12 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1974–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Arellano-Medrano v. Stategreen1 sentence2022The reasoning behind this principle is that a complaint or counterclaim drafted by an attorney “is but a tentative outline of a pleader’s position.” Adams v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 392 So. 2d 4, 5 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); see Chase Home Loans, LLC v. Sosa, 104 So. 3d 1240 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012); Fallon v. City Furniture, Inc., 959 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). | 1 | 1 |
William v. Lynchgreen1 sentence2022The reasoning behind this principle is that a complaint or counterclaim drafted by an attorney “is but a tentative outline of a pleader’s position.” Adams v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 392 So. 2d 4, 5 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); see Chase Home Loans, LLC v. Sosa, 104 So. 3d 1240 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012); Fallon v. City Furniture, Inc., 959 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). | 1 | 1 |
Stanford v. Stategreen2 sentences2019Section 90.801(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2016), states: “A statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement is . . . [o]ne of identification of a person made after perceiving the person.” The reasoning behind the rule is that “such statements bear the mark of reliability because they are usually made in close temporal proximity to the actual event while the witnesses’ visual memory of the event is fresh.” Stanford v. State, 576 So. 2d 737, 739 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). 2019A statement of identification “refers to the witness seeing a person after the criminal episode and identifying that person as the offender.” Id. at 740 . | 1 | 1 |
Mitchell v. Stategreen1 sentence2012See also Mitchell v. State, 620 So.2d 1008, 1009 (Fla.1993); Milstein v. Mutual Sec. | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Stategreen1 sentence2010See Johnson v. State, 10 So.3d 680, 681 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009). | 1 | 1 |
Gelabert v. Stategreen1 sentence1995However, commentators prefer to attribute the basis to substantial policy considerations: unfair surprise, undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, and finally, time wasting and its adverse effect on judicial economy. (footnote omitted)... . 407 So.2d 1007, 1009 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). | 1 | 1 |
Seymour v. Seymourgreen1 sentence1994See Seymour v. Seymour, 85 So.2d 726 (Fla. 1956); Barnard v. Gunter, 625 So.2d 56 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Nahar v. Nahar, 576 So.2d 862 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). | 1 | 1 |
McCall v. Dick Burns, Inc.green1 sentence1992This court gave the following similar reason in McCall v. Dick Burns, Inc., 408 So.2d 787, 790 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982): The reasoning behind the requirement of both a legal and medical causation analysis in heart cases, as well as in pre-existing disease cases, stems in good part from the view that the natural progress of a disease might precipitate a collapse during working hours. | 1 | 1 |
Fidalgo v. Fidalgogreen1 sentence1986While a defendant may be charged with the highest offense that a prosecutor or grand jury believes appropriate considering the available evidence, that does not mean that the state must necessarily risk giving up the right to prove a lesser charge against the defendant. 472 So.2d at 492 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Fallon v. City Furniture, Inc.
green
1 sentence2022The reasoning behind this principle is that a complaint or counterclaim drafted by an attorney “is but a tentative outline of a pleader’s position.” Adams v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 392 So. 2d 4, 5 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); see Chase Home Loans, LLC v. Sosa, 104 So. 3d 1240 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012); Fallon v. City Furniture, Inc., 959 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Joiner v. State
green
1 sentence2012We briefly address this issue as a reminder to practitioners that the reasoning behind this rule is to prevent defense from proceeding to trial “before a jury he unqualifiedly accepted, knowing that in the event of an unfavorable verdict, he would hold a trump card entitling him to a new trial.” Id. at 176 n. 2. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Del Gaudio
green
1 sentence2004Del Gaudio, 445 So.2d at 608 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Barnard v. Gunter
neutral
1 sentence1994See Seymour v. Seymour, 85 So.2d 726 (Fla. 1956); Barnard v. Gunter, 625 So.2d 56 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Nahar v. Nahar, 576 So.2d 862 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Nahar v. Nahar
green
1 sentence1994See Seymour v. Seymour, 85 So.2d 726 (Fla. 1956); Barnard v. Gunter, 625 So.2d 56 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Nahar v. Nahar, 576 So.2d 862 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Crosby v. Stubblebine
green
1 sentence1985The reasoning behind this principle is well set out in Crosby v. Stubblebine, 142 So.2d 358 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962), wherein the appellant alleged error in the trial court’s failure to give two charges which he had requested. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Stewart v. State
green
1 sentence1981Stewart v. State, 42 Fla. 591 , 28 So. 815 , 816 (1900). [1] The reasoning behind the rule has been attributed to the evidentiary philosophy that a party cannot impeach his own witness and when the question is outside the scope of direct examination and on a collateral matter, the cross-examiner adopts the witness as his own. [2] However, commentators prefer to attribute the basis to substantial policy considerations: unfair surprise, undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, and finally, time wasting and its adverse effect on judicial economy. [3] The admissibility of contradictory evidence t | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Peterson v. State
neutral
2 sentences1974Nickels v. State, 1925, 90 Fla. 659 , 106 So. 479 ; Peterson v. State, 1925, 90 Fla. 361 , 106 So. 75 ; Tully v. State, 1915, 69 Fla. 662 , 68 So. 934 . [1] In discussing the reasoning behind the rule, the Supreme Court in Rice went on to say: "... 1974Nickels v. State, 1925, 90 Fla. 659 , 106 So. 479 ; Peterson v. State, 1925, 90 Fla. 361 , 106 So. 75 ; Tully v. State, 1915, 69 Fla. 662 , 68 So. 934 . [1] In discussing the reasoning behind the rule, the Supreme Court in Rice went on to say: "... | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Nickels v. State
green
2 sentences1974Nickels v. State, 1925, 90 Fla. 659 , 106 So. 479 ; Peterson v. State, 1925, 90 Fla. 361 , 106 So. 75 ; Tully v. State, 1915, 69 Fla. 662 , 68 So. 934 . [1] In discussing the reasoning behind the rule, the Supreme Court in Rice went on to say: "... 1974Nickels v. State, 1925, 90 Fla. 659 , 106 So. 479 ; Peterson v. State, 1925, 90 Fla. 361 , 106 So. 75 ; Tully v. State, 1915, 69 Fla. 662 , 68 So. 934 . [1] In discussing the reasoning behind the rule, the Supreme Court in Rice went on to say: "... | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Tully v. State
green
2 sentences1974Nickels v. State, 1925, 90 Fla. 659 , 106 So. 479 ; Peterson v. State, 1925, 90 Fla. 361 , 106 So. 75 ; Tully v. State, 1915, 69 Fla. 662 , 68 So. 934 . [1] In discussing the reasoning behind the rule, the Supreme Court in Rice went on to say: "... 1974Nickels v. State, 1925, 90 Fla. 659 , 106 So. 479 ; Peterson v. State, 1925, 90 Fla. 361 , 106 So. 75 ; Tully v. State, 1915, 69 Fla. 662 , 68 So. 934 . [1] In discussing the reasoning behind the rule, the Supreme Court in Rice went on to say: "... | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.