reasoning behind rule in Illinois

2023Malmenato, 14 Ill. 2d at 61 .” People v. Johnson, 2020 IL App (3d) 130543-B, ¶ 21 .

2020Malmenato, 14 Ill. 2d at 61 . ¶ 22 In People v. Downs, 2015 IL 117934, ¶ 3 , the defendant was charged with first degree murder and tried before a jury.

2020Malmenato, 14 Ill. 2d at 61 . ¶ 22 In People v. Downs, 2015 IL 117934, ¶ 3 , the defendant was charged with first degree murder and tried before a jury.

2020Malmenato, 14 Ill. 2d at 61 . ¶ 22 In People v. Downs, 2015 IL 117934, ¶ 3 , the defendant was charged with first degree murder and tried before a jury.

2015Any insured, whether large and sophisticated or not, must enter into a contract with the insurer which is written according to the insurer’s pleasure by the insurer. [Citations.] Generally, since little or no negotiation occurs in this process, the insurer has total control of the terms and the drafting of the contract. [Citations.] This rule of construction recognizes *** these facets of the insurance contracting process. [Citations.] *** After all, the insurer chose the words used in the policy. [Citation.]” Outboard Marine, 154 Ill. 2d at 121-22 . ¶ 93 State Farm argues that its interpretat

2015Any insured, whether large and sophisticated or not, must enter into a contract with the insurer which is written according to the insurer's pleasure by the insurer. [Citation.] Generally, since little or no negotiation occurs in this process, the insurer has total control of the terms and the drafting of the contract. [Citation.] This rule of construction recognizes *** these facets of the insurance contracting process. [Citation.] *** After all, the insurer chose the words used in the policy. [Citation.]" Outboard Marine, 154 Ill. 2d at 121-22 . ¶ 93 State Farm argues that its interpretation

2015(Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 [(1969)].) *** [I]ncreased attention has *** been given to the long-standing practice of pleading guilty as a consequence of a prior agreement 10 No. 1-13-1117 between the prosecution and defense concerning the disposition of the case; it is generally conceded that 'plea discussions' and 'plea agreements' are often appropriate, but that such procedures should not be concealed behind an in-court ceremony at which the defendant sometimes seems to think that he is expected to state falsely that no promises were made to him.

2015(Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 [(1969)].) *** [I]ncreased attention has *** been given to the long-standing practice of pleading guilty as a consequence of a prior agreement between the prosecution and defense concerning the disposition of the case; it is generally conceded that ‘plea discussions’ and ‘plea agreements’ are often appropriate, but that such procedures should not be concealed -6- behind an in-court ceremony at which the defendant sometimes seems to think that he is expected to state falsely that no promises were made to him.

2007Greinke, 234 Ill. at 572 , 85 N.E. at 330 .

2007Greinke, 234 Ill. at 572 , 85 N.E. at 330 .

2001In re Marriage of Abma, 308 Ill.

2001In re Marriage of Abma, 308 Ill.

2026Nonetheless, “[t]he testimony of the officer regarding the words of the communication must not be used for their truth by the prosecution, but only used to show that the words were spoken when the fact they were spoken satisfies a relevant nonhearsay purpose.” Jura, 352 Ill.

2026The reasoning behind the rule is that “a portrayal of the events in question lessens the need of the fact finder to speculate on the reasons for the officers’ subsequent actions.” Id.

2024McCarter, 385 Ill.

2024ANALYSIS ¶ 12 The compulsory joinder statute provides as follows: “(b) If the several offenses are known to the proper prosecuting officer at the time of commencing the prosecution and are within the jurisdiction of a single court, they must be prosecuted in a single prosecution, except as provided in Subsection (c) [(where the court may order a separate trial in the interest of justice)], if they are based on the same act.” 720 ILCS 5/3-3(b) (West 2020). ¶ 13 Our supreme court has recognized, however, that the “compulsory-joinder provisions of section 3-3 do not apply to offenses that have be

2023We cannot be in the business of trying to guess what a defendant chooses to file, or why, but to consider the filing in light of the facts of the case and the applicable rules. ¶ 22 As a final matter, the partial dissent’s reliance on People v. Kibbons, 2016 IL App (3d) 150090, ¶ 12 , we would suggest, seems equally misplaced.

2022According to the appellate court, the reasoning behind that rule is “the lack of certainty in showing lost profits for a new business that has yet to show what its profits actually are.” Id.

2016Id.

2011While we agree with this court’s uniform rejection of the defendants’ argument, we write further to address the defendants’ claim that the court’s decisions “denigrate the reasoning behind the rule against prior consistent statements.” ¶ 50 Defendants rely on the “long-established evidentiary rule against admission of a prior consistent statement, unless there has been a charge of recent fabrication or a motive to testify falsely.” Johnson, 385 Ill.

2009Just as it is reasonable to assume that a competent lawyer will fail to perceive the possibility of raising such a claim, it is also reasonable to assume that a court will similarly fail to appreciate the claim. *** *** [I]f we were to hold that the novelty of a constitutional question does not give rise to cause for counsel’s failure to raise it, we might actually disrupt state-court proceedings by encouraging defense counsel to include any and all remotely constitutional claims that could, some day, gain recognition.” Reed, 468 U.S. at 15-16 , 82 L.

2009Just as it is reasonable to assume that a competent lawyer will fail to perceive the possibility of raising such a claim, it is also reasonable to assume that a court will similarly fail to appreciate the claim. *** *** [I]f we were to hold that the novelty of a constitutional question does not give rise to cause for counsel’s failure to raise it, we might actually disrupt state-court proceedings by encouraging defense counsel to include any and all remotely constitutional claims that could, some day, gain recognition.” Reed, 468 U.S. at 15-16 , 82 L.

1992Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 2—1001(a)(2); In re Dominique F. (1991), 145 Ill. 2d 311 .) The reasoning behind this principle is that one should not be compelled to plead his cause before a judge who is prejudiced, whether actually or only by suspicion.

1992People v. Brown (1990), 199 Ill.

1987In International Insurance Co. v. Melrose Park National Bank (1986), 145 Ill.

1987App. 3d 611 , 484 N.E.2d 909 .) The reasoning behind this rule is that when the exercise of governmental authority is discretionary and for the general public’s health and safety, the duty being carried out runs to the public generally, not to any particular person. 137 Ill.

1987App. 3d 611 , 484 N.E.2d 909 .) The reasoning behind this rule is that when the exercise of governmental authority is discretionary and for the general public’s health and safety, the duty being carried out runs to the public generally, not to any particular person. 137 Ill.

1984App. 3d 65, 69 , 284 N.E.2d 509, 512 , to explain the reasoning behind this rule: “The theory behind this rule rests upon a distinction drawn between compensation and punishment.

1981(Nordstrom v. Nordstrom (1976), 36 Ill.

1977The basic reasoning behind the rule was well enunciated in the case of McGurn v. Brotman (1st Dist. 1960), 25 Ill.

1977App. 2d 294, 298 , 167 N.E.2d 12 , wherein the court stated: “In a trial the parties have the right to confront adverse witnesses.

1976(People v. Curry, 56 Ill.2d 162 .) The reasoning behind that rule is that the trial court should have the first opportunity to consider any question that may arise in a case.