seat belt defense in Connecticut

2018To arrive at the conclusion that probable cause existed, one must ignore the fact that, except for the seat belt violation, the defendant operated his motor vehicle in a manner consistent with that of an ordinary, careful and prudent driver over a considerable distance on multiple city roads." Id., at 529-30, 901 A.2d 706 .

2007In this opinion the other justices concurred. 1 This court granted the state’s petition for certification to appeal limited to the following issue: “Did the Appellate Court properly reach the question whether the defendant’s arrest for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs was based on probable cause, and, if so, did it properly conclude that probable cause was lacking?” State v. Dalzell, 280 Conn. 914 , 908 A.2d 539 (2006). 2 We affirm that part of the Appellate Court’s judgment affirming the defendant’s conviction of failure to wear a seat belt in violation of § 14-100

2007In this opinion the other justices concurred. 1 This court granted the state’s petition for certification to appeal limited to the following issue: “Did the Appellate Court properly reach the question whether the defendant’s arrest for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs was based on probable cause, and, if so, did it properly conclude that probable cause was lacking?” State v. Dalzell, 280 Conn. 914 , 908 A.2d 539 (2006). 2 We affirm that part of the Appellate Court’s judgment affirming the defendant’s conviction of failure to wear a seat belt in violation of § 14-100

2006The defendant asks this court to hold that it is the subjective intent of law enforcement officers that should govern *525 whether the motor vehicle traffic stop was pretextual and violative of §§ 7 and 9 of the Connecticut constitution, although he admits that Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 , 116 S. Ct. 1769 , 135 L.

2006The defendant asks this court to hold that it is the subjective intent of law enforcement officers that should govern *525 whether the motor vehicle traffic stop was pretextual and violative of §§ 7 and 9 of the Connecticut constitution, although he admits that Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 , 116 S. Ct. 1769 , 135 L.

1995In interpreting § 19, our Supreme Court has held “that the right to a jury trial exists both in cases in which it existed at common law at the time of the adoption of the constitutional provisions preserving it and in cases substantially similar thereto.” Ford v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Connecticut, Inc., 216 Conn. 40, 50 , 578 A.2d 1054 (1990); Spitzer v. Haims & Co., 217 Conn. 532, 539-41 , 587 A.2d 105 (1991).

1995In interpreting § 19, our Supreme Court has held “that the right to a jury trial exists both in cases in which it existed at common law at the time of the adoption of the constitutional provisions preserving it and in cases substantially similar thereto.” Ford v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Connecticut, Inc., 216 Conn. 40, 50 , 578 A.2d 1054 (1990); Spitzer v. Haims & Co., 217 Conn. 532, 539-41 , 587 A.2d 105 (1991).

1995In interpreting § 19, our Supreme Court has held “that the right to a jury trial exists both in cases in which it existed at common law at the time of the adoption of the constitutional provisions preserving it and in cases substantially similar thereto.” Ford v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Connecticut, Inc., 216 Conn. 40, 50 , 578 A.2d 1054 (1990); Spitzer v. Haims & Co., 217 Conn. 532, 539-41 , 587 A.2d 105 (1991).

1995In interpreting § 19, our Supreme Court has held “that the right to a jury trial exists both in cases in which it existed at common law at the time of the adoption of the constitutional provisions preserving it and in cases substantially similar thereto.” Ford v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Connecticut, Inc., 216 Conn. 40, 50 , 578 A.2d 1054 (1990); Spitzer v. Haims & Co., 217 Conn. 532, 539-41 , 587 A.2d 105 (1991).

1995In Caciopoli v. Acam-para, 30 Conn. App. 327 , 620 A.2d 191 (1993), a defense recognized by law was at issue; the case at hand is distinguishable as the defense is not recognized by law.

1995In Caciopoli v. Acam-para, 30 Conn. App. 327 , 620 A.2d 191 (1993), a defense recognized by law was at issue; the case at hand is distinguishable as the defense is not recognized by law.

1995The defendants rely on Gentile v. Altermatt, 169 Conn. 267 , 363 A.2d 1 (1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 1041 , 96 S. Ct. 763 , 46 L.

1995The defendants rely on Gentile v. Altermatt, 169 Conn. 267 , 363 A.2d 1 (1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 1041 , 96 S. Ct. 763 , 46 L.

1995The defendants rely on Gentile v. Altermatt, 169 Conn. 267 , 363 A.2d 1 (1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 1041 , 96 S. Ct. 763 , 46 L.

1995The defendants rely on Gentile v. Altermatt, 169 Conn. 267 , 363 A.2d 1 (1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 1041 , 96 S. Ct. 763 , 46 L.

1995The defendants rely on Gentile v. Altermatt, 169 Conn. 267 , 363 A.2d 1 (1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 1041 , 96 S. Ct. 763 , 46 L.

1992The defendants further argue that in Wassell v. Hamblin, 196 Conn. 463 , 493 A.2d 870 (1985), the Supreme Court impliedly authorized the use of the seat belt defense for purposes of mitigation of damages.

1992The defendants further argue that in Wassell v. Hamblin, 196 Conn. 463 , 493 A.2d 870 (1985), the Supreme Court impliedly authorized the use of the seat belt defense for purposes of mitigation of damages.