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11 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1959–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Eisel v. Midwest BankCentregreen2 sentences2015The voluntary payment doctrine, however, is “not applicable in all situations.” Eisel v. Midwest BankCentre, 230 S.W.3d 335, 339 (Mo. 2007). 2015The voluntary payment doctrine, however, is “not applicable in all situations.” Huch, 290 S.W.3d at 727 (quoting Eisel v. Midwest BankCentre, 230 S.W.3d 335, 339 (Mo. banc 2007)). | 2 | 2 |
Brown v. Johnsongreen1 sentence2001See State v. Hall, 982 S.W.2d 675, 682 (Mo. banc 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1151 , 119 S.Ct. 2034 , 143 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1999). 4 Rejecting the defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in faffing to instruct on voluntary manslaughter, the Supreme Court in State v. Jones, 979 S.W.2d 171, 185 (Mo. banc 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1112 , 119 S.Ct. 886 , 142 L.Ed.2d 785 (1999), explained the reasoning behind this rule: The jury, when presented with instructions on murder in the first degree and murder in the second degree, had the opportunity to find that [the defendant’s] actions were not d | 1 | 1 |
Ramires v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2001See State v. Hall, 982 S.W.2d 675, 682 (Mo. banc 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1151 , 119 S.Ct. 2034 , 143 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1999). 4 Rejecting the defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in faffing to instruct on voluntary manslaughter, the Supreme Court in State v. Jones, 979 S.W.2d 171, 185 (Mo. banc 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1112 , 119 S.Ct. 886 , 142 L.Ed.2d 785 (1999), explained the reasoning behind this rule: The jury, when presented with instructions on murder in the first degree and murder in the second degree, had the opportunity to find that [the defendant’s] actions were not d 2001See State v. Hall, 982 S.W.2d 675, 682 (Mo. banc 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1151 , 119 S.Ct. 2034 , 143 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1999). 4 Rejecting the defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in faffing to instruct on voluntary manslaughter, the Supreme Court in State v. Jones, 979 S.W.2d 171, 185 (Mo. banc 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1112 , 119 S.Ct. 886 , 142 L.Ed.2d 785 (1999), explained the reasoning behind this rule: The jury, when presented with instructions on murder in the first degree and murder in the second degree, had the opportunity to find that [the defendant’s] actions were not d | 1 | 1 |
Beaven v. Scroghamgreen1 sentence2001See State v. Hall, 982 S.W.2d 675, 682 (Mo. banc 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1151 , 119 S.Ct. 2034 , 143 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1999). 4 Rejecting the defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in faffing to instruct on voluntary manslaughter, the Supreme Court in State v. Jones, 979 S.W.2d 171, 185 (Mo. banc 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1112 , 119 S.Ct. 886 , 142 L.Ed.2d 785 (1999), explained the reasoning behind this rule: The jury, when presented with instructions on murder in the first degree and murder in the second degree, had the opportunity to find that [the defendant’s] actions were not d | 1 | 1 |
Revelo v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2001See State v. Hall, 982 S.W.2d 675, 682 (Mo. banc 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1151 , 119 S.Ct. 2034 , 143 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1999). 4 Rejecting the defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in faffing to instruct on voluntary manslaughter, the Supreme Court in State v. Jones, 979 S.W.2d 171, 185 (Mo. banc 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1112 , 119 S.Ct. 886 , 142 L.Ed.2d 785 (1999), explained the reasoning behind this rule: The jury, when presented with instructions on murder in the first degree and murder in the second degree, had the opportunity to find that [the defendant’s] actions were not d | 1 | 1 |
Hall v. Missourigreen1 sentence2001See State v. Hall, 982 S.W.2d 675, 682 (Mo. banc 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1151 , 119 S.Ct. 2034 , 143 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1999). 4 Rejecting the defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in faffing to instruct on voluntary manslaughter, the Supreme Court in State v. Jones, 979 S.W.2d 171, 185 (Mo. banc 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1112 , 119 S.Ct. 886 , 142 L.Ed.2d 785 (1999), explained the reasoning behind this rule: The jury, when presented with instructions on murder in the first degree and murder in the second degree, had the opportunity to find that [the defendant’s] actions were not d | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jonesgreen1 sentence2001See State v. Hall, 982 S.W.2d 675, 682 (Mo. banc 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1151 , 119 S.Ct. 2034 , 143 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1999). 4 Rejecting the defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in faffing to instruct on voluntary manslaughter, the Supreme Court in State v. Jones, 979 S.W.2d 171, 185 (Mo. banc 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1112 , 119 S.Ct. 886 , 142 L.Ed.2d 785 (1999), explained the reasoning behind this rule: The jury, when presented with instructions on murder in the first degree and murder in the second degree, had the opportunity to find that [the defendant’s] actions were not d | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hallgreen1 sentence2001See State v. Hall, 982 S.W.2d 675, 682 (Mo. banc 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1151 , 119 S.Ct. 2034 , 143 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1999). 4 Rejecting the defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in faffing to instruct on voluntary manslaughter, the Supreme Court in State v. Jones, 979 S.W.2d 171, 185 (Mo. banc 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1112 , 119 S.Ct. 886 , 142 L.Ed.2d 785 (1999), explained the reasoning behind this rule: The jury, when presented with instructions on murder in the first degree and murder in the second degree, had the opportunity to find that [the defendant’s] actions were not d | 1 | 1 |
Brennecke Ex Rel. Brennecke v. Kilpatrickgreen1 sentence1994Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68, 73 (Mo. banc 1960). | 1 | 1 |
Condos v. Associated Transports, Inc.green1 sentence1988In concluding the trial court did not err in allowing the proffered testimony, we are mindful of the reasoning behind the rule requiring specific pleadings of special damages: “to give defendant fair notice of the damage that plaintiff will claim and thus to prevent surprise.” Condos v. Associated Transports, Inc., 453 S.W.2d 682, 690 (Mo.App.1970) citing S.S. | 1 | 1 |
Parry v. Woodsongreen1 sentence1981The controlling principle is that a misnomer is not fatal, and the judgment creditor may show who the true defendant is and may proceed to enforce the judgment against that true defendant. 1 The reasoning behind this principle of law is well stated in the leading case Parry v. Woodson, 33 Mo. 347, 348 (1863): “A name is a means of identity; but the change of the name or the application of a wrong name does not change the thing identified. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Reesegreen2 sentences1975The general rule comes from the oft-quoted case of State v. Reese, 364 Mo. 1221 , 274 S.W.2d 304, 307 (Mo. banc 1954): “proof of the commission of separate and distinct crimes is not admissible, unless such proof has some legitimate tendency to directly establish the defendant’s guilt of the charge for which he is on trial.” The reasoning behind this rule is that such evidence violates defendant’s right to be tried on the charge for which he is indicted and also, the tendency of this type of evidence to be misleading. 1975The general rule comes from the oft-quoted case of State v. Reese, 364 Mo. 1221 , 274 S.W.2d 304, 307 (Mo. banc 1954): “proof of the commission of separate and distinct crimes is not admissible, unless such proof has some legitimate tendency to directly establish the defendant’s guilt of the charge for which he is on trial.” The reasoning behind this rule is that such evidence violates defendant’s right to be tried on the charge for which he is indicted and also, the tendency of this type of evidence to be misleading. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Shrock
green
2 sentences2015The reasoning behind this doctrine is that “it would be inequitable to give [the payor] the privilege of selecting his own time and convenience for litigation short of the bar of the statute of limitations ... thereby subjecting] the payee to the uncertainties and casualties of human affairs likely to affect his means of defending the claim.” Id. 2015The reasoning behind this doctrine is that “it would be inequitable to give [the payor] the privilege of selecting his own time and convenience for litigation short of the bar of the statute of limitations . . . thereby subject[ing] the payee to the uncertainties and casualties of human affairs likely to affect his means of defending the claim.” Id. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
United States v. Chadwick
red
2 sentences2016To safeguard himself and others, and to prevent the loss of evidence, it has been held reasonable for the arresting officer to conduct a prompt, war-rantless search of the arrestee’s person and the area within his immediate control United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 14 , 97 S.Ct. 2476 , 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (internal quotations omitted). 2016To safeguard himself and others, and to prevent the loss of evidence, it has been held reasonable for the arresting officer to conduct a prompt, war-rantless search of the arrestee’s person and the area within his immediate control United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 14 , 97 S.Ct. 2476 , 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (internal quotations omitted). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Huch v. Charter Communications, Inc.
green
1 sentence2015The voluntary payment doctrine, however, is “not applicable in all situations.” Huch, 290 S.W.3d at 727 (quoting Eisel v. Midwest BankCentre, 230 S.W.3d 335, 339 (Mo. banc 2007)). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Kelley v. Hudson
green
1 sentence1986The reasoning behind this rule appears to be that “where the argument can have no conceivably proper purpose, and is obviously false and manifestly prejudicial upon every consideration and for every reason, it would be labor lost to require a technically precise objection to it; indeed, to insist upon it in those circumstances, ... would surely provoke the Scriptural rebuke of straining at a gnat and swallowing a camel.” Kelley, 407 S.W.2d at 558 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
People v. Rupp
green
1 sentence1964The reasoning behind the rule is stated: “The task of proration begins at the point when the taxing authorities end their duty of fixing the estate tax; it takes the accomplished fact of taxation and then prorates the burden of the actuality of the tax.” In re Buckhantz’ Estate, supra, 260 P.2d 1 . c. 797. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Goucan v. Atlas Portland Cement Co.
neutral
2 sentences1959In the case of Goucan v. Atlas Portland Cement Co., 317 Mo. 919 , 298 S.W. 789 , loc. cit. 793, the Supreme Court said: “ * * * it was a continuing duty of defendants to use ordinary care to furnish the deceased with * * * reasonably safe appliances with which, to do his work, and to avoid enhancement of the natural risks of his employment, (cases cited.) The fact that the work in which the servant is engaged is inherently dangerous certainly does not absolve the master from the duty of exercising reasonable care to avoid enhancing the natural risks of his employment.” The reasoning behind thi 1959In the case of Goucan v. Atlas Portland Cement Co., 317 Mo. 919 , 298 S.W. 789 , loc. cit. 793, the Supreme Court said: “ * * * it was a continuing duty of defendants to use ordinary care to furnish the deceased with * * * reasonably safe appliances with which, to do his work, and to avoid enhancement of the natural risks of his employment, (cases cited.) The fact that the work in which the servant is engaged is inherently dangerous certainly does not absolve the master from the duty of exercising reasonable care to avoid enhancing the natural risks of his employment.” The reasoning behind thi | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.