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20 Montana opinions name it 1 courts 1994–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Montana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Clinegreen2 sentences2003Hulse , ¶¶ 56-57 (affirming our holding in State v. Cline (1996), 275 Mont. 46, 55 , 909 P.2d 1171, 1177 , that “all scientific expert testimony is not subject to the Daubert standard and the Daubert test should only be used to determine the admissibility of novel scientific evidence”). ¶38 In Hulse , we concluded that the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test was not novel scientific evidence, noting that for several decades, law enforcement officials had used the HGN test, and that as early as 1986, the admissibility of the HGN test had been considered in other jurisdictions. 2003Hulse , ¶¶ 56-57 (affirming our holding in State v. Cline (1996), 275 Mont. 46, 55 , 909 P.2d 1171, 1177 , that “all scientific expert testimony is not subject to the Daubert standard and the Daubert test should only be used to determine the admissibility of novel scientific evidence”). ¶38 In Hulse , we concluded that the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test was not novel scientific evidence, noting that for several decades, law enforcement officials had used the HGN test, and that as early as 1986, the admissibility of the HGN test had been considered in other jurisdictions. | 4 | 7 |
Gilkey v. Schweitzergreen2 sentences2007State v. Cline, 275 Mont. 46, 55 , 909 P.2d 1171, 1177 (1996); Hulse v. State, Dept. of Justice, 1998 MT 108, ¶¶ 55-69 , 289 Mont. 1, ¶¶ 55-69 , 961 P.2d 75, ¶¶ 55-69 ; State v. Southern, 1999 MT 94, ¶ 59 , 294 Mont. 225, ¶ 59 , 980 P.2d 3, ¶ 59 ; Gilkey v. Schweitzer, 1999 MT 188, ¶¶ 18-20 , 295 Mont. 345, ¶¶ 18-20 , 983 P.2d 869, ¶¶ 18-20 ; State v. Hocevar, 2000 MT 157, ¶ 56 , 300 Mont. 167, ¶ 56 , 7 P.3d 329, ¶ 56 ; State v. Ayers, 2003 MT 114, ¶ 37 , 315 Mont. 395, ¶ 37 , 68 P.3d 768, ¶ 37 . ¶48 In Moore , the defendant argued that the district court erred in admitting DNA evidence. 2007State v. Cline, 275 Mont. 46, 55 , 909 P.2d 1171, 1177 (1996); Hulse v. State, Dept. of Justice, 1998 MT 108, ¶¶ 55-69 , 289 Mont. 1, ¶¶ 55-69 , 961 P.2d 75, ¶¶ 55-69 ; State v. Southern, 1999 MT 94, ¶ 59 , 294 Mont. 225, ¶ 59 , 980 P.2d 3, ¶ 59 ; Gilkey v. Schweitzer, 1999 MT 188, ¶¶ 18-20 , 295 Mont. 345, ¶¶ 18-20 , 983 P.2d 869, ¶¶ 18-20 ; State v. Hocevar, 2000 MT 157, ¶ 56 , 300 Mont. 167, ¶ 56 , 7 P.3d 329, ¶ 56 ; State v. Ayers, 2003 MT 114, ¶ 37 , 315 Mont. 395, ¶ 37 , 68 P.3d 768, ¶ 37 . ¶48 In Moore , the defendant argued that the district court erred in admitting DNA evidence. | 2 | 3 |
Williams v. Hedicangreen2 sentences1999See also Williams v. Hedican (Iowa 1997), 561 N.W.2d 817, 825-27 (concluding, in dicta, that the approach taken in Thornton and other federal courts restricting Daubert in favor of a conventional Rule 702 analysis was reasonable); Collins v. Commonwealth (Ky. 1997), 951 S.W.2d 569, 574-75 (concluding that although the court previously adopted the Daubert analysis, Daubert was not triggered because the doctor’s expert testimony concerned basic female anatomical findings that “did not involve any novel scientific techniques or theories”); and State v. Hodgson (Minn. 1994), 512 N.W.2d 95, 98 (ack 1999See also Williams v. Hedican (Iowa 1997), 561 N.W.2d 817, 825-27 (concluding, in dicta, that the approach taken in Thornton and other federal courts restricting Daubert in favor of a conventional Rule 702 analysis was reasonable); Collins v. Commonwealth (Ky. 1997), 951 S.W.2d 569, 574-75 (concluding that although the court previously adopted the Daubert analysis, Daubert was not triggered because the doctor’s expert testimony concerned basic female anatomical findings that “did not involve any novel scientific techniques or theories”); and State v. Hodgson (Minn. 1994), 512 N.W.2d 95, 98 (ack | 2 | 2 |
Collins v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1999See also Williams v. Hedican (Iowa 1997), 561 N.W.2d 817, 825-27 (concluding, in dicta, that the approach taken in Thornton and other federal courts restricting Daubert in favor of a conventional Rule 702 analysis was reasonable); Collins v. Commonwealth (Ky. 1997), 951 S.W.2d 569, 574-75 (concluding that although the court previously adopted the Daubert analysis, Daubert was not triggered because the doctor’s expert testimony concerned basic female anatomical findings that “did not involve any novel scientific techniques or theories”); and State v. Hodgson (Minn. 1994), 512 N.W.2d 95, 98 (ack 1999See also Williams v. Hedican (Iowa 1997), 561 N.W.2d 817, 825-27 (concluding, in dicta, that the approach taken in Thornton and other federal courts restricting Daubert in favor of a conventional Rule 702 analysis was reasonable); Collins v. Commonwealth (Ky. 1997), 951 S.W.2d 569, 574-75 (concluding that although the court previously adopted the Daubert analysis, Daubert was not triggered because the doctor’s expert testimony concerned basic female anatomical findings that “did not involve any novel scientific techniques or theories”); and State v. Hodgson (Minn. 1994), 512 N.W.2d 95, 98 (ack | 2 | 2 |
State v. Hodgsongreen2 sentences1999See also Williams v. Hedican (Iowa 1997), 561 N.W.2d 817, 825-27 (concluding, in dicta, that the approach taken in Thornton and other federal courts restricting Daubert in favor of a conventional Rule 702 analysis was reasonable); Collins v. Commonwealth (Ky. 1997), 951 S.W.2d 569, 574-75 (concluding that although the court previously adopted the Daubert analysis, Daubert was not triggered because the doctor’s expert testimony concerned basic female anatomical findings that “did not involve any novel scientific techniques or theories”); and State v. Hodgson (Minn. 1994), 512 N.W.2d 95, 98 (ack 1999See also Williams v. Hedican (Iowa 1997), 561 N.W.2d 817, 825-27 (concluding, in dicta, that the approach taken in Thornton and other federal courts restricting Daubert in favor of a conventional Rule 702 analysis was reasonable); Collins v. Commonwealth (Ky. 1997), 951 S.W.2d 569, 574-75 (concluding that although the court previously adopted the Daubert analysis, Daubert was not triggered because the doctor’s expert testimony concerned basic female anatomical findings that “did not involve any novel scientific techniques or theories”); and State v. Hodgson (Minn. 1994), 512 N.W.2d 95, 98 (ack | 2 | 2 |
State v. Mooregreen2 sentences2005Evid. 702(3) (giving trial courts the decision whether the qualified expert witness reliably applied the reliable field to the facts). ¶29 The Daubert test helps determine the reliability of a field of expert methods. 509 U.S. at 592 , 113 S.Ct. at 2796 , 125 L.Ed.2d at 482 ; accord State v. Moore (1994), 268 Mont. 20, 41 , 885 P.2d 457, 470 . 2005Evid. 702(3) (giving trial courts the decision whether the qualified expert witness reliably applied the reliable field to the facts). ¶29 The Daubert test helps determine the reliability of a field of expert methods. 509 U.S. at 592 , 113 S.Ct. at 2796 , 125 L.Ed.2d at 482 ; accord State v. Moore (1994), 268 Mont. 20, 41 , 885 P.2d 457, 470 . | 1 | 4 |
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.green2 sentences2005Evid. 702(3) (giving trial courts the decision whether the qualified expert witness reliably applied the reliable field to the facts). ¶29 The Daubert test helps determine the reliability of a field of expert methods. 509 U.S. at 592 , 113 S.Ct. at 2796 , 125 L.Ed.2d at 482 ; accord State v. Moore (1994), 268 Mont. 20, 41 , 885 P.2d 457, 470 . 2005Evid. 702(3) (giving trial courts the decision whether the qualified expert witness reliably applied the reliable field to the facts). ¶29 The Daubert test helps determine the reliability of a field of expert methods. 509 U.S. at 592 , 113 S.Ct. at 2796 , 125 L.Ed.2d at 482 ; accord State v. Moore (1994), 268 Mont. 20, 41 , 885 P.2d 457, 470 . | 1 | 3 |
Barmeyer v. Montana Power Co.green2 sentences2007Daubert, 509 U.S. at 583, 113 S. Ct. at 2796-97. ¶47 In 1994, this Court adopted the Daubert factors, concluding they were consistent with our holding in Barmeyer v. Montana Power Co., 202 Mont. 185 , 657 P.2d 594 (1983), overruled on other grounds by Martel v. Montana Power Co., 231 Mont. 96 , 752 P.2d 140 (1988), concerning the admission of novel scientific evidence. 2007Daubert, 509 U.S. at 583, 113 S. Ct. at 2796-97. ¶47 In 1994, this Court adopted the Daubert factors, concluding they were consistent with our holding in Barmeyer v. Montana Power Co., 202 Mont. 185 , 657 P.2d 594 (1983), overruled on other grounds by Martel v. Montana Power Co., 231 Mont. 96 , 752 P.2d 140 (1988), concerning the admission of novel scientific evidence. | 1 | 3 |
Martel v. Montana Power Co.green2 sentences2007Daubert, 509 U.S. at 583, 113 S. Ct. at 2796-97. ¶47 In 1994, this Court adopted the Daubert factors, concluding they were consistent with our holding in Barmeyer v. Montana Power Co., 202 Mont. 185 , 657 P.2d 594 (1983), overruled on other grounds by Martel v. Montana Power Co., 231 Mont. 96 , 752 P.2d 140 (1988), concerning the admission of novel scientific evidence. 2007Daubert, 509 U.S. at 583, 113 S. Ct. at 2796-97. ¶47 In 1994, this Court adopted the Daubert factors, concluding they were consistent with our holding in Barmeyer v. Montana Power Co., 202 Mont. 185 , 657 P.2d 594 (1983), overruled on other grounds by Martel v. Montana Power Co., 231 Mont. 96 , 752 P.2d 140 (1988), concerning the admission of novel scientific evidence. | 1 | 2 |
Carpenter v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2024Accord Jovanovic & Cummings, 10 IEEE Access at 28050–51 (asserting that geolocation based on RTT measurements can provide useful and reliable location estimates and recommending that governments compel network operators to include RTT data in all CDRs to increase their accuracy for evidence); Reynolds II, 86 F.4th at 345 (concluding no Daubert analysis was required for RTT data when defendant’s expert, Jovanovic (the same as cited in the above article relied upon by Wood), agreed that Trax’s use of arcs to map RTT data is “generally accepted in the relevant scientific/technical community”); Ca 2024Accord Jovanovic & Cummings, 10 IEEE Access at 28050–51 (asserting that geolocation based on RTT measurements can provide useful and reliable location estimates and recommending that governments compel network operators to include RTT data in all CDRs to increase their accuracy for evidence); Reynolds II, 86 F.4th at 345 (concluding no Daubert analysis was required for RTT data when defendant’s expert, Jovanovic (the same as cited in the above article relied upon by Wood), agreed that Trax’s use of arcs to map RTT data is “generally accepted in the relevant scientific/technical community”); Ca | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Mustafa Deville Reynoldsgreen1 sentence2024Accord Jovanovic & Cummings, 10 IEEE Access at 28050–51 (asserting that geolocation based on RTT measurements can provide useful and reliable location estimates and recommending that governments compel network operators to include RTT data in all CDRs to increase their accuracy for evidence); Reynolds II, 86 F.4th at 345 (concluding no Daubert analysis was required for RTT data when defendant’s expert, Jovanovic (the same as cited in the above article relied upon by Wood), agreed that Trax’s use of arcs to map RTT data is “generally accepted in the relevant scientific/technical community”); Ca | 1 | 1 |
Graftenreed v. Seabaughgreen2 sentences2019App. 364 , 268 S.W.3d 905 (2007) (noting that the Daubert factors apply only to "novel" evidence, theory, or methodology). 2019App. 364 , 268 S.W.3d 905 (2007) (noting that the Daubert factors apply only to "novel" evidence, theory, or methodology). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Damongreen2 sentences2009State v. Damon, 2005 MT 218, ¶ 17 , 328 Mont. 276, ¶ 17 , 119 P.3d 1194, ¶ 17 (internal quotations omitted). ¶33 We held the district court’s gatekeeper role in applying the Daubert factors, which guide trial courts in their assessment of the reliability of proffered scientific expert testimony, applies only to the admission of novel scientific evidence in Montana. 2009State v. Damon, 2005 MT 218, ¶ 17 , 328 Mont. 276, ¶ 17 , 119 P.3d 1194, ¶ 17 (internal quotations omitted). ¶33 We held the district court’s gatekeeper role in applying the Daubert factors, which guide trial courts in their assessment of the reliability of proffered scientific expert testimony, applies only to the admission of novel scientific evidence in Montana. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cliffordgreen2 sentences2007See State v. Clifford, 2005 MT 219, ¶¶ 60-91 , 328 Mont. 300, ¶¶ 60-91 , 121 P.3d 489, ¶¶ 60-91 (Nelson, J., concurring). 2007See State v. Clifford, 2005 MT 219, ¶¶ 60-91 , 328 Mont. 300, ¶¶ 60-91 , 121 P.3d 489, ¶¶ 60-91 (Nelson, J., concurring). | 1 | 1 |
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Juan Ramon MATTA-BALLESTEROS, Defendant-Appellantgreen2 sentences1999Accord United States v. Matta-Ballesteros (9th Cir. 1995), 71 F.3d 754, 766-67 (holding that the defendant’s objection to expert microscopic hair comparison testimony went to the weight, not the admissibility, of the testimony, and therefore that Rule 702, Fed.R.Evid., did not warrant the exclusion of such testimony). ¶64 As a final point, the two cases which Southern relies on for the proposition that microscopic hair comparison evidence is inadmissible under the Daubert factors have been specifically reversed or overruled on that point. 1999Accord United States v. Matta-Ballesteros (9th Cir. 1995), 71 F.3d 754, 766-67 (holding that the defendant’s objection to expert microscopic hair comparison testimony went to the weight, not the admissibility, of the testimony, and therefore that Rule 702, Fed.R.Evid., did not warrant the exclusion of such testimony). ¶64 As a final point, the two cases which Southern relies on for the proposition that microscopic hair comparison evidence is inadmissible under the Daubert factors have been specifically reversed or overruled on that point. | 1 | 1 |
| Montana Deaconess Hospital v. Grattongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Montana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael
green
2 sentences2005Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 141 , 119 S.Ct. at 1171 , 143 L.Ed.2d at 246 . ¶30 The Daubert test does not require a district court to determine whether the expert reliably applied expert methods to the facts. 2005Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 141 , 119 S.Ct. at 1171 , 143 L.Ed.2d at 246 . ¶30 The Daubert test does not require a district court to determine whether the expert reliably applied expert methods to the facts. | 4 | 1999–2015 |
State v. Hocevar
green
2 sentences2005For instance, in State v. Hocevar, 2000 MT 157, ¶ 56 , 300 Mont. 167, ¶ 56 , 7 P.3d 329, ¶ 56 , we held that expert testimony regarding Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy to be “neither novel nor scientific” and therefore not subject to a Daubert analysis. 2005For instance, in State v. Hocevar, 2000 MT 157, ¶ 56 , 300 Mont. 167, ¶ 56 , 7 P.3d 329, ¶ 56 , we held that expert testimony regarding Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy to be “neither novel nor scientific” and therefore not subject to a Daubert analysis. | 3 | 2005–2007 |
State v. Hocevar
green
2 sentences2005For instance, in State v. Hocevar, 2000 MT 157, ¶ 56 , 300 Mont. 167, ¶ 56 , 7 P.3d 329, ¶ 56 , we held that expert testimony regarding Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy to be “neither novel nor scientific” and therefore not subject to a Daubert analysis. 2005For instance, in State v. Hocevar, 2000 MT 157, ¶ 56 , 300 Mont. 167, ¶ 56 , 7 P.3d 329, ¶ 56 , we held that expert testimony regarding Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy to be “neither novel nor scientific” and therefore not subject to a Daubert analysis. | 3 | 2005–2007 |
Hulse v. State, Department of Justice
green
2 sentences2005We similarly held that the results of the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) field sobriety test did not constitute novel scientific evidence in Hulse v. State, Dept. of Justice, 1998 MT 108, ¶ 69 , 289 Mont. 1, ¶ 69 , 961 P.2d 75, ¶ 69 , thereby making the Daubert factors inapplicable in determining whether HGN test results could be admitted as substantive evidence. ¶19 Thus, we have encouraged a trial court, presented with scientific evidence, novel or otherwise, to construe liberally the rules of evidence so as to admit all relevant expert testimony pursuant to Barmeyer. 2005We similarly held that the results of the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) field sobriety test did not constitute novel scientific evidence in Hulse v. State, Dept. of Justice, 1998 MT 108, ¶ 69 , 289 Mont. 1, ¶ 69 , 961 P.2d 75, ¶ 69 , thereby making the Daubert factors inapplicable in determining whether HGN test results could be admitted as substantive evidence. ¶19 Thus, we have encouraged a trial court, presented with scientific evidence, novel or otherwise, to construe liberally the rules of evidence so as to admit all relevant expert testimony pursuant to Barmeyer. | 3 | 1999–2007 |
State v. S. Trujillo
green
2 sentences2026“Mere assertion that an asserted error implicates a constitutional right or that a manifest miscarriage of justice will result absent review is insufficient—the appellant must affirmatively demonstrate the criteria for plain error review.” State v. Trujillo, 2020 MT 128, ¶ 6 , 400 Mont. 124 , 464 P.3d 72 (citation omitted). 2026“Mere assertion that an asserted error implicates a constitutional right or that a manifest miscarriage of justice will result absent review is insufficient—the appellant must affirmatively demonstrate the criteria for plain error review.” State v. Trujillo, 2020 MT 128, ¶ 6 , 400 Mont. 124 , 464 P.3d 72 (citation omitted). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Northern v. State
neutral
2 sentences2019Britt further asserts that the State did not offer evidence of the other Daubert factors as was done in Northern v. State , 2015 Ark. 2019Britt further asserts that the State did not offer evidence of the other Daubert factors as was done in Northern v. State , 2015 Ark. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Moore v. State
green
2 sentences2019The State cites Moore v. State , 323 Ark. 529 , 915 S.W.2d 284 (1996), which held that DNA-profiling evidence should no longer be viewed as novel scientific evidence requiring a preliminary inquiry beyond the showing that the expert properly performed a reliable methodology in creating the DNA profiles. 2019The State cites Moore v. State , 323 Ark. 529 , 915 S.W.2d 284 (1996), which held that DNA-profiling evidence should no longer be viewed as novel scientific evidence requiring a preliminary inquiry beyond the showing that the expert properly performed a reliable methodology in creating the DNA profiles. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Becker v. ROSEBUD OPERATING SERVICES, INC.
green
2 sentences2009Alternatively, the State argues that a Daubert hearing is unnecessary because this case does not involve a novel scientific method. ¶22 Montana statutes state that ‘jjQailure to make a timely objection during trial constitutes a waiver of the objection ....” Section 46-20-104(2), MCA. ‘The general rule in Montana is that this Court will not address either an issue raised for the first time on appeal or a party’s change in legal theory.” Becker v. Rosebud Operating Servs., Inc., 2008 MT 285, ¶ 17 , 345 Mont. 368 , 191 P.3d 435 . 2009Alternatively, the State argues that a Daubert hearing is unnecessary because this case does not involve a novel scientific method. ¶22 Montana statutes state that ‘jjQailure to make a timely objection during trial constitutes a waiver of the objection ....” Section 46-20-104(2), MCA. ‘The general rule in Montana is that this Court will not address either an issue raised for the first time on appeal or a party’s change in legal theory.” Becker v. Rosebud Operating Servs., Inc., 2008 MT 285, ¶ 17 , 345 Mont. 368 , 191 P.3d 435 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Gittens
green
2 sentences2009The State also replies that a Daubert hearing was unnecessary and that McLaughlin waived the issues of foundation and expert testimony by raising them for the first time on appeal. ¶14 The statutory transaction rule states that Twjhere the declaration, act, or omission forms part of a transaction which is itself the fact in dispute or evidence of that fact, such declaration, act, or omission is evidence as part of the transaction.” Section 26-1-103, MCA. ‘Pursuant to the transaction rule, prior acts that are inextricably linked to, and explanatory of, the charged offense are admissible notwith 2009The State also replies that a Daubert hearing was unnecessary and that McLaughlin waived the issues of foundation and expert testimony by raising them for the first time on appeal. ¶14 The statutory transaction rule states that Twjhere the declaration, act, or omission forms part of a transaction which is itself the fact in dispute or evidence of that fact, such declaration, act, or omission is evidence as part of the transaction.” Section 26-1-103, MCA. ‘Pursuant to the transaction rule, prior acts that are inextricably linked to, and explanatory of, the charged offense are admissible notwith | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. MacKrill
green
2 sentences2009The State also replies that a Daubert hearing was unnecessary and that McLaughlin waived the issues of foundation and expert testimony by raising them for the first time on appeal. ¶14 The statutory transaction rule states that Twjhere the declaration, act, or omission forms part of a transaction which is itself the fact in dispute or evidence of that fact, such declaration, act, or omission is evidence as part of the transaction.” Section 26-1-103, MCA. ‘Pursuant to the transaction rule, prior acts that are inextricably linked to, and explanatory of, the charged offense are admissible notwith 2009The State also replies that a Daubert hearing was unnecessary and that McLaughlin waived the issues of foundation and expert testimony by raising them for the first time on appeal. ¶14 The statutory transaction rule states that Twjhere the declaration, act, or omission forms part of a transaction which is itself the fact in dispute or evidence of that fact, such declaration, act, or omission is evidence as part of the transaction.” Section 26-1-103, MCA. ‘Pursuant to the transaction rule, prior acts that are inextricably linked to, and explanatory of, the charged offense are admissible notwith | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Blain Southern
green
2 sentences2007State v. Cline, 275 Mont. 46, 55 , 909 P.2d 1171, 1177 (1996); Hulse v. State, Dept. of Justice, 1998 MT 108, ¶¶ 55-69 , 289 Mont. 1, ¶¶ 55-69 , 961 P.2d 75, ¶¶ 55-69 ; State v. Southern, 1999 MT 94, ¶ 59 , 294 Mont. 225, ¶ 59 , 980 P.2d 3, ¶ 59 ; Gilkey v. Schweitzer, 1999 MT 188, ¶¶ 18-20 , 295 Mont. 345, ¶¶ 18-20 , 983 P.2d 869, ¶¶ 18-20 ; State v. Hocevar, 2000 MT 157, ¶ 56 , 300 Mont. 167, ¶ 56 , 7 P.3d 329, ¶ 56 ; State v. Ayers, 2003 MT 114, ¶ 37 , 315 Mont. 395, ¶ 37 , 68 P.3d 768, ¶ 37 . ¶48 In Moore , the defendant argued that the district court erred in admitting DNA evidence. 2007State v. Cline, 275 Mont. 46, 55 , 909 P.2d 1171, 1177 (1996); Hulse v. State, Dept. of Justice, 1998 MT 108, ¶¶ 55-69 , 289 Mont. 1, ¶¶ 55-69 , 961 P.2d 75, ¶¶ 55-69 ; State v. Southern, 1999 MT 94, ¶ 59 , 294 Mont. 225, ¶ 59 , 980 P.2d 3, ¶ 59 ; Gilkey v. Schweitzer, 1999 MT 188, ¶¶ 18-20 , 295 Mont. 345, ¶¶ 18-20 , 983 P.2d 869, ¶¶ 18-20 ; State v. Hocevar, 2000 MT 157, ¶ 56 , 300 Mont. 167, ¶ 56 , 7 P.3d 329, ¶ 56 ; State v. Ayers, 2003 MT 114, ¶ 37 , 315 Mont. 395, ¶ 37 , 68 P.3d 768, ¶ 37 . ¶48 In Moore , the defendant argued that the district court erred in admitting DNA evidence. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Ayers
green
2 sentences2007State v. Cline, 275 Mont. 46, 55 , 909 P.2d 1171, 1177 (1996); Hulse v. State, Dept. of Justice, 1998 MT 108, ¶¶ 55-69 , 289 Mont. 1, ¶¶ 55-69 , 961 P.2d 75, ¶¶ 55-69 ; State v. Southern, 1999 MT 94, ¶ 59 , 294 Mont. 225, ¶ 59 , 980 P.2d 3, ¶ 59 ; Gilkey v. Schweitzer, 1999 MT 188, ¶¶ 18-20 , 295 Mont. 345, ¶¶ 18-20 , 983 P.2d 869, ¶¶ 18-20 ; State v. Hocevar, 2000 MT 157, ¶ 56 , 300 Mont. 167, ¶ 56 , 7 P.3d 329, ¶ 56 ; State v. Ayers, 2003 MT 114, ¶ 37 , 315 Mont. 395, ¶ 37 , 68 P.3d 768, ¶ 37 . ¶48 In Moore , the defendant argued that the district court erred in admitting DNA evidence. 2007State v. Cline, 275 Mont. 46, 55 , 909 P.2d 1171, 1177 (1996); Hulse v. State, Dept. of Justice, 1998 MT 108, ¶¶ 55-69 , 289 Mont. 1, ¶¶ 55-69 , 961 P.2d 75, ¶¶ 55-69 ; State v. Southern, 1999 MT 94, ¶ 59 , 294 Mont. 225, ¶ 59 , 980 P.2d 3, ¶ 59 ; Gilkey v. Schweitzer, 1999 MT 188, ¶¶ 18-20 , 295 Mont. 345, ¶¶ 18-20 , 983 P.2d 869, ¶¶ 18-20 ; State v. Hocevar, 2000 MT 157, ¶ 56 , 300 Mont. 167, ¶ 56 , 7 P.3d 329, ¶ 56 ; State v. Ayers, 2003 MT 114, ¶ 37 , 315 Mont. 395, ¶ 37 , 68 P.3d 768, ¶ 37 . ¶48 In Moore , the defendant argued that the district court erred in admitting DNA evidence. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
City of Billings v. Bruce
green
2 sentences2005Whether the District Court erred in rejecting Van Haele’s motion to dismiss for the denial of his right to a speedy hearing. ¶57 Although Van Haele refers to our decision in City of Billings v. Bruce, 1998 MT 186 , 290 Mont. 148 , 965 P.2d 866 , as setting forth “speedy trial analysis,”he fails to substantiate his assertion that ‘ttjhe speedy trial guarantees apply to petitions for revocation.” Perhaps the ‘holdings of the Montana Supreme Court,” based upon which Van Haele asserts that he “properly raised his claim of denial of a speedy *411 hearing,” provide support for his argument; which of 2005Whether the District Court erred in rejecting Van Haele’s motion to dismiss for the denial of his right to a speedy hearing. ¶57 Although Van Haele refers to our decision in City of Billings v. Bruce, 1998 MT 186 , 290 Mont. 148 , 965 P.2d 866 , as setting forth “speedy trial analysis,”he fails to substantiate his assertion that ‘ttjhe speedy trial guarantees apply to petitions for revocation.” Perhaps the ‘holdings of the Montana Supreme Court,” based upon which Van Haele asserts that he “properly raised his claim of denial of a speedy *411 hearing,” provide support for his argument; which of | 1 | 2005–2005 |
General Electric Co. v. Joiner
green
2 sentences2005Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93 , 113 S.Ct. at 2796 ; Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146 , 118 S.Ct. at 519 ; Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152 , 119 S.Ct. at 1176 . ¶80 Under the trilogy of cases, Clifford was entitled to a Daubert hearing on Blanco’s testimony as to method validity. 2005Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93 , 113 S.Ct. at 2796 ; Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146 , 118 S.Ct. at 519 ; Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152 , 119 S.Ct. at 1176 . ¶80 Under the trilogy of cases, Clifford was entitled to a Daubert hearing on Blanco’s testimony as to method validity. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Klawitter
green
2 sentences2003We cited with approval the Minnesota Supreme Court comment that “the HGN test ‘can hardly be characterized as an emerging scientific technique’ because nystagmus has long been known and the tests have been in common medical use for many years.” Hulse , ¶ 68 (citing State v. Klawitter (Minn. 1994), 518 N.W.2d 577, 584 ). ¶39 Likewise, we concluded in Southern that microscopic hair comparison evidence was not novel scientific evidence-noting that since 1978 we had considered several cases wherein witnesses had testified on such evidence and that comparing hair samples with a microscope had been 2003We cited with approval the Minnesota Supreme Court comment that “the HGN test ‘can hardly be characterized as an emerging scientific technique’ because nystagmus has long been known and the tests have been in common medical use for many years.” Hulse , ¶ 68 (citing State v. Klawitter (Minn. 1994), 518 N.W.2d 577, 584 ). ¶39 Likewise, we concluded in Southern that microscopic hair comparison evidence was not novel scientific evidence-noting that since 1978 we had considered several cases wherein witnesses had testified on such evidence and that comparing hair samples with a microscope had been | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Connery v. Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp. neutral | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Williamson v. Reynolds green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| McGrew v. State green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| McGrew v. State green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Ronald Keith Williamson v. Ronald Ward, Warden, State Penitentiary at McAlester green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| State v. Walters neutral | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| State v. Walters neutral | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| United States v. Carl Joseph Baller, Jr. green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Hicks v. Virginia green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Cunningham v. Columbia, Newberry & Laurens Railroad green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| United States v. John Ray Bonds (91-3610) Mark Verdi (91-3609) and Steven Wayne Yee (91-3608) green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.