Daubert standard in Illinois

2024In the alternative, Gavin sought to exclude testimony that did not comply with the “Rule 702/Daubert standard ([Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)]) or the Frye-plus-reliability standard.” Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C.

2001People v. Eyler, 133 Ill. 2d 173, 211 (1989); see also People v. Miller, 173 Ill. 2d 167 (1996) (declining to adopt the Daubert test (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 125 L.

2001People v. Eyler, 133 Ill. 2d 173, 211 (1989); see also People v. Miller, 173 Ill. 2d 167 (1996) (declining to adopt the Daubert test (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 125 L.

2001People v. Eyler, 133 Ill. 2d 173, 211 (1989); see also People v. Miller, 173 Ill. 2d 167 (1996) (declining to adopt the Daubert test (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 125 L.

2024In the alternative, Gavin sought to exclude testimony that did not comply with the “Rule 702/Daubert standard ([Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)]) or the Frye-plus-reliability standard.” Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C.

2020It was not enough for the plaintiff’s witnesses to posit that “each and every exposure to asbestos, including the first exposure, no matter how de minimis, ‘is a substantial contribution to the cumulative total.’ ” Id. 674-75 (quoting Krik v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 76 F. Supp. 3d 747 , 753 6 We note that while the federal courts use the Daubert standard, Illinois courts employ the Frye standard, which dictates that “scientific evidence is admissible at trial only if the methodology or scientific principle upon which the opinion is based is ‘sufficiently established to have gained general acceptanc

2013See People v. Eyler, 133 Ill. 2d 173, 215 (1989) (agreeing with lower court that “electrophoresis is 4 Massachusetts follows a hybrid Frye-Daubert test that first looks to general acceptance, but allows the proponent of evidence to use the remaining Daubert factors as “an alternate method of establishing reliability.” Patterson, 840 N.E.2d at 23 . -18- generally accepted by forensic scientists as a reliable method of detecting genetic markers in blood and is therefore admissible”); People v. Thomas, 137 Ill. 2d 500, 518 (1990) (“The Partee decision allowed the trial court in this case to effec

2013See People v. Eyler, 133 Ill. 2d 173, 215 (1989) (agreeing with lower court that “electrophoresis is 4 Massachusetts follows a hybrid Frye-Daubert test that first looks to general acceptance, but allows the proponent of evidence to use the remaining Daubert factors as “an alternate method of establishing reliability.” Patterson, 840 N.E.2d at 23 . -18- generally accepted by forensic scientists as a reliable method of detecting genetic markers in blood and is therefore admissible”); People v. Thomas, 137 Ill. 2d 500, 518 (1990) (“The Partee decision allowed the trial court in this case to effec

2006See Donaldson v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 199 Ill. 2d 63 , 80 n.1 (2002) (noting that this court has not considered adopting the new Daubert standard to replace the Frye standard).

2006See Donaldson v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 199 Ill. 2d 63 , 80 n.1 (2002) (noting that this court has not considered adopting the new Daubert standard to replace the Frye standard).

2025See, e.g., Sewell, 2023 IL App (1st) 220168, ¶ 91 ; Brown, 2021 IL App (1st) 191606, ¶ 91 ; Adams, 2021 IL App (1st) 182049, ¶ 56 ; In re Detention of Melcher, 2013 IL App (1st) 123085, ¶¶ 58-62 . ¶ 105 Indeed, respondent concedes that, in light of this precedent, “this Court cannot choose to abandon the Frye standard and adopt the Daubert standard.” Yet, he only raises the issue “lest it be waived in a further appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court[.]” Because respondent gives us no reason to depart from our established precedent, we decline to do so. ¶ 106 D.

2025See, e.g., Sewell, 2023 IL App (1st) 220168, ¶ 91 ; Brown, 2021 IL App (1st) 191606, ¶ 91 ; Adams, 2021 IL App (1st) 182049, ¶ 56 ; In re Detention of Melcher, 2013 IL App (1st) 123085, ¶¶ 58-62 . ¶ 105 Indeed, respondent concedes that, in light of this precedent, “this Court cannot choose to abandon the Frye standard and adopt the Daubert standard.” Yet, he only raises the issue “lest it be waived in a further appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court[.]” Because respondent gives us no reason to depart from our established precedent, we decline to do so. ¶ 106 D.

2020It was not enough for the plaintiff’s witnesses to posit that “each and every exposure to asbestos, including the first exposure, no matter how de minimis, ‘is a substantial contribution to the cumulative total.’ ” Id. 674-75 (quoting Krik v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 76 F. Supp. 3d 747 , 753 6 We note that while the federal courts use the Daubert standard, Illinois courts employ the Frye standard, which dictates that “scientific evidence is admissible at trial only if the methodology or scientific principle upon which the opinion is based is ‘sufficiently established to have gained general acceptanc

2020It was not enough for the plaintiff’s witnesses to posit that “each and every exposure to asbestos, including the first exposure, no matter how de minimis, ‘is a substantial contribution to the cumulative total.’ ” Id. 674-75 (quoting Krik v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 76 F. Supp. 3d 747 , 753 6 We note that while the federal courts use the Daubert standard, Illinois courts employ the Frye standard, which dictates that “scientific evidence is admissible at trial only if the methodology or scientific principle upon which the opinion is based is ‘sufficiently established to have gained general acceptanc

2013Ct. App. 2005) (“We take judicial notice, based on the overwhelming case law from other jurisdictions, that the theory underlying latent fingerprint identification is valid and that the procedures used in identifying latent fingerprints, if performed properly, have been widely accepted as reliable.”); United States v. Herrera, 704 F.3d 480, 484 (7th Cir. 2013) (rejecting the defendant’s “frontal assault on the use of fingerprint evidence in litigation” under Daubert); United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 989-92 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding, based on record developed at a Daubert hearing, “overw

2013Ct. App. 2005) (“We take judicial notice, based on the overwhelming case law from other jurisdictions, that the theory underlying latent fingerprint identification is valid and that the procedures used in identifying latent fingerprints, if performed properly, have been widely accepted as reliable.”); United States v. Herrera, 704 F.3d 480, 484 (7th Cir. 2013) (rejecting the defendant’s “frontal assault on the use of fingerprint evidence in litigation” under Daubert); United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 989-92 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding, based on record developed at a Daubert hearing, “overw

2013See People v. Eyler, 133 Ill. 2d 173, 215 (1989) (agreeing with lower court that “electrophoresis is 4 Massachusetts follows a hybrid Frye-Daubert test that first looks to general acceptance, but allows the proponent of evidence to use the remaining Daubert factors as “an alternate method of establishing reliability.” Patterson, 840 N.E.2d at 23 . -18- generally accepted by forensic scientists as a reliable method of detecting genetic markers in blood and is therefore admissible”); People v. Thomas, 137 Ill. 2d 500, 518 (1990) (“The Partee decision allowed the trial court in this case to effec

2013See People v. Eyler, 133 Ill. 2d 173, 215 (1989) (agreeing with lower court that “electrophoresis is 4 Massachusetts follows a hybrid Frye-Daubert test that first looks to general acceptance, but allows the proponent of evidence to use the remaining Daubert factors as “an alternate method of establishing reliability.” Patterson, 840 N.E.2d at 23 . -18- generally accepted by forensic scientists as a reliable method of detecting genetic markers in blood and is therefore admissible”); People v. Thomas, 137 Ill. 2d 500, 518 (1990) (“The Partee decision allowed the trial court in this case to effec

2013Ct. App. 2005) (“We take judicial notice, based on the overwhelming case law from other jurisdictions, that the theory underlying latent fingerprint identification is valid and that the procedures used in identifying latent fingerprints, if performed properly, have been widely accepted as reliable.”); United States v. Herrera, 704 F.3d 480, 484 (7th Cir. 2013) (rejecting the defendant’s “frontal assault on the use of fingerprint evidence in litigation” under Daubert); United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 989-92 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding, based on record developed at a Daubert hearing, “overw

2013Ct. App. 2005) (“We take judicial notice, based on the overwhelming case law from other jurisdictions, that the theory underlying latent fingerprint identification is valid and that the procedures used in identifying latent fingerprints, if performed properly, have been widely accepted as reliable.”); United States v. Herrera, 704 F.3d 480, 484 (7th Cir. 2013) (rejecting the defendant’s “frontal assault on the use of fingerprint evidence in litigation” under Daubert); United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 989-92 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding, based on record developed at a Daubert hearing, “overw

2013Ct. App. 2005) (“We take judicial notice, based on the overwhelming case law from other jurisdictions, that the theory underlying latent fingerprint identification is valid and that the procedures used in identifying latent fingerprints, if performed properly, have been widely accepted as reliable.”); United States v. Herrera, 704 F.3d 480, 484 (7th Cir. 2013) (rejecting the defendant’s “frontal assault on the use of fingerprint evidence in litigation” under Daubert); United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 989-92 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding, based on record developed at a Daubert hearing, “overw

2013Ct. App. 2005) (“We take judicial notice, based on the overwhelming case law from other jurisdictions, that the theory underlying latent fingerprint identification is valid and that the procedures used in identifying latent fingerprints, if performed properly, have been widely accepted as reliable.”); United States v. Herrera, 704 F.3d 480, 484 (7th Cir. 2013) (rejecting the defendant’s “frontal assault on the use of fingerprint evidence in litigation” under Daubert); United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 989-92 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding, based on record developed at a Daubert hearing, “overw

2013Ct. App. 2005) (“We take judicial notice, based on the overwhelming case law from other jurisdictions, that the theory underlying latent fingerprint identification is valid and that the procedures used in identifying latent fingerprints, if performed properly, have been widely accepted as reliable.”); United States v. Herrera, 704 F.3d 480, 484 (7th Cir. 2013) (rejecting the defendant’s “frontal assault on the use of fingerprint evidence in litigation” under Daubert); United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 989-92 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding, based on record developed at a Daubert hearing, “overw

2013Ct. App. 2005) (“We take judicial notice, based on the overwhelming case law from other jurisdictions, that the theory underlying latent fingerprint identification is valid and that the procedures used in identifying latent fingerprints, if performed properly, have been widely accepted as reliable.”); United States v. Herrera, 704 F.3d 480, 484 (7th Cir. 2013) (rejecting the defendant’s “frontal assault on the use of fingerprint evidence in litigation” under Daubert); United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 989-92 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding, based on record developed at a Daubert hearing, “overw

2013App. 3d 915, 926 (1994) (rejecting the State’s argument that the relevant field includes only forensic scientists and concluding that the general acceptance of the proposed DNA profiling evidence should be evaluated by scientists in the fields of molecular biology, population genetics, and forensic science); cf. McKown II, 236 Ill. 2d at 300 (where the question was whether HGN testing could reliably determine alcohol impairment, relevant scientific fields included medicine, ophthalmology, optometry, and neurophysiology, and thus police officer’s testimony that “HGN testing is generally accepte

2013App. 3d 915, 926 (1994) (rejecting the State’s argument that the relevant field includes only forensic scientists and concluding that the general acceptance of the proposed DNA profiling evidence should be evaluated by scientists in the fields of molecular biology, population genetics, and forensic science); cf. McKown II, 236 Ill. 2d at 300 (where the question was whether HGN testing could reliably determine alcohol impairment, relevant scientific fields included medicine, ophthalmology, optometry, and neurophysiology, and thus police officer’s testimony that “HGN testing is generally accepte

2013Ct. App. 2005) (“We take judicial notice, based on the overwhelming case law from other jurisdictions, that the theory underlying latent fingerprint identification is valid and that the procedures used in identifying latent fingerprints, if performed properly, have been widely accepted as reliable.”); United States v. Herrera, 704 F.3d 480, 484 (7th Cir. 2013) (rejecting the defendant’s “frontal assault on the use of fingerprint evidence in litigation” under Daubert); United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 989-92 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding, based on record developed at a Daubert hearing, “overw

2013Ct. App. 2005) (“We take judicial notice, based on the overwhelming case law from other jurisdictions, that the theory underlying latent fingerprint identification is valid and that the procedures used in identifying latent fingerprints, if performed properly, have been widely accepted as reliable.”); United States v. Herrera, 704 F.3d 480, 484 (7th Cir. 2013) (rejecting the defendant’s “frontal assault on the use of fingerprint evidence in litigation” under Daubert); United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 989-92 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding, based on record developed at a Daubert hearing, “overw

2013See People v. Eyler, 133 Ill. 2d 173, 215 (1989) (agreeing with lower court that “electrophoresis is 4 Massachusetts follows a hybrid Frye-Daubert test that first looks to general acceptance, but allows the proponent of evidence to use the remaining Daubert factors as “an alternate method of establishing reliability.” Patterson, 840 N.E.2d at 23 . -18- generally accepted by forensic scientists as a reliable method of detecting genetic markers in blood and is therefore admissible”); People v. Thomas, 137 Ill. 2d 500, 518 (1990) (“The Partee decision allowed the trial court in this case to effec

2013See People v. Eyler, 133 Ill. 2d 173, 215 (1989) (agreeing with lower court that “electrophoresis is 4 Massachusetts follows a hybrid Frye-Daubert test that first looks to general acceptance, but allows the proponent of evidence to use the remaining Daubert factors as “an alternate method of establishing reliability.” Patterson, 840 N.E.2d at 23 . -18- generally accepted by forensic scientists as a reliable method of detecting genetic markers in blood and is therefore admissible”); People v. Thomas, 137 Ill. 2d 500, 518 (1990) (“The Partee decision allowed the trial court in this case to effec

2013App. 3d 915, 926 (1994) (rejecting the State’s argument that the relevant field includes only forensic scientists and concluding that the general acceptance of the proposed DNA profiling evidence should be evaluated by scientists in the fields of molecular biology, population genetics, and forensic science); cf. McKown II, 236 Ill. 2d at 300 (where the question was whether HGN testing could reliably determine alcohol impairment, relevant scientific fields included medicine, ophthalmology, optometry, and neurophysiology, and thus police officer’s testimony that “HGN testing is generally accepte

2013App. 3d 915, 926 (1994) (rejecting the State’s argument that the relevant field includes only forensic scientists and concluding that the general acceptance of the proposed DNA profiling evidence should be evaluated by scientists in the fields of molecular biology, population genetics, and forensic science); cf. McKown II, 236 Ill. 2d at 300 (where the question was whether HGN testing could reliably determine alcohol impairment, relevant scientific fields included medicine, ophthalmology, optometry, and neurophysiology, and thus police officer’s testimony that “HGN testing is generally accepte

2013See People v. Eyler, 133 Ill. 2d 173, 215 (1989) (agreeing with lower court that “electrophoresis is 4 Massachusetts follows a hybrid Frye-Daubert test that first looks to general acceptance, but allows the proponent of evidence to use the remaining Daubert factors as “an alternate method of establishing reliability.” Patterson, 840 N.E.2d at 23 . -18- generally accepted by forensic scientists as a reliable method of detecting genetic markers in blood and is therefore admissible”); People v. Thomas, 137 Ill. 2d 500, 518 (1990) (“The Partee decision allowed the trial court in this case to effec

2013See People v. Eyler, 133 Ill. 2d 173, 215 (1989) (agreeing with lower court that “electrophoresis is 4 Massachusetts follows a hybrid Frye-Daubert test that first looks to general acceptance, but allows the proponent of evidence to use the remaining Daubert factors as “an alternate method of establishing reliability.” Patterson, 840 N.E.2d at 23 . -18- generally accepted by forensic scientists as a reliable method of detecting genetic markers in blood and is therefore admissible”); People v. Thomas, 137 Ill. 2d 500, 518 (1990) (“The Partee decision allowed the trial court in this case to effec

2013Ct. App. 2005) (“We take judicial notice, based on the overwhelming case law from other jurisdictions, that the theory underlying latent fingerprint identification is valid and that the procedures used in identifying latent fingerprints, if performed properly, have been widely accepted as reliable.”); United States v. Herrera, 704 F.3d 480, 484 (7th Cir. 2013) (rejecting the defendant’s “frontal assault on the use of fingerprint evidence in litigation” under Daubert); United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 989-92 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding, based on record developed at a Daubert hearing, “overw

2013Ct. App. 2005) (“We take judicial notice, based on the overwhelming case law from other jurisdictions, that the theory underlying latent fingerprint identification is valid and that the procedures used in identifying latent fingerprints, if performed properly, have been widely accepted as reliable.”); United States v. Herrera, 704 F.3d 480, 484 (7th Cir. 2013) (rejecting the defendant’s “frontal assault on the use of fingerprint evidence in litigation” under Daubert); United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 989-92 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding, based on record developed at a Daubert hearing, “overw

2013Ct. App. 2005) (“We take judicial notice, based on the overwhelming case law from other jurisdictions, that the theory underlying latent fingerprint identification is valid and that the procedures used in identifying latent fingerprints, if performed properly, have been widely accepted as reliable.”); United States v. Herrera, 704 F.3d 480, 484 (7th Cir. 2013) (rejecting the defendant’s “frontal assault on the use of fingerprint evidence in litigation” under Daubert); United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 989-92 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding, based on record developed at a Daubert hearing, “overw

2013Ct. App. 2005) (“We take judicial notice, based on the overwhelming case law from other jurisdictions, that the theory underlying latent fingerprint identification is valid and that the procedures used in identifying latent fingerprints, if performed properly, have been widely accepted as reliable.”); United States v. Herrera, 704 F.3d 480, 484 (7th Cir. 2013) (rejecting the defendant’s “frontal assault on the use of fingerprint evidence in litigation” under Daubert); United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 989-92 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding, based on record developed at a Daubert hearing, “overw

2013Ct. App. 2005) (“We take judicial notice, based on the overwhelming case law from other jurisdictions, that the theory underlying latent fingerprint identification is valid and that the procedures used in identifying latent fingerprints, if performed properly, have been widely accepted as reliable.”); United States v. Herrera, 704 F.3d 480, 484 (7th Cir. 2013) (rejecting the defendant’s “frontal assault on the use of fingerprint evidence in litigation” under Daubert); United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 989-92 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding, based on record developed at a Daubert hearing, “overw

2013Ct. App. 2005) (“We take judicial notice, based on the overwhelming case law from other jurisdictions, that the theory underlying latent fingerprint identification is valid and that the procedures used in identifying latent fingerprints, if performed properly, have been widely accepted as reliable.”); United States v. Herrera, 704 F.3d 480, 484 (7th Cir. 2013) (rejecting the defendant’s “frontal assault on the use of fingerprint evidence in litigation” under Daubert); United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 989-92 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding, based on record developed at a Daubert hearing, “overw

2013Ct. App. 2005) (“We take judicial notice, based on the overwhelming case law from other jurisdictions, that the theory underlying latent fingerprint identification is valid and that the procedures used in identifying latent fingerprints, if performed properly, have been widely accepted as reliable.”); United States v. Herrera, 704 F.3d 480, 484 (7th Cir. 2013) (rejecting the defendant’s “frontal assault on the use of fingerprint evidence in litigation” under Daubert); United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 989-92 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding, based on record developed at a Daubert hearing, “overw

2013Ct. App. 2005) (“We take judicial notice, based on the overwhelming case law from other jurisdictions, that the theory underlying latent fingerprint identification is valid and that the procedures used in identifying latent fingerprints, if performed properly, have been widely accepted as reliable.”); United States v. Herrera, 704 F.3d 480, 484 (7th Cir. 2013) (rejecting the defendant’s “frontal assault on the use of fingerprint evidence in litigation” under Daubert); United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 989-92 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding, based on record developed at a Daubert hearing, “overw