11 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1995–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Witt v. Stategreen2 sentences2004This case also provides us with the opportunity directly to address whether this Court should continue to use the retroactivity analysis it announced in Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922, 925 (Fla.1980), or whether we should instead adopt the Teague analysis employed by the federal courts. 2004This case also provides us with the opportunity directly to address whether this Court should continue to use the retroactivity analysis it announced in Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922, 925 (Fla.1980), or whether we should instead adopt the Teague analysis employed by the federal courts. | 2 | 3 |
Colwell v. Stategreen2 sentences2004Pierre, 118 Wash.2d 321 , 823 P.2d 492, 494 (1992); State v. Blake, 197 W.Va. 700 , 478 S.E.2d 550, 562 (1996); State v. Lo, 264 Wis.2d 1 , 665 N.W.2d 756, 772 (2003); see also Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807 , 59 P.3d 463, 471 (2002) (adopting Teague for determining the retroactivity of Ring but reserving discretion in its application to state cases); State v. Purnell, 161 N.J. 44 , 735 A.2d 513, 521 (1999) (using a Teague analysis for determining the retroactivity of federal constitutional rights). [29] See, e.g., Ex parte Coker, 575 So.2d 43, 52 (Ala.1990); Pohutski v. City of Allen Park, 46 2004Pierre, 118 Wash.2d 321 , 823 P.2d 492, 494 (1992); State v. Blake, 197 W.Va. 700 , 478 S.E.2d 550, 562 (1996); State v. Lo, 264 Wis.2d 1 , 665 N.W.2d 756, 772 (2003); see also Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807 , 59 P.3d 463, 471 (2002) (adopting Teague for determining the retroactivity of Ring but reserving discretion in its application to state cases); State v. Purnell, 161 N.J. 44 , 735 A.2d 513, 521 (1999) (using a Teague analysis for determining the retroactivity of federal constitutional rights). [29] See, e.g., Ex parte Coker, 575 So.2d 43, 52 (Ala.1990); Pohutski v. City of Allen Park, 46 | 2 | 2 |
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences2016SC16-223, SC16-102, & SC16-628, 210 So.3d 1 , 2016 WL 7406538 (slip op. issued Fla. Dec. 22, 2016) (Polston, J., concurring); see also Johnson v. State, 904 So.2d 400, 413 (Fla. 2005) (Cantero, J., concurring) (explaining that this Court should apply the Teague standard when determining the retroactivity of United States Supreme Court decisions). 2016SC16-223, SC16-102, & SC16-628, 210 So.3d 1 , 2016 WL 7406538 (slip op. issued Fla. Dec. 22, 2016) (Polston, J., concurring); see also Johnson v. State, 904 So.2d 400, 413 (Fla. 2005) (Cantero, J., concurring) (explaining that this Court should apply the Teague standard when determining the retroactivity of United States Supreme Court decisions). | 1 | 3 |
Schriro v. Summerlingreen2 sentences2016First, we relied on the Supreme Court’s Teague analysis in Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004), finding that the decision in Ring “was 14. 2016First, we relied on the Supreme Court’s Teague analysis in Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 , 124 S.Ct. 2519 , 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004), finding that the decision in Ring “was not a substantive change to the law, but rather a ‘prototypical procedural rule[ ],’ in that it regulates the manner in which culpability is determined but does not alter the range of conduct or class of persons that the law punishes. | 1 | 2 |
Stovall v. Dennogreen2 sentences2005See supra note 14. [16] For an extended discussion of why the restrictive Teague standard is inappropriate as a standard for retroactivity in state courts see my opinion in Hughes and the authorities discussed therein. [17] Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 , 85 S.Ct. 1731 , 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965). [18] Indeed, perhaps the most notable case emanating from Florida that was given retroactive application was one that involved judicial process and the right to counsel during that process. 2005See supra note 14. [16] For an extended discussion of why the restrictive Teague standard is inappropriate as a standard for retroactivity in state courts see my opinion in Hughes and the authorities discussed therein. [17] Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 , 85 S.Ct. 1731 , 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965). [18] Indeed, perhaps the most notable case emanating from Florida that was given retroactive application was one that involved judicial process and the right to counsel during that process. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Whitfieldgreen2 sentences2005As the Missouri Supreme Court accurately and pointedly noted in a recent opinion rejecting the adoption of the Teague standard, "it has been suggested that `[t]he Teague test essentially prevents state courts from achieving their goal [of correcting injustice], for through its focus on the impropriety of disturbing a final conviction, it diverts attention from constitutional violations and prohibits relief except in the very rare case.'" State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253 , 268 n. 15 (Mo.2003) (alterations in original) (quoting Mary C. 2005As the Missouri Supreme Court accurately and pointedly noted in a recent opinion rejecting the adoption of the Teague standard, "it has been suggested that `[t]he Teague test essentially prevents state courts from achieving their goal [of correcting injustice], for through its focus on the impropriety of disturbing a final conviction, it diverts attention from constitutional violations and prohibits relief except in the very rare case.'" State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253 , 268 n. 15 (Mo.2003) (alterations in original) (quoting Mary C. | 1 | 2 |
Edwards v. Vannoygreen2 sentences2025In his dissenting opinion, Justice Kavanaugh observed that “[f]or any case that is already final, the Teague rule will presumably bar the defendant from raising today’s new rule in collateral proceedings.” 602 U.S. at 859 n.3 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (citing Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U.S. 255, 258 (2021); Teague v. - 12 - change in the law only applies retroactively to final cases if the change (1) emanates from the Florida Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court, (2) is constitutional in nature, and (3) constitutes a development of fundamental significance. 2025In his dissenting opinion, Justice Kavanaugh observed that “[f]or any case that is already final, the Teague rule will presumably bar the defendant from raising today’s new rule in collateral proceedings.” 602 U.S. at 859 n.3 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (citing Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U.S. 255, 258 (2021); Teague v. - 12 - change in the law only applies retroactively to final cases if the change (1) emanates from the Florida Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court, (2) is constitutional in nature, and (3) constitutes a development of fundamental significance. | 1 | 1 |
Washington v. Stategreen2 sentences2016Id.; see also Washington v. State, 907 So. 2d 512, 516 (Fla. 2005) (Lewis, J., concurring) (“[T]he purpose served by a new rule of law is a key factor in determining retroactivity in Florida, and the United States Supreme Court in DeStefano held that the purpose served by the jury-trial guarantee (‘to prevent apply the Teague standard when determining the retroactivity of United States Supreme Court decisions). 2016Id.; see also Washington v. State, 907 So. 2d 512, 516 (Fla. 2005) (Lewis, J., concurring) (“[T]he purpose served by a new rule of law is a key factor in determining retroactivity in Florida, and the United States Supreme Court in DeStefano held that the purpose served by the jury-trial guarantee (‘to prevent apply the Teague standard when determining the retroactivity of United States Supreme Court decisions). | 1 | 1 |
Montgomery v. Louisianagreen2 sentences2016See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 728 (2016) (“Teague requires the retroactive application of new substantive and watershed procedural rules in federal habeas proceedings.”); Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004). - 21 - not a substantive change to the law, but rather a ‘prototypical procedural rule[],’ in that it regulates the manner in which culpability is determined but does not alter the range of conduct or class of persons that the law punishes. 2016See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 728 (2016) (“Teague requires the retroactive application of new substantive and watershed procedural rules in federal habeas proceedings.”); Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004). - 21 - not a substantive change to the law, but rather a ‘prototypical procedural rule[],’ in that it regulates the manner in which culpability is determined but does not alter the range of conduct or class of persons that the law punishes. | 1 | 1 |
Windom v. Stategreen2 sentences2013I echo (and will not repeat) the analysis set forth by then-Justice Raoul Cantero in Windom v. State, 886 So.2d 915, 941-45 (Cantero, J., specially concurring) urging the Supreme Court to abandon the Witt standard in favor of Teague where the newly-announced rule of law emanates from the United States Supreme Court and is premised upon a federal constitutional right. .Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 , 125 S.Ct. 1183 , 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of eighteen when their crimes were committed. 2013I echo (and will not repeat) the analysis set forth by then-Justice Raoul Cantero in Windom v. State, 886 So.2d 915, 941-45 (Cantero, J., specially concurring) urging the Supreme Court to abandon the Witt standard in favor of Teague where the newly-announced rule of law emanates from the United States Supreme Court and is premised upon a federal constitutional right. .Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 , 125 S.Ct. 1183 , 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of eighteen when their crimes were committed. | 1 | 1 |
Monlyn v. Stategreen2 sentences2005Johnson v. State, No. SC03-1042, 904 So.2d 400, 405 , 2005 WL 977017 (Fla. Apr. 28, 2005); see also Monlyn v. State, 894 So.2d 832, 839-40 (Fla.2004) (Cantero, J., concurring); id. at 841 (Pariente, C.J., specially concurring). 2005Johnson v. State, No. SC03-1042, 904 So.2d 400, 405 , 2005 WL 977017 (Fla. Apr. 28, 2005); see also Monlyn v. State, 894 So.2d 832, 839-40 (Fla.2004) (Cantero, J., concurring); id. at 841 (Pariente, C.J., specially concurring). | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Browngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Chester McCoy v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Labrum v. Utah State Board of Pardonsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Logan v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Farbotnik v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sepulveda v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Matter of Personal Restraint of St. Pierregreen | 1 | 1 |
Meadows v. Stategreen2 sentences2004Pierre, 118 Wash.2d 321 , 823 P.2d 492, 494 (1992); State v. Blake, 197 W.Va. 700 , 478 S.E.2d 550, 562 (1996); State v. Lo, 264 Wis.2d 1 , 665 N.W.2d 756, 772 (2003); see also Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807 , 59 P.3d 463, 471 (2002) (adopting Teague for determining the retroactivity of Ring but reserving discretion in its application to state cases); State v. Purnell, 161 N.J. 44 , 735 A.2d 513, 521 (1999) (using a Teague analysis for determining the retroactivity of federal constitutional rights). [29] See, e.g., Ex parte Coker, 575 So.2d 43, 52 (Ala.1990); Pohutski v. City of Allen Park, 46 2004Pierre, 118 Wash.2d 321 , 823 P.2d 492, 494 (1992); State v. Blake, 197 W.Va. 700 , 478 S.E.2d 550, 562 (1996); State v. Lo, 264 Wis.2d 1 , 665 N.W.2d 756, 772 (2003); see also Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807 , 59 P.3d 463, 471 (2002) (adopting Teague for determining the retroactivity of Ring but reserving discretion in its application to state cases); State v. Purnell, 161 N.J. 44 , 735 A.2d 513, 521 (1999) (using a Teague analysis for determining the retroactivity of federal constitutional rights). [29] See, e.g., Ex parte Coker, 575 So.2d 43, 52 (Ala.1990); Pohutski v. City of Allen Park, 46 | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Logreen | 1 | 1 |
| Tyler v. Caingreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Purnellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Figarola v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gisi v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hughes v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Sean Lamar Sanders, A/K/A Sean Lamont Sandersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Darius M. Mossgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Juan Sanchez-Cervantes, AKA Hugo Quirox, Quiroc, Quiroz, Quiroz Trejo, and Quiroz Tapiagreen | 1 | 1 |
Jeffrey P. Curtis and Martin A. Sax v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2004Pierre, 118 Wash.2d 321 , 823 P.2d 492, 494 (1992); State v. Blake, 197 W.Va. 700 , 478 S.E.2d 550, 562 (1996); State v. Lo, 264 Wis.2d 1 , 665 N.W.2d 756, 772 (2003); see also Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807 , 59 P.3d 463, 471 (2002) (adopting Teague for determining the retroactivity of Ring but reserving discretion in its application to state cases); State v. Purnell, 161 N.J. 44 , 735 A.2d 513, 521 (1999) (using a Teague analysis for determining the retroactivity of federal constitutional rights). [29] See, e.g., Ex parte Coker, 575 So.2d 43, 52 (Ala.1990); Pohutski v. City of Allen Park, 46 2004Pierre, 118 Wash.2d 321 , 823 P.2d 492, 494 (1992); State v. Blake, 197 W.Va. 700 , 478 S.E.2d 550, 562 (1996); State v. Lo, 264 Wis.2d 1 , 665 N.W.2d 756, 772 (2003); see also Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807 , 59 P.3d 463, 471 (2002) (adopting Teague for determining the retroactivity of Ring but reserving discretion in its application to state cases); State v. Purnell, 161 N.J. 44 , 735 A.2d 513, 521 (1999) (using a Teague analysis for determining the retroactivity of federal constitutional rights). [29] See, e.g., Ex parte Coker, 575 So.2d 43, 52 (Ala.1990); Pohutski v. City of Allen Park, 46 | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Orlando Moragreen | 1 | 1 |
Kevin Antonio Goode v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2004Pierre, 118 Wash.2d 321 , 823 P.2d 492, 494 (1992); State v. Blake, 197 W.Va. 700 , 478 S.E.2d 550, 562 (1996); State v. Lo, 264 Wis.2d 1 , 665 N.W.2d 756, 772 (2003); see also Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807 , 59 P.3d 463, 471 (2002) (adopting Teague for determining the retroactivity of Ring but reserving discretion in its application to state cases); State v. Purnell, 161 N.J. 44 , 735 A.2d 513, 521 (1999) (using a Teague analysis for determining the retroactivity of federal constitutional rights). [29] See, e.g., Ex parte Coker, 575 So.2d 43, 52 (Ala.1990); Pohutski v. City of Allen Park, 46 2004Pierre, 118 Wash.2d 321 , 823 P.2d 492, 494 (1992); State v. Blake, 197 W.Va. 700 , 478 S.E.2d 550, 562 (1996); State v. Lo, 264 Wis.2d 1 , 665 N.W.2d 756, 772 (2003); see also Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807 , 59 P.3d 463, 471 (2002) (adopting Teague for determining the retroactivity of Ring but reserving discretion in its application to state cases); State v. Purnell, 161 N.J. 44 , 735 A.2d 513, 521 (1999) (using a Teague analysis for determining the retroactivity of federal constitutional rights). [29] See, e.g., Ex parte Coker, 575 So.2d 43, 52 (Ala.1990); Pohutski v. City of Allen Park, 46 | 1 | 1 |
| William T. Coleman v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Andre Swintongreen | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Cokergreen2 sentences2004Pierre, 118 Wash.2d 321 , 823 P.2d 492, 494 (1992); State v. Blake, 197 W.Va. 700 , 478 S.E.2d 550, 562 (1996); State v. Lo, 264 Wis.2d 1 , 665 N.W.2d 756, 772 (2003); see also Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807 , 59 P.3d 463, 471 (2002) (adopting Teague for determining the retroactivity of Ring but reserving discretion in its application to state cases); State v. Purnell, 161 N.J. 44 , 735 A.2d 513, 521 (1999) (using a Teague analysis for determining the retroactivity of federal constitutional rights). [29] See, e.g., Ex parte Coker, 575 So.2d 43, 52 (Ala.1990); Pohutski v. City of Allen Park, 46 2004Pierre, 118 Wash.2d 321 , 823 P.2d 492, 494 (1992); State v. Blake, 197 W.Va. 700 , 478 S.E.2d 550, 562 (1996); State v. Lo, 264 Wis.2d 1 , 665 N.W.2d 756, 772 (2003); see also Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807 , 59 P.3d 463, 471 (2002) (adopting Teague for determining the retroactivity of Ring but reserving discretion in its application to state cases); State v. Purnell, 161 N.J. 44 , 735 A.2d 513, 521 (1999) (using a Teague analysis for determining the retroactivity of federal constitutional rights). [29] See, e.g., Ex parte Coker, 575 So.2d 43, 52 (Ala.1990); Pohutski v. City of Allen Park, 46 | 1 | 1 |
| Pohutski v. City of Allen Parkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cowell v. Leapleygreen | 1 | 1 |
State v. Blakegreen2 sentences2004Pierre, 118 Wash.2d 321 , 823 P.2d 492, 494 (1992); State v. Blake, 197 W.Va. 700 , 478 S.E.2d 550, 562 (1996); State v. Lo, 264 Wis.2d 1 , 665 N.W.2d 756, 772 (2003); see also Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807 , 59 P.3d 463, 471 (2002) (adopting Teague for determining the retroactivity of Ring but reserving discretion in its application to state cases); State v. Purnell, 161 N.J. 44 , 735 A.2d 513, 521 (1999) (using a Teague analysis for determining the retroactivity of federal constitutional rights). [29] See, e.g., Ex parte Coker, 575 So.2d 43, 52 (Ala.1990); Pohutski v. City of Allen Park, 46 2004Pierre, 118 Wash.2d 321 , 823 P.2d 492, 494 (1992); State v. Blake, 197 W.Va. 700 , 478 S.E.2d 550, 562 (1996); State v. Lo, 264 Wis.2d 1 , 665 N.W.2d 756, 772 (2003); see also Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807 , 59 P.3d 463, 471 (2002) (adopting Teague for determining the retroactivity of Ring but reserving discretion in its application to state cases); State v. Purnell, 161 N.J. 44 , 735 A.2d 513, 521 (1999) (using a Teague analysis for determining the retroactivity of federal constitutional rights). [29] See, e.g., Ex parte Coker, 575 So.2d 43, 52 (Ala.1990); Pohutski v. City of Allen Park, 46 | 1 | 1 |
| Lambrix v. Singletarygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pickett v. Illinoisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Linkletter v. Walker
red
2 sentences2005See supra note 14. [16] For an extended discussion of why the restrictive Teague standard is inappropriate as a standard for retroactivity in state courts see my opinion in Hughes and the authorities discussed therein. [17] Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 , 85 S.Ct. 1731 , 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965). [18] Indeed, perhaps the most notable case emanating from Florida that was given retroactive application was one that involved judicial process and the right to counsel during that process. 2005See supra note 14. [16] For an extended discussion of why the restrictive Teague standard is inappropriate as a standard for retroactivity in state courts see my opinion in Hughes and the authorities discussed therein. [17] Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 , 85 S.Ct. 1731 , 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965). [18] Indeed, perhaps the most notable case emanating from Florida that was given retroactive application was one that involved judicial process and the right to counsel during that process. | 2 | 2005–2013 |
Erlinger v. United States
green
2 sentences2025In his dissenting opinion, Justice Kavanaugh observed that “[f]or any case that is already final, the Teague rule will presumably bar the defendant from raising today’s new rule in collateral proceedings.” 602 U.S. at 859 n.3 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (citing Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U.S. 255, 258 (2021); Teague v. - 12 - change in the law only applies retroactively to final cases if the change (1) emanates from the Florida Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court, (2) is constitutional in nature, and (3) constitutes a development of fundamental significance. 2025In his dissenting opinion, Justice Kavanaugh observed that “[f]or any case that is already final, the Teague rule will presumably bar the defendant from raising today’s new rule in collateral proceedings.” 602 U.S. at 859 n.3 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (citing Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U.S. 255, 258 (2021); Teague v. - 12 - change in the law only applies retroactively to final cases if the change (1) emanates from the Florida Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court, (2) is constitutional in nature, and (3) constitutes a development of fundamental significance. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Danforth v. Minnesota
green
2 sentences2016Jurists have echoed this type of approach as a remedy to the more exacting federal Teague standard.21 Federal courts have employed a similar preservation approach, and it is “one of the dominant means by which federal courts limit the disruptive effects of legal change in the context of direct review of federal criminal convictions.”22 Regardless of the limited federal approach, scholars urge state courts to pull retroactivity off Teague’s constitutional floor,23 which the Supreme Court expressly permitted in Danforth v. Minnesota. 552 U.S. 264 , 280 (2008). 2016Jurists have echoed this type of approach as a remedy to the more exacting federal Teague standard. 21 Federal courts have employed a similar preservation approach, and it is “one of the dominant means by which federal courts limit the disruptive effects of legal change in the context of direct review of federal criminal convictions.” 22 Regardless of the limited federal approach, scholars urge state courts to pull retroactivity off Teague’s constitutional floor, 23 which the Supreme Court expressly permitted in Danforth v. Minnesota. 552 U.S. 264 , 280, 128 S.Ct. 1029 , 169 L.Ed.2d 859 (2008) | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Mark James Asay v. State of Florida, SC16-102 Mark James Asay v. Julie L. Jones, etc. & SC16-628 Mark James Asay v. Julie L. Jones, etc.
green
2 sentences2016SC16-223, SC16-102, & SC16-628, 210 So.3d 1 , 2016 WL 7406538 (slip op. issued Fla. Dec. 22, 2016) (Polston, J., concurring); see also Johnson v. State, 904 So.2d 400, 413 (Fla. 2005) (Cantero, J., concurring) (explaining that this Court should apply the Teague standard when determining the retroactivity of United States Supreme Court decisions). 2016SC16-223, SC16-102, & SC16-628, 210 So.3d 1 , 2016 WL 7406538 (slip op. issued Fla. Dec. 22, 2016) (Polston, J., concurring); see also Johnson v. State, 904 So.2d 400, 413 (Fla. 2005) (Cantero, J., concurring) (explaining that this Court should apply the Teague standard when determining the retroactivity of United States Supreme Court decisions). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Roper v. Simmons
green
2 sentences2013I echo (and will not repeat) the analysis set forth by then-Justice Raoul Cantero in Windom v. State, 886 So.2d 915, 941-45 (Cantero, J., specially concurring) urging the Supreme Court to abandon the Witt standard in favor of Teague where the newly-announced rule of law emanates from the United States Supreme Court and is premised upon a federal constitutional right. .Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 , 125 S.Ct. 1183 , 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of eighteen when their crimes were committed. 2013I echo (and will not repeat) the analysis set forth by then-Justice Raoul Cantero in Windom v. State, 886 So.2d 915, 941-45 (Cantero, J., specially concurring) urging the Supreme Court to abandon the Witt standard in favor of Teague where the newly-announced rule of law emanates from the United States Supreme Court and is premised upon a federal constitutional right. .Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 , 125 S.Ct. 1183 , 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of eighteen when their crimes were committed. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Gideon v. Wainwright
green
2 sentences2005Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). [19] The majority relies on out-of-context statements from Ring to bolster its analysis. 2005Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). [19] The majority relies on out-of-context statements from Ring to bolster its analysis. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Llanez-Espinoza v. United States green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Alonso-Ochoa v. United States green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Guadalupe Uriarte v. United States green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Zuluaga v. Massachusetts green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Knight v. York, Superintendent, Albemarle Correctional Institution
green
2 sentences2004Pierre, 118 Wash.2d 321 , 823 P.2d 492, 494 (1992); State v. Blake, 197 W.Va. 700 , 478 S.E.2d 550, 562 (1996); State v. Lo, 264 Wis.2d 1 , 665 N.W.2d 756, 772 (2003); see also Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807 , 59 P.3d 463, 471 (2002) (adopting Teague for determining the retroactivity of Ring but reserving discretion in its application to state cases); State v. Purnell, 161 N.J. 44 , 735 A.2d 513, 521 (1999) (using a Teague analysis for determining the retroactivity of federal constitutional rights). [29] See, e.g., Ex parte Coker, 575 So.2d 43, 52 (Ala.1990); Pohutski v. City of Allen Park, 46 2004Pierre, 118 Wash.2d 321 , 823 P.2d 492, 494 (1992); State v. Blake, 197 W.Va. 700 , 478 S.E.2d 550, 562 (1996); State v. Lo, 264 Wis.2d 1 , 665 N.W.2d 756, 772 (2003); see also Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807 , 59 P.3d 463, 471 (2002) (adopting Teague for determining the retroactivity of Ring but reserving discretion in its application to state cases); State v. Purnell, 161 N.J. 44 , 735 A.2d 513, 521 (1999) (using a Teague analysis for determining the retroactivity of federal constitutional rights). [29] See, e.g., Ex parte Coker, 575 So.2d 43, 52 (Ala.1990); Pohutski v. City of Allen Park, 46 | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Bennafield v. United States
green
2 sentences2004Pierre, 118 Wash.2d 321 , 823 P.2d 492, 494 (1992); State v. Blake, 197 W.Va. 700 , 478 S.E.2d 550, 562 (1996); State v. Lo, 264 Wis.2d 1 , 665 N.W.2d 756, 772 (2003); see also Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807 , 59 P.3d 463, 471 (2002) (adopting Teague for determining the retroactivity of Ring but reserving discretion in its application to state cases); State v. Purnell, 161 N.J. 44 , 735 A.2d 513, 521 (1999) (using a Teague analysis for determining the retroactivity of federal constitutional rights). [29] See, e.g., Ex parte Coker, 575 So.2d 43, 52 (Ala.1990); Pohutski v. City of Allen Park, 46 2004Pierre, 118 Wash.2d 321 , 823 P.2d 492, 494 (1992); State v. Blake, 197 W.Va. 700 , 478 S.E.2d 550, 562 (1996); State v. Lo, 264 Wis.2d 1 , 665 N.W.2d 756, 772 (2003); see also Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807 , 59 P.3d 463, 471 (2002) (adopting Teague for determining the retroactivity of Ring but reserving discretion in its application to state cases); State v. Purnell, 161 N.J. 44 , 735 A.2d 513, 521 (1999) (using a Teague analysis for determining the retroactivity of federal constitutional rights). [29] See, e.g., Ex parte Coker, 575 So.2d 43, 52 (Ala.1990); Pohutski v. City of Allen Park, 46 | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Markowski v. Securities and Exchange Commission green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Brown v. United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Wahab v. United States green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Moreno-Fuentes v. United States green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Rios-Amaya v. United States green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Ramirez-Ramirez v. United States green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Smith v. United States
green
2 sentences2004Pierre, 118 Wash.2d 321 , 823 P.2d 492, 494 (1992); State v. Blake, 197 W.Va. 700 , 478 S.E.2d 550, 562 (1996); State v. Lo, 264 Wis.2d 1 , 665 N.W.2d 756, 772 (2003); see also Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807 , 59 P.3d 463, 471 (2002) (adopting Teague for determining the retroactivity of Ring but reserving discretion in its application to state cases); State v. Purnell, 161 N.J. 44 , 735 A.2d 513, 521 (1999) (using a Teague analysis for determining the retroactivity of federal constitutional rights). [29] See, e.g., Ex parte Coker, 575 So.2d 43, 52 (Ala.1990); Pohutski v. City of Allen Park, 46 2004Pierre, 118 Wash.2d 321 , 823 P.2d 492, 494 (1992); State v. Blake, 197 W.Va. 700 , 478 S.E.2d 550, 562 (1996); State v. Lo, 264 Wis.2d 1 , 665 N.W.2d 756, 772 (2003); see also Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807 , 59 P.3d 463, 471 (2002) (adopting Teague for determining the retroactivity of Ring but reserving discretion in its application to state cases); State v. Purnell, 161 N.J. 44 , 735 A.2d 513, 521 (1999) (using a Teague analysis for determining the retroactivity of federal constitutional rights). [29] See, e.g., Ex parte Coker, 575 So.2d 43, 52 (Ala.1990); Pohutski v. City of Allen Park, 46 | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Drakes v. Perry, Administrator, General Services Administration green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Justin D., a Juvenile v. United States green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Givens v. State green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Gantorius v. State
green
2 sentences2004Pierre, 118 Wash.2d 321 , 823 P.2d 492, 494 (1992); State v. Blake, 197 W.Va. 700 , 478 S.E.2d 550, 562 (1996); State v. Lo, 264 Wis.2d 1 , 665 N.W.2d 756, 772 (2003); see also Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807 , 59 P.3d 463, 471 (2002) (adopting Teague for determining the retroactivity of Ring but reserving discretion in its application to state cases); State v. Purnell, 161 N.J. 44 , 735 A.2d 513, 521 (1999) (using a Teague analysis for determining the retroactivity of federal constitutional rights). [29] See, e.g., Ex parte Coker, 575 So.2d 43, 52 (Ala.1990); Pohutski v. City of Allen Park, 46 2004Pierre, 118 Wash.2d 321 , 823 P.2d 492, 494 (1992); State v. Blake, 197 W.Va. 700 , 478 S.E.2d 550, 562 (1996); State v. Lo, 264 Wis.2d 1 , 665 N.W.2d 756, 772 (2003); see also Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807 , 59 P.3d 463, 471 (2002) (adopting Teague for determining the retroactivity of Ring but reserving discretion in its application to state cases); State v. Purnell, 161 N.J. 44 , 735 A.2d 513, 521 (1999) (using a Teague analysis for determining the retroactivity of federal constitutional rights). [29] See, e.g., Ex parte Coker, 575 So.2d 43, 52 (Ala.1990); Pohutski v. City of Allen Park, 46 | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Penry v. Lynaugh red | 1 | 2004–2004 |
House v. State
green
2 sentences2004Pierre, 118 Wash.2d 321 , 823 P.2d 492, 494 (1992); State v. Blake, 197 W.Va. 700 , 478 S.E.2d 550, 562 (1996); State v. Lo, 264 Wis.2d 1 , 665 N.W.2d 756, 772 (2003); see also Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807 , 59 P.3d 463, 471 (2002) (adopting Teague for determining the retroactivity of Ring but reserving discretion in its application to state cases); State v. Purnell, 161 N.J. 44 , 735 A.2d 513, 521 (1999) (using a Teague analysis for determining the retroactivity of federal constitutional rights). [29] See, e.g., Ex parte Coker, 575 So.2d 43, 52 (Ala.1990); Pohutski v. City of Allen Park, 46 2004Pierre, 118 Wash.2d 321 , 823 P.2d 492, 494 (1992); State v. Blake, 197 W.Va. 700 , 478 S.E.2d 550, 562 (1996); State v. Lo, 264 Wis.2d 1 , 665 N.W.2d 756, 772 (2003); see also Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807 , 59 P.3d 463, 471 (2002) (adopting Teague for determining the retroactivity of Ring but reserving discretion in its application to state cases); State v. Purnell, 161 N.J. 44 , 735 A.2d 513, 521 (1999) (using a Teague analysis for determining the retroactivity of federal constitutional rights). [29] See, e.g., Ex parte Coker, 575 So.2d 43, 52 (Ala.1990); Pohutski v. City of Allen Park, 46 | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Teague v. Lane green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Quoc Thai Minh Thuy v. United States green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Alfaro-Rojas v. United States
green
2 sentences2004Pierre, 118 Wash.2d 321 , 823 P.2d 492, 494 (1992); State v. Blake, 197 W.Va. 700 , 478 S.E.2d 550, 562 (1996); State v. Lo, 264 Wis.2d 1 , 665 N.W.2d 756, 772 (2003); see also Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807 , 59 P.3d 463, 471 (2002) (adopting Teague for determining the retroactivity of Ring but reserving discretion in its application to state cases); State v. Purnell, 161 N.J. 44 , 735 A.2d 513, 521 (1999) (using a Teague analysis for determining the retroactivity of federal constitutional rights). [29] See, e.g., Ex parte Coker, 575 So.2d 43, 52 (Ala.1990); Pohutski v. City of Allen Park, 46 2004Pierre, 118 Wash.2d 321 , 823 P.2d 492, 494 (1992); State v. Blake, 197 W.Va. 700 , 478 S.E.2d 550, 562 (1996); State v. Lo, 264 Wis.2d 1 , 665 N.W.2d 756, 772 (2003); see also Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807 , 59 P.3d 463, 471 (2002) (adopting Teague for determining the retroactivity of Ring but reserving discretion in its application to state cases); State v. Purnell, 161 N.J. 44 , 735 A.2d 513, 521 (1999) (using a Teague analysis for determining the retroactivity of federal constitutional rights). [29] See, e.g., Ex parte Coker, 575 So.2d 43, 52 (Ala.1990); Pohutski v. City of Allen Park, 46 | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Clark v. United States green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Redman v. United States
green
2 sentences2004Pierre, 118 Wash.2d 321 , 823 P.2d 492, 494 (1992); State v. Blake, 197 W.Va. 700 , 478 S.E.2d 550, 562 (1996); State v. Lo, 264 Wis.2d 1 , 665 N.W.2d 756, 772 (2003); see also Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807 , 59 P.3d 463, 471 (2002) (adopting Teague for determining the retroactivity of Ring but reserving discretion in its application to state cases); State v. Purnell, 161 N.J. 44 , 735 A.2d 513, 521 (1999) (using a Teague analysis for determining the retroactivity of federal constitutional rights). [29] See, e.g., Ex parte Coker, 575 So.2d 43, 52 (Ala.1990); Pohutski v. City of Allen Park, 46 2004Pierre, 118 Wash.2d 321 , 823 P.2d 492, 494 (1992); State v. Blake, 197 W.Va. 700 , 478 S.E.2d 550, 562 (1996); State v. Lo, 264 Wis.2d 1 , 665 N.W.2d 756, 772 (2003); see also Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807 , 59 P.3d 463, 471 (2002) (adopting Teague for determining the retroactivity of Ring but reserving discretion in its application to state cases); State v. Purnell, 161 N.J. 44 , 735 A.2d 513, 521 (1999) (using a Teague analysis for determining the retroactivity of federal constitutional rights). [29] See, e.g., Ex parte Coker, 575 So.2d 43, 52 (Ala.1990); Pohutski v. City of Allen Park, 46 | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Medina-Garcia v. United States green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Osterback v. Ingram green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Philistin v. Pennsylvania green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Coleman v. United States green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Claiborne v. United States green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Warren Wesley Summerlin v. Terry L. Stewart, Director of Arizona Department of Corrections green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Bottoson v. Moore
green
2 sentences2004Pierre, 118 Wash.2d 321 , 823 P.2d 492, 494 (1992); State v. Blake, 197 W.Va. 700 , 478 S.E.2d 550, 562 (1996); State v. Lo, 264 Wis.2d 1 , 665 N.W.2d 756, 772 (2003); see also Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807 , 59 P.3d 463, 471 (2002) (adopting Teague for determining the retroactivity of Ring but reserving discretion in its application to state cases); State v. Purnell, 161 N.J. 44 , 735 A.2d 513, 521 (1999) (using a Teague analysis for determining the retroactivity of federal constitutional rights). [29] See, e.g., Ex parte Coker, 575 So.2d 43, 52 (Ala.1990); Pohutski v. City of Allen Park, 46 2004Pierre, 118 Wash.2d 321 , 823 P.2d 492, 494 (1992); State v. Blake, 197 W.Va. 700 , 478 S.E.2d 550, 562 (1996); State v. Lo, 264 Wis.2d 1 , 665 N.W.2d 756, 772 (2003); see also Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807 , 59 P.3d 463, 471 (2002) (adopting Teague for determining the retroactivity of Ring but reserving discretion in its application to state cases); State v. Purnell, 161 N.J. 44 , 735 A.2d 513, 521 (1999) (using a Teague analysis for determining the retroactivity of federal constitutional rights). [29] See, e.g., Ex parte Coker, 575 So.2d 43, 52 (Ala.1990); Pohutski v. City of Allen Park, 46 | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Union Bleaching & Finishing Co. v. Barker Fuel Co. green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Steffa v. State green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Merritt v. State green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.