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24 California opinions name it 2 courts 1959–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, LLP v. J-M Mfg. Co.green1 sentence2020(McIntosh, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 344 .) The reasoning behind the rule was explained: “ ‘Prohibited fee-splitting between lawyer and layman carries with it the danger of competitive solicitation [citation]; poses the possibility of control by the lay person, interested in his own profit rather than the client’s fate [citation]; facilitates the lay intermediary’s tendency to select the most generous, not the most competent, attorney [citations]. [The rule’s] prohibition against lay intermediaries seeks to bar both solicitation and the presence of a party demanding allegiance the lawyer ow | 1 | 1 |
In Re Marriage of Bartholdgreen2 sentences2009(Id. at p. 1108 [correction of interim orders]; In re Marriage of Barthold (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1309 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 691 ] (Barthold) [correction of judgments or postjudgment orders].) The reasoning behind the rule that judges retain inherent authority to reconsider and correct erroneous orders independent of the statutory limitations imposed on reconsideration motions initiated by the parties was recently explained in Barthold, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th 1301 . 2009(Id. at p. 1108 [correction of interim orders]; In re Marriage of Barthold (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1309 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 691 ] (Barthold) [correction of judgments or postjudgment orders].) The reasoning behind the rule that judges retain inherent authority to reconsider and correct erroneous orders independent of the statutory limitations imposed on reconsideration motions initiated by the parties was recently explained in Barthold, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th 1301 . | 1 | 1 |
Nakamura v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2004CDC cites Nakamura v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 825, 834 [ 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 97 ], that the reasoning behind this rule is the Legislature would not have mentioned the particular thing if it intended the general words to be used in an unrestricted sense, because that would render the particular item surplusage. 2004CDC cites Nakamura v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 825, 834 [ 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 97 ], that the reasoning behind this rule is the Legislature would not have mentioned the particular thing if it intended the general words to be used in an unrestricted sense, because that would render the particular item surplusage. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Riverside Universitygreen2 sentences2003(Ibid.; People v. Riverside University (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 572, 583-584 [ 111 Cal.Rptr. 68 ]; Steinberg v. Goldstein (1954) 129 Cal.App.2d 682, 685-686 [ 278 P.2d 22 ].) The receiver is an agent and officer of the court and the property in her or his hands remains under the control and continuous supervision of the court. 2003(Ibid.; People v. Riverside University (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 572, 583-584 [ 111 Cal.Rptr. 68 ]; Steinberg v. Goldstein (1954) 129 Cal.App.2d 682, 685-686 [ 278 P.2d 22 ].) The receiver is an agent and officer of the court and the property in her or his hands remains under the control and continuous supervision of the court. | 1 | 1 |
Steinberg v. Goldsteingreen2 sentences2003(Ibid.; People v. Riverside University (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 572, 583-584 [ 111 Cal.Rptr. 68 ]; Steinberg v. Goldstein (1954) 129 Cal.App.2d 682, 685-686 [ 278 P.2d 22 ].) The receiver is an agent and officer of the court and the property in her or his hands remains under the control and continuous supervision of the court. 2003(Ibid.; People v. Riverside University (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 572, 583-584 [ 111 Cal.Rptr. 68 ]; Steinberg v. Goldstein (1954) 129 Cal.App.2d 682, 685-686 [ 278 P.2d 22 ].) The receiver is an agent and officer of the court and the property in her or his hands remains under the control and continuous supervision of the court. | 1 | 1 |
Hoel v. City of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences1995(Bady v. Detwiler (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 321, 325 [ 273 P.2d 941 ]; Hoel v. City of Los Angeles (1955) 136 Cal.App.2d 295, 299 [ 288 P.2d 989 ]; Goodman v. Raposa (1957) 151 Cal.App.2d 830, 832, 834-835 [ 312 P.2d 65 ]. 1995(Bady v. Detwiler (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 321, 325 [ 273 P.2d 941 ]; Hoel v. City of Los Angeles (1955) 136 Cal.App.2d 295, 299 [ 288 P.2d 989 ]; Goodman v. Raposa (1957) 151 Cal.App.2d 830, 832, 834-835 [ 312 P.2d 65 ]. | 1 | 1 |
Bady v. Detwilergreen2 sentences1995(Bady v. Detwiler (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 321, 325 [ 273 P.2d 941 ]; Hoel v. City of Los Angeles (1955) 136 Cal.App.2d 295, 299 [ 288 P.2d 989 ]; Goodman v. Raposa (1957) 151 Cal.App.2d 830, 832, 834-835 [ 312 P.2d 65 ]. 1995(Bady v. Detwiler (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 321, 325 [ 273 P.2d 941 ]; Hoel v. City of Los Angeles (1955) 136 Cal.App.2d 295, 299 [ 288 P.2d 989 ]; Goodman v. Raposa (1957) 151 Cal.App.2d 830, 832, 834-835 [ 312 P.2d 65 ]. | 1 | 1 |
Goodman v. Raposagreen2 sentences1995(Bady v. Detwiler (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 321, 325 [ 273 P.2d 941 ]; Hoel v. City of Los Angeles (1955) 136 Cal.App.2d 295, 299 [ 288 P.2d 989 ]; Goodman v. Raposa (1957) 151 Cal.App.2d 830, 832, 834-835 [ 312 P.2d 65 ]. 1995(Bady v. Detwiler (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 321, 325 [ 273 P.2d 941 ]; Hoel v. City of Los Angeles (1955) 136 Cal.App.2d 295, 299 [ 288 P.2d 989 ]; Goodman v. Raposa (1957) 151 Cal.App.2d 830, 832, 834-835 [ 312 P.2d 65 ]. | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte State of New York, No. 1green2 sentences1990See In re New York, 256 U.S. 490, 501 , 41 S.Ct. 588, 591 (“the proceedings ... have no element of a proceeding in rem”). 1990See In re New York, 256 U.S. 490, 501 , 41 S.Ct. 588, 591 (“the proceedings ... have no element of a proceeding in rem”). | 1 | 1 |
Greene v. Zankgreen2 sentences1985The reasoning behind such a rule was suggested in Robichaud v. Ronan, 9th Cir., [1965] 351 F.2d 533, 536 , where this court stated that ‘[t]he key to the immunity previously held to be protective to the prosecuting attorney is that the acts, alleged to have been wrongful, were committed by the office in the performance of an integral part of the judicial process.’ As an arm of the Washington Supreme Court in connection with disciplinary proceedings, the Bar Association is an ‘integral part of the judicial process’ and is therefore entitled to the same immunity which is afforded to prosecuting 1985The reasoning behind such a rule was suggested in Robichaud v. Ronan, 9th Cir., [1965] 351 F.2d 533, 536 , where this court stated that ‘[t]he key to the immunity previously held to be protective to the prosecuting attorney is that the acts, alleged to have been wrongful, were committed by the office in the performance of an integral part of the judicial process.’ As an arm of the Washington Supreme Court in connection with disciplinary proceedings, the Bar Association is an ‘integral part of the judicial process’ and is therefore entitled to the same immunity which is afforded to prosecuting | 1 | 1 |
Robert N. Kissell and Beverly J. Kissell v. Sheldon A. Breskowgreen1 sentence1985The reasoning behind such a rule was suggested in Robichaud v. Ronan, 9th Cir., [1965] 351 F.2d 533, 536 , where this court stated that ‘[t]he key to the immunity previously held to be protective to the prosecuting attorney is that the acts, alleged to have been wrongful, were committed by the office in the performance of an integral part of the judicial process.’ As an arm of the Washington Supreme Court in connection with disciplinary proceedings, the Bar Association is an ‘integral part of the judicial process’ and is therefore entitled to the same immunity which is afforded to prosecuting | 1 | 1 |
Agins v. City of Tiburongreen2 sentences1985(See Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura (1973) 10 Cal.3d 110, 128 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 799 , 514 P.2d 111 ].) The reasoning behind this rule was stated by the California Supreme Court in Agins v. City of Tiburon (1979) 24 Cal.3d 266, 276 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 372 , 598 P.2d 25 ]: “' . . . [T]he legislative body assesses the desirability of a program on the assumption that compensation will not be required to achieve the objectives of that ordinance. 1985(See Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura (1973) 10 Cal.3d 110, 128 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 799 , 514 P.2d 111 ].) The reasoning behind this rule was stated by the California Supreme Court in Agins v. City of Tiburon (1979) 24 Cal.3d 266, 276 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 372 , 598 P.2d 25 ]: “' . . . [T]he legislative body assesses the desirability of a program on the assumption that compensation will not be required to achieve the objectives of that ordinance. | 1 | 1 |
Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventuragreen2 sentences1985(See Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura (1973) 10 Cal.3d 110, 128 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 799 , 514 P.2d 111 ].) The reasoning behind this rule was stated by the California Supreme Court in Agins v. City of Tiburon (1979) 24 Cal.3d 266, 276 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 372 , 598 P.2d 25 ]: “' . . . [T]he legislative body assesses the desirability of a program on the assumption that compensation will not be required to achieve the objectives of that ordinance. 1985(See Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura (1973) 10 Cal.3d 110, 128 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 799 , 514 P.2d 111 ].) The reasoning behind this rule was stated by the California Supreme Court in Agins v. City of Tiburon (1979) 24 Cal.3d 266, 276 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 372 , 598 P.2d 25 ]: “' . . . [T]he legislative body assesses the desirability of a program on the assumption that compensation will not be required to achieve the objectives of that ordinance. | 1 | 1 |
Hickman v. Taylorgreen2 sentences1981Proc., § 2016, subd. (g).) This purpose is elaborated in Hickman v. Taylor (1947) 329 U.S. 495, 511 [ 91 L.Ed. 451, 462 , 67 S.Ct. 385 ], which was influential in framing the federal and *394 California work product privileges. ‘Proper preparation of a client’s case demands that he assemble information, sift what he considers to be the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy without undue and needless interference.... 1981Proc., § 2016, subd. (g).) This purpose is elaborated in Hickman v. Taylor (1947) 329 U.S. 495, 511 [ 91 L.Ed. 451, 462 , 67 S.Ct. 385 ], which was influential in framing the federal and *394 California work product privileges. ‘Proper preparation of a client’s case demands that he assemble information, sift what he considers to be the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy without undue and needless interference.... | 1 | 1 |
Popelka, Allard, McCowan & Jones v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1981The court in Popelka, Allard, McCowan & Jones v. Superior Court (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 496, 501 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 748 ], properly summarized the reasoning behind the privilege as follows: “If filing a malicious prosecution action (or, by the same logic, a malpractice action) could automatically open an attorney’s files to a prior action, then an attorney, anticipating such a future suit, would hesitate to commit his or her doubts about a case to paper. [¶] Preventing such hesitation on an attorney’s part is one of the principal purposes of the privilege, which is designed ‘... (i) to preserve the 1981The court in Popelka, Allard, McCowan & Jones v. Superior Court (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 496, 501 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 748 ], properly summarized the reasoning behind the privilege as follows: “If filing a malicious prosecution action (or, by the same logic, a malpractice action) could automatically open an attorney’s files to a prior action, then an attorney, anticipating such a future suit, would hesitate to commit his or her doubts about a case to paper. [¶] Preventing such hesitation on an attorney’s part is one of the principal purposes of the privilege, which is designed ‘... (i) to preserve the | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Martinezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Adamegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Krouse v. Grahamgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Hutchinsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Scott
green
2 sentences2019Included in this category are cases in which the stated reasons allegedly do not apply to the particular case, and cases in which the court purportedly . . . misweighed the various factors, or failed to . . . give a sufficient number of valid reasons.” (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353 .) The reasoning behind the rule is that trial counsel is charged with clarifying permissible sentencing choices at the hearing, and “[r]outine defects in the court’s statement of reasons are easily prevented and corrected if called to the court’s attention.” (Ibid.) 28 “[T]he Scott rule applies when th 2019Included in this category are cases in which the stated reasons allegedly do not apply to the particular case, and cases in which the court purportedly . . . misweighed the various factors, or failed to . . . give a sufficient number of valid reasons.” (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353 .) The reasoning behind the rule is that trial counsel is charged with clarifying permissible sentencing choices at the hearing, and “[r]outine defects in the court’s statement of reasons are easily prevented and corrected if called to the court’s attention.” (Ibid.) “[T]he Scott rule applies when the t | 3 | 2019–2019 |
Tillman v. Bungenstock
green
2 sentences1963The reasoning behind such a rule being sound p,nd consistent with fairness, it should h§ applied in this ease. *77 (Accord: Tillman v. Bungenstock, 185 Mo.App. 66 [ 171 S.W. 938, 939 ]: “But where a third party has paramount title to the money in the hands of the agent, and notifies the latter of his claim, if the agent nevertheless pays the principal, he is liable to the true owner”; Sims v. Brown, 6 Thomp. & C. 1963The reasoning behind such a rule being sound p,nd consistent with fairness, it should h§ applied in this ease. *77 (Accord: Tillman v. Bungenstock, 185 Mo.App. 66 [ 171 S.W. 938, 939 ]: “But where a third party has paramount title to the money in the hands of the agent, and notifies the latter of his claim, if the agent nevertheless pays the principal, he is liable to the true owner”; Sims v. Brown, 6 Thomp. & C. | 2 | 1963–1967 |
People v. Chhoun
green
1 sentence2026Code § 1200.) However, exceptions to the hearsay rule exist, including in Evidence Code section 1230, which describes the exception for a declaration against interest: “Evidence of a statement by a declarant having sufficient knowledge of the subject is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness and the statement, when made, . . . so far subjected him to the risk of civil or criminal liability . . . , or created such a risk of making him an object of hatred, ridicule, or social disgrace in the community, that a reasonable man in his position would no | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Cortez
green
1 sentence2025A A court should only give an instruction based on CALCRIM No. 361 “when a defendant completely fails to explain or deny incriminating evidence, or claims to lack knowledge and it appears from the evidence that the defendant could reasonably be expected to have that knowledge.” (See People v. Cortez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 101, 117 .) The reasoning behind the instruction is that a defendant’s failure to explain or deny incriminating evidence allows the jury to give additional weight to the evidence against 11 the defendant. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Grandberry
green
1 sentence2025(People v. Grandberry (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 599, 605 .) The parties agree the trial court erred in giving a CALCRIM No. 361 instruction: when he testified, Borbon denied the evidence against him and offered an alibi for his whereabouts during the night of Mendieta’s death. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
McIntosh v. Mills
green
1 sentence2020(McIntosh, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 344 .) The reasoning behind the rule was explained: “ ‘Prohibited fee-splitting between lawyer and layman carries with it the danger of competitive solicitation [citation]; poses the possibility of control by the lay person, interested in his own profit rather than the client’s fate [citation]; facilitates the lay intermediary’s tendency to select the most generous, not the most competent, attorney [citations]. [The rule’s] prohibition against lay intermediaries seeks to bar both solicitation and the presence of a party demanding allegiance the lawyer ow | 1 | 2020–2020 |
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.
green
1 sentence2013(McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co. (1995) 513 U.S. 352, 359-360 .) The reasoning behind this rule focuses on the employer’s motive: an employer could not have been motivated not to hire a job applicant based on information that it did not have at the time of the employment decision. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Thompson
green
2 sentences1993(See People v. Thompson, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 165 .) Defendant repeatedly explained that he did not feel that a lawyer could assist him since he was guilty and previously had revealed this fact to the police. 1993(See People v. Thompson, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 165 .) Defendant repeatedly explained that he did not feel that a lawyer could assist him since he was guilty and previously had revealed this fact to the police. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
People v. Hill
green
2 sentences1990People v. Hill (1968) 69 Cal.2d 550 [ 72 Cal.Rptr. 641 , 446 P.2d 521 ] stated the doctrine as: “[A] search is not unreasonable if made with the consent of a third party whom the police reasonably and in good faith believe has authority to consent to their search. ...” (Id. at p. 554.) The reasoning behind this doctrine is consistent with the “police misconduct” rationale for the exclusionary rule judicially determined for Fourth Amendment violations. 1990People v. Hill (1968) 69 Cal.2d 550 [ 72 Cal.Rptr. 641 , 446 P.2d 521 ] stated the doctrine as: “[A] search is not unreasonable if made with the consent of a third party whom the police reasonably and in good faith believe has authority to consent to their search. ...” (Id. at p. 554.) The reasoning behind this doctrine is consistent with the “police misconduct” rationale for the exclusionary rule judicially determined for Fourth Amendment violations. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Villarreal v. State
green
2 sentences1990By objecting, the defendant is relying on the status quo of the prior adjudication where he did have the burden of proof." ( Villarreal v. State (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) 699 S.W.2d 364, 366 .) The reasoning by the Texas courts requiring the state to prove restoration of competency is very similar to the reasoning behind the presumption of continued insanity expressed by our Supreme Court in In re Franklin, quoted, ante, page 1492. 1990By objecting, the defendant is relying on the status quo of the prior adjudication where he did have the burden of proof.” (Villarreal v. State (Tex.Ct.App. 1985) 699 S.W.2d 364, 366 .) The reasoning by the Texas courts requiring the state to prove restoration of competency is very similar to the reasoning behind the presumption of continued insanity expressed by our Supreme Court in In re Franklin, quoted, ante, page 1492. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Perkins v. Mayo
green
2 sentences1990In Perkins v. Mayo (Fla. 1957) 92 So.2d 641, 644 , the Florida Supreme Court granted a petition for writ of habeas corpus on the ground the trial court accepted defendant's guilty pleas and imposed sentence despite having found the defendant incompetent to stand trial. 1990In Perkins v. Mayo (Fla. 1957) 92 So.2d 641, 644 , the Florida Supreme Court granted a petition for writ of habeas corpus on the ground the trial court accepted defendant’s guilty pleas and imposed sentence despite having found the defendant incompetent to stand trial. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Robichaud v. Ronan
green
1 sentence1985The reasoning behind such a rule was suggested in Robichaud v. Ronan, 9th Cir., [1965] 351 F.2d 533, 536 , where this court stated that ‘[t]he key to the immunity previously held to be protective to the prosecuting attorney is that the acts, alleged to have been wrongful, were committed by the office in the performance of an integral part of the judicial process.’ As an arm of the Washington Supreme Court in connection with disciplinary proceedings, the Bar Association is an ‘integral part of the judicial process’ and is therefore entitled to the same immunity which is afforded to prosecuting | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Jack Silver v. Fred R. Dickson
green
1 sentence1985The reasoning behind such a rule was suggested in Robichaud v. Ronan, 9th Cir., [1965] 351 F.2d 533, 536 , where this court stated that ‘[t]he key to the immunity previously held to be protective to the prosecuting attorney is that the acts, alleged to have been wrongful, were committed by the office in the performance of an integral part of the judicial process.’ As an arm of the Washington Supreme Court in connection with disciplinary proceedings, the Bar Association is an ‘integral part of the judicial process’ and is therefore entitled to the same immunity which is afforded to prosecuting | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Robert E. Sykes v. State of California (Department of Motor Vehicles)
green
1 sentence1985The reasoning behind such a rule was suggested in Robichaud v. Ronan, 9th Cir., [1965] 351 F.2d 533, 536 , where this court stated that ‘[t]he key to the immunity previously held to be protective to the prosecuting attorney is that the acts, alleged to have been wrongful, were committed by the office in the performance of an integral part of the judicial process.’ As an arm of the Washington Supreme Court in connection with disciplinary proceedings, the Bar Association is an ‘integral part of the judicial process’ and is therefore entitled to the same immunity which is afforded to prosecuting | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Silver v. Dickson
green
1 sentence1985The reasoning behind such a rule was suggested in Robichaud v. Ronan, 9th Cir., [1965] 351 F.2d 533, 536 , where this court stated that ‘[t]he key to the immunity previously held to be protective to the prosecuting attorney is that the acts, alleged to have been wrongful, were committed by the office in the performance of an integral part of the judicial process.’ As an arm of the Washington Supreme Court in connection with disciplinary proceedings, the Bar Association is an ‘integral part of the judicial process’ and is therefore entitled to the same immunity which is afforded to prosecuting | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Lewis & Queen v. N. M. Ball Sons green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Kidd v. . Bottom neutral | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Hard v. Hollywood Turf Club green | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| Raich v. Aldon Construction Co. green | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.