‘more liber- ally than the United States Supreme Court [might] other- wise apply it . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Casiano v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 317 Conn. 64 ; see also, e.g., Rhoades v. State, 149 Idaho 130, 139 , 233 P.3d 61 (2010) (because comity concerns do not apply to state court’s review of state convictions, Idaho courts are ‘‘not required to blindly follow [the United States Supreme Court’s] view of . . . whether a new rule is a watershed rule’’), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1258 , 131 S. Ct. 1571 , 179 L. | 2 | 3 |
Evanson v. Reedygreen2 sentences2024We have applied the Teague framework ‘‘more liber- ally than the United States Supreme Court [might] other- wise apply it . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Casiano v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 317 Conn. 64 ; see also, e.g., Rhoades v. State, 149 Idaho 130, 139 , 233 P.3d 61 (2010) (because comity concerns do not apply to state court’s review of state convictions, Idaho courts are ‘‘not required to blindly follow [the United States Supreme Court’s] view of . . . whether a new rule is a watershed rule’’), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1258 , 131 S. Ct. 1571 , 179 L. 2024We have applied the Teague framework ‘‘more liber- ally than the United States Supreme Court [might] other- wise apply it . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Casiano v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 317 Conn. 64 ; see also, e.g., Rhoades v. State, 149 Idaho 130, 139 , 233 P.3d 61 (2010) (because comity concerns do not apply to state court’s review of state convictions, Idaho courts are ‘‘not required to blindly follow [the United States Supreme Court’s] view of . . . whether a new rule is a watershed rule’’), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1258 , 131 S. Ct. 1571 , 179 L. | 2 | 3 |
Rhoades v. Idahogreen2 sentences2024We have applied the Teague framework ‘‘more liber- ally than the United States Supreme Court [might] other- wise apply it . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Casiano v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 317 Conn. 64 ; see also, e.g., Rhoades v. State, 149 Idaho 130, 139 , 233 P.3d 61 (2010) (because comity concerns do not apply to state court’s review of state convictions, Idaho courts are ‘‘not required to blindly follow [the United States Supreme Court’s] view of . . . whether a new rule is a watershed rule’’), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1258 , 131 S. Ct. 1571 , 179 L. 2024We have applied the Teague framework ‘‘more liber- ally than the United States Supreme Court [might] other- wise apply it . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Casiano v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 317 Conn. 64 ; see also, e.g., Rhoades v. State, 149 Idaho 130, 139 , 233 P.3d 61 (2010) (because comity concerns do not apply to state court’s review of state convictions, Idaho courts are ‘‘not required to blindly follow [the United States Supreme Court’s] view of . . . whether a new rule is a watershed rule’’), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1258 , 131 S. Ct. 1571 , 179 L. | 2 | 3 |
Johnson v. Warden, State Prisongreen2 sentences2015Teague v. Lane, supra, [ 489 U.S. 310 .] Although this court has in the past applied the Teague framework to state habeas proceedings as well; see, e.g., Johnson v. Warden, 218 Conn. 791, 797 , 591 A.2d 407 (1991); the United States Supreme Court recently held in Danforth v. Minnesota, [supra, 552 U.S. 282 ], that the restrictions Teague imposes on the fully retroactive application of new procedural rules are not binding on the states.’’ (Emphasis added.) The majority states that ‘‘[c]ontrary to the petitioner’s suggestion, our reference in Luurtsema to Danforth did not mean that this court wa 2015Teague v. Lane, supra, [ 489 U.S. 310 .] Although this court has in the past applied the Teague framework to state habeas proceedings as well; see, e.g., Johnson v. Warden, 218 Conn. 791, 797 , 591 A.2d 407 (1991); the United States Supreme Court recently held in Danforth v. Minnesota, [supra, 552 U.S. 282 ], that the restrictions Teague imposes on the fully retroactive application of new procedural rules are not binding on the states.’’ (Emphasis added.) The majority states that ‘‘[c]ontrary to the petitioner’s suggestion, our reference in Luurtsema to Danforth did not mean that this court wa | 2 | 3 |
Teague v. Lanegreen2 sentences2024Held that the Appellate Court, which lacked the benefit of this court’s newly expanded formulation of the framework set forth in Teague v. Lane ( 489 U.S. 288 ) for evaluating whether a new constitutional rule applies retroactively on collateral review, should not have upheld the habeas court’s dismissal of the petitioner’s due process and actual innocence claims on the ground that Dickson did not apply retroactively to those claims on collateral review: Under the Teague framework, a new rule, such as the new rules articu- lated in Guilbert and Dickson, will not apply retroactively to cases on 2024Held that the Appellate Court, which lacked the benefit of this court’s newly expanded formulation of the framework set forth in Teague v. Lane ( 489 U.S. 288 ) for evaluating whether a new constitutional rule applies retroactively on collateral review, should not have upheld the habeas court’s dismissal of the petitioner’s due process and actual innocence claims on the ground that Dickson did not apply retroactively to those claims on collateral review: Under the Teague framework, a new rule, such as the new rules articu- lated in Guilbert and Dickson, will not apply retroactively to cases on | 1 | 3 |
Ronnie Maurice Howard v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2024Marceau, ‘‘Gideon’s Shadow,’’ 122 Yale L.J. 2482 , 2488 (2013); cf. Howard v. United States, 374 F.3d 1068, 1081 (11th Cir. 2004) (‘‘[a]t the risk of oversimplification, for purposes of the second Teague exception there are new rules, and then there are new Gideon-extension rules’’). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Maresgreen2 sentences2024Ed. 2d 477 (2011); State v. Mares, 335 P.3d 487, 504 (Wyo. 2014) (applying Teague more broadly than United States Supreme Court when ‘‘a particular state interest is better served by a broader retroactivity ruling’’). 2024Ed. 2d 477 (2011); State v. Mares, 335 P.3d 487, 504 (Wyo. 2014) (applying Teague more broadly than United States Supreme Court when ‘‘a particular state interest is better served by a broader retroactivity ruling’’). | 1 | 1 |
Missouri v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2024We have applied the Teague framework ‘‘more liber- ally than the United States Supreme Court [might] other- wise apply it . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Casiano v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 317 Conn. 64 ; see also, e.g., Rhoades v. State, 149 Idaho 130, 139 , 233 P.3d 61 (2010) (because comity concerns do not apply to state court’s review of state convictions, Idaho courts are ‘‘not required to blindly follow [the United States Supreme Court’s] view of . . . whether a new rule is a watershed rule’’), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1258 , 131 S. Ct. 1571 , 179 L. 2024We have applied the Teague framework ‘‘more liber- ally than the United States Supreme Court [might] other- wise apply it . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Casiano v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 317 Conn. 64 ; see also, e.g., Rhoades v. State, 149 Idaho 130, 139 , 233 P.3d 61 (2010) (because comity concerns do not apply to state court’s review of state convictions, Idaho courts are ‘‘not required to blindly follow [the United States Supreme Court’s] view of . . . whether a new rule is a watershed rule’’), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1258 , 131 S. Ct. 1571 , 179 L. | 1 | 1 |
Danforth v. Stategreen2 sentences2024Rather than ‘‘blindly follow’’ the United States Supreme Court’s application of Teague, this court will continue to ‘‘independently review cases when applying the Teague standard,’’ including when determining whether a new procedural rule is water- shed, notwithstanding the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Edwards v. Vannoy, supra, 593 U.S. 272 .2 Rhoades v. State, supra, 149 Idaho 139 ; see also, e.g., Danforth v. State, 761 N.W.2d 493, 500 (Minn. 2009); State v. Mares, supra, 335 P.3d 504 . 2024Rather than ‘‘blindly follow’’ the United States Supreme Court’s application of Teague, this court will continue to ‘‘independently review cases when applying the Teague standard,’’ including when determining whether a new procedural rule is water- shed, notwithstanding the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Edwards v. Vannoy, supra, 593 U.S. 272 .2 Rhoades v. State, supra, 149 Idaho 139 ; see also, e.g., Danforth v. State, 761 N.W.2d 493, 500 (Minn. 2009); State v. Mares, supra, 335 P.3d 504 . | 1 | 1 |
Dan Carmichael McCarthan v. Director of Goodwill Industries-Suncoast, Inc.green2 sentences2024See, e.g., McCarthan v. Director of Goodwill Industries-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1087 (11th Cir.) (concluding that petitioner 3 State courts have adopted a variety of caveats to the Teague standard. 2024See, e.g., McCarthan v. Director of Goodwill Industries-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1087 (11th Cir.) (concluding that petitioner 3 State courts have adopted a variety of caveats to the Teague standard. | 1 | 1 |
Beard v. Banksgreen2 sentences2015Ed. 2d 442 (2004); and that it had ‘‘rejected every claim that a new rule has satisfied the requirements for watershed status.’’ Whorton v. Bockt- ing, supra, 549 U.S. 418 ; see, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 420 , 124 S. Ct. 2504 , 159 L. 2015Ed. 2d 442 (2004); and that it had ‘‘rejected every claim that a new rule has satisfied the requirements for watershed status.’’ Whorton v. Bockt- ing, supra, 549 U.S. 418 ; see, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 420 , 124 S. Ct. 2504 , 159 L. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gilnitegreen2 sentences2015See State v. Gilnite, 202 Conn. 369 , 381–82, 521 A.2d 547 (1987) (‘‘A plea of guilty . . . involves the waiver of several fundamental constitutional rights and therefore must be knowingly and voluntarily entered so as not to violate due process. . . . 2015See State v. Gilnite, 202 Conn. 369 , 381–82, 521 A.2d 547 (1987) (‘‘A plea of guilty . . . involves the waiver of several fundamental constitutional rights and therefore must be knowingly and voluntarily entered so as not to violate due process. . . . | 1 | 1 |
Shermaine Johnson v. Henry Pontongreen1 sentence2015In light of this precedent, it is not surprising that all other federal and state jurisdictions that have consid- ered the issue have concluded unanimously that the rule announced in Miller is not a watershed rule of criminal procedure that applies retroactively under the second Teague exception.7 See, e.g., Martin v. Symmes, 782 F.3d 939, 943 (8th Cir. 2015); Johnson v. Ponton, 780 F.3d 219, 226 (4th Cir. 2015); In re Morgan, 713 F.3d 1365 , 1367–68 (11th Cir. 2013); Craig v. Cain, United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Docket No. 12- 30035 (5th Cir. January 4, 2013); Malvo v. Mathena, Unite | 1 | 1 |
State v. Paynegreen2 sentences2015See State v. Payne, 303 Conn. 538 , 549–50, 550 n.10, 34 A.3d 370 (2012) (adopting new approach to joinder of criminal trials under rules of practice and noting that it will not apply retroactively on collateral review); Johnson v. Warden, 218 Conn. 791 , 796– 98, 591 A.2d 407 (1991) (concluding that United States Supreme Court deci- sion on which petitioner relied did not apply retroactively because it had resolved question of statutory interpretation and did not announce constitu- tional rule). 2015See State v. Payne, 303 Conn. 538 , 549–50, 550 n.10, 34 A.3d 370 (2012) (adopting new approach to joinder of criminal trials under rules of practice and noting that it will not apply retroactively on collateral review); Johnson v. Warden, 218 Conn. 791 , 796– 98, 591 A.2d 407 (1991) (concluding that United States Supreme Court deci- sion on which petitioner relied did not apply retroactively because it had resolved question of statutory interpretation and did not announce constitu- tional rule). | 1 | 1 |
LaMonte Martin v. Jessica Symmesgreen1 sentence2015In light of this precedent, it is not surprising that all other federal and state jurisdictions that have consid- ered the issue have concluded unanimously that the rule announced in Miller is not a watershed rule of criminal procedure that applies retroactively under the second Teague exception.7 See, e.g., Martin v. Symmes, 782 F.3d 939, 943 (8th Cir. 2015); Johnson v. Ponton, 780 F.3d 219, 226 (4th Cir. 2015); In re Morgan, 713 F.3d 1365 , 1367–68 (11th Cir. 2013); Craig v. Cain, United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Docket No. 12- 30035 (5th Cir. January 4, 2013); Malvo v. Mathena, Unite | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Miller v. Alabama
green
2 sentences2024For example, we have applied the Teague analysis and concluded that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 , 132 S. Ct. 2455 , 183 L. 2024For example, we have applied the Teague analysis and concluded that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 , 132 S. Ct. 2455 , 183 L. | 2 | 2016–2024 |
Saffle v. Parks
green
2 sentences2021The first Teague exception ‘‘permits the retroactive application of a new rule if the rule places a class of private conduct beyond the power of the [s]tate to proscribe . . . or addresses a substantive categorical guarante[e] accorded by the [c]onstitution, such as a rule prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 494 , 110 S. Ct. 1257 , 108 L. 2021The first Teague exception ‘‘permits the retroactive application of a new rule if the rule places a class of private conduct beyond the power of the [s]tate to proscribe . . . or addresses a substantive categorical guarante[e] accorded by the [c]onstitution, such as a rule prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 494 , 110 S. Ct. 1257 , 108 L. | 2 | 2002–2021 |
Duperry v. Solnit
green
2 sentences2016In Duperry v. Solnit , supra, at 311 , 803 A.2d 287 , this court considered whether the habeas court "improperly established a new constitutional rule in a collateral proceeding in contravention of the principle announced in Teague v. Lane , [supra, 489 U.S. at 288 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 ], by concluding that a criminal defendant who pleads not guilty with the affirmative defense of mental disease or defect must be canvassed as though he is pleading guilty to ensure that his plea is made knowingly and voluntarily ...." 5 (Footnote omitted.) We engaged in a Teague analysis of whether the canvass issu 2016In Duperry v. Solnit , supra, at 311 , 803 A.2d 287 , this court considered whether the habeas court "improperly established a new constitutional rule in a collateral proceeding in contravention of the principle announced in Teague v. Lane , [supra, 489 U.S. at 288 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 ], by concluding that a criminal defendant who pleads not guilty with the affirmative defense of mental disease or defect must be canvassed as though he is pleading guilty to ensure that his plea is made knowingly and voluntarily ...." 5 (Footnote omitted.) We engaged in a Teague analysis of whether the canvass issu | 2 | 2015–2016 |
State v. Harris
green
2 sentences2024This court preliminarily observed that its recent holding in State v. Harris ( 330 Conn. 91 ) that the Connecticut constitution affords greater protec- tion than the United States constitution with respect to the admissibility of eyewitness identification testimony militated in favor of the retroactive application of Guilbert and Dickson on collateral review, and also noted that recent case law has recognized that mistaken eyewitness identifica- tions are the leading cause of wrongful convictions and that the risk of mistake is particularly acute when an identification has been tainted by an u 2024This court preliminarily observed that its recent holding in State v. Harris ( 330 Conn. 91 ) that the Connecticut constitution affords greater protec- tion than the United States constitution with respect to the admissibility of eyewitness identification testimony militated in favor of the retroactive application of Guilbert and Dickson on collateral review, and also noted that recent case law has recognized that mistaken eyewitness identifica- tions are the leading cause of wrongful convictions and that the risk of mistake is particularly acute when an identification has been tainted by an u | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Benjamin F. Miller, Jr. v. Colin C.J. Angliker, M.D., Director, Whiting Forensic Institute
green
2 sentences2016Miller v. Angliker, supra, 1312 .10 Further, as a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Miller was not binding on Connecticut state courts and, thus, the trial court was not bound by that decision. 2016Miller v. Angliker , supra, at1312. 10 Further, as a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Miller was not binding on Connecticut state courts and, thus, the trial court was not bound by that decision. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Initiative v. King Cnty.
green
2 sentences2016Semple v. Casiano, U.S. , 136 S. Ct. 1364 , 194 L. 2016Semple v. Casiano , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 1364 , 194 L.Ed.2d 376 (2016). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Semple v. Casiano
green
2 sentences2016Semple v. Casiano, U.S. , 136 S. Ct. 1364 , 194 L. 2016Semple v. Casiano , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 1364 , 194 L.Ed.2d 376 (2016). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Schriro v. Summerlin
green
2 sentences2015In subsequent decisions, the United States Supreme Court further noted that the class of rules to which the second Teague exception applies is ‘‘extremely nar- row’’; Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 , 124 S. Ct. 2519 , 159 L. 2015In subsequent decisions, the United States Supreme Court further noted that the class of rules to which the second Teague exception applies is ‘‘extremely nar- row’’; Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 , 124 S. Ct. 2519 , 159 L. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Luurtsema v. Commissioner of Correction
green
2 sentences2015I also note that I agree with the majority that nothing we said in Luurtsema v. Commissioner of Correction, 299 Conn. 740 , 12 A.3d 817 (2011), suggests that we should no longer follow the Teague framework in determining whether a constitutional rule applies retroactively. 5 As the Nevada Supreme Court recently put it, ‘‘[t]he policy concerns behind Teague are partly germane to collateral review by this and other state courts and partly not. 2015I also note that I agree with the majority that nothing we said in Luurtsema v. Commissioner of Correction, 299 Conn. 740 , 12 A.3d 817 (2011), suggests that we should no longer follow the Teague framework in determining whether a constitutional rule applies retroactively. 5 As the Nevada Supreme Court recently put it, ‘‘[t]he policy concerns behind Teague are partly germane to collateral review by this and other state courts and partly not. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2015Although I agree that we should continue to apply the Teague framework in determining whether a decision that rec- ognizes a constitutional rule of criminal procedure should be applied retroactively in habeas proceedings, I would conclude that Padilla did not announce a new rule because it was merely an application of the well established standard governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S. Ct. 2052 , 80 L. 2015Although I agree that we should continue to apply the Teague framework in determining whether a decision that rec- ognizes a constitutional rule of criminal procedure should be applied retroactively in habeas proceedings, I would conclude that Padilla did not announce a new rule because it was merely an application of the well established standard governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S. Ct. 2052 , 80 L. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Linkletter v. Walker
red
2 sentences2015The Florida Supreme Court thus concluded that the rule in Miller was retroactive under Florida’s retroactivity standard for the same reason a new rule may be deemed retroactive under the first Teague exception. 9 Although Michigan applies the test established in Teague, it also applies a state retroactivity analysis derived from the three step test set forth in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 , 85 S. Ct. 1731 , 14 L. 2015The Florida Supreme Court thus concluded that the rule in Miller was retroactive under Florida’s retroactivity standard for the same reason a new rule may be deemed retroactive under the first Teague exception. 9 Although Michigan applies the test established in Teague, it also applies a state retroactivity analysis derived from the three step test set forth in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 , 85 S. Ct. 1731 , 14 L. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Commonwealth v. Bray
green
2 sentences2015The court then determined that, although it had incorporated the ‘‘original’’ formulation into the Massachusetts definition of a new rule when it adopted the Teague framework in Commonwealth v. Bray, 407 Mass. 296 , 300–301, 553 N.E.2d 538 (1990), it would not incorporate the expanded definition into Massachusetts law but, rather, would continue to adhere to the ‘‘original’’ definition that a rule is new only when the result is not dictated by precedent. 2015The court then determined that, although it had incorporated the ‘‘original’’ formulation into the Massachusetts definition of a new rule when it adopted the Teague framework in Commonwealth v. Bray, 407 Mass. 296 , 300–301, 553 N.E.2d 538 (1990), it would not incorporate the expanded definition into Massachusetts law but, rather, would continue to adhere to the ‘‘original’’ definition that a rule is new only when the result is not dictated by precedent. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Colwell v. State
green
2 sentences2015In Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807, 819 , 59 P.3d 463 (2002), the Nevada Supreme Court adopted the general framework of Teague but reserved its prerogative ‘‘to define and determine within this framework whether a rule is new and whether it falls within the two exceptions to nonretroactivity . . . .’’ The court defined the criteria for determining whether a rule is new as whether the rule ‘‘[1] overrules precedent, or [2] disapprove[s] a practice [the] [c]ourt had arguably sanctioned in prior cases, or [3] overturns a longstanding practice that lower courts had uniformly approved.’’ (Footnote o 2015In Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807, 819 , 59 P.3d 463 (2002), the Nevada Supreme Court adopted the general framework of Teague but reserved its prerogative ‘‘to define and determine within this framework whether a rule is new and whether it falls within the two exceptions to nonretroactivity . . . .’’ The court defined the criteria for determining whether a rule is new as whether the rule ‘‘[1] overrules precedent, or [2] disapprove[s] a practice [the] [c]ourt had arguably sanctioned in prior cases, or [3] overturns a longstanding practice that lower courts had uniformly approved.’’ (Footnote o | 1 | 2015–2015 |
In re Morgan
green
1 sentence2015In light of this precedent, it is not surprising that all other federal and state jurisdictions that have consid- ered the issue have concluded unanimously that the rule announced in Miller is not a watershed rule of criminal procedure that applies retroactively under the second Teague exception.7 See, e.g., Martin v. Symmes, 782 F.3d 939, 943 (8th Cir. 2015); Johnson v. Ponton, 780 F.3d 219, 226 (4th Cir. 2015); In re Morgan, 713 F.3d 1365 , 1367–68 (11th Cir. 2013); Craig v. Cain, United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Docket No. 12- 30035 (5th Cir. January 4, 2013); Malvo v. Mathena, Unite | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Henderson green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.