Teague exception in New York

2025This Court finds that neither of the two exceptions articulated in Teague apply, nor does New York State law compel Erlinger's new rule to be retroactively applied ( see Erlinger, 602 US at 898, n.3 [Kavanugh, J. dissenting]["For any case that is already final, the Teague rule will presumably bar the defendant from raising today's new rule in collateral proceedings"]; Allen v. United States , 2025 WL 755186 *4 [USDC, MD Florida, 2025]; Rodney , 85 Misc 3d at 855-859).

2025This Court finds that neither of the two exceptions articulated in Teague apply, nor does New York State law compel Erlinger's new rule to be retroactively applied ( see Erlinger, 602 US at 898, n.3 [Kavanugh, J. dissenting]["For any case that is already final, the Teague rule will presumably bar the defendant from raising today's new rule in collateral proceedings"]; Allen v. United States , 2025 WL 755186 *4 [USDC, MD Florida, 2025]; Rodney , 85 Misc 3d at 855-859).

2024Since Erlinger thus established a new rule, not subject to either of the Teague exceptions, [FN2] it may not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review ( see People v Eastman , 85 NY2d 265, 275 [1995]; see also Erlinger , 602 US at 859 n 3 [Kavanaugh, J., dissenting] ["For any case that is already final, the Teague rule will presumably bar the defendant from raising today's new rule in collateral proceedings" (citations omitted)]).

2024Since Erlinger thus established a new rule, not subject to either of the Teague exceptions, [FN2] it may not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review ( see People v Eastman , 85 NY2d 265, 275 [1995]; see also Erlinger , 602 US at 859 n 3 [Kavanaugh, J., dissenting] ["For any case that is already final, the Teague rule will presumably bar the defendant from raising today's new rule in collateral proceedings" (citations omitted)]).

2016Absent an applicable exception, “[a]ll other new rules of criminal procedure must be applied in future trials and in cases pending on direct review, but may not provide the basis for a federal collateral attack on a state-court conviction” (Danforth v Minnesota, 552 US 264, 266 [2008] [summarizing the Teague rule]).

2016Absent an applicable exception, “[a]ll other new rules of criminal procedure must be applied in future trials and in cases pending on direct review, but may not provide the basis for a federal collateral attack on a state-court conviction” (Danforth v Minnesota, 552 US 264, 266 [2008] [summarizing the Teague rule]).

2015Eastman/Teague Analysis Under the general retroactivity rubric of Teague v Lane ( 489 US 288 [1989]), adopted by the Court of Appeals in People v Eastman ( 85 NY2d 265, 275 [1995]) and reaffirmed in People v Baret ( 23 NY3d 777 [2014]), a “new” federal rule of constitutional criminal procedure will not be retroactively applicable outside of direct appeal. 13 The threshold issue in the application of Eastman/Teague analysis is whether the decision has announced a “new” rule.

2014It was intended to limit the authority of federal courts to overturn state convictions — not to limit a state court’s authority to grant relief for violations of new rules of constitutional law when reviewing its own State’s convictions” (id. at 280-281). 10 On remand, the Minnesota Supreme Court elected to retain the Teague standard, principally so as not to “ ‘undermine[ ] the principle of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system’ ” (Danforth v State, 761 NW2d 493, 498 [Minn 2009], quoting Teague, 489 US at 309 ), and affirmed Danforth’s conviction.

2014Teague established as a guiding principle that new rules of federal constitutional criminal procedure do not apply retroactively to cases that had become final on direct review before the new rule was announced (see Whorton v Bockting, 549 US 406, 416 [2007] [“Under the Teague framework, an old rule applies both on direct and collateral review, but a new rule is generally applicable only to cases that are still on direct review”]). 1 Additionally, Teague created a test to differentiate a new rule from an existing or old rule; namely, “[i]n general, ... a case announces a new rule when it break

2014Teague established as a guiding principle that new rules of federal constitutional criminal procedure do not apply retroactively to cases that had become final on direct review before the new rule was announced (see Whorton v Bockting, 549 US 406, 416 [2007] [“Under the Teague framework, an old rule applies both on direct and collateral review, but a new rule is generally applicable only to cases that are still on direct review”]). 1 Additionally, Teague created a test to differentiate a new rule from an existing or old rule; namely, “[i]n general, ... a case announces a new rule when it break

2014In short, “[t]hat a new procedural rule is ‘fundamental’ in some abstract sense is not enough; the rule must be one ‘without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished’ ” (Schriro v Summerlin, 542 US 348, 352 [2004], quoting Teague, 489 US at 313 ).

2014In short, “[t]hat a new procedural rule is ‘fundamental’ in some abstract sense is not enough; the rule must be one ‘without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished’ ” (Schriro v Summerlin, 542 US 348, 352 [2004], quoting Teague, 489 US at 313 ).

2014Writing for a six-Justice majority, 6 Justice Kagan stated as a basic premise that “ ‘a rule designed for the specific purpose of evaluating a myriad of factual contexts . . . will . . . infrequent[ly] . . . yield[ ] a result so novel that it forges a new rule . . . not dictated by precedent’ ” within the meaning of Teague (Chaidez , 568 US at —, 133 S Ct at 1107 , quoting Wright v West, 505 US 277, 309 [1992, Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment]).

2014Writing for a six-Justice majority, 6 Justice Kagan stated as a basic premise that “ ‘a rule designed for the specific purpose of evaluating a myriad of factual contexts . . . will . . . infrequent[ly] . . . yield[ ] a result so novel that it forges a new rule . . . not dictated by precedent’ ” within the meaning of Teague (Chaidez , 568 US at —, 133 S Ct at 1107 , quoting Wright v West, 505 US 277, 309 [1992, Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment]).

2014Although the lead opinion in Teague attracted only a four-Justice plurality, a majority of the Court soon adopted its retroactivity analysis (see Penry v Lynaugh, 492 US 302, 313 [1989] [adopting Teague analysis as majority approach], overruled on other grounds by Atkins v Virginia, 536 US 304 [2002]).

2014It was intended to limit the authority of federal courts to overturn state convictions — not to limit a state court’s authority to grant relief for violations of new rules of constitutional law when reviewing its own State’s convictions” (id. at 280-281). 10 On remand, the Minnesota Supreme Court elected to retain the Teague standard, principally so as not to “ ‘undermine[ ] the principle of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system’ ” (Danforth v State, 761 NW2d 493, 498 [Minn 2009], quoting Teague, 489 US at 309 ), and affirmed Danforth’s conviction.

2014It was intended to limit the authority of federal courts to overturn state convictions — not to limit a state court’s authority to grant relief for violations of new rules of constitutional law when reviewing its own State’s convictions” (id. at 280-281). 10 On remand, the Minnesota Supreme Court elected to retain the Teague standard, principally so as not to “ ‘undermine[ ] the principle of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system’ ” (Danforth v State, 761 NW2d 493, 498 [Minn 2009], quoting Teague, 489 US at 309 ), and affirmed Danforth’s conviction.

2014After Chaidez was decided, the Appellate Division abandoned the reasoning that it had espoused in this case on the ground that “ ‘the principles of retroactivity developed by the Supreme Court in construing Federal constitutional law govern the disposition’ ” of a New York case involving a new rule of federal constitutional criminal procedure (People v Verdejo, 109 AD3d 138, 141 [1st Dept 2013], quoting Eastman, 85 NY2d at 274-275 ), and the Padilla rule, which “merely prescribes] a duty imposed on counsel,” does not fall within Teague’s exception to non-retroactivity for watershed rules ( 109

2014After Chaidez was decided, the Appellate Division abandoned the reasoning that it had espoused in this case on the ground that “ ‘the principles of retroactivity developed by the Supreme Court in construing Federal constitutional law govern the disposition’ ” of a New York case involving a new rule of federal constitutional criminal procedure (People v Verdejo, 109 AD3d 138, 141 [1st Dept 2013], quoting Eastman, 85 NY2d at 274-275 ), and the Padilla rule, which “merely prescribes] a duty imposed on counsel,” does not fall within Teague’s exception to non-retroactivity for watershed rules ( 109

2014After Chaidez was decided, the Appellate Division abandoned the reasoning that it had espoused in this case on the ground that “ ‘the principles of retroactivity developed by the Supreme Court in construing Federal constitutional law govern the disposition’ ” of a New York case involving a new rule of federal constitutional criminal procedure (People v Verdejo, 109 AD3d 138, 141 [1st Dept 2013], quoting Eastman, 85 NY2d at 274-275 ), and the Padilla rule, which “merely prescribes] a duty imposed on counsel,” does not fall within Teague’s exception to non-retroactivity for watershed rules ( 109

2014On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, concluding that Padilla had announced a new rule within the meaning of Teague (Chaidez v United States, 655 F3d 684, 686 [2011]). 5 The Supreme Court agreed and therefore affirmed, holding that, under the Teague framework, Padilla does not apply in collateral challenges to final convictions.

2014On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, concluding that Padilla had announced a new rule within the meaning of Teague (Chaidez v United States, 655 F3d 684, 686 [2011]). 5 The Supreme Court agreed and therefore affirmed, holding that, under the Teague framework, Padilla does not apply in collateral challenges to final convictions.

2014Justice Thomas, who dissented in Padilla , still considered that case to be “wrongly decided” and so, in his view, the majority’s Teague analysis was “unnecessary” (568 US at —, 133 S Ct at 1114 [Thomas, J., concurring in judgment only]).

2014Justice Thomas, who dissented in Padilla , still considered that case to be “wrongly decided” and so, in his view, the majority’s Teague analysis was “unnecessary” (568 US at —, 133 S Ct at 1114 [Thomas, J., concurring in judgment only]).

2005We thus conclude that Crawford should not be applied retroactively on collateral review.” As such, the court agrees and holds that Crawford (supra) is not applicable on collateral review. * In any event, the court finds that the pedigree information at issue in this case is not testimonial in nature, in that it was not “[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact,” nor a statement that was “made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.” (Cra

2002The Supreme Court has emphasized “that the exception is exceedingly narrow, applying ‘only to a small core of rules requiring observance of those procedures that * * * are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ ” (United States v Mandanici, 205 F3d 519, 528 [2d Cir 2000], quoting Graham v Collins, 506 US 461, 478 ).