18 California opinions name it 3 courts 1995–2023 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Daveggio & Michaudgreen2 sentences2023(See People v. Daveggio and Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790, 831, fn. 7 .) 41. dispelling any “ ‘ “ ‘misleading aura of certainty’ ” ’ ” regarding the process. 2023(See People v. Daveggio and Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790, 831, fn. 7 .) 41. dispelling any “ ‘ “ ‘misleading aura of certainty’ ” ’ ” regarding the process. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Leahygreen2 sentences2014(People v. Leahy (1994) 8 Cal.4th 587, 593-604 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 663 , 882 P.2d 321 ] [holding that the Kelly prongs survived Daubert in this state].) In addition, our opinion in Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California, supra, 55 Cal.4th 747 did not, by using the term “gatekeeper,” indicate any move away from the Kelly test toward the federal Daubert standard. 2014(People v. Leahy (1994) 8 Cal.4th 587, 593-604 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 663 , 882 P.2d 321 ] [holding that the Kelly prongs survived Daubert in this state].) In addition, our opinion in Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California, supra, 55 Cal.4th 747 did not, by using the term “gatekeeper,” indicate any move away from the Kelly test toward the federal Daubert standard. | 2 | 2 |
Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern Californiagreen2 sentences2018(Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 770-771 .) The Kelly/Daubert rule conditions the admissibility of evidence based on a new scientific method on a showing that the method is generally accepted as reliable in the relevant scientific community. 2014(People v. Leahy (1994) 8 Cal.4th 587, 593-604 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 663 , 882 P.2d 321 ] [holding that the Kelly prongs survived Daubert in this state].) In addition, our opinion in Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California, supra, 55 Cal.4th 747 did not, by using the term “gatekeeper,” indicate any move away from the Kelly test toward the federal Daubert standard. | 1 | 3 |
People v. Venegasgreen2 sentences2021(People v. Venegas (1998) 18 Cal.4th 47, 88 [relying in part on state court decisions using the Daubert standard]; People v. Buell (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 682 , 690–691 [same].) 28 relied on the database never claimed that the database positively identified the defendant’s print. 2021(People v. Venegas (1998) 18 Cal.4th 47, 88 [relying in part on state court decisions using the Daubert standard]; People v. Buell (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 682 , 690–691 [same].) 28 relied on the database never claimed that the database positively identified the defendant’s print. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Lucasgreen2 sentences2021(Lucas, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 245, fn. 36 .) We reject the claim of error. 2021But we have previously rejected such claims, and defendant offers no persuasive reason for reconsideration of our conclusion. [Citation.] In addition, our opinion in [Sargon], did not, by using the term ‘gatekeeper,’ indicate any move away from the Kelly test toward the federal Daubert standard.” (Lucas, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 245, fn. 36 .) Likewise, in the present case, defendant’s Sargon argument amounts to an invitation to abandon the Kelly test in favor of the federal Daubert standard. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Morrisgreen1 sentence2014(Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 772, fn. 6 .) 37 “Electrophoresis allows typing of individual blood proteins and enzymes found in a blood sample by a method that separates electrically charged molecules.” (People v. Morris, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 206.) 38 In Crawford , Washington state law forbid the defendant’s spouse from testifying without the defendant husband’s consent, which he refused to give. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cody Clarkgreen2 sentences2013(Palaschak, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1242 .) 10 court’s decision to admit the testimony was not “‘so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.’” (Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 773 , quoting People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377 ; see also State v. Clark (Mont. 2008) 198 P.3d 809, 819 [pharmacist’s “testimony regarding the identification of prescription drugs by reference to their unique imprint code and national pharmaceutical databases is not novel scientific evidence requiring a Daubert hearing”]; Stank, supra, 708 N.W.2d at p. 55 [noting courts “have reco 2013(Palaschak, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1242 .) 10 court’s decision to admit the testimony was not “‘so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.’” (Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 773 , quoting People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377 ; see also State v. Clark (Mont. 2008) 198 P.3d 809, 819 [pharmacist’s “testimony regarding the identification of prescription drugs by reference to their unique imprint code and national pharmaceutical databases is not novel scientific evidence requiring a Daubert hearing”]; Stank, supra, 708 N.W.2d at p. 55 [noting courts “have reco | 1 | 1 |
State v. Stankgreen2 sentences2013(Palaschak, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1242 .) 10 court’s decision to admit the testimony was not “‘so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.’” (Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 773 , quoting People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377 ; see also State v. Clark (Mont. 2008) 198 P.3d 809, 819 [pharmacist’s “testimony regarding the identification of prescription drugs by reference to their unique imprint code and national pharmaceutical databases is not novel scientific evidence requiring a Daubert hearing”]; Stank, supra, 708 N.W.2d at p. 55 [noting courts “have reco 2013(Palaschak, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1242 .) 10 court’s decision to admit the testimony was not “‘so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.’” (Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 773 , quoting People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377 ; see also State v. Clark (Mont. 2008) 198 P.3d 809, 819 [pharmacist’s “testimony regarding the identification of prescription drugs by reference to their unique imprint code and national pharmaceutical databases is not novel scientific evidence requiring a Daubert hearing”]; Stank, supra, 708 N.W.2d at p. 55 [noting courts “have reco | 1 | 1 |
Rock v. Arkansasgreen2 sentences2004(See United States v. Cordoba (9th Cir.1997) 104 F.3d 225, 227-229 [holding that the Ninth Circuit's per se ban on polygraph evidence, based upon Frye , was overturned by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra, 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 , which concluded the Federal Rules of Evidence superceded the Frye "general acceptance" test in federal courts]; United States v. Piccinonna (11th Cir.1989) 885 F.2d 1529, 1532-1537 [concluding there was no per se ban on polygraph evidence in the Eleventh Circuit]; United States v. Galbreth, supra, 908 F.Supp. 877, 890-896 [h 2004(See United States v. Cordoba (9th Cir.1997) 104 F.3d 225, 227-229 [holding that the Ninth Circuit's per se ban on polygraph evidence, based upon Frye , was overturned by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra, 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 , which concluded the Federal Rules of Evidence superceded the Frye "general acceptance" test in federal courts]; United States v. Piccinonna (11th Cir.1989) 885 F.2d 1529, 1532-1537 [concluding there was no per se ban on polygraph evidence in the Eleventh Circuit]; United States v. Galbreth, supra, 908 F.Supp. 877, 890-896 [h | 1 | 1 |
| cluster 732510green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Keglergreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Crumbygreen | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Scheffergreen2 sentences2004(See United States v. Cordoba (9th Cir.1997) 104 F.3d 225, 227-229 [holding that the Ninth Circuit's per se ban on polygraph evidence, based upon Frye , was overturned by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra, 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 , which concluded the Federal Rules of Evidence superceded the Frye "general acceptance" test in federal courts]; United States v. Piccinonna (11th Cir.1989) 885 F.2d 1529, 1532-1537 [concluding there was no per se ban on polygraph evidence in the Eleventh Circuit]; United States v. Galbreth, supra, 908 F.Supp. 877, 890-896 [h 2004(See United States v. Cordoba (9th Cir.1997) 104 F.3d 225, 227-229 [holding that the Ninth Circuit's per se ban on polygraph evidence, based upon Frye , was overturned by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra, 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 , which concluded the Federal Rules of Evidence superceded the Frye "general acceptance" test in federal courts]; United States v. Piccinonna (11th Cir.1989) 885 F.2d 1529, 1532-1537 [concluding there was no per se ban on polygraph evidence in the Eleventh Circuit]; United States v. Galbreth, supra, 908 F.Supp. 877, 890-896 [h | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Julio Piccinonnagreen | 1 | 1 |
People v. Aontae D.green2 sentences2004(See United States v. Cordoba (9th Cir.1997) 104 F.3d 225, 227-229 [holding that the Ninth Circuit's per se ban on polygraph evidence, based upon Frye , was overturned by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra, 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 , which concluded the Federal Rules of Evidence superceded the Frye "general acceptance" test in federal courts]; United States v. Piccinonna (11th Cir.1989) 885 F.2d 1529, 1532-1537 [concluding there was no per se ban on polygraph evidence in the Eleventh Circuit]; United States v. Galbreth, supra, 908 F.Supp. 877, 890-896 [h 2004(See United States v. Cordoba (9th Cir.1997) 104 F.3d 225, 227-229 [holding that the Ninth Circuit's per se ban on polygraph evidence, based upon Frye , was overturned by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra, 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 , which concluded the Federal Rules of Evidence superceded the Frye "general acceptance" test in federal courts]; United States v. Piccinonna (11th Cir.1989) 885 F.2d 1529, 1532-1537 [concluding there was no per se ban on polygraph evidence in the Eleventh Circuit]; United States v. Galbreth, supra, 908 F.Supp. 877, 890-896 [h | 1 | 1 |
Chambers v. Mississippigreen2 sentences2004(See United States v. Cordoba (9th Cir.1997) 104 F.3d 225, 227-229 [holding that the Ninth Circuit's per se ban on polygraph evidence, based upon Frye , was overturned by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra, 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 , which concluded the Federal Rules of Evidence superceded the Frye "general acceptance" test in federal courts]; United States v. Piccinonna (11th Cir.1989) 885 F.2d 1529, 1532-1537 [concluding there was no per se ban on polygraph evidence in the Eleventh Circuit]; United States v. Galbreth, supra, 908 F.Supp. 877, 890-896 [h 2004(See United States v. Cordoba (9th Cir.1997) 104 F.3d 225, 227-229 [holding that the Ninth Circuit's per se ban on polygraph evidence, based upon Frye , was overturned by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra, 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 , which concluded the Federal Rules of Evidence superceded the Frye "general acceptance" test in federal courts]; United States v. Piccinonna (11th Cir.1989) 885 F.2d 1529, 1532-1537 [concluding there was no per se ban on polygraph evidence in the Eleventh Circuit]; United States v. Galbreth, supra, 908 F.Supp. 877, 890-896 [h | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Galbrethgreen2 sentences2004(See United States v. Cordoba (9th Cir.1997) 104 F.3d 225, 227-229 [holding that the Ninth Circuit's per se ban on polygraph evidence, based upon Frye , was overturned by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra, 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 , which concluded the Federal Rules of Evidence superceded the Frye "general acceptance" test in federal courts]; United States v. Piccinonna (11th Cir.1989) 885 F.2d 1529, 1532-1537 [concluding there was no per se ban on polygraph evidence in the Eleventh Circuit]; United States v. Galbreth, supra, 908 F.Supp. 877, 890-896 [h 2004(See United States v. Cordoba (9th Cir.1997) 104 F.3d 225, 227-229 [holding that the Ninth Circuit's per se ban on polygraph evidence, based upon Frye , was overturned by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra, 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 , which concluded the Federal Rules of Evidence superceded the Frye "general acceptance" test in federal courts]; United States v. Piccinonna (11th Cir.1989) 885 F.2d 1529, 1532-1537 [concluding there was no per se ban on polygraph evidence in the Eleventh Circuit]; United States v. Galbreth, supra, 908 F.Supp. 877, 890-896 [h | 1 | 1 |
Green v. Georgiagreen2 sentences2004In Rock , the United States Supreme Court concluded that a per se rule excluding all hypnotically refreshed testimony infringed upon the defendant's constitutional right to testify, where the rule prevented the defendant from testifying regarding the circumstances underlying the charged killing, including whether it was accidental. ( Rock v. Arkansas, supra, 483 U.S. at pp. 56-62, 107 S.Ct. 2704 .) The court in Chambers held that the defendant's constitutional right to present a defense was impaired by Mississippi's "voucher" rule, which prevented the defendant from impeaching a defense witnes 2004In Rock , the United States Supreme Court concluded that a per se rule excluding all hypnotically refreshed testimony infringed upon the defendant's constitutional right to testify, where the rule prevented the defendant from testifying regarding the circumstances underlying the charged killing, including whether it was accidental. ( Rock v. Arkansas, supra, 483 U.S. at pp. 56-62, 107 S.Ct. 2704 .) The court in Chambers held that the defendant's constitutional right to present a defense was impaired by Mississippi's "voucher" rule, which prevented the defendant from impeaching a defense witnes | 1 | 1 |
| Isely v. Capuchin Provincegreen | 1 | 1 |
| K.B. v. Evangelical Lutheran Church in Americagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Shahzade v. Gregorygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Copelandgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Emerson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
green
2 sentences2022(See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) 509 U.S. 579, 586 ; Soto, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 515, fn. 3.) “Though the federal Daubert standard for admission of scientific evidence differs somewhat from the Kelly standard, appellate decisions affirming the admission of scientific evidence under that standard are relevant to the Kelly analysis.” (People v. Lund (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 1119 , 1140, fn. 6 (Lund).) 10 Nevertheless, “proof of a technique’s general acceptance in the relevant scientific community [is not] necessary once a published appellate decision ha[s] affirmed a trial 2004(See United States v. Cordoba (9th Cir.1997) 104 F.3d 225, 227-229 [holding that the Ninth Circuit's per se ban on polygraph evidence, based upon Frye , was overturned by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra, 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 , which concluded the Federal Rules of Evidence superceded the Frye "general acceptance" test in federal courts]; United States v. Piccinonna (11th Cir.1989) 885 F.2d 1529, 1532-1537 [concluding there was no per se ban on polygraph evidence in the Eleventh Circuit]; United States v. Galbreth, supra, 908 F.Supp. 877, 890-896 [h | 6 | 1998–2022 |
In Re Zurn Pex Plumbing Products Liability
green
2 sentences2018(See, e.g., In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Products Liability Litigation (8th Cir. 2011) 644 F.3d 604 , 614 ; Fosmire v. Progressive Max Insurance Co. (W.D.Wash. 2011) 277 F.R.D. 625 , 629.) The fact that federal courts apply their Daubert standard at class certification shows both the feasibility and desirability of ensuring the reliability of expert opinion evidence at this stage. 2018(See, e.g., In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Products Liability Litigation (8th Cir. 2011) 644 F.3d 604, 614 ; Fosmire v. Progressive Max Insurance Co. (W.D.Wash. 2011) 277 F.R.D. 625, 629 .) The fact that federal courts apply their Daubert standard at class certification shows both the feasibility and desirability of ensuring the reliability of expert opinion evidence at this stage. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Fosmire v. Progressive Max Insurance
green
2 sentences2018(See, e.g., In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Products Liability Litigation (8th Cir. 2011) 644 F.3d 604 , 614 ; Fosmire v. Progressive Max Insurance Co. (W.D.Wash. 2011) 277 F.R.D. 625 , 629.) The fact that federal courts apply their Daubert standard at class certification shows both the feasibility and desirability of ensuring the reliability of expert opinion evidence at this stage. 2018(See, e.g., In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Products Liability Litigation (8th Cir. 2011) 644 F.3d 604, 614 ; Fosmire v. Progressive Max Insurance Co. (W.D.Wash. 2011) 277 F.R.D. 625, 629 .) The fact that federal courts apply their Daubert standard at class certification shows both the feasibility and desirability of ensuring the reliability of expert opinion evidence at this stage. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Stone v. Advance America
green
2 sentences2018(See, e.g., Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp. (9th Cir. 2011) 657 F.3d 970 , 982 ; Kamakahi v. American Society for Reproductive Medicine (N.D.Cal. 2015) 305 F.R.D. 164 , 176 ; Stone v. Advance America (S.D.Cal. 2011) 278 F.R.D. 562 , 566.) Although some federal courts appear to have a largely semantic disagreement over whether to apply a "full" or *1120 "focused" Daubert analysis, the substantive result appears the same. 2018(See, e.g., Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp. (9th Cir. 2011) 657 F.3d 970, 982 ; Kamakahi v. American Society for Reproductive Medicine (N.D.Cal. 2015) 305 F.R.D. 164, 176 ; Stone v. Advance America (S.D.Cal. 2011) 278 F.R.D. 562, 566 .) Although some federal courts appear to have a largely semantic disagreement over whether to apply a "full" or "focused" Daubert analysis, the substantive result appears the same. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Kamakahi v. American Society for Reproductive Medicine
green
2 sentences2018(See, e.g., Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp. (9th Cir. 2011) 657 F.3d 970 , 982 ; Kamakahi v. American Society for Reproductive Medicine (N.D.Cal. 2015) 305 F.R.D. 164 , 176 ; Stone v. Advance America (S.D.Cal. 2011) 278 F.R.D. 562 , 566.) Although some federal courts appear to have a largely semantic disagreement over whether to apply a "full" or *1120 "focused" Daubert analysis, the substantive result appears the same. 2018(See, e.g., Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp. (9th Cir. 2011) 657 F.3d 970, 982 ; Kamakahi v. American Society for Reproductive Medicine (N.D.Cal. 2015) 305 F.R.D. 164, 176 ; Stone v. Advance America (S.D.Cal. 2011) 278 F.R.D. 562, 566 .) Although some federal courts appear to have a largely semantic disagreement over whether to apply a "full" or "focused" Daubert analysis, the substantive result appears the same. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp.
green
2 sentences2018(See, e.g., Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp. (9th Cir. 2011) 657 F.3d 970 , 982 ; Kamakahi v. American Society for Reproductive Medicine (N.D.Cal. 2015) 305 F.R.D. 164 , 176 ; Stone v. Advance America (S.D.Cal. 2011) 278 F.R.D. 562 , 566.) Although some federal courts appear to have a largely semantic disagreement over whether to apply a "full" or *1120 "focused" Daubert analysis, the substantive result appears the same. 2018(See, e.g., Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp. (9th Cir. 2011) 657 F.3d 970, 982 ; Kamakahi v. American Society for Reproductive Medicine (N.D.Cal. 2015) 305 F.R.D. 164, 176 ; Stone v. Advance America (S.D.Cal. 2011) 278 F.R.D. 562, 566 .) Although some federal courts appear to have a largely semantic disagreement over whether to apply a "full" or "focused" Daubert analysis, the substantive result appears the same. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Kelly
red
2 sentences2018(Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 30 .) The Kelly/Daubert rule applies only to expert testimony “based, in whole or part, on a technique, process, or theory which is new to science, and, even more so, the law.” (People v. Stoll (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1136, 1156 .) The Kelly/Daubert rule applies only if “the unproven technique or procedure appears in both name and description to provide some definitive truth which the expert need only accurately recognize and relay to the jury. 2011First, California has rejected the Daubert analysis in favor of the test in Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d 24 . | 2 | 2011–2018 |
State v. Anderson
green
2 sentences1999(See, e.g., Com. v. Blasioli (1998) 552 Pa. 149 [ 713 A.2d 1117 ] [Pennsylvania; Frye test]; State v. Freeman (1997) 253 Neb. 385 [ 571 N.W.2d 276 ] [Nebraska; Frye test]; Armstead v. State, supra, 673 A.2d 221 [Maryland; Frye test and statute authorizing admissibility of RFLP statistical evidence]; State v. Copeland, supra, 922 P.2d 1304 [Washington; Frye test]; People v. Miller (1996) 173 Ill.2d 167 [219 Ill.Dec 43, 670 N.E.2d 721 ] [Illinois; Frye test]; State v. Marcus (1996) 294 N.J.Super. 267 [ 683 A.2d 221 ] [New Jersey; Frye test]; State v. Morel (R.I. 1996) 676 A.2d 1347 [Rhode Island 1999(See, e.g., Com. v. Blasioli (1998) 552 Pa. 149 [ 713 A.2d 1117 ] [Pennsylvania; Frye test]; State v. Freeman (1997) 253 Neb. 385 [ 571 N.W.2d 276 ] [Nebraska; Frye test]; Armstead v. State, supra, 673 A.2d 221 [Maryland; Frye test and statute authorizing admissibility of RFLP statistical evidence]; State v. Copeland, supra, 922 P.2d 1304 [Washington; Frye test]; People v. Miller (1996) 173 Ill.2d 167 [219 Ill.Dec 43, 670 N.E.2d 721 ] [Illinois; Frye test]; State v. Marcus (1996) 294 N.J.Super. 267 [ 683 A.2d 221 ] [New Jersey; Frye test]; State v. Morel (R.I. 1996) 676 A.2d 1347 [Rhode Island | 2 | 1998–1999 |
Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2021(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 .) The trial court surveyed a wide range of scientific perspectives and reasonably found that firearms comparison evidence continues to be generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.9 The trial court had no obligation under Sargon to independently evaluate the reliability of firearms comparison evidence under the federal Daubert standard. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Buell
green
2 sentences2021(People v. Venegas (1998) 18 Cal.4th 47, 88 [relying in part on state court decisions using the Daubert standard]; People v. Buell (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 682 , 690–691 [same].) 28 relied on the database never claimed that the database positively identified the defendant’s print. 2021(People v. Venegas (1998) 18 Cal.4th 47, 88 [relying in part on state court decisions using the Daubert standard]; People v. Buell (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 682 , 690–691 [same].) 28 relied on the database never claimed that the database positively identified the defendant’s print. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
United States v. Baines
green
2 sentences2018(Cf. U.S. v. Baines (10th Cir. 2009) 573 F.3d 979 , 988 [upholding the admission of fingerprint evidence under the Daubert standard and noting, inter alia: "Every published decision to address this issue has found the evidence admissible. 2018(Cf. U.S. v. Baines (10th Cir. 2009) 573 F.3d 979 , 988 [upholding the admission of fingerprint evidence under the Daubert standard and noting, inter alia: "Every published decision to address this issue has found the evidence admissible. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Harlan
green
2 sentences2018In People v. Harlan (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 439, 448-450 , the Court of Appeal concluded that CSAAS is not scientific evidence subject to the Kelly/Daubert rule. 2018In People v. Harlan (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 439, 448-450 , the Court of Appeal concluded that CSAAS is not scientific evidence subject to the Kelly/Daubert rule. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Stoll
green
1 sentence2018(Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 30 .) The Kelly/Daubert rule applies only to expert testimony “based, in whole or part, on a technique, process, or theory which is new to science, and, even more so, the law.” (People v. Stoll (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1136, 1156 .) The Kelly/Daubert rule applies only if “the unproven technique or procedure appears in both name and description to provide some definitive truth which the expert need only accurately recognize and relay to the jury. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Shirley
green
1 sentence2018(People v. Shirley (1982) 31 Cal.3d 18, 34 .) Reliability of the evidence is established by showing that the method has gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Carmony
green
2 sentences2013(Palaschak, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1242 .) 10 court’s decision to admit the testimony was not “‘so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.’” (Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 773 , quoting People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377 ; see also State v. Clark (Mont. 2008) 198 P.3d 809, 819 [pharmacist’s “testimony regarding the identification of prescription drugs by reference to their unique imprint code and national pharmaceutical databases is not novel scientific evidence requiring a Daubert hearing”]; Stank, supra, 708 N.W.2d at p. 55 [noting courts “have reco 2013(Palaschak, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1242 .) 10 court’s decision to admit the testimony was not “‘so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.’” (Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 773 , quoting People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377 ; see also State v. Clark (Mont. 2008) 198 P.3d 809, 819 [pharmacist’s “testimony regarding the identification of prescription drugs by reference to their unique imprint code and national pharmaceutical databases is not novel scientific evidence requiring a Daubert hearing”]; Stank, supra, 708 N.W.2d at p. 55 [noting courts “have reco | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Palaschak
green
2 sentences2013(Palaschak, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1242 .) 10 court’s decision to admit the testimony was not “‘so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.’” (Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 773 , quoting People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377 ; see also State v. Clark (Mont. 2008) 198 P.3d 809, 819 [pharmacist’s “testimony regarding the identification of prescription drugs by reference to their unique imprint code and national pharmaceutical databases is not novel scientific evidence requiring a Daubert hearing”]; Stank, supra, 708 N.W.2d at p. 55 [noting courts “have reco 2013(Palaschak, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1242 .) 10 court’s decision to admit the testimony was not “‘so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.’” (Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 773 , quoting People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377 ; see also State v. Clark (Mont. 2008) 198 P.3d 809, 819 [pharmacist’s “testimony regarding the identification of prescription drugs by reference to their unique imprint code and national pharmaceutical databases is not novel scientific evidence requiring a Daubert hearing”]; Stank, supra, 708 N.W.2d at p. 55 [noting courts “have reco | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Morel green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| State v. Weeks green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| State v. Dinkins green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Armstead v. State green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| State v. Futrell green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Lindsey v. People green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Commonwealth v. Blasioli green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| State v. Marcus green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| People v. Miller green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| People v. Chandler green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Taylor v. State green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| State v. Freeman green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| State v. Streich green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| State v. Hungerford green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.