evidence supporting instruction in District of Columbia

12 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1979–2017 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (10)

Case	Followed	Cited
Shuler v. United Statesgreen dc · 1996 · cited in 7 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1997–2017 2 sentences 2017See (Anthony) Shuler v. United States, 677 A.2d 1014, 1017 (D.C. 1996). “[T]he weight of the evidence supporting the instruction is immaterial; as long as a jury could rationally convict on the lesser-included offense after crediting the evidence, the court must give the instruction no matter how inclined it might be to discount that evidence.” Id. 2017See (Anthony) Shuler v. United States, 677 A.2d 1014, 1017 (D.C. 1996). “[T]he weight of the evidence supporting the instruction is immaterial; as long as a jury could rationally convict on the lesser-included offense after crediting the evidence, the court must give the instruction no matter how inclined it might be to discount that evidence.” Id.	5	7
Comber v. United Statesgreen dc · 1990 · cited in 2 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2004–2006 2 sentences 2006A lesser-ineluded offense instruction must be given when there is “evidence, however weak, sufficient to support a conclusion that the defendant is guilty of the lesser rather than the greater offense.” Comber v. United States, 584 A.2d 26, 54 (D.C.1990) (en banc). “[T]he weight of the evidence supporting the instruction is immaterial; as long as a jury could rationally convict on the lesser-ineluded offense after crediting the evidence, the court must give the instruction no matter how inclined it might be to discount that evidence.” Shuler v. United States, 677 A.2d 1014, 1017 (D.C.1996) (em 2004The instruction must be provided if there is “evidence, however weak, sufficient to support a conclusion that the defendant is guilty of the lesser rather than the greater offense.” Comber v. United States, 584 A.2d 26, 54 (D.C.1990) (en banc) (citing Graves v. United States, 490 A.2d 1086 (D.C.1984) (en banc)). “[T]he weight of the evidence supporting the instruction is immaterial; as long as a jury could rationally convict on the lesser-included offense after crediting the evidence, the court must give the instruction no matter how inclined it might be to discount that evidence.” Shuler v. U	2	2
Charles v. United Statesgreen dc · 1977 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013 1 sentence 2013Absent any finding on the degree of care appellants exercised before cutting the wires, we cannot take into account, even if relevant, the fact that some of the cut wires were live ones. .Charles v. United States, 371 A.2d 404, 411 (D.C.1977). .	1	1
United States v. Bradfordgreen dc · 1975 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004 1 sentence 2004Specifically, “[t]he intent necessary to prove criminal negligence involuntary manslaughter is a ‘lack of awareness or failure to perceive the risk of injury from a course of conduct under circumstances in which the actor should have been aware of the risk.’ Thus, where the accused was aware of the risk of harm, but acted in conscious disregard of it, the killing is murder or voluntary manslaughter, and where the accused is not aware of the risk of harm, but should have been, the killing will be involuntary manslaughter.” *1074 Boykins, supra, 702 A.2d at 1250 -51 (quoting United States v. Bra	1	1
United States v. Dale, David M.green cadc · 1998 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999 2 sentences 1999D.C. 335, 338, 140 F.3d 1054, 1056 (1998); Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463 , 478 (9th Cir.1997); Burks v. Dubois, 55 F.3d 712, 717 (1st Cir.1995); Miller v. Comm’n of Correction, 242 Conn. 745 , 700 A.2d 1108 , 1129 n. 28 (1997); In re Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 , 206 n. 1 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). 3 Second, when the majority acknowledges appellants’ constitutional claims, it applies the rule in MAP. v. Ryan to preclude review under § 23-110 because this court was previously presented with and implicitly decided the same constitutional claims on direct appeal (albeit without the benefit of the new 1999D.C. 335, 338, 140 F.3d 1054, 1056 (1998); Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463 , 478 (9th Cir.1997); Burks v. Dubois, 55 F.3d 712, 717 (1st Cir.1995); Miller v. Comm'n of Correction, 242 Conn. 745 , 700 A.2d 1108 , 1129 n. 28 (1997); In re Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 , 206 n. 1 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). [3] *516 Second, when the majority acknowledges appellants' constitutional claims, it applies the rule in M.A.P. v. Ryan to preclude review under § 23-110 because this court was previously presented with and implicitly decided the same constitutional claims on direct appeal (albeit without the benefit o	1	1
Burks, Jr. v. Duboisegreen ca1 · 1995 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999 2 sentences 1999D.C. 335, 338, 140 F.3d 1054, 1056 (1998); Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463 , 478 (9th Cir.1997); Burks v. Dubois, 55 F.3d 712, 717 (1st Cir.1995); Miller v. Comm’n of Correction, 242 Conn. 745 , 700 A.2d 1108 , 1129 n. 28 (1997); In re Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 , 206 n. 1 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). 3 Second, when the majority acknowledges appellants’ constitutional claims, it applies the rule in MAP. v. Ryan to preclude review under § 23-110 because this court was previously presented with and implicitly decided the same constitutional claims on direct appeal (albeit without the benefit of the new 1999D.C. 335, 338, 140 F.3d 1054, 1056 (1998); Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463 , 478 (9th Cir.1997); Burks v. Dubois, 55 F.3d 712, 717 (1st Cir.1995); Miller v. Comm'n of Correction, 242 Conn. 745 , 700 A.2d 1108 , 1129 n. 28 (1997); In re Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 , 206 n. 1 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). [3] *516 Second, when the majority acknowledges appellants' constitutional claims, it applies the rule in M.A.P. v. Ryan to preclude review under § 23-110 because this court was previously presented with and implicitly decided the same constitutional claims on direct appeal (albeit without the benefit o	1	1
West v. United Statesgreen dc · 1985 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996 1 sentence 1996At the same time, the court is “not required to put the case to the jury on a basis that essentially indulges and even encourages speculations as to bizarre reconstruction.” Sinclair, 144 U.S.App.D.C. at 15, 444 F.2d at 890 ; see West v. United States, 499 A.2d 860, 865 (D.C.1985) (no error in withholding instruction that lacked a “rational basis” in the evidence and would have encouraged jury to undertake a “bizarre reconstruction” of the proof).	1	1
Day v. United Statesgreen dc · 1978 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996 1 sentence 1996This requirement is “a minimal one; it means any evidence ... however weak.” Day v. United States, 390 A.2d 957, 962 (D.C.1978). 4 That is to say, the weight of the evidence supporting the instruction is immaterial; as long as a jury could rationally convict on the lesser-included offense after crediting the evidence, the court must give the instruction no matter how inclined it might be to discount that evidence.	1	1
Nova University v. Educational Institution Licensure Commissiongreen dc · 1984 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1985–1985 1 sentence 1985Thus, the evidence supporting the hearing examiner’s conclusion is “more than a mere scintilla,” but rather “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U.S. 197, 229 , 59 S.Ct. 206, 216 , 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938); Nova University v. Educational Institution Licensure Commission, 483 A.2d 1172, 1190 (D.C.1984), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 1759 , 84 L.Ed.2d 822 (1985).	1	1
United States v. Robertsongreen dcd · 1977 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1979–1979 2 sentences 1979See Robertson, 430 F.Supp. at 446 . . 1979See Robertson, 430 F.Supp. at 446 . [16] The court stated: One of the major foundations for the structure of the criminal law is the concept of responsibility, . . .	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (12)

Case	Cited	Years
Gardner v. United States green dc · 2006 1 sentence 2008Jones argues that there was no evidentiary basis for the second-degree murder instruction because it was “[t]he government’s theory ... that the decedents were killed in a cold-blooded, deliberate revenge killing for having broken into Mr. Jones’s car.” See Gardner v. United States, 898 A.2d 367 , 375 n. 20 (D.C.2006) (noting that first-degree murder requires “deliberate and premeditated malice,” while second-degree murder does not (quoting D.C.Code § 22-2101)).	1	2008–2008
Graves v. United States green dc · 1984 1 sentence 2004The instruction must be provided if there is “evidence, however weak, sufficient to support a conclusion that the defendant is guilty of the lesser rather than the greater offense.” Comber v. United States, 584 A.2d 26, 54 (D.C.1990) (en banc) (citing Graves v. United States, 490 A.2d 1086 (D.C.1984) (en banc)). “[T]he weight of the evidence supporting the instruction is immaterial; as long as a jury could rationally convict on the lesser-included offense after crediting the evidence, the court must give the instruction no matter how inclined it might be to discount that evidence.” Shuler v. U	1	2004–2004
Boykins v. United States green dc · 1997 1 sentence 2004Specifically, “[t]he intent necessary to prove criminal negligence involuntary manslaughter is a ‘lack of awareness or failure to perceive the risk of injury from a course of conduct under circumstances in which the actor should have been aware of the risk.’ Thus, where the accused was aware of the risk of harm, but acted in conscious disregard of it, the killing is murder or voluntary manslaughter, and where the accused is not aware of the risk of harm, but should have been, the killing will be involuntary manslaughter.” *1074 Boykins, supra, 702 A.2d at 1250 -51 (quoting United States v. Bra	1	2004–2004
Miller v. Commissioner of Correction green conn · 1997 2 sentences 1999D.C. 335, 338, 140 F.3d 1054, 1056 (1998); Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463 , 478 (9th Cir.1997); Burks v. Dubois, 55 F.3d 712, 717 (1st Cir.1995); Miller v. Comm’n of Correction, 242 Conn. 745 , 700 A.2d 1108 , 1129 n. 28 (1997); In re Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 , 206 n. 1 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). 3 Second, when the majority acknowledges appellants’ constitutional claims, it applies the rule in MAP. v. Ryan to preclude review under § 23-110 because this court was previously presented with and implicitly decided the same constitutional claims on direct appeal (albeit without the benefit of the new 1999D.C. 335, 338, 140 F.3d 1054, 1056 (1998); Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463 , 478 (9th Cir.1997); Burks v. Dubois, 55 F.3d 712, 717 (1st Cir.1995); Miller v. Comm’n of Correction, 242 Conn. 745 , 700 A.2d 1108 , 1129 n. 28 (1997); In re Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 , 206 n. 1 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). 3 Second, when the majority acknowledges appellants’ constitutional claims, it applies the rule in MAP. v. Ryan to preclude review under § 23-110 because this court was previously presented with and implicitly decided the same constitutional claims on direct appeal (albeit without the benefit of the new	1	1999–1999
Carriger v. Stewart green ca9 · 1997 2 sentences 1999D.C. 335, 338, 140 F.3d 1054, 1056 (1998); Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463 , 478 (9th Cir.1997); Burks v. Dubois, 55 F.3d 712, 717 (1st Cir.1995); Miller v. Comm’n of Correction, 242 Conn. 745 , 700 A.2d 1108 , 1129 n. 28 (1997); In re Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 , 206 n. 1 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). 3 Second, when the majority acknowledges appellants’ constitutional claims, it applies the rule in MAP. v. Ryan to preclude review under § 23-110 because this court was previously presented with and implicitly decided the same constitutional claims on direct appeal (albeit without the benefit of the new 1999D.C. 335, 338, 140 F.3d 1054, 1056 (1998); Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463 , 478 (9th Cir.1997); Burks v. Dubois, 55 F.3d 712, 717 (1st Cir.1995); Miller v. Comm'n of Correction, 242 Conn. 745 , 700 A.2d 1108 , 1129 n. 28 (1997); In re Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 , 206 n. 1 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). [3] *516 Second, when the majority acknowledges appellants' constitutional claims, it applies the rule in M.A.P. v. Ryan to preclude review under § 23-110 because this court was previously presented with and implicitly decided the same constitutional claims on direct appeal (albeit without the benefit o	1	1999–1999
Ex Parte Elizondo yellow texcrimapp · 1997 2 sentences 1999D.C. 335, 338, 140 F.3d 1054, 1056 (1998); Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463 , 478 (9th Cir.1997); Burks v. Dubois, 55 F.3d 712, 717 (1st Cir.1995); Miller v. Comm’n of Correction, 242 Conn. 745 , 700 A.2d 1108 , 1129 n. 28 (1997); In re Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 , 206 n. 1 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). 3 Second, when the majority acknowledges appellants’ constitutional claims, it applies the rule in MAP. v. Ryan to preclude review under § 23-110 because this court was previously presented with and implicitly decided the same constitutional claims on direct appeal (albeit without the benefit of the new 1999D.C. 335, 338, 140 F.3d 1054, 1056 (1998); Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463 , 478 (9th Cir.1997); Burks v. Dubois, 55 F.3d 712, 717 (1st Cir.1995); Miller v. Comm'n of Correction, 242 Conn. 745 , 700 A.2d 1108 , 1129 n. 28 (1997); In re Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 , 206 n. 1 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). [3] *516 Second, when the majority acknowledges appellants' constitutional claims, it applies the rule in M.A.P. v. Ryan to preclude review under § 23-110 because this court was previously presented with and implicitly decided the same constitutional claims on direct appeal (albeit without the benefit o	1	1999–1999
United States v. Rodney Sinclair green cadc · 1971 1 sentence 1996At the same time, the court is “not required to put the case to the jury on a basis that essentially indulges and even encourages speculations as to bizarre reconstruction.” Sinclair, 144 U.S.App.D.C. at 15, 444 F.2d at 890 ; see West v. United States, 499 A.2d 860, 865 (D.C.1985) (no error in withholding instruction that lacked a “rational basis” in the evidence and would have encouraged jury to undertake a “bizarre reconstruction” of the proof).	1	1996–1996
Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board green scotus · 1938 2 sentences 1985Thus, the evidence supporting the hearing examiner’s conclusion is “more than a mere scintilla,” but rather “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U.S. 197, 229 , 59 S.Ct. 206, 216 , 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938); Nova University v. Educational Institution Licensure Commission, 483 A.2d 1172, 1190 (D.C.1984), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 1759 , 84 L.Ed.2d 822 (1985). 1985Thus, the evidence supporting the hearing examiner’s conclusion is “more than a mere scintilla,” but rather “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U.S. 197, 229 , 59 S.Ct. 206, 216 , 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938); Nova University v. Educational Institution Licensure Commission, 483 A.2d 1172, 1190 (D.C.1984), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 1759 , 84 L.Ed.2d 822 (1985).	1	1985–1985
Nova University v. Educational Institution Licensure Commission green scotus · 1985 2 sentences 1985Thus, the evidence supporting the hearing examiner’s conclusion is “more than a mere scintilla,” but rather “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U.S. 197, 229 , 59 S.Ct. 206, 216 , 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938); Nova University v. Educational Institution Licensure Commission, 483 A.2d 1172, 1190 (D.C.1984), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 1759 , 84 L.Ed.2d 822 (1985). 1985Thus, the evidence supporting the hearing examiner’s conclusion is “more than a mere scintilla,” but rather “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U.S. 197, 229 , 59 S.Ct. 206, 216 , 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938); Nova University v. Educational Institution Licensure Commission, 483 A.2d 1172, 1190 (D.C.1984), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 1759 , 84 L.Ed.2d 822 (1985).	1	1985–1985
William L. Trest v. United States green cadc · 1965 1 sentence 1979D.C. 11, 350 F.2d 794 (1965) (per curiam), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1018 , 86 S.Ct. 634 , 15 L.Ed.2d 532 (1966); cf. United States v. Bradley, 149 U.S.App.D.C. 405 , 463 F.2d 808 (1972) (per curiam) (failure to pursue insanity defense not abuse of discretion). [15] On remand, the District Court in Robertson summarized several factors relevant to a judge's decision to raise the defense: (1) the quality of the evidence supporting the defense, (2) the defendant's wishes, (3) the quality of the defendant's decision not to raise the defense, (4) the reasonableness of the defendant's motives for oppos	1	1979–1979
United States v. Paul Bradley green cadc · 1972 2 sentences 1979D.C. 11, 350 F.2d 794 (1965) (per curiam), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1018 , 86 S.Ct. 634 , 15 L.Ed.2d 532 (1966); cf. United States v. Bradley, 149 U.S.App.D.C. 405 , 463 F.2d 808 (1972) (per curiam) (failure to pursue insanity defense not abuse of discretion). [15] On remand, the District Court in Robertson summarized several factors relevant to a judge's decision to raise the defense: (1) the quality of the evidence supporting the defense, (2) the defendant's wishes, (3) the quality of the defendant's decision not to raise the defense, (4) the reasonableness of the defendant's motives for oppos 1979D.C. 11, 350 F.2d 794 (1965) (per curiam), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1018 , 86 S.Ct. 634 , 15 L.Ed.2d 532 (1966); cf. United States v. Bradley, 149 U.S.App.D.C. 405 , 463 F.2d 808 (1972) (per curiam) (failure to pursue insanity defense not abuse of discretion). [15] On remand, the District Court in Robertson summarized several factors relevant to a judge's decision to raise the defense: (1) the quality of the evidence supporting the defense, (2) the defendant's wishes, (3) the quality of the defendant's decision not to raise the defense, (4) the reasonableness of the defendant's motives for oppos	1	1979–1979
Trest v. United States green scotus · 1966 2 sentences 1979D.C. 11, 350 F.2d 794 (1965) (per curiam), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1018 , 86 S.Ct. 634 , 15 L.Ed.2d 532 (1966); cf. United States v. Bradley, 149 U.S.App.D.C. 405 , 463 F.2d 808 (1972) (per curiam) (failure to pursue insanity defense not abuse of discretion). [15] On remand, the District Court in Robertson summarized several factors relevant to a judge's decision to raise the defense: (1) the quality of the evidence supporting the defense, (2) the defendant's wishes, (3) the quality of the defendant's decision not to raise the defense, (4) the reasonableness of the defendant's motives for oppos 1979D.C. 11, 350 F.2d 794 (1965) (per curiam), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1018 , 86 S.Ct. 634 , 15 L.Ed.2d 532 (1966); cf. United States v. Bradley, 149 U.S.App.D.C. 405 , 463 F.2d 808 (1972) (per curiam) (failure to pursue insanity defense not abuse of discretion). [15] On remand, the District Court in Robertson summarized several factors relevant to a judge's decision to raise the defense: (1) the quality of the evidence supporting the defense, (2) the defendant's wishes, (3) the quality of the defendant's decision not to raise the defense, (4) the reasonableness of the defendant's motives for oppos	1	1979–1979

Where else courts name it

TX 101 (1972–2026) CA 94 (1963–2026) GA 26 (1957–2024) IL 23 (2000–2025) FL 16 (1985–2016) OH 14 (1990–2026) MO 12 (1959–2025) DC 12 (1979–2017) KS 11 (1987–2025) OR 11 (2005–2025) IN 10 (1998–2016) NY 10 (1899–2021) MS 9 (1986–2014) WA 8 (2018–2026) IA 8 (1991–2017) MA 7 (1982–2018) MI 7 (1971–2024) OK 5 (2000–2021) NJ 5 (1979–2019) PA 4 (2017–2025) ME 4 (1984–2025) AK 4 (2018–2023) LA 4 (1971–2015) CT 4 (2000–2015) VA 3 (2005–2024) AL 3 (1926–2024) ID 3 (2004–2025) NM 3 (1993–2025) UT 3 (2012–2023) AR 2 (1948–1989) MD 2 (1978–2010) RI 2 (1995–2008) NC 2 (2014–2024) KY 2 (2010–2025) MN 2 (1954–2026) VT 2 (2014–2025) DE 2 (1988–2021) CO 2 (2024–2025)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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evidence supporting instruction in District of Columbia

Followed or applied (10)

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Also cited on this issue (12)

Where else courts name it