reasoning behind rule in New York

2014Co. of Reading, Pa., 65 AD3d at 19-20 .) The upshot is, as to plaintiff S.M.M.B.

2014Co., 102 AD3d 442 , 443 [1st Dept 2013].) “The reasoning behind the rule is that, because a pro rata clause applies only in the presence of other primary insurance, there is no conflict between a primary policy containing a pro rata clause and a second primary policy containing an excess clause rending the latter excess to other primary insurance.” (Sport Rock Intl., Inc. v American Cas.

2011However the reasoning behind the rule is that such property owners, through the change in zoning in that particular zoning district, suffer an injury different in kind and nature than that suffered by the public at large (see Matter of Har Enter. v Town of Brookhaven, supra; Matter of Rossi v Town Bd. of Town of Ballston, 49 AD3d at 1142 ).

2011However the reasoning behind the rule is that such property owners, through the change in zoning in that particular zoning district, suffer an injury different in kind and nature than that suffered by the public at large (see Matter of Har Enter. v Town of Brookhaven, supra; Matter of Rossi v Town Bd. of Town of Ballston, 49 AD3d at 1142 ).

2001In People v Collins ( 186 Misc 2d 818 ), the court correctly interpreted the reasoning behind the requirement that the People must promptly notify the defense of its trial readiness.

2001(Jalinos v Ramkalup, 255 AD2d 293 [2d Dept 1998].) The reasoning behind this rule is also clear and was well stated by Honorable Margaret Taylor in 40 Clinton St.

1996Corp. v Tax Assessor of City of White Plains, 58 AD2d 871 , affd 44 NY2d 971 ).

1996Corp. v Tax Assessor of City of White Plains, 58 AD2d 871 , affd 44 NY2d 971 ).

1986Where a defendant voluntarily chooses to participate in an action brought against him, there is no unfairness in overlooking any deficiency in the plaintiffs attempt to bring him within the court’s jurisdiction (Gager v White, 53 NY2d 475, 488 ).

1985Hosp. ( 88 AD2d 379, 383 , supra), Justice Lazer of this court discussed the reasoning behind the doctrine in these words: “The rationale for the continuous treatment exception rests on a number of doctrinal assumptions.

1980While this question is left unanswered by Payton v New York ( 445 US 573, 583 , supra), this language by the Supreme Court may be indicative: “Nor do these cases raise any question concerning the authority of the police, without either a search or arrest warrant, to enter a third party’s home to arrest a suspect” (emphasis added).

1973(It may also be noted that there is no question of anticipatory breach since the carrier did not, and indeed because of its own lack of knowledge of the loss, could not have informed the importer before February 15, 1969 of its inability to perform [see, generally, regarding doctrine of anticipatory or prospective breach, 11 Williston, Contracts (3d ed.), § 1300 et seq., supra].) A more general statement of the measure of damages for nondelivery of goods reflecting the reasoning behind the rule and supporting the analysis above is found in the case The Merauke ( 31 F. 2d 974 [C.

1963No. 3, 308 N. Y. 226 .) The reasoning behind the requirement is simply that the employer is the real party in interest, i.e., the body corporate.

1962In Campbell v. Cothran ( 56 N. Y. 279, 285 ) the Court of Appeals said: “ The authorities establish that a sheriff who has completed the service of an execution, is entitled to poundage, although the judgment and process be afterward set aside; and also when he has been prevented from fully executing the writ by the act or interference of the plaintiff.” The reasoning behind this principle was thus stated by the court in Flack v. State of New York ( 95 N. Y. 461, 466 ): “ It has been uniformly held in England as well as in this country, under all statutes giving fees to sheriffs upon execution

1962In Campbell v. Cothran ( 56 N. Y. 279, 285 ) the Court of Appeals said: “ The authorities establish that a sheriff who has completed the service of an execution, is entitled to poundage, although the judgment and process be afterward set aside; and also when he has been prevented from fully executing the writ by the act or interference of the plaintiff.” The reasoning behind this principle was thus stated by the court in Flack v. State of New York ( 95 N. Y. 461, 466 ): “ It has been uniformly held in England as well as in this country, under all statutes giving fees to sheriffs upon execution

1962(Alchin v. Wells, 5 Term R. 470; Hildreth v. Ellice, 1 Caines, 192 ; Campbell v. Cothran, 56 N. Y. 282 .) These cases proceed upon an obvious equity, analogous to that underlying the familiar principle which debars a party to a contract from claiming the benefit of the non-performance of a condition precedent by the other party, where he has, by his own conduct, made performance thereof by such party impossible. ’ ’ The court further stated in the Flack opinion (p. 472): “ This right [to collect poundage] is made by the language of the statute to depend exclusively upon the collection of the m