12 Iowa opinions name it 2 courts 1997–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Iowa courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Leaf v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.green2 sentences2026Although we have approved of courts considering the Daubert factors in certain types of cases, see Leaf v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 590 N.W.2d 525, 532 (Iowa 1999) (en banc), we have never adopted or required the stricter Daubert test, Ranes, 778 N.W.2d at 685–86. 2026Although we have approved of courts considering the Daubert factors in certain types of cases, see Leaf v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 590 N.W.2d 525, 532 (Iowa 1999) (en banc), we have never adopted or required the stricter Daubert test, Ranes, 778 N.W.2d at 685–86. | 3 | 4 |
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.green2 sentences2016We determine the district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Detective Tompkins to testify for the purpose of interpreting cell phone records. 3 Rendon’s complaint Detective Tompkins did not have up-to-date technical 3 On appeal, Rendon claims the interpretation of the cell phone records was a novel or complex matter and the district court should have applied the test found in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-92 (1993). “[T]rial courts are not required to apply the Daubert analysis in considering the admission of expert testimony.” Leaf v. Goodyear Tire & Ru 2016We determine the district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Detective Tompkins to testify for the purpose of interpreting cell phone records. 3 Rendon’s complaint Detective Tompkins did not have up-to-date technical 3 On appeal, Rendon claims the interpretation of the cell phone records was a novel or complex matter and the district court should have applied the test found in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-92 (1993). “[T]rial courts are not required to apply the Daubert analysis in considering the admission of expert testimony.” Leaf v. Goodyear Tire & Ru | 2 | 3 |
Katie Bonner, Esau Bonner v. Isp Technologies, Inc., Crawford & Company, Inc., Movantgreen2 sentences2010Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93 , 113 S.Ct. at 2796 , 125 L.Ed.2d at 482 ; see also Bonner, 259 F.3d at 929 (recognizing the purpose of Daubert factors). 2010Ed. 2d at 482; see also Bonner, 259 F.3d at 929 (recognizing the purpose of Daubert factors). | 2 | 2 |
Reese v. Strohgreen2 sentences1997See Reese v. Stroh, 128 Wash.2d 300, 308 , 907 P.2d 282, 286 (1995) (en banc). 1997See Reese v. Stroh, 128 Wash.2d 300, 308 , 907 P.2d 282, 286 (1995) (en banc). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Hallgreen2 sentences1999The expert’s testimony (regarding the properties and dangers of lightning) were “so ‘close to the ken of the average layman’ that a Daubert analysis would only complicate the court’s decision regarding liability.” Id. (quoting State v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80, 86 (Iowa 1980)). 1999The expert’s testimony (regarding the properties and dangers of lightning) were “so ‘close to the ken of the average layman’ that a Daubert analysis would only complicate the court’s decision regarding liability.” Id. (quoting State v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80, 86 (Iowa 1980)). | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Johngreen2 sentences2017United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 274 (5th Cir. 2010) (“We agree that in most cases, absent novel challenges, fingerprint evidence is sufficiently reliable to satisfy Rule 702 and Daubert.”); see also United States v. Pena, 586 F.3d 105 , 110–11 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 992 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Abreu, 406 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 246 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. George, 363 F.3d 666 , 672–73 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Collins, 340 F.3d 672 , 682–83 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Sher 2017United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 274 (5th Cir. 2010) (“We agree that in most cases, absent novel challenges, fingerprint evidence is sufficiently reliable to satisfy Rule 702 and Daubert.”); see also United States v. Pena, 586 F.3d 105 , 110–11 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 992 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Abreu, 406 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 246 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. George, 363 F.3d 666 , 672–73 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Collins, 340 F.3d 672 , 682–83 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Sher | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Jose Manuel Abreugreen2 sentences2017United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 274 (5th Cir. 2010) (“We agree that in most cases, absent novel challenges, fingerprint evidence is sufficiently reliable to satisfy Rule 702 and Daubert.”); see also United States v. Pena, 586 F.3d 105 , 110–11 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 992 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Abreu, 406 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 246 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. George, 363 F.3d 666 , 672–73 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Collins, 340 F.3d 672 , 682–83 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Sher 2017United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 274 (5th Cir. 2010) (“We agree that in most cases, absent novel challenges, fingerprint evidence is sufficiently reliable to satisfy Rule 702 and Daubert.”); see also United States v. Pena, 586 F.3d 105 , 110–11 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 992 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Abreu, 406 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 246 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. George, 363 F.3d 666 , 672–73 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Collins, 340 F.3d 672 , 682–83 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Sher | 1 | 1 |
cluster 728046green2 sentences2017United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 274 (5th Cir. 2010) (“We agree that in most cases, absent novel challenges, fingerprint evidence is sufficiently reliable to satisfy Rule 702 and Daubert.”); see also United States v. Pena, 586 F.3d 105 , 110–11 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 992 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Abreu, 406 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 246 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. George, 363 F.3d 666 , 672–73 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Collins, 340 F.3d 672 , 682–83 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Sher 2017United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 274 (5th Cir. 2010) (“We agree that in most cases, absent novel challenges, fingerprint evidence is sufficiently reliable to satisfy Rule 702 and Daubert.”); see also United States v. Pena, 586 F.3d 105 , 110–11 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 992 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Abreu, 406 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 246 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. George, 363 F.3d 666 , 672–73 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Collins, 340 F.3d 672 , 682–83 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Sher | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Bainesgreen2 sentences2017United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 274 (5th Cir. 2010) (“We agree that in most cases, absent novel challenges, fingerprint evidence is sufficiently reliable to satisfy Rule 702 and Daubert.”); see also United States v. Pena, 586 F.3d 105 , 110–11 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 992 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Abreu, 406 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 246 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. George, 363 F.3d 666 , 672–73 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Collins, 340 F.3d 672 , 682–83 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Sher 2017United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 274 (5th Cir. 2010) (“We agree that in most cases, absent novel challenges, fingerprint evidence is sufficiently reliable to satisfy Rule 702 and Daubert.”); see also United States v. Pena, 586 F.3d 105 , 110–11 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 992 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Abreu, 406 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 246 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. George, 363 F.3d 666 , 672–73 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Collins, 340 F.3d 672 , 682–83 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Sher | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Penagreen2 sentences2017United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 274 (5th Cir. 2010) (“We agree that in most cases, absent novel challenges, fingerprint evidence is sufficiently reliable to satisfy Rule 702 and Daubert.”); see also United States v. Pena, 586 F.3d 105 , 110–11 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 992 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Abreu, 406 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 246 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. George, 363 F.3d 666 , 672–73 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Collins, 340 F.3d 672 , 682–83 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Sher 2017United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 274 (5th Cir. 2010) (“We agree that in most cases, absent novel challenges, fingerprint evidence is sufficiently reliable to satisfy Rule 702 and Daubert.”); see also United States v. Pena, 586 F.3d 105 , 110–11 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 992 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Abreu, 406 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 246 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. George, 363 F.3d 666 , 672–73 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Collins, 340 F.3d 672 , 682–83 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Sher | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Byron Mitchellgreen2 sentences2017United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 274 (5th Cir. 2010) (“We agree that in most cases, absent novel challenges, fingerprint evidence is sufficiently reliable to satisfy Rule 702 and Daubert.”); see also United States v. Pena, 586 F.3d 105 , 110–11 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 992 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Abreu, 406 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 246 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. George, 363 F.3d 666 , 672–73 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Collins, 340 F.3d 672 , 682–83 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Sher 2017United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 274 (5th Cir. 2010) (“We agree that in most cases, absent novel challenges, fingerprint evidence is sufficiently reliable to satisfy Rule 702 and Daubert.”); see also United States v. Pena, 586 F.3d 105 , 110–11 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 992 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Abreu, 406 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 246 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. George, 363 F.3d 666 , 672–73 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Collins, 340 F.3d 672 , 682–83 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Sher | 1 | 1 |
Armstrong v. City of Wichitagreen2 sentences1999App.2d 750 , 907 P.2d 923, 929 (1995), the court declined to adopt Daubert and stated: “There are a number of reasons why we decline to apply the Daubert test. 1999App.2d 750 , 907 P.2d 923, 929 (1995), the court declined to adopt Daubert and stated: “There are a number of reasons why we decline to apply the Daubert test. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Leahygreen2 sentences1999In People v. Leahy, 8 Cal.4th 587 , 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 663 , 882 P.2d 321, 331 (1994), the court said that California’s previous case law “survived Daubert in this state, [and nothing cited] persuades us to reconsider or modify [the prior case law] at this time.” We hold that trial courts are not required to apply the Daubert analysis in considering the admission of expert testimony. 1999In People v. Leahy, 8 Cal.4th 587 , 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 663 , 882 P.2d 321, 331 (1994), the court said that California’s previous case law “survived Daubert in this state, [and nothing cited] persuades us to reconsider or modify [the prior case law] at this time.” We hold that trial courts are not required to apply the Daubert analysis in considering the admission of expert testimony. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Lealon Muldrowgreen2 sentences1997Using the language of rule 702, complex cases would usually involve “scientific” as opposed to those involving “technical or other specialized knowledge.” Williams, 561 N.W.2d at 822 ; see Compton v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 82 F.3d 1513 , 1519-20 (10th Cir.) (limiting Daubert to unique, untested, or controversial methodologies), cert. denied 513 U.S. 862 , 117 S.Ct. 611 , 136 L.Ed.2d 536 (1996); Iacobelli Constr., Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19, 25 (2d Cir.1994) (finding error in applying Daubert to expert testimony regarding nonscientific evidence); United States v. Muldrow, 19 F.3d 1332, 1997Using the language of rule 702, complex cases would usually involve “scientific” as opposed to those involving “technical or other specialized knowledge.” Williams, 561 N.W.2d at 822 ; see Compton v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 82 F.3d 1513 , 1519-20 (10th Cir.) (limiting Daubert to unique, untested, or controversial methodologies), cert. denied 513 U.S. 862 , 117 S.Ct. 611 , 136 L.Ed.2d 536 (1996); Iacobelli Constr., Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19, 25 (2d Cir.1994) (finding error in applying Daubert to expert testimony regarding nonscientific evidence); United States v. Muldrow, 19 F.3d 1332, | 1 | 1 |
Iacobelli Construction, Inc. v. County of Monroe, Rochester Pure Waters District, and Calocerinos & Spina Consulting Engineers, P.C.green2 sentences1997Using the language of rule 702, complex cases would usually involve “scientific” as opposed to those involving “technical or other specialized knowledge.” Williams, 561 N.W.2d at 822 ; see Compton v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 82 F.3d 1513 , 1519-20 (10th Cir.) (limiting Daubert to unique, untested, or controversial methodologies), cert. denied 513 U.S. 862 , 117 S.Ct. 611 , 136 L.Ed.2d 536 (1996); Iacobelli Constr., Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19, 25 (2d Cir.1994) (finding error in applying Daubert to expert testimony regarding nonscientific evidence); United States v. Muldrow, 19 F.3d 1332, 1997Using the language of rule 702, complex cases would usually involve “scientific” as opposed to those involving “technical or other specialized knowledge.” Williams, 561 N.W.2d at 822 ; see Compton v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 82 F.3d 1513 , 1519-20 (10th Cir.) (limiting Daubert to unique, untested, or controversial methodologies), cert. denied 513 U.S. 862 , 117 S.Ct. 611 , 136 L.Ed.2d 536 (1996); Iacobelli Constr., Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19, 25 (2d Cir.1994) (finding error in applying Daubert to expert testimony regarding nonscientific evidence); United States v. Muldrow, 19 F.3d 1332, | 1 | 1 |
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.green2 sentences1997In doing so, the court noted that expert testimony flowing from existing research rather than developed for litigation purposes is an important factor in determining whether the proposed testimony amounts to “good science.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 116 S.Ct.189, 133 L.Ed.2d 126 (1995). 1997In doing so, the court noted that expert testimony flowing from existing research rather than developed for litigation purposes is an important factor in determining whether the proposed testimony amounts to “good science.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 116 S.Ct.189, 133 L.Ed.2d 126 (1995). | 1 | 1 |
cluster 717568green2 sentences1997Using the language of rule 702, complex cases would usually involve “scientific” as opposed to those involving “technical or other specialized knowledge.” Williams, 561 N.W.2d at 822 ; see Compton v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 82 F.3d 1513 , 1519-20 (10th Cir.) (limiting Daubert to unique, untested, or controversial methodologies), cert. denied 513 U.S. 862 , 117 S.Ct. 611 , 136 L.Ed.2d 536 (1996); Iacobelli Constr., Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19, 25 (2d Cir.1994) (finding error in applying Daubert to expert testimony regarding nonscientific evidence); United States v. Muldrow, 19 F.3d 1332, 1997Using the language of rule 702, complex cases would usually involve “scientific” as opposed to those involving “technical or other specialized knowledge.” Williams, 561 N.W.2d at 822 ; see Compton v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 82 F.3d 1513 , 1519-20 (10th Cir.) (limiting Daubert to unique, untested, or controversial methodologies), cert. denied 513 U.S. 862 , 117 S.Ct. 611 , 136 L.Ed.2d 536 (1996); Iacobelli Constr., Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19, 25 (2d Cir.1994) (finding error in applying Daubert to expert testimony regarding nonscientific evidence); United States v. Muldrow, 19 F.3d 1332, | 1 | 1 |
Thornton v. Caterpillar, Inc.green2 sentences1997Using the language of rule 702, complex cases would usually involve “scientific” as opposed to those involving “technical or other specialized knowledge.” Williams, 561 N.W.2d at 822 ; see Compton v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 82 F.3d 1513 , 1519-20 (10th Cir.) (limiting Daubert to unique, untested, or controversial methodologies), cert. denied 513 U.S. 862 , 117 S.Ct. 611 , 136 L.Ed.2d 536 (1996); Iacobelli Constr., Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19, 25 (2d Cir.1994) (finding error in applying Daubert to expert testimony regarding nonscientific evidence); United States v. Muldrow, 19 F.3d 1332, 1997Using the language of rule 702, complex cases would usually involve “scientific” as opposed to those involving “technical or other specialized knowledge.” Williams, 561 N.W.2d at 822 ; see Compton v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 82 F.3d 1513 , 1519-20 (10th Cir.) (limiting Daubert to unique, untested, or controversial methodologies), cert. denied 513 U.S. 862 , 117 S.Ct. 611 , 136 L.Ed.2d 536 (1996); Iacobelli Constr., Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19, 25 (2d Cir.1994) (finding error in applying Daubert to expert testimony regarding nonscientific evidence); United States v. Muldrow, 19 F.3d 1332, | 1 | 1 |
Adams v. CSX Transportation, Inc.green2 sentences1997Using the language of rule 702, complex cases would usually involve “scientific” as opposed to those involving “technical or other specialized knowledge.” Williams, 561 N.W.2d at 822 ; see Compton v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 82 F.3d 1513 , 1519-20 (10th Cir.) (limiting Daubert to unique, untested, or controversial methodologies), cert. denied 513 U.S. 862 , 117 S.Ct. 611 , 136 L.Ed.2d 536 (1996); Iacobelli Constr., Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19, 25 (2d Cir.1994) (finding error in applying Daubert to expert testimony regarding nonscientific evidence); United States v. Muldrow, 19 F.3d 1332, 1997Using the language of rule 702, complex cases would usually involve “scientific” as opposed to those involving “technical or other specialized knowledge.” Williams, 561 N.W.2d at 822 ; see Compton v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 82 F.3d 1513 , 1519-20 (10th Cir.) (limiting Daubert to unique, untested, or controversial methodologies), cert. denied 513 U.S. 862 , 117 S.Ct. 611 , 136 L.Ed.2d 536 (1996); Iacobelli Constr., Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19, 25 (2d Cir.1994) (finding error in applying Daubert to expert testimony regarding nonscientific evidence); United States v. Muldrow, 19 F.3d 1332, | 1 | 1 |
Kissi v. Great American Insurancegreen2 sentences1997Using the language of rule 702, complex cases would usually involve “scientific” as opposed to those involving “technical or other specialized knowledge.” Williams, 561 N.W.2d at 822 ; see Compton v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 82 F.3d 1513 , 1519-20 (10th Cir.) (limiting Daubert to unique, untested, or controversial methodologies), cert. denied 513 U.S. 862 , 117 S.Ct. 611 , 136 L.Ed.2d 536 (1996); Iacobelli Constr., Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19, 25 (2d Cir.1994) (finding error in applying Daubert to expert testimony regarding nonscientific evidence); United States v. Muldrow, 19 F.3d 1332, 1997Using the language of rule 702, complex cases would usually involve “scientific” as opposed to those involving “technical or other specialized knowledge.” Williams, 561 N.W.2d at 822 ; see Compton v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 82 F.3d 1513 , 1519-20 (10th Cir.) (limiting Daubert to unique, untested, or controversial methodologies), cert. denied 513 U.S. 862 , 117 S.Ct. 611 , 136 L.Ed.2d 536 (1996); Iacobelli Constr., Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19, 25 (2d Cir.1994) (finding error in applying Daubert to expert testimony regarding nonscientific evidence); United States v. Muldrow, 19 F.3d 1332, | 1 | 1 |
| Minier-Contreras v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Iowa. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. Hedican
green
2 sentences1999As we have noted, the Daubert analysis “can be time-consuming and costly.” Williams, 561 N.W.2d at 827 . 1999As we have noted, the Daubert analysis “can be time-consuming and costly.” Williams, 561 N.W.2d at 827 . | 3 | 1997–1999 |
Ragland v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2016Id. at 574 . 2016Id. at 574 . | 2 | 2016–2016 |
United States v. Romero-Lobato
green
1 sentence2026The legal posture in this case is different, with Wyldes’s challenge raised in a postconviction-relief action based on the discovery of new evidence after a conviction several decades ago. 16 In United States v. Romero-Lobato, a Nevada federal district court evaluated the reliability of firearm toolmark expert testimony by applying the five Daubert factors. 379 F. Supp. 3d at 1118–22. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Ranes v. Adams Laboratories, Inc.
green
2 sentences2026Although we have approved of courts considering the Daubert factors in certain types of cases, see Leaf v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 590 N.W.2d 525, 532 (Iowa 1999) (en banc), we have never adopted or required the stricter Daubert test, Ranes, 778 N.W.2d at 685–86. 2026Although we have approved of courts considering the Daubert factors in certain types of cases, see Leaf v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 590 N.W.2d 525, 532 (Iowa 1999) (en banc), we have never adopted or required the stricter Daubert test, Ranes, 778 N.W.2d at 685–86. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
United States v. Jeffrey H. Collins
green
2 sentences2017United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 274 (5th Cir. 2010) (“We agree that in most cases, absent novel challenges, fingerprint evidence is sufficiently reliable to satisfy Rule 702 and Daubert.”); see also United States v. Pena, 586 F.3d 105 , 110–11 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 992 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Abreu, 406 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 246 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. George, 363 F.3d 666 , 672–73 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Collins, 340 F.3d 672 , 682–83 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Sher 2017United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 274 (5th Cir. 2010) (“We agree that in most cases, absent novel challenges, fingerprint evidence is sufficiently reliable to satisfy Rule 702 and Daubert.”); see also United States v. Pena, 586 F.3d 105 , 110–11 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 992 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Abreu, 406 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 246 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. George, 363 F.3d 666 , 672–73 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Collins, 340 F.3d 672 , 682–83 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Sher | 1 | 2017–2017 |
United States v. Fowobi George and Ola Mustapha
green
2 sentences2017United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 274 (5th Cir. 2010) (“We agree that in most cases, absent novel challenges, fingerprint evidence is sufficiently reliable to satisfy Rule 702 and Daubert.”); see also United States v. Pena, 586 F.3d 105 , 110–11 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 992 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Abreu, 406 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 246 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. George, 363 F.3d 666 , 672–73 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Collins, 340 F.3d 672 , 682–83 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Sher 2017United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 274 (5th Cir. 2010) (“We agree that in most cases, absent novel challenges, fingerprint evidence is sufficiently reliable to satisfy Rule 702 and Daubert.”); see also United States v. Pena, 586 F.3d 105 , 110–11 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 992 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Abreu, 406 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 246 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. George, 363 F.3d 666 , 672–73 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Collins, 340 F.3d 672 , 682–83 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Sher | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Carolan v. Hill
green
2 sentences1999Dist., 570 N.W.2d 633 (Iowa 1997); Mensink, 564 N.W.2d at 380-81 ; Williams v. Hedican, 561 N.W.2d 817 (Iowa 1997); Carolan v. Hill, 553 N.W.2d 882 (Iowa 1996); and Hutchison v. American Family Mut. 1999Dist., 570 N.W.2d 633 (Iowa 1997); Mensink, 564 N.W.2d at 380-81 ; Williams v. Hedican, 561 N.W.2d 817 (Iowa 1997); Carolan v. Hill, 553 N.W.2d 882 (Iowa 1996); and Hutchison v. American Family Mut. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Mensink v. American Grain
green
2 sentences1999The expert’s testimony (regarding the properties and dangers of lightning) were “so ‘close to the ken of the average layman’ that a Daubert analysis would only complicate the court’s decision regarding liability.” Id. (quoting State v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80, 86 (Iowa 1980)). 1999The expert’s testimony (regarding the properties and dangers of lightning) were “so ‘close to the ken of the average layman’ that a Daubert analysis would only complicate the court’s decision regarding liability.” Id. (quoting State v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80, 86 (Iowa 1980)). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Johnson v. Knoxville Community School District
green
2 sentences1999Dist., 570 N.W.2d 633 (Iowa 1997); Mensink, 564 N.W.2d at 380-81 ; Williams v. Hedican, 561 N.W.2d 817 (Iowa 1997); Carolan v. Hill, 553 N.W.2d 882 (Iowa 1996); and Hutchison v. American Family Mut. 1999Dist., 570 N.W.2d 633 (Iowa 1997); Mensink, 564 N.W.2d at 380-81 ; Williams v. Hedican, 561 N.W.2d 817 (Iowa 1997); Carolan v. Hill, 553 N.W.2d 882 (Iowa 1996); and Hutchison v. American Family Mut. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Hunt v. California
green
2 sentences1997Using the language of rule 702, complex cases would usually involve “scientific” as opposed to those involving “technical or other specialized knowledge.” Williams, 561 N.W.2d at 822 ; see Compton v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 82 F.3d 1513 , 1519-20 (10th Cir.) (limiting Daubert to unique, untested, or controversial methodologies), cert. denied 513 U.S. 862 , 117 S.Ct. 611 , 136 L.Ed.2d 536 (1996); Iacobelli Constr., Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19, 25 (2d Cir.1994) (finding error in applying Daubert to expert testimony regarding nonscientific evidence); United States v. Muldrow, 19 F.3d 1332, 1997Using the language of rule 702, complex cases would usually involve “scientific” as opposed to those involving “technical or other specialized knowledge.” Williams, 561 N.W.2d at 822 ; see Compton v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 82 F.3d 1513 , 1519-20 (10th Cir.) (limiting Daubert to unique, untested, or controversial methodologies), cert. denied 513 U.S. 862 , 117 S.Ct. 611 , 136 L.Ed.2d 536 (1996); Iacobelli Constr., Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19, 25 (2d Cir.1994) (finding error in applying Daubert to expert testimony regarding nonscientific evidence); United States v. Muldrow, 19 F.3d 1332, | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.