35 Nebraska opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Nebraska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.green2 sentences2014ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR Cox assigns that the district court erred by admitting the testimony of the State’s expert witness, Michalski; by over- ruling his Daubert objection, see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S. Ct. 2786 , 125 L. 2014ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR Cox assigns that the district court erred by admitting the testimony of the State’s expert witness, Michalski; by over- ruling his Daubert objection, see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S. Ct. 2786 , 125 L. | 8 | 12 |
Pineda v. Ford Motor Co.green2 sentences2019See, generally, Pineda v. Ford Motor Co., 520 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2008) (it is abuse of discretion to exclude testimony simply because trial court does not deem proposed expert to be best qualified or because proposed expert does not have specialization that court considers most appropri- ate); U.S. v. Sandoval-Mendoza, 472 F.3d 645, 655 (9th Cir. 2006) (because medical expert opinion testimony is based on specialized, as distinguished from scientific, knowledge, “‘Daubert factors are not intended to be exhaustive or unduly restrictive’”); Robinson v. GEICO General Ins. 2019See, generally, Pineda v. Ford Motor Co. , 520 F.3d 237 (3d Cir.2008) (it is abuse of discretion to exclude testimony simply because trial court does not deem proposed expert to be best qualified or because proposed expert does not have specialization that court considers most appropriate); U.S. v. Sandoval-Mendoza , 472 F.3d 645 , 655 (9th Cir.2006) (because medical expert opinion testimony is based on specialized, as distinguished from scientific, knowledge, " ' Daubert factors are not intended to be exhaustive or unduly restrictive' "); Robinson v. GEICO General Ins. | 3 | 3 |
United States v. Eduardo Sandoval-Mendozagreen2 sentences2019See, generally, Pineda v. Ford Motor Co., 520 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2008) (it is abuse of discretion to exclude testimony simply because trial court does not deem proposed expert to be best qualified or because proposed expert does not have specialization that court considers most appropri- ate); U.S. v. Sandoval-Mendoza, 472 F.3d 645, 655 (9th Cir. 2006) (because medical expert opinion testimony is based on specialized, as distinguished from scientific, knowledge, “‘Daubert factors are not intended to be exhaustive or unduly restrictive’”); Robinson v. GEICO General Ins. 2019See, generally, Pineda v. Ford Motor Co. , 520 F.3d 237 (3d Cir.2008) (it is abuse of discretion to exclude testimony simply because trial court does not deem proposed expert to be best qualified or because proposed expert does not have specialization that court considers most appropriate); U.S. v. Sandoval-Mendoza , 472 F.3d 645 , 655 (9th Cir.2006) (because medical expert opinion testimony is based on specialized, as distinguished from scientific, knowledge, " ' Daubert factors are not intended to be exhaustive or unduly restrictive' "); Robinson v. GEICO General Ins. | 2 | 3 |
Gonzales v. Nebraska Pediatric Practicegreen2 sentences2019See Zimmerman v. Powell, supra (trial court need not recite Daubert standard, but must explain its decision so that appellate court has adequate basis to determine whether analytical path taken by trial court was within range of reason- able methods for distinguishing reliable expert testimony from false expertise). - 801 - Nebraska Court of A ppeals A dvance Sheets 26 Nebraska A ppellate R eports GONZALES v. NEBRASKA PEDIATRIC PRACTICE Cite as 26 Neb. 2019See Zimmerman v. Powell, supra (trial court need not recite Daubert standard, but must explain its decision so that appellate court has adequate basis to determine whether analytical path taken by trial court was within range of reason- able methods for distinguishing reliable expert testimony from false expertise). - 801 - Nebraska Court of A ppeals A dvance Sheets 26 Nebraska A ppellate R eports GONZALES v. NEBRASKA PEDIATRIC PRACTICE Cite as 26 Neb. | 2 | 2 |
Schafersman v. Agland Coop.green2 sentences2008In Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 262 Neb. 215, 222 , 631 N.W.2d 862, 871 (2001), the case in which the Nebraska Supreme Court adopted the Daubert standard, the court rejected expert opinion testimony that relied on "multiple mineral toxicity," a theory that was not generally accepted or recognized in any scientific field. 2008In Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 262 Neb. 215, 222 , 631 N.W.2d 862, 871 (2001), the case in which the Nebraska Supreme Court adopted the Daubert standard, the court rejected expert opinion testimony that relied on "multiple mineral toxicity," a theory that was not generally accepted or recognized in any scientific field. | 1 | 3 |
Zimmerman v. Powellgreen2 sentences2006Mason first argues that the court improperly conducted the Daubert analysis by putting the burden on him to prove that Bohaty’s methodology was unreliable rather than putting the burden on the State to prove that it was reliable. *35 With regard to the respective burdens of the parties to a Daubert challenge, we have stated that “[o]nce a party opposing an expert’s testimony has sufficiently called into question ‘the testimony’s factual basis, data, principles, [or] methods, or their application ... the trial judge must determine whether the testimony has a reliable basis in the knowledge and 2006Mason first argues that the court improperly conducted the Daubert analysis by putting the burden on him to prove that Bohaty’s methodology was unreliable rather than putting the burden on the State to prove that it was reliable. *35 With regard to the respective burdens of the parties to a Daubert challenge, we have stated that “[o]nce a party opposing an expert’s testimony has sufficiently called into question ‘the testimony’s factual basis, data, principles, [or] methods, or their application ... the trial judge must determine whether the testimony has a reliable basis in the knowledge and | 1 | 2 |
State v. Masongreen2 sentences2006Ed. 2d 469 (1993), we have stated: “If it is necessary for the *311 court to conduct a Daubert analysis, then the court must determine whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the expert testimony is scientifically valid and reliable.” Mason, ante at 33-34 , 709 N.W.2d at 653 . 2006Ed. 2d 469 (1993), we have stated: “If it is necessary for the *311 court to conduct a Daubert analysis, then the court must determine whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the expert testimony is scientifically valid and reliable.” Mason, ante at 33-34 , 709 N.W.2d at 653 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Liermangreen2 sentences2024Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Monterroso finally assigns that he received ineffective assist ance of counsel when his trial counsel failed (a) to request a Daubert hearing to challenge the admissibility of Dr. Sturgis’ testimony and to renew his motion in limine to her testimony, (b) to move to strike one of the jurors due to his inattentive- ness or alleged sleeping during the trial, (c) to object based on confrontation and hearsay to the admission of exhibits 8 and 11 when the translator of the statements was not called to tes- tify at trial, and (d) to object or move to strike from the 2024Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Monterroso finally assigns that he received ineffective assist ance of counsel when his trial counsel failed (a) to request a Daubert hearing to challenge the admissibility of Dr. Sturgis’ testimony and to renew his motion in limine to her testimony, (b) to move to strike one of the jurors due to his inattentive- ness or alleged sleeping during the trial, (c) to object based on confrontation and hearsay to the admission of exhibits 8 and 11 when the translator of the statements was not called to tes- tify at trial, and (d) to object or move to strike from the | 1 | 1 |
Perry Lumber Co. v. Durable Services, Inc.green2 sentences2008See, e.g., Perry Lumber Co. v. Durable Servs., 271 Neb. 303 , 710 N.W.2d 854 (2006) (concluding that no Daubert analysis of methodology was necessary where party asserting error did not challenge scientific validity and reliability of methodology set forth in publication providing guidelines for scientific method of fire investigation). 2008See, e.g., Perry Lumber Co. v. Durable Servs., 271 Neb. 303 , 710 N.W.2d 854 (2006) (concluding that no Daubert analysis of methodology was necessary where party asserting error did not challenge scientific validity and reliability of methodology set forth in publication providing guidelines for scientific method of fire investigation). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Dahoodgreen2 sentences2006See State v. Dahood, 148 N.H. 723 , 814 A.2d 159 (2002). “[I]t would be unreasonable to conclude that the subject of scientific testimony must be ‘known’ to a certainty; arguably, there are no certainties in science.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 , 113 S. Ct. 2786 , 125 L. 2006See State v. Dahood, 148 N.H. 723 , 814 A.2d 159 (2002). “[I]t would be unreasonable to conclude that the subject of scientific testimony must be ‘known’ to a certainty; arguably, there are no certainties in science.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 , 113 S. Ct. 2786 , 125 L. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Leibhartgreen2 sentences2006In State v. Leibhart, 266 Neb. 133, 144 , 662 N.W.2d 618, 628 (2003), with respect to a Daubert challenge to expert testimony regarding shaken baby syndrome, we stated: We note that the evidence presented at the Daubert hearing in this case was not extensive and consisted mainly of [the expert’s] testimony and his reference to the relevant literature. 2006In State v. Leibhart, 266 Neb. 133, 144 , 662 N.W.2d 618, 628 (2003), with respect to a Daubert challenge to expert testimony regarding shaken baby syndrome, we stated: We note that the evidence presented at the Daubert hearing in this case was not extensive and consisted mainly of [the expert’s] testimony and his reference to the relevant literature. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Richard Hicksgreen2 sentences2006See U.S. v. Hicks, 389 F.3d 514, 526 (5th Cir. 2004) (stating that “[w]e have not been pointed to a single case in this or any other circuit suggesting that the methodology employed by [the government’s ballistics expert] is unreliable”). 2006See U.S. v. Hicks, 389 F.3d 514, 526 (5th Cir. 2004) (stating that “[w]e have not been pointed to a single case in this or any other circuit suggesting that the methodology employed by [the government’s ballistics expert] is unreliable”). | 1 | 1 |
Pizal v. Monaco Coach Corp.green1 sentence2005Pizal v. Monaco Coach Corp., 374 F. Supp. 2d 653, 656 (N.D. | 1 | 1 |
Club Car, Inc. v. Club Car (Quebec) Import, Inc.green2 sentences2004See, e.g., Club Car, Inc. v. Club Car (Quebec) Import, Inc., 362 F.3d 775 (11th Cir. 2004); U.S. v. Alatorre, 222 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2000). 2004The 11th Circuit has agreed, holding that “a trial court has broad discretion in determining how to perform its gatekeeper function, and nothing prohibits it from hearing a Daubert motion during trial.” Club Car, Inc., 362 F.3d at 780 . | 1 | 1 |
Raymond Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corporationgreen1 sentence2004See, also, Rosen v. Ciby-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 318-19 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that object of Daubert standard “was to make sure that when scientists testify in court they adhere to the same standards of intellectual rigor that are demanded in their professional work.... | 1 | 1 |
| Black v. Food Lion, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Coongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Biblegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Nebraska. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Karla Robinson v. Geico General Insurance Company
green
2 sentences2019Co., 447 F.3d 1096 (8th Cir. 2006) (most courts have held that physi- cian with general knowledge may testify regarding medical issues that specialist might treat in clinical setting); R. 2019Co. , 447 F.3d 1096 (8th Cir.2006) (most courts have held that physician with general knowledge may testify regarding medical issues that specialist might treat in clinical setting); R. | 3 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Casillas
green
2 sentences2019And our Daubert framework “permits re-examination of the issue if the validity of the prior determination can be - 394 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 304 Nebraska Reports STATE v. SIMMER Cite as 304 Neb. 369 appropriately questioned.” Schafersman v. Agland Coop, supra. See, also, State v. Casillas, 279 Neb. 820 , 782 N.W.2d 882 (2010). 2019And our Daubert framework “permits re-examination of the issue if the validity of the prior determination can be - 394 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 304 Nebraska Reports STATE v. SIMMER Cite as 304 Neb. 369 appropriately questioned.” Schafersman v. Agland Coop, supra. See, also, State v. Casillas, 279 Neb. 820 , 782 N.W.2d 882 (2010). | 2 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Simmer
green
2 sentences2019And our Daubert framework “permits re-examination of the issue if the validity of the prior determination can be - 394 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 304 Nebraska R eports STATE v. SIMMER Cite as 304 Neb. 369 appropriately questioned.” Schafersman v. Agland Coop, supra. See, also, State v. Casillas, 279 Neb. 820 , 782 N.W.2d 882 (2010). 2019And our Daubert framework “permits re-examination of the issue if the validity of the prior determination can be - 394 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 304 Nebraska Reports STATE v. SIMMER Cite as 304 Neb. 369 appropriately questioned.” Schafersman v. Agland Coop, supra. See, also, State v. Casillas, 279 Neb. 820 , 782 N.W.2d 882 (2010). | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael
green
2 sentences2018The U.S. Supreme Court noted that this reliability test is " 'flexible' " and that the district court is given "the same broad latitude when it decides how to determine reliability as it enjoys in respect to its ultimate reliability determination." See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 , 141, 142, 119 S.Ct. 1167 , 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999) (discussing Daubert factors). 2018The U.S. Supreme Court noted that this reliability test is " 'flexible' " and that the district court is given "the same broad latitude when it decides how to determine reliability as it enjoys in respect to its ultimate reliability determination." See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 , 141, 142, 119 S.Ct. 1167 , 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999) (discussing Daubert factors). | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Frye v. United States
red
2 sentences1998The Nebraska Supreme Court has refused to adopt the above Daubert standard and has reaffirmed the standard set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. 1998The Nebraska Supreme Court has refused to adopt the above Daubert standard and has reaffirmed the standard set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. | 2 | 1998–2008 |
State v. Monterroso
green
2 sentences2024MONTERROSO Cite as 33 Neb. 2024MONTERROSO Cite as 33 Neb. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Hill
green
2 sentences2018This entails a preliminary assessment whether the reasoning or method- ology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and 30 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra note 2 . 31 Brief for appellant at 21-23. 32 State v. Bauldwin, 283 Neb. 678 , 811 N.W.2d 267 (2012). - 690 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 298 Nebraska R eports STATE v. HILL Cite as 298 Neb. 675 whether that reasoning or methodology may properly be applied to the facts in issue.33 Applying the Daubert standard to the PCR-STR analysis, we found: The State’s expert witnesses testified that the scien 2018This entails a preliminary assessment whether the reasoning or method- ology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and 30 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra note 2 . 31 Brief for appellant at 21-23. 32 State v. Bauldwin, 283 Neb. 678 , 811 N.W.2d 267 (2012). - 690 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 298 Nebraska R eports STATE v. HILL Cite as 298 Neb. 675 whether that reasoning or methodology may properly be applied to the facts in issue.33 Applying the Daubert standard to the PCR-STR analysis, we found: The State’s expert witnesses testified that the scien | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Sedlak Aerial Spray, Ltd. v. Miller
green
2 sentences2014See, also, State v. Robinson, supra; Sedlak Aerial Spray v. Miller, 251 Neb. 45 , 555 N.W.2d 32 (1996) (“expert witness” who testified about flying was testifying not as to opinions based upon his exper- tise, but as to personal knowledge). 2014See, also, State v. Robinson, supra; Sedlak Aerial Spray v. Miller, 251 Neb. 45 , 555 N.W.2d 32 (1996) (“expert witness” who testified about flying was testifying not as to opinions based upon his exper- tise, but as to personal knowledge). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Robinson
green
2 sentences2014We then determined that a Daubert challenge was not pertinent to the cell phone records, because they “contained nothing even resembling ‘expert opinion tes- timony.’” State v. Robinson, 272 Neb. at 619 , 724 N.W.2d at 69 . 2014We then determined that a Daubert challenge was not pertinent to the cell phone records, because they “contained nothing even resembling ‘expert opinion tes- timony.’” State v. Robinson, 272 Neb. at 619 , 724 N.W.2d at 69 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Schreiner
green
2 sentences2014The court concluded that “this is simply not the sort of expert testimony that demands a Daubert inquiry.” State v. Schreiner, 276 Neb. at 405 , 754 N.W.2d at 754 . 2014The court concluded that “this is simply not the sort of expert testimony that demands a Daubert inquiry.” State v. Schreiner, 276 Neb. at 405 , 754 N.W.2d at 754 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Johnny C. McClain v. Metabolife International, Inc
green
2 sentences2008In McClain v. Metabolife Intern., Inc., 401 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2005), an expert testified that the ephedrine combined with caffeine in a weight-loss product caused heart attacks because ephedrine was classified within a drug family that causes blood vessel constriction and increased pulse rate and blood pressure, which over the long term can lead to narrowing and inflammation of the blood vessels, which can lead to heart attacks and strokes. 2008In McClain v. Metabolife Intern., Inc., 401 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2005), an expert testified that the ephedrine combined with caffeine in a weight-loss product caused heart attacks because ephedrine was classified within a drug family that causes blood vessel constriction and increased pulse rate and blood pressure, which over the long term can lead to narrowing and inflammation of the blood vessels, which can lead to heart attacks and strokes. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Summers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad System
green
1 sentence2008System, 132 F.3d 599 (10th Cir.1997); Hose v. Chicago Northwestern Transp. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Diefenbach v. Sheridan Transportation
green
1 sentence2008Co., supra note 13; Diefenbach v. Sheridan Transp., 229 F.3d 27 (1st Cir.2000) (discussing Daubert challenge in a Jones Act case); Summers v. Missouri Pacific R.R. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Schafersman v. Agland Coop
green
2 sentences2008In its opinion, see Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 268 Neb. 138 , 681 N.W.2d 47 (2004), the Nebraska Supreme Court noted that the lack of independent hard scientific support for multiple mineral toxicity was not the only reason the trial court gave for excluding the plaintiffs' experts. 2008In its opinion, see Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 268 Neb. 138 , 681 N.W.2d 47 (2004), the Nebraska Supreme Court noted that the lack of independent hard scientific support for multiple mineral toxicity was not the only reason the trial court gave for excluding the plaintiffs' experts. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Goebel v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
prod.liab.rep. (Cch) P 15,373 Nathaniel Ancho v. Pentek Corporation
green
2 sentences2004This does not mean, however, that trial courts must “ ‘recite the Daubert standard as though it were some magical incantation.’ ” Goebel, 215 F.3d at 1088 (quoting Ancho v. Pentek Corp., 157 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 1998)). 2004This does not mean, however, that trial courts must “ ‘recite the Daubert standard as though it were some magical incantation.’ ” Goebel, 215 F.3d at 1088 (quoting Ancho v. Pentek Corp., 157 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 1998)). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| United States v. Jorge Alberto Alatorre green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Nelson v. American Home Products Corp. green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.