12 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Baldwin v. Reagangreen2 sentences2023The plain language of the statute requires “‘that when a stop to determine seat belt compliance is made, the police are strictly prohibited from determining anything else, even if other law would permit.’” Id. (quoting Baldwin v. Reagan, 715 N.E.2d 332, 339 (Ind. 1999)). 2023“Reasonable suspicion exists where the facts known to the officer, together with the reasonable inferences arising from such facts, would cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe that criminal activity has or is about to occur.” Id. at 384 (quoting Baldwin, 715 N.E.2d at 337 ) (emphasis added in Richardson). | 3 | 4 |
State v. Richardsongreen2 sentences2023Law enforcement officers can initiate a traffic stop pursuant to the ISEA “only where they [have] reasonable suspicion that a seat belt violation [has] occurred.” State v. Richardson, 927 N.E.2d 379, 382 (Ind. 2010). 2023Our Indiana Supreme Court stated, based on Baldwin, that the ISEA “simply does not permit investigatory behavior based solely on a seat belt violation unless circumstances arise after the stop that independently provide the officer with reasonable suspicion of other crimes.” Id. at 383 . | 3 | 3 |
Trigg v. Stategreen2 sentences2010In Trigg v. State, 725 N.E.2d 446, 448 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), the Court of Appeals interpreted Baldwin to allow for a limited search for weapons when an officer makes a traffic stop based on reasonable suspicion that a seat belt violation has occurred. 2010However, the Court said that a limited search for weapons must be "the result of actions or behavior on the part of the defendant after the initial stop that led a police officer to fear for his safety." Trigg, 725 N.E.2d at 448 (emphasis added). | 2 | 2 |
Hopper v. Careygreen2 sentences2015Id. at 573-74 . 2015Id. at 574-75 (internal citations omitted). [15] As the City notes, our decision in Hopper was dicta with respect to vehicles that are governed by the Seatbelt Act. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Morrisgreen1 sentence2010Cf. Morris, 732 N.E.2d at 228 (finding an independent basis for further inquiry above and beyond the seat belt violation, where the defendant failed to produce a valid license, and a computer check later revealed his license was suspended). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Washingtongreen1 sentence2010The State relies on our decision in State v. Washington, 898 N.E.2d 1200, 1207-08 (Ind.2008), to contend that Officer Eastwood's inquiry was entirely proper because under Section 11, an officer may ask a motorist whether he or she has a weapon on his person. | 1 | 1 |
cluster 8255green1 sentence1999See, e.g., United States v. Fields, 72 F.3d 1200, 1212 (5th Cm.) (upholding against federal constitutional challenge the impoundment and inventory search of a vehicle stopped for a seat belt violation where *339 driver had not updated the address on his license and did not have proof of insurance), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 807 , 117 S.Ct. 48 , 136 L.Ed.2d 13 (1996). | 1 | 1 |
Stattin v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.green1 sentence1999See, e.g., United States v. Fields, 72 F.3d 1200, 1212 (5th Cm.) (upholding against federal constitutional challenge the impoundment and inventory search of a vehicle stopped for a seat belt violation where *339 driver had not updated the address on his license and did not have proof of insurance), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 807 , 117 S.Ct. 48 , 136 L.Ed.2d 13 (1996). | 1 | 1 |
McGlory v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1999See, e.g., United States v. Fields, 72 F.3d 1200, 1212 (5th Cm.) (upholding against federal constitutional challenge the impoundment and inventory search of a vehicle stopped for a seat belt violation where *339 driver had not updated the address on his license and did not have proof of insurance), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 807 , 117 S.Ct. 48 , 136 L.Ed.2d 13 (1996). | 1 | 1 |
Cousin v. Office of Thrift Supervisiongreen1 sentence1999See, e.g., United States v. Fields, 72 F.3d 1200, 1212 (5th Cm.) (upholding against federal constitutional challenge the impoundment and inventory search of a vehicle stopped for a seat belt violation where *339 driver had not updated the address on his license and did not have proof of insurance), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 807 , 117 S.Ct. 48 , 136 L.Ed.2d 13 (1996). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kavanagh v. Butorac
green
2 sentences1981In Kavanagh v. Butorac, (1966) 140 Ind.App. 139 , 221 N.E.2d 824 , the defendant advanced the theory that the “avoidable consequences” doctrine applied to a seat belt defense. 1981In Kavanagh v. Butorac, (1966) 140 Ind.App. 139 , 221 N.E.2d 824 , the defendant advanced the theory that the “avoidable consequences” doctrine applied to a seat belt defense. | 2 | 1977–1981 |
State v. Massey
green
1 sentence2015Id. [10] Indiana Code Section 9-19-10-2 requires each occupant of a motor vehicle equipped with a safety belt to “have a safety belt properly fastened about the occupant’s body at all times when the vehicle is in forward motion.” In determining whether a stop for a seat belt violation was reasonable under an Indiana constitutional analysis, our supreme court has held: that a police officer may not stop a motorist in Indiana for a possible seat belt violation unless that officer reasonably suspects that the driver or a passenger in the vehicle is not wearing a seat belt as required by law. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Richardson
neutral
1 sentence2010State v. Richardson, 906 N.E.2d 263 (Ind.Ct.App.2009). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
In Re Cherry
green
1 sentence2010On the basis of the language of the statute, we agreed with the Attorney General's position that "the statute requires that when a stop to determine seat belt law compliance is made, the police are strictly prohibited from determining anything else, even if other law would permit." Baldwin, 715 N.E.2d at 339 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Clark v. State
green
1 sentence2007Id. at 201 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Martin WALSH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EMERGENCY ONE, INC., Defendant-Appellee
green
1 sentence1999We note that in Walsh v. Emergency One, Inc., 26 F.3d 1417 (7th Cir.1994), the court held that the Fire Department’s policy that fire fighters must wear seatbelts created a duty of fire fighters to do so. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Ingram
green
1 sentence1999Id. at 448 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Rhinebarger v. Mummert
green
1 sentence1999He stated that few courts have found a common law duty to use seat belts which would support a finding of contributory negligence and no evidence should even have been admitted regarding a seat-belt defense “in the absence of legislation requiring the use of seat belts.... ” Id. ( Buchanan, J., concurring). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Gibson v. Henninger
green
2 sentences1977Gibson v. Henninger (1976), 170 Ind. App. 55 , 350 N.E.2d 631, 634 , held a seat belt instruction was properly refused because “[t]here was no evidence that had [plaintiff] been ‘buckled up’ . . . she would not have . . . sustained injury.” See also: Kavanagh v. Butorac (1966), 140 Ind. App. 139 , 221 N.E.2d 824 . 1977Gibson v. Henninger (1976), 170 Ind. App. 55 , 350 N.E.2d 631, 634 , held a seat belt instruction was properly refused because “[t]here was no evidence that had [plaintiff] been ‘buckled up’ . . . she would not have . . . sustained injury.” See also: Kavanagh v. Butorac (1966), 140 Ind. App. 139 , 221 N.E.2d 824 . | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.