seat belt violation in Texas

2013The question was finally answered in Quinius v. Estrada, 448 S.W.2d 552, 554 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

2013The question was finally answered in Quinius v. Estrada, 448 S.W.2d 552, 554 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1969, writ refd n.r.e.).

2013Tom Brown Drilling Co. v. Nieman, 418 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1967, writ refd n.r.e).

2013Tom Brown Drilling Co. v. Nieman, 418 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1967, writ refd n.r.e).

2012See Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 531 (Tex. Crim.App.2001) (addressing sufficiency of facts to justify stop: "The question, then, is whether the child looking back several times is enough to establish reasonable suspicion for a seat belt violation.").

2012See Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 531 (Tex.Crim.App.2001) (addressing sufficiency of facts to justify stop: "The question, then, is whether the child looking back several times is enough to establish reasonable suspicion for a seat belt violation.”).

2012As the Second Court of Appeals has explained, evidence that an officer "reasonably suspected that a defendant had violated a traffic law" is constitutionally insufficient because to hold otherwise "would transform the Fourth Amendment's objective standard into a subjective standard dependent on the whims of the police's `understanding' of the law." Fowler v. State, 266 S.W.3d 498, 504 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. ref'd). [9] "Subtitle C.

2012As the Second Court of Appeals has explained, evidence that an officer "reasonably suspected that a defendant had violated a traffic law” is constitutionally insufficient because to hold otherwise "would transform the Fourth Amendment's objective standard into a subjective standard dependent on the whims of the police’s 'understanding' of the law.” Fowler v. State, 266 S.W.3d 498, 504 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. ref’d). .

2012Rather, the matter before us is the application of the law to the facts.”) (emphasis added); see also Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 531 (Tex.Crim.App.2001) (In addressing the sufficiency of the facts to justify the stop in Garcia , we explained that the issue was an application of the law to the facts; "The question, then, is whether the child looking back several times is enough to establish reasonable suspicion for a seat belt violation.”); Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 121 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (In reviewing the defendant’s claim that his cellmate violated his Sixth Amendment right to c

2012App. 2001) (In addressing the sufficiency of the facts to justify the stop in Garcia , we explained that the issue was an application of the law to the facts: "The question, then, is whether the child looking back several times is enough to establish reasonable suspicion for a seat belt violation."); Wesbrook v. State , 29 S.W.3d 103, 121 (Tex. Crim.

2011Virnau & Sons, Inc., 28 S.W.3d 226, 232-33 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2000, pet. denied) (holding that "the documentary evidence submitted by appellants shows the same model tractor with the ROPS [Rollover Protective Structure] and the seat belt as standard equipment is some evidence, certainly more than a scintilla, that the combination system did not jeopardize or diminish the utility of the tractor").

2011Virnau & Sons, Inc., 28 S.W.3d 226, 232-33 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2000, pet. denied) (holding that “the documentary evidence submitted by appellants shows the same model tractor with the ROPS [Rollover Protective Structure] and the seat belt as standard equipment is some evidence, certainly more than a scintilla, that the combination system did not jeopardize or diminish the utility of the tractor”).

2015App. 2001) (refusing to defer to an officer's legal conclusion about reasonable suspicion—“we will not use [the officer’s] ‘legal conclusion’ that a seat belt violation may have occurred to imply more than what his testimony reveals: that the child looked back several times.”); Viveros v. State, 828 S.W.2d 2, 4 (Tex. Crim.

2012An expert may not “simply ... opine that the defendant’s negligence caused the plaintiffs injury.” Jelinek v. Casas, 328 S.W.3d 526, 536 (Tex.2010).

2000See Tokai Corp., 2 S.W.3d at 260 .

2000See Richards v. State, 743 S.W.2d 747, 749 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987) (noting that Texas seat belt law serves the public safety and welfare by enhancing a driver’s ability to maintain control of his vehicle, and by reducing injuries not only to himself, but also to others), pet. ref'd, 757 S.W.2d 723 (Tex.Crim.App.1988).

2000See Richards v. State, 743 S.W.2d 747, 749 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987) (noting that Texas seat belt law serves the public safety and welfare by enhancing a driver’s ability to maintain control of his vehicle, and by reducing injuries not only to himself, but also to others), pet. ref'd, 757 S.W.2d 723 (Tex.Crim.App.1988).

2000On rehearing, the court upheld the summary judgment in the officer’s favor, concluding that the arrest was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the officer had probable cause to arrest the motorist for the seat belt violation and the arrest was not conducted in an “extraordinary manner.” See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 195 F.3d 242, 245-46 (5 th Cir.1999) (en banc).

2000See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235 , 94 S.Ct. 467 ; Gustafson, 414 U.S. at 265-66 , 94 S.Ct. 488 .

2000See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235 , 94 S.Ct. 467 ; Gustafson, 414 U.S. at 265-66 , 94 S.Ct. 488 .

1996In New York v. Belton , 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981), the Court rejected a case-by-case application of the rule of Chimel v. California , 395 U.S. 752 (1969), to automobiles in favor of a standard procedure governing all cases.

1996See Christopher v. State , 639 S.W.2d 932, 935 (Tex. Crim.