reasoning behind rule in Texas

2017Long , 137 S.W.3d 923 , 926 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.)"The reasoning behind the rule is clear: in the partition process, decisions must be made upon which other decisions will be based.

2017An appeal at each stage provides a practical way to review controlling, intermediate decisions before the consequences of any error do irreparable injury." Id. at 926 .

2012The reasoning behind this rule is that to require that every instrument executed in conjunction with a promissory note contain the necessary language would be “unnecessarily duplicative.” See Dolci v. Askew, No. 04-95-00867-CV, 1997 WL 428560 , at *2 (Tex.App.-San Antonio, July 30, 1997)(not designated for publication), citing Parker, 852 S.W.2d at 744 .

2012The reasoning behind this rule is that to require that every instrument executed in conjunction with a promissory note contain the necessary language would be “unnecessarily duplicative.” See Dolci v. Askew, No. 04-95-00867-CV, 1997 WL 428560 , at *2 (Tex.App.--San Antonio, July 30, 1997)(not designated for publication), citing Parker, 852 S.W.2d at 744 .

2012Regardless of whether the waiver appears in the note or the deed of trust, the waiver must be “clear and unequivocal.” See Dolci, 1997 WL 428560 , at *2, citing Shumway, 801 S.W.2d at 893 .

2012Regardless of whether the waiver appears in the note or the deed of trust, the waiver must be “clear and unequivocal.” See Dolci, 1997 WL 428560 , at *2, citing Shumway, 801 S.W.2d at 893 .

2010Id. at 643 .

2010Id. at 643 .

2009Id.

2009Id.

1977Ass’n v. Wallace, 70 S.W.2d 832 (Tex.Civ.App., Eastland 1934), expressed the reasoning behind the rule which prohibited the testimony of the examining physicians, as follows: ‘We are of the opinion that the foregoing testimony, admitted over said objections, was inadmissible.

1967Ass’n v. Wallace, 70 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. Civ.App., Eastland 1934), expressed the reasoning behind the rule which prohibited the testimony of the examining physicians, as follows: “We are of the opinion that the foregoing testimony, admitted over said objections, was inadmissible.

2024Mkts., Inc., 258 S.W.3d 623, 625 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Perry Homes, 258 S.W.3d at 597 ); see also Puente, 2020 WL 4680283 , at *4.

2021Even 80 years ago, the reasoning behind this requirement was “obvious”: “The reason is obvious, because, if the rule were otherwise, titles would be insecure and ruinous consequences would ensue from the doubt and uncertainty with which titles would be clouded.” Id.

2015Id.

2015In Henderson v. Chelsey, 273 S.W. 299 (Tex.App.—1925), aff’d, 292 S.W. 156 (Tex. 1927), that court provided the reasoning behind the rule: REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS, LARRY T.

2015In Henderson v. Chelsey, 273 S.W. 299 (Tex.App.—1925), aff’d, 292 S.W. 156 (Tex. 1927), that court provided the reasoning behind the rule: REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS, LARRY T.

2000The reasoning behind this rule was also given by the court: The reason that a conviction which occurred before the statute was enacted may be used for enhancement is that the statute providing for a greater penalty upon a subsequent conviction does not seek to punish the offender for the original criminal act a second time, but rather, “The repetition of criminal conduct aggravates ... guilt and justifies heavier penalties.... ” Vasquez, 477 S.W.2d at 632 (citing Graham, v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 623 , 32 S.Ct. 583 , 56 L.Ed. 917 (1912)).

2000The reasoning behind this rule was also given by the court: The reason that a conviction which occurred before the statute was enacted may be used for enhancement is that the statute providing for a greater penalty upon a subsequent conviction does not seek to punish the offender for the original criminal act a second time, but rather, “The repetition of criminal conduct aggravates ... guilt and justifies heavier penalties.... ” Vasquez, 477 S.W.2d at 632 (citing Graham, v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 623 , 32 S.Ct. 583 , 56 L.Ed. 917 (1912)).

2000The reasoning behind this rule was also given by the court: The reason that a conviction which occurred before the statute was enacted may be used for enhancement is that the statute providing for a greater penalty upon a subsequent conviction does not seek to punish the offender for the original criminal act a second time, but rather, “The repetition of criminal conduct aggravates ... guilt and justifies heavier penalties.... ” Vasquez, 477 S.W.2d at 632 (citing Graham, v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 623 , 32 S.Ct. 583 , 56 L.Ed. 917 (1912)).

2000Nonetheless, we note that the reasoning behind the rule is to “avoid the ‘taint of criminality’ inherent in interrogation conducted at the unsupervised discretion of law enforcement officers.” Comer, 776 S.W.2d at 196 (quoting Act of May 25, 1973, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 544, § 1, 1973 Tex. Gen.

1999Appellant bolsters this argument with reliance on our holding in Ex parte McAtee, supra. In McAtee , this Court reaffirmed the Walker court’s holding that a total failure of the trial court to admonish the defendant concerning the range of punishment is reversible error without regard to harm. 2 We reasoned harm was not a consideration because when a trial judge fails to give the article 26.13(a)(1) admonishment there is no substantial compliance. 3 We stated: The reasoning behind this rule is that where the record indicates that the defendant has received an admonishment with respect to punis

1997Id.

1992Id.

1992National Shoe & Leather Bank, 74 N.Y. at 476 . *620 The split occurs over whether a bank has the same right when the deceased customer's estate is insolvent.

1992National Shoe & Leather Bank, 74 N.Y. at 476 .

1992Id. at 674 .

1991Since the reasoning behind this rule is to provide notice of testifying witnesses’ identities, the writing requirement “avoids the inevitable disputes over who said what when.” Sharp, supra at 671 .

1990Id.

1990Id.

1990As this court stated in American General Insurance Co. v. Coleman, 157 Tex. 377 , 303 S.W.2d 370 (1957), the reasoning behind this rule is that injury incurred in such travel does not arise out of that person’s employment, but rather is suffered due to the dangers and risks to which all traveling persons are exposed.

1990As this court stated in American General Insurance Co. v. Coleman, 157 Tex. 377 , 303 S.W.2d 370 (1957), the reasoning behind this rule is that injury incurred in such travel does not arise out of that person's employment, but rather is suffered due to the dangers and risks to which all traveling persons are exposed.

1990As this court stated in American General Insurance Co. v. Coleman, 157 Tex. 377 , 303 S.W.2d 370 (1957), the reasoning behind this rule is that injury incurred in such travel does not arise out of that person’s employment, but rather is suffered due to the dangers and risks to which all traveling persons are exposed.

1990As this court stated in American General Insurance Co. v. Coleman, 157 Tex. 377 , 303 S.W.2d 370 (1957), the reasoning behind this rule is that injury incurred in such travel does not arise out of that person's employment, but rather is suffered due to the dangers and risks to which all traveling persons are exposed.

1984The reasoning behind such a rule of law is that “a denial of the commission of the offense is inconsistent with entrapment, as this defense assumes that the offense was committed.” Norman, supra at 345 .

1982United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 , 91 S.Ct. 275 , 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 , 90 S.Ct. 1975 , 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970); United States v. Rollins, 522 F.2d 160 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 , 96 S.Ct. 1122 , 47 L.Ed.2d 324 (1975).