Teague rule in Texas

2014Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 , 128 S.Ct. 1029 , 169 L.Ed.2d 859 (2008) (Teague does not constrain the authority of state courts to give broader effect to new rules of criminal procedure); State v. Smart, 202 P.3d 1130, 1136 (Alaska 2009) (“Danforth ... allows us to apply either the Teague test for full retroactivity or a state constitutional test so long as the state test is at least as comprehensive as the federal test.”). .

2014Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 , 128 S.Ct. 1029 , 169 L.Ed.2d 859 (2008) (Teague does not constrain the authority of state courts to give broader effect to new rules of criminal procedure); State v. Smart, 202 P.3d 1130, 1136 (Alaska 2009) (“Danforth ... allows us to apply either the Teague test for full retroactivity or a state constitutional test so long as the state test is at least as comprehensive as the federal test.”). .

2014See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 417 , 124 S.Ct. 2504 , 159 L.Ed.2d 494 (2004) ("... it should come as no surprise that we have yet to find a new rule that falls under the second Teague exception.”); Keith, 202 S.W.3d at 770 ("It is worth noting that, since Teague, no new rule of criminal procedure has been found to meet that high standard [required for the second exception to apply].”). .

2014Publish. 15 Applicant’s Brief at 23. 16 See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 417 , 124 S.Ct. 2504 , 159 L.Ed.2d 494 (2004) (“ . . . it should come as no surprise that we have yet to find a new rule that falls under the second Teague exception.”); Keith, 202 S.W.3d at 770 (“It is worth noting that, since Teague, no new rule of criminal procedure has been found to meet that high standard [required for the second exception to apply].”). 17 See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 , 128 S.Ct. 1029 , 169 L.Ed.2d 859 (2008) (holding that Teague does not constrain “the authority of state courts to

2014The second Teague exception applies to “watershed rules of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.”14 This is a very 10 Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2470 . 11 Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (internal quotation marks omitted). 12 O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 157 , 117 S.Ct. 1969 , 138 L.Ed.2d 351 (1997). 13 Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2471 . 14 O’Dell, 521 U.S. at 157 . 3 limited exception, and the applicant stated he would not discuss it in his brief.15 In light of the extremely limited nature of this exception,16 and the applicant’s choice not to argu

2012See Commonwealth v. Alebord, 80 Mass.App.Ct. 432, 436-37 , 953 N.E.2d 744, 748-49 (2011) (Presley applies retroactively in post-conviction proceedings because it is not a "new rule” in contemplation of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 , 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), where Massachusetts has adopted the Teague standard for determining retroactivity in a collateral attack).

2015Further, in applying the “Teague doctrine,” the United States Supreme Court has adopted a similar definition of the term “final, conviction.” Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 411 , 124 S.Ct. 2504, 2510 , 159 L.Ed.2d 494 (2004).

2015Further, in applying the “Teague doctrine,” the United States Supreme Court has adopted a similar definition of the term “final, conviction.” Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 411 , 124 S.Ct. 2504, 2510 , 159 L.Ed.2d 494 (2004).

2014Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 , 128 S.Ct. 1029 , 169 L.Ed.2d 859 (2008) (Teague does not constrain the authority of state courts to give broader effect to new rules of criminal procedure); State v. Smart, 202 P.3d 1130, 1136 (Alaska 2009) (“Danforth ... allows us to apply either the Teague test for full retroactivity or a state constitutional test so long as the state test is at least as comprehensive as the federal test.”). .

2014Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 , 128 S.Ct. 1029 , 169 L.Ed.2d 859 (2008) (Teague does not constrain the authority of state courts to give broader effect to new rules of criminal procedure); State v. Smart, 202 P.3d 1130, 1136 (Alaska 2009) (“Danforth ... allows us to apply either the Teague test for full retroactivity or a state constitutional test so long as the state test is at least as comprehensive as the federal test.”). .

2012See Commonwealth v. Alebord, 80 Mass.App.Ct. 432, 436-37 , 953 N.E.2d 744, 748-49 (2011) (Presley applies retroactively in post-conviction proceedings because it is not a "new rule” in contemplation of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 , 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), where Massachusetts has adopted the Teague standard for determining retroactivity in a collateral attack).

2012See Commonwealth v. Alebord, 80 Mass.App.Ct. 432, 436-37 , 953 N.E.2d 744, 748-49 (2011) (Presley applies retroactively in post-conviction proceedings because it is not a "new rule” in contemplation of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 , 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), where Massachusetts has adopted the Teague standard for determining retroactivity in a collateral attack).

2014Publish. 15 Applicant’s Brief at 23. 16 See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 417 , 124 S.Ct. 2504 , 159 L.Ed.2d 494 (2004) (“ . . . it should come as no surprise that we have yet to find a new rule that falls under the second Teague exception.”); Keith, 202 S.W.3d at 770 (“It is worth noting that, since Teague, no new rule of criminal procedure has been found to meet that high standard [required for the second exception to apply].”). 17 See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 , 128 S.Ct. 1029 , 169 L.Ed.2d 859 (2008) (holding that Teague does not constrain “the authority of state courts to

2011Ex parte Lave, 257 S.W.3d at 237 , citing Ex parte Keith, 202 S.W.3d 767, 769 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (analyzing the retroactivity of Crawford v. Washington [ 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004) ] under the Teague rule). *729 The threshold inquiry under Teag-ue is whether the rule that the habeas applicant seeks to apply retroactively is a “new rule.” See Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 467 , 113 S.Ct. 892, 897 , 122 L.Ed.2d 260 (1993).

2015Fifteen years after Teague was- decided, the Supreme Court clarified that, with respect to the first Teague exception, “[n]ew substantive rules generally apply retroactively.” Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351 , 124 S.Ct. 2519 , 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004) (emphasis in original).

2015Fifteen years after Teague was- decided, the Supreme Court clarified that, with respect to the first Teague exception, “[n]ew substantive rules generally apply retroactively.” Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351 , 124 S.Ct. 2519 , 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004) (emphasis in original).

2014Under the Teague framework, a “new rule” applies retroactively in a collateral proceeding only if the rule (1) is substantive or (2) is a “watershed” rule of criminal procedure.13 New substantive rules “apply retroactively because they ‘necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of an act that the law does not make criminal’ or faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him” because of his status or offense.14 Watershed rules of criminal procedure also apply retroactively because those rules implicate “the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal pr

2014Under the Teague framework, a “new rule” applies retroactively in a collateral proceeding only if the rule (1) is substantive or (2) is a “watershed” rule of criminal procedure.13 New substantive rules “apply retroactively because they ‘necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of an act that the law does not make criminal’ or faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him” because of his status or offense.14 Watershed rules of criminal procedure also apply retroactively because those rules implicate “the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal pr

2014See In re Sparks, 657 F.3d 258, 261-62 (5th Cir.2011) (indicating Graham was made retroactive on collateral review by the Supreme Court as a matter of logical necessity under Tyler); see also Tyler, 533 U.S. [656, 669, 121 S.Ct. 2478 (2001)] (O’Connor, J., concurring) (describing the syllogistic relationship between Teague’s exception to nonretroactivity for rules placing certain conduct beyond the power of the state to proscribe and subsequent cases that fit into Teague's exception); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 , 109 S.Ct. 2934 , 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (”[T]he first exception set fort

2014See In re Sparks, 657 F.3d 258, 261-62 (5th Cir.2011) (indicating Graham was made retroactive on collateral review by the Supreme Court as a matter of logical necessity under Tyler); see also Tyler, 533 U.S. [656, 669, 121 S.Ct. 2478 (2001)] (O’Connor, J., concurring) (describing the syllogistic relationship between Teague’s exception to nonretroactivity for rules placing certain conduct beyond the power of the state to proscribe and subsequent cases that fit into Teague's exception); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 , 109 S.Ct. 2934 , 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (”[T]he first exception set fort

2014See In re Sparks, 657 F.3d 258, 261-62 (5th Cir.2011) (indicating Graham was made retroactive on collateral review by the Supreme Court as a matter of logical necessity under Tyler); see also Tyler, 533 U.S. [656, 669, 121 S.Ct. 2478 (2001)] (O’Connor, J., concurring) (describing the syllogistic relationship between Teague’s exception to nonretroactivity for rules placing certain conduct beyond the power of the state to proscribe and subsequent cases that fit into Teague's exception); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 , 109 S.Ct. 2934 , 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (”[T]he first exception set fort

2014See In re Sparks, 657 F.3d 258, 261-62 (5th Cir.2011) (indicating Graham was made retroactive on collateral review by the Supreme Court as a matter of logical necessity under Tyler); see also Tyler, 533 U.S. [656, 669, 121 S.Ct. 2478 (2001)] (O’Connor, J., concurring) (describing the syllogistic relationship between Teague’s exception to nonretroactivity for rules placing certain conduct beyond the power of the state to proscribe and subsequent cases that fit into Teague's exception); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 , 109 S.Ct. 2934 , 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (”[T]he first exception set fort

2014See In re Sparks, 657 F.3d 258, 261-62 (5th Cir.2011) (indicating Graham was made retroactive on collateral review by the Supreme Court as a matter of logical necessity under Tyler); see also Tyler, 533 U.S. [656, 669, 121 S.Ct. 2478 (2001)] (O’Connor, J., concurring) (describing the syllogistic relationship between Teague’s exception to nonretroactivity for rules placing certain conduct beyond the power of the state to proscribe and subsequent cases that fit into Teague's exception); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 , 109 S.Ct. 2934 , 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (”[T]he first exception set fort

2014See In re Sparks, 657 F.3d 258 , 261–62 (5th Cir. 2011) (indicating Graham was made retroactive on collateral review by the Supreme Court as a matter of logical necessity under Tyler ); see also Tyler, 533 U.S. [656, 669 (2001)] (O’Connor, J., concurring) (describing the syllogistic relationship between Teague's exception to nonretroactivity for rules placing certain conduct beyond the power of the state to proscribe and subsequent cases that fit into Teague's exception); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989) (“[T]he first exception set forth in Teague should be understood to cover not on

2014See Ex parte Chandler, 182 S.W.3d 350, 358-60 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (noting that “a bar card does not come with a crystal ball attached” and holding that "counsel's performance will be measured against the state of the law in effect during the time of trial and we will not find counsel ineffective where the claimed error is based upon unsettled law”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). .

2014See Ex parte Chandler, 182 S.W.3d 350, 358-60 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (noting that “a bar card does not come with a crystal ball attached” and holding that "counsel's performance will be measured against the state of the law in effect during the time of trial and we will not find counsel ineffective where the claimed error is based upon unsettled law”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). .

2017Castro-Taveras, 841 F.3d at 51 (internal citations omitted).

2017Castro-Taveras, 841 F.3d at 51 (internal citations omitted).

2014Rather, Miller prohibits a sentencing scheme in which a particular sentence is mandatory rather than the result of a process in which the offender’s youth and attendant circumstances are considered.”). 28 Carp, 828 N.W.2d at 711 (“Our determination that Miller does not comprise a substantive new rule and, therefore, is not subject to retroactive application for cases on collateral review is supported by the fact that the ruling does not place certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.”) (quotation marks omitted). 29

2014Rather, Miller prohibits a sentencing scheme in which a particular sentence is mandatory rather than the result of a process in which the offender’s youth and attendant circumstances are considered.”). 28 Carp, 828 N.W.2d at 711 (“Our determination that Miller does not comprise a substantive new rule and, therefore, is not subject to retroactive application for cases on collateral review is supported by the fact that the ruling does not place certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.”) (quotation marks omitted). 29

2014Rather, Miller prohibits a sentencing scheme in which a particular sentence is mandatory rather than the result of a process in which the offender’s youth and attendant circumstances are considered.”). 28 Carp, 828 N.W.2d at 711 (“Our determination that Miller does not comprise a substantive new rule and, therefore, is not subject to retroactive application for cases on collateral review is supported by the fact that the ruling does not place certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.”) (quotation marks omitted). 29

2014Under the Teague framework, a “new rule” applies retroactively in a collateral proceeding only if the rule (1) is substantive or (2) is a “watershed” rule of criminal procedure.13 New substantive rules “apply retroactively because they ‘necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of an act that the law does not make criminal’ or faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him” because of his status or offense.14 Watershed rules of criminal procedure also apply retroactively because those rules implicate “the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal pr

2014Under the Teague framework, a “new rule” applies retroactively in a collateral proceeding only if the rule (1) is substantive or (2) is a “watershed” rule of criminal procedure.13 New substantive rules “apply retroactively because they ‘necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of an act that the law does not make criminal’ or faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him” because of his status or offense.14 Watershed rules of criminal procedure also apply retroactively because those rules implicate “the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal pr

2014Under the Teague framework, a “new rule” applies retroactively in a collateral proceeding only if the rule (1) is substantive or (2) is a “watershed” rule of criminal procedure.13 New substantive rules “apply retroactively because they ‘necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of an act that the law does not make criminal’ or faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him” because of his status or offense.14 Watershed rules of criminal procedure also apply retroactively because those rules implicate “the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal pr

2014Under the Teague framework, a “new rule” applies retroactively in a collateral proceeding only if the rule (1) is substantive or (2) is a “watershed” rule of criminal procedure.13 New substantive rules “apply retroactively because they ‘necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of an act that the law does not make criminal’ or faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him” because of his status or offense.14 Watershed rules of criminal procedure also apply retroactively because those rules implicate “the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal pr

2014See In re Sparks, 657 F.3d 258, 261-62 (5th Cir.2011) (indicating Graham was made retroactive on collateral review by the Supreme Court as a matter of logical necessity under Tyler); see also Tyler, 533 U.S. [656, 669, 121 S.Ct. 2478 (2001)] (O’Connor, J., concurring) (describing the syllogistic relationship between Teague’s exception to nonretroactivity for rules placing certain conduct beyond the power of the state to proscribe and subsequent cases that fit into Teague's exception); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 , 109 S.Ct. 2934 , 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (”[T]he first exception set fort

2014Rather, Miller prohibits a sentencing scheme in which a particular sentence is mandatory rather than the result of a process in which the offender’s youth and attendant circumstances are considered.”). 28 Carp, 828 N.W.2d at 711 (“Our determination that Miller does not comprise a substantive new rule and, therefore, is not subject to retroactive application for cases on collateral review is supported by the fact that the ruling does not place certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.”) (quotation marks omitted). 29

2014Rather, Miller prohibits a sentencing scheme in which a particular sentence is mandatory rather than the result of a process in which the offender’s youth and attendant circumstances are considered.”). 28 Carp, 828 N.W.2d at 711 (“Our determination that Miller does not comprise a substantive new rule and, therefore, is not subject to retroactive application for cases on collateral review is supported by the fact that the ruling does not place certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.”) (quotation marks omitted). 29