9 Rhode Island opinions name it 2 courts 1999–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Rhode Island courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
DiPetrillo v. Dow Chemical Co.green2 sentences2024The trial justice also found Dr. Scheller’s testimony to be concerning when he stated that he did not believe that a person “without a history of a serious psychological problem or a serious behavior problem * * * would violently shake a child just simply out of frustration * * *.” The court later engaged in the following colloquy to clarify its concerns: 4 “In DiPetrillo v. Dow Chemical Co., 729 A.2d 677, 686 (R.I. 1999), this Court discussed the standard for admitting expert scientific testimony that should govern the trial court’s decision about whether to allow the jury to hear this type o 2024The trial justice also found Dr. Scheller’s testimony to be concerning when he stated that he did not believe that a person “without a history of a serious psychological problem or a serious behavior problem * * * would violently shake a child just simply out of frustration * * *.” The court later engaged in the following colloquy to clarify its concerns: 4 “In DiPetrillo v. Dow Chemical Co., 729 A.2d 677, 686 (R.I. 1999), this Court discussed the standard for admitting expert scientific testimony that should govern the trial court’s decision about whether to allow the jury to hear this type o | 3 | 4 |
Roe v. Gelineaugreen2 sentences2006Roe v. Gelineau, 794 A.2d 476, 488 (R.I.2002); DiPetrillo v. Dow Chemical Co., 729 A.2d 677, 688 (R.I.1999). 2006Roe v. Gelineau, 794 A.2d 476, 488 (R.I.2002); DiPetrillo v. Dow Chemical Co., 729 A.2d 677, 688 (R.I.1999). | 1 | 2 |
Owens v. Silviagreen2 sentences2024The trial justice also found Dr. Scheller’s testimony to be concerning when he stated that he did not believe that a person “without a history of a serious psychological problem or a serious behavior problem * * * would violently shake a child just simply out of frustration * * *.” The court later engaged in the following colloquy to clarify its concerns: 4 “In DiPetrillo v. Dow Chemical Co., 729 A.2d 677, 686 (R.I. 1999), this Court discussed the standard for admitting expert scientific testimony that should govern the trial court’s decision about whether to allow the jury to hear this type o 2024The trial justice also found Dr. Scheller’s testimony to be concerning when he stated that he did not believe that a person “without a history of a serious psychological problem or a serious behavior problem * * * would violently shake a child just simply out of frustration * * *.” The court later engaged in the following colloquy to clarify its concerns: 4 “In DiPetrillo v. Dow Chemical Co., 729 A.2d 677, 686 (R.I. 1999), this Court discussed the standard for admitting expert scientific testimony that should govern the trial court’s decision about whether to allow the jury to hear this type o | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ashnessgreen1 sentence2010See R.I. v. Gardiner , 895 A.2d 703 , 713 (R.I. 2006) (holding that "[w]e need not determine whether the failure to follow this procedure [for admitting experts] was prejudicial because defendant failed to make a timely objection to [witness]'s testimony, including his opinion testimony, which was based on his professional experience"); R.I. v. Ashness , 461 A.2d 659 , 669 (R.I. 1983) ("When the [prosecution witness giving expert testimony concerning firearms identification] finished his testimony, the defendant moved to strike it, but the trial justice [properly] ruled that the objection was | 1 | 1 |
Narragansett Electric Co. v. Carbonegreen1 sentence2010See R.I. v. Gardiner , 895 A.2d 703 , 713 (R.I. 2006) (holding that "[w]e need not determine whether the failure to follow this procedure [for admitting experts] was prejudicial because defendant failed to make a timely objection to [witness]'s testimony, including his opinion testimony, which was based on his professional experience"); R.I. v. Ashness , 461 A.2d 659 , 669 (R.I. 1983) ("When the [prosecution witness giving expert testimony concerning firearms identification] finished his testimony, the defendant moved to strike it, but the trial justice [properly] ruled that the objection was | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gardinergreen1 sentence2010See R.I. v. Gardiner , 895 A.2d 703 , 713 (R.I. 2006) (holding that "[w]e need not determine whether the failure to follow this procedure [for admitting experts] was prejudicial because defendant failed to make a timely objection to [witness]'s testimony, including his opinion testimony, which was based on his professional experience"); R.I. v. Ashness , 461 A.2d 659 , 669 (R.I. 1983) ("When the [prosecution witness giving expert testimony concerning firearms identification] finished his testimony, the defendant moved to strike it, but the trial justice [properly] ruled that the objection was | 1 | 1 |
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.green2 sentences2009See Raimbeault , 772 A.2d at 1061 (holding that Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. , 509 U.S. 579 , 589 (1993), applies to scientific testimony in Rhode Island state courts). 2009See Raimbeault , 772 A.2d at 1061 (holding that Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. , 509 U.S. 579 , 589 (1993), applies to scientific testimony in Rhode Island state courts). | 1 | 1 |
Raimbeault v. Takeuchi Manufacturing (U.S.), Ltd.green2 sentences2009See Raimbeault , 772 A.2d at 1061 (holding that Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. , 509 U.S. 579 , 589 (1993), applies to scientific testimony in Rhode Island state courts). 2009See Raimbeault , 772 A.2d at 1061 (holding that Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. , 509 U.S. 579 , 589 (1993), applies to scientific testimony in Rhode Island state courts). | 1 | 1 |
Teresa Ambrosini v. Jorge Labarraque and the Upjohn Companygreen1 sentence2003Faigman et al., Modem Scientific Evidence, § 1-3.4 at 26 n. 74 (2002) (collecting cases). “[T]he Daubert analysis does not establish a heightened threshold for the admission of expert evidence, but rather focuses on the court’s ‘gatekeeper’ role as a check on ‘subjective belief and ‘unsupported speculation.’ ” Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129, 134 (D.C.Cir.1996). | 1 | 1 |
Lewis R. Robinson v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Companygreen2 sentences1999And in Robinson v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 16 F.3d 1083, 1089 (10th Cir.1994), the Tenth Circuit suggested that “as ‘gatekeeper’ the district court carefully and meticulously make an early pretrial evaluation of issues of admissibility * * *.” See also Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1319 n. 10 (“Where the opposing party * * * raises a material dispute as to the admissibility of expert scientific evidence, the [trial] court must hold an in limine hearing (a so-called Daubert hearing) to consider the conflicting evidence and make findings about the soundness and reliability of the methodology emp 1999And in Robinson v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 16 F.3d 1083, 1089 (10th Cir.1994), the Tenth Circuit suggested that “as ‘gatekeeper’ the district court carefully and meticulously make an early pretrial evaluation of issues of admissibility * * *.” See also Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1319 n. 10 (“Where the opposing party * * * raises a material dispute as to the admissibility of expert scientific evidence, the [trial] court must hold an in limine hearing (a so-called Daubert hearing) to consider the conflicting evidence and make findings about the soundness and reliability of the methodology emp | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Lavandris Johnsongreen2 sentences1999See United States v. Johnson, 56 F.3d 947, 952 (8th Cir.1995) (noting that because the court had previously determined that DNA profiling was reliable under Daubert I, in the future courts could take judicial notice of that finding of reliability); In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717 , 744 n. 10 (3rd Cir.1994) (“if it is a technique of uncontro-verted validity, this [Daubert ] inquiry can be resolved by judicial notice. 1999See United States v. Johnson, 56 F.3d 947, 952 (8th Cir.1995) (noting that because the court had previously determined that DNA profiling was reliable under Daubert I, in the future courts could take judicial notice of that finding of reliability); In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717 , 744 n. 10 (3rd Cir.1994) (“if it is a technique of uncontro-verted validity, this [Daubert ] inquiry can be resolved by judicial notice. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hungerfordgreen2 sentences1999The State argues for what it terms a "relaxed Daubert criteria applicable to the `soft sciences.'" 70 The State contends that the standard in establishing general acceptance should be flexible for much of the data at work in the fields of psychiatry and psychology is subjective and many theories are difficult to verify. 71 In further support of this relaxed standard, the State points to federal case law decided subsequent to Quattrocchi and Hungerford (cited infra ) in which a relaxed standard is applied to the soft sciences. 72 The State reads these cases as standing for the relinquishment of 1999Hungerford , 697 A.2d at 928 ( Cf . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Rhode Island. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation
green
2 sentences1999See United States v. Johnson, 56 F.3d 947, 952 (8th Cir.1995) (noting that because the court had previously determined that DNA profiling was reliable under Daubert I, in the future courts could take judicial notice of that finding of reliability); In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717 , 744 n. 10 (3rd Cir.1994) (“if it is a technique of uncontro-verted validity, this [Daubert ] inquiry can be resolved by judicial notice. 1999See United States v. Johnson, 56 F.3d 947, 952 (8th Cir.1995) (noting that because the court had previously determined that DNA profiling was reliable under Daubert I, in the future courts could take judicial notice of that finding of reliability); In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717 , 744 n. 10 (3rd Cir.1994) (“if it is a technique of uncontro-verted validity, this [Daubert ] inquiry can be resolved by judicial notice. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
green
2 sentences1999And in Robinson v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 16 F.3d 1083, 1089 (10th Cir.1994), the Tenth Circuit suggested that “as ‘gatekeeper’ the district court carefully and meticulously make an early pretrial evaluation of issues of admissibility * * *.” See also Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1319 n. 10 (“Where the opposing party * * * raises a material dispute as to the admissibility of expert scientific evidence, the [trial] court must hold an in limine hearing (a so-called Daubert hearing) to consider the conflicting evidence and make findings about the soundness and reliability of the methodology emp 1999And in Robinson v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 16 F.3d 1083, 1089 (10th Cir.1994), the Tenth Circuit suggested that “as ‘gatekeeper’ the district court carefully and meticulously make an early pretrial evaluation of issues of admissibility * * *.” See also Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1319 n. 10 (“Where the opposing party * * * raises a material dispute as to the admissibility of expert scientific evidence, the [trial] court must hold an in limine hearing (a so-called Daubert hearing) to consider the conflicting evidence and make findings about the soundness and reliability of the methodology emp | 1 | 1999–1999 |
General Electric Co. v. Joiner
green
2 sentences1999If and when the situation arises, this Court will address the appropriate standard of review of a trial courts decision to admit or exclude scientific evidence after a preliminary Daubert hearing, in light of the Supreme Court’s opinion in General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 .U.S. 136, 118 S.Ct. 512 , 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997) (holding that the abuse of discretion standard is the proper one by which to review a trial court's decision whether to admit scientific evidence). 14 . 1999If and when the situation arises, this Court will address the appropriate standard of review of a trial courts decision to admit or exclude scientific evidence after a preliminary Daubert hearing, in light of the Supreme Court’s opinion in General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 .U.S. 136, 118 S.Ct. 512 , 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997) (holding that the abuse of discretion standard is the proper one by which to review a trial court's decision whether to admit scientific evidence). 14 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.