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9 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Saffle v. Parksgreen2 sentences2008See, e,g., Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 , 110 S.Ct. 1257 , 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990) (“Foremost among [the underlying purposes of the habeas corpus writ 1 ] is ensuring that state courts conduct criminal proceedings in accordance with the Constitution as interpreted at the time of the proceedings.”) (citing Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 412-14 , 110 S.Ct. 1212 , 108 L.Ed.2d 347 (1990)) (emphasis added); O’Dell v. Netherlands 521 U.S. 151, 156 , 117 S.Ct. 1969 , 138 L.Ed.2d 351 (1997) (in explaining second step of Teague analysis, clarifying that question is whether state court consideri 2008See, e,g., Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 , 110 S.Ct. 1257 , 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990) (“Foremost among [the underlying purposes of the habeas corpus writ 1 ] is ensuring that state courts conduct criminal proceedings in accordance with the Constitution as interpreted at the time of the proceedings.”) (citing Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 412-14 , 110 S.Ct. 1212 , 108 L.Ed.2d 347 (1990)) (emphasis added); O’Dell v. Netherlands 521 U.S. 151, 156 , 117 S.Ct. 1969 , 138 L.Ed.2d 351 (1997) (in explaining second step of Teague analysis, clarifying that question is whether state court consideri | 2 | 2 |
North Carolina v. Pearcered2 sentences1997The Fifth Amendment categorically states that “[n]o person shall ... be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb....” The double jeopardy clause is a “basic constitutional guarantee.” North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 718 , 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2077 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656, 665 (1969). 1997The Fifth Amendment categorically states that “[n]o person shall ... be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb....” The double jeopardy clause is a “basic constitutional guarantee.” North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 718 , 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2077 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656, 665 (1969). | 2 | 2 |
cluster 583595green2 sentences1998United States v. Salerno, 964 F.2d 172, 179 (2d Cir.1992). 7 .Given this interpretation of the first Teague exception, the Court in Penry concluded that a new rule prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded defendants would fall under the first exception to the general rule of rionretroactivity and would apply to defendants on collateral review — assuming that the Court found, as a substantive matter, that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of mentally retarded persons such as Penry regardless of the procedures followed. 1997Contra, U.S. v. Salerno, 964 F.2d 172 (2nd Cir.1992), (Grady announced new rule which could not be applied retroactively because rule did not satisfy either Teague exception). | 1 | 3 |
Butler v. McKellargreen2 sentences2008See, e,g., Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 , 110 S.Ct. 1257 , 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990) (“Foremost among [the underlying purposes of the habeas corpus writ 1 ] is ensuring that state courts conduct criminal proceedings in accordance with the Constitution as interpreted at the time of the proceedings.”) (citing Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 412-14 , 110 S.Ct. 1212 , 108 L.Ed.2d 347 (1990)) (emphasis added); O’Dell v. Netherlands 521 U.S. 151, 156 , 117 S.Ct. 1969 , 138 L.Ed.2d 351 (1997) (in explaining second step of Teague analysis, clarifying that question is whether state court consideri 2008See, e,g., Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 , 110 S.Ct. 1257 , 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990) (“Foremost among [the underlying purposes of the habeas corpus writ 1 ] is ensuring that state courts conduct criminal proceedings in accordance with the Constitution as interpreted at the time of the proceedings.”) (citing Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 412-14 , 110 S.Ct. 1212 , 108 L.Ed.2d 347 (1990)) (emphasis added); O’Dell v. Netherlands 521 U.S. 151, 156 , 117 S.Ct. 1969 , 138 L.Ed.2d 351 (1997) (in explaining second step of Teague analysis, clarifying that question is whether state court consideri | 1 | 2 |
State v. Mohlergreen2 sentences1998See State v. Mohler, 679 N.E.2d 170, 173 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) ("a rule that double jeopardy applies is equivalent to the rule considered in Penry"); McIntyre, 938 F.2d at 904 ("a rule concerning double jeopardy, such as the Grady rule, falls under the first Teague exception and must be accorded full retroactive effect”). 10 . 1998The court therefore determined that the Bryant holding “falls squarely under the first Teague exception and must be accorded full retroactive effect.” Id. | 1 | 2 |
Teague v. Lanegreen2 sentences1996He correctly states that a new rule should be applied retroactively if it requires the observance of “those procedures that ... are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” and “without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.” Id. (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 307, 314 , 109 S.Ct. at 1073, 1077 , 103 L.Ed.2d at 353, 358 ). 1996He correctly states that a new rule should be applied retroactively if it requires the observance of “those procedures that ... are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” and “without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.” Id. (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 307, 314 , 109 S.Ct. at 1073, 1077 , 103 L.Ed.2d at 353, 358 ). | 1 | 2 |
Beard v. Banksgreen2 sentences2008We need not apply the Teague analysis to the rule announced in Fajardo , however, because it fails to satisfy an even more fundamental requirement of that case and its progeny, namely, that the rule be “a rule of constitutional criminal procedure[.]” Id. (citing Beard, 542 U.S. at 410, 124 S.Ct. 2504 ) (emphasis added). 2008We need not apply the Teague analysis to the rule announced in Fajardo , however, because it fails to satisfy an even more fundamental requirement of that case and its progeny, namely, that the rule be “a rule of constitutional criminal procedure[.]” Id. (citing Beard, 542 U.S. at 410, 124 S.Ct. 2504 ) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Uphoffgreen2 sentences2008See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 514 N.E.2d 282, 284 (Ind.1987) (declaring that the resolution of whether the new rule on the use of a defendant’s post-Mircroda silence is retroactive “is controlled by the recent decision in Griffith v. Kentucky,” which was later incorporated into the Teague analysis); Bintz v. Bertrand, 403 F.3d 859, 865-67 (7th Cir.2005) (applying Teague to determine whether the exclusion of testimonial out-of-court statements applies retroactively); Mungo v. Duncan, 393 F.3d 327, 335-36 (2d Cir.2004) (same); Brown v. Uphoff 381 F.3d 1219, 1225-27 (10th Cir.2004) (same); Winsett 2008See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 514 N.E.2d 282, 284 (Ind.1987) (declaring that the resolution of whether the new rule on the use of a defendant’s post-Mircroda silence is retroactive “is controlled by the recent decision in Griffith v. Kentucky,” which was later incorporated into the Teague analysis); Bintz v. Bertrand, 403 F.3d 859, 865-67 (7th Cir.2005) (applying Teague to determine whether the exclusion of testimonial out-of-court statements applies retroactively); Mungo v. Duncan, 393 F.3d 327, 335-36 (2d Cir.2004) (same); Brown v. Uphoff 381 F.3d 1219, 1225-27 (10th Cir.2004) (same); Winsett | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Stategreen2 sentences2008See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 514 N.E.2d 282, 284 (Ind.1987) (declaring that the resolution of whether the new rule on the use of a defendant’s post-Mircroda silence is retroactive “is controlled by the recent decision in Griffith v. Kentucky,” which was later incorporated into the Teague analysis); Bintz v. Bertrand, 403 F.3d 859, 865-67 (7th Cir.2005) (applying Teague to determine whether the exclusion of testimonial out-of-court statements applies retroactively); Mungo v. Duncan, 393 F.3d 327, 335-36 (2d Cir.2004) (same); Brown v. Uphoff 381 F.3d 1219, 1225-27 (10th Cir.2004) (same); Winsett 2008See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 514 N.E.2d 282, 284 (Ind.1987) (declaring that the resolution of whether the new rule on the use of a defendant’s post-Mircroda silence is retroactive “is controlled by the recent decision in Griffith v. Kentucky,” which was later incorporated into the Teague analysis); Bintz v. Bertrand, 403 F.3d 859, 865-67 (7th Cir.2005) (applying Teague to determine whether the exclusion of testimonial out-of-court statements applies retroactively); Mungo v. Duncan, 393 F.3d 327, 335-36 (2d Cir.2004) (same); Brown v. Uphoff 381 F.3d 1219, 1225-27 (10th Cir.2004) (same); Winsett | 1 | 1 |
Larry Winsett v. Odie Washington, Warden of Dixon Correctional Centergreen2 sentences2008See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 514 N.E.2d 282, 284 (Ind.1987) (declaring that the resolution of whether the new rule on the use of a defendant’s post-Mircroda silence is retroactive “is controlled by the recent decision in Griffith v. Kentucky,” which was later incorporated into the Teague analysis); Bintz v. Bertrand, 403 F.3d 859, 865-67 (7th Cir.2005) (applying Teague to determine whether the exclusion of testimonial out-of-court statements applies retroactively); Mungo v. Duncan, 393 F.3d 327, 335-36 (2d Cir.2004) (same); Brown v. Uphoff 381 F.3d 1219, 1225-27 (10th Cir.2004) (same); Winsett 2008See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 514 N.E.2d 282, 284 (Ind.1987) (declaring that the resolution of whether the new rule on the use of a defendant’s post-Mircroda silence is retroactive “is controlled by the recent decision in Griffith v. Kentucky,” which was later incorporated into the Teague analysis); Bintz v. Bertrand, 403 F.3d 859, 865-67 (7th Cir.2005) (applying Teague to determine whether the exclusion of testimonial out-of-court statements applies retroactively); Mungo v. Duncan, 393 F.3d 327, 335-36 (2d Cir.2004) (same); Brown v. Uphoff 381 F.3d 1219, 1225-27 (10th Cir.2004) (same); Winsett | 1 | 1 |
Robert Bintz v. Daniel Bertrandgreen2 sentences2008See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 514 N.E.2d 282, 284 (Ind.1987) (declaring that the resolution of whether the new rule on the use of a defendant’s post-Mircroda silence is retroactive “is controlled by the recent decision in Griffith v. Kentucky,” which was later incorporated into the Teague analysis); Bintz v. Bertrand, 403 F.3d 859, 865-67 (7th Cir.2005) (applying Teague to determine whether the exclusion of testimonial out-of-court statements applies retroactively); Mungo v. Duncan, 393 F.3d 327, 335-36 (2d Cir.2004) (same); Brown v. Uphoff 381 F.3d 1219, 1225-27 (10th Cir.2004) (same); Winsett 2008See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 514 N.E.2d 282, 284 (Ind.1987) (declaring that the resolution of whether the new rule on the use of a defendant’s post-Mircroda silence is retroactive “is controlled by the recent decision in Griffith v. Kentucky,” which was later incorporated into the Teague analysis); Bintz v. Bertrand, 403 F.3d 859, 865-67 (7th Cir.2005) (applying Teague to determine whether the exclusion of testimonial out-of-court statements applies retroactively); Mungo v. Duncan, 393 F.3d 327, 335-36 (2d Cir.2004) (same); Brown v. Uphoff 381 F.3d 1219, 1225-27 (10th Cir.2004) (same); Winsett | 1 | 1 |
Marcus Mungo v. George Duncangreen2 sentences2008See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 514 N.E.2d 282, 284 (Ind.1987) (declaring that the resolution of whether the new rule on the use of a defendant’s post-Mircroda silence is retroactive “is controlled by the recent decision in Griffith v. Kentucky,” which was later incorporated into the Teague analysis); Bintz v. Bertrand, 403 F.3d 859, 865-67 (7th Cir.2005) (applying Teague to determine whether the exclusion of testimonial out-of-court statements applies retroactively); Mungo v. Duncan, 393 F.3d 327, 335-36 (2d Cir.2004) (same); Brown v. Uphoff 381 F.3d 1219, 1225-27 (10th Cir.2004) (same); Winsett 2008See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 514 N.E.2d 282, 284 (Ind.1987) (declaring that the resolution of whether the new rule on the use of a defendant’s post-Mircroda silence is retroactive “is controlled by the recent decision in Griffith v. Kentucky,” which was later incorporated into the Teague analysis); Bintz v. Bertrand, 403 F.3d 859, 865-67 (7th Cir.2005) (applying Teague to determine whether the exclusion of testimonial out-of-court statements applies retroactively); Mungo v. Duncan, 393 F.3d 327, 335-36 (2d Cir.2004) (same); Brown v. Uphoff 381 F.3d 1219, 1225-27 (10th Cir.2004) (same); Winsett | 1 | 1 |
Lambrix v. Singletarygreen2 sentences1998See Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518 , ——, 117 S.Ct. 1517, 1531 , 137 L.Ed.2d 771 (1997) (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 , 110 S.Ct. 1257, 1263-64 , 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990)) (rule at issue not entitled to retroactive effect under Penry because it " 'neither decriminalize[s] a class of conduct nor prohibit[s] the imposition of capital punishment on a particular class of persons' ” (emphasis supplied)); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 , 110 S.Ct. 1212, 1217-18 , 108 L.Ed.2d 347 (1990) (rule at issue not entitled to retroactive effect under Penry because it did not address any 1998See Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518 , ——, 117 S.Ct. 1517, 1531 , 137 L.Ed.2d 771 (1997) (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 , 110 S.Ct. 1257, 1263-64 , 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990)) (rule at issue not entitled to retroactive effect under Penry because it " 'neither decriminalize[s] a class of conduct nor prohibit[s] the imposition of capital punishment on a particular class of persons' ” (emphasis supplied)); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 , 110 S.Ct. 1212, 1217-18 , 108 L.Ed.2d 347 (1990) (rule at issue not entitled to retroactive effect under Penry because it did not address any | 1 | 1 |
Terry D. McIntyre v. Myrna Trickeygreen1 sentence1998See State v. Mohler, 679 N.E.2d 170, 173 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) ("a rule that double jeopardy applies is equivalent to the rule considered in Penry"); McIntyre, 938 F.2d at 904 ("a rule concerning double jeopardy, such as the Grady rule, falls under the first Teague exception and must be accorded full retroactive effect”). 10 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Daniels v. State
green
2 sentences1998Mohler does not contend that the Bryant rule falls under either of these exceptions and we hold that it does not. 6 D-2 Daniels also recognized that Penry expanded the first Teague exception set forth in subsection D-l supra to permit retroactive application for new rules “ ‘prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense.’ ” Daniels, 561 N.E.2d at 490 (quoting Penry, 492 U.S. at 330 , 109 S.Ct. at 2952-53 ). 1997Daniels, 561 N.E.2d at 490 . | 4 | 1996–1998 |
Penry v. Lynaugh
red
2 sentences1998Mohler does not contend that the Bryant rule falls under either of these exceptions and we hold that it does not. 6 D-2 Daniels also recognized that Penry expanded the first Teague exception set forth in subsection D-l supra to permit retroactive application for new rules “ ‘prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense.’ ” Daniels, 561 N.E.2d at 490 (quoting Penry, 492 U.S. at 330 , 109 S.Ct. at 2952-53 ). 1998Mohler does not contend that the Bryant rule falls under either of these exceptions and we hold that it does not. 6 D-2 Daniels also recognized that Penry expanded the first Teague exception set forth in subsection D-l supra to permit retroactive application for new rules “ ‘prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense.’ ” Daniels, 561 N.E.2d at 490 (quoting Penry, 492 U.S. at 330 , 109 S.Ct. at 2952-53 ). | 3 | 1997–1998 |
MacKey v. United States
green
2 sentences1997In both cases, the Constitution itself deprives the State of the power to impose a certain penalty, and the. finality and comity concerns underlying Justice Harlan’s view of retroactivity [expressed in Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 , 91 S.Ct. 1160 , 28 L.Ed.2d 404 (1971)] have little force. 1997In both cases, the Constitution itself deprives the State of the power to impose a certain penalty, and the. finality and comity concerns underlying Justice Harlan’s view of retroactivity [expressed in Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 , 91 S.Ct. 1160 , 28 L.Ed.2d 404 (1971)] have little force. | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Litchfield v. State
green
2 sentences2023Because the jurisdictional rule at issue here doesn’t quite fit the Teague analysis, we offer a modified rule to guide us in similar cases going forward: When a decision implicates a new jurisdictional rule, as in K.C.G., we apply the principle of non-retroactivity, rather than vacate a 17In relevant part, Litchfield held that, for a warrantless trash search to be reasonable, police (1) must retrieve the trash “in substantially the same manner as the trash collector would take it” and (2) must possess an “articulable individualized suspicion” that the subject of the search was engaged in illeg 2023Because the jurisdictional rule at issue here doesn’t quite fit the Teague analysis, we offer a modified rule to guide us in similar cases going forward: When a decision implicates a new jurisdictional rule, as in K.C.G., we apply the principle of non-retroactivity, rather than vacate a 17In relevant part, Litchfield held that, for a warrantless trash search to be reasonable, police (1) must retrieve the trash “in substantially the same manner as the trash collector would take it” and (2) must possess an “articulable individualized suspicion” that the subject of the search was engaged in illeg | 1 | 2023–2023 |
O'Dell v. Netherland
green
2 sentences2008See, e,g., Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 , 110 S.Ct. 1257 , 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990) (“Foremost among [the underlying purposes of the habeas corpus writ 1 ] is ensuring that state courts conduct criminal proceedings in accordance with the Constitution as interpreted at the time of the proceedings.”) (citing Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 412-14 , 110 S.Ct. 1212 , 108 L.Ed.2d 347 (1990)) (emphasis added); O’Dell v. Netherlands 521 U.S. 151, 156 , 117 S.Ct. 1969 , 138 L.Ed.2d 351 (1997) (in explaining second step of Teague analysis, clarifying that question is whether state court consideri 2008See, e,g., Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 , 110 S.Ct. 1257 , 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990) (“Foremost among [the underlying purposes of the habeas corpus writ 1 ] is ensuring that state courts conduct criminal proceedings in accordance with the Constitution as interpreted at the time of the proceedings.”) (citing Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 412-14 , 110 S.Ct. 1212 , 108 L.Ed.2d 347 (1990)) (emphasis added); O’Dell v. Netherlands 521 U.S. 151, 156 , 117 S.Ct. 1969 , 138 L.Ed.2d 351 (1997) (in explaining second step of Teague analysis, clarifying that question is whether state court consideri | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Jacobs v. State
green
2 sentences2008We need not apply the Teague analysis to the rule announced in Fajardo , however, because it fails to satisfy an even more fundamental requirement of that case and its progeny, namely, that the rule be “a rule of constitutional criminal procedure[.]” Id. (citing Beard, 542 U.S. at 410, 124 S.Ct. 2504 ) (emphasis added). 2008We need not apply the Teague analysis to the rule announced in Fajardo , however, because it fails to satisfy an even more fundamental requirement of that case and its progeny, namely, that the rule be “a rule of constitutional criminal procedure[.]” Id. (citing Beard, 542 U.S. at 410, 124 S.Ct. 2504 ) (emphasis added). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Collins v. Youngblood
green
2 sentences1990Daniels directs our attention to Collins v. Youngblood (1990), 497 U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 2715 , 111 L.Ed.2d 30 , in which the Supreme Court noted that during oral argument the State of Texas expressly stated that it "had chosen not to rely" on the Teague rule, and held that the rule is "not 'Jurisdictional'" in the sense that a reviewing court "must raise and decide the issue sua sponte." 110 S.Ct. at 2718, 111 L.Ed.2d at 38, (emphasis in original). 1990Daniels directs our attention to Collins v. Youngblood (1990), 497 U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 2715 , 111 L.Ed.2d 30 , in which the Supreme Court noted that during oral argument the State of Texas expressly stated that it "had chosen not to rely" on the Teague rule, and held that the rule is "not 'Jurisdictional'" in the sense that a reviewing court "must raise and decide the issue sua sponte." 110 S.Ct. at 2718, 111 L.Ed.2d at 38, (emphasis in original). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.