immediate hearing in New York

2014“Where, as here, governmental activity is being challenged, the immediate inquiry is whether the challenge could have been advanced in a CPLR article 78 proceeding” (Spinney at Pond View, LLC v Town Bd. of the Town of Schodack, 99 AD3d 1088 , 1089 [2012] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; accord Thrun v Cuomo, 112 AD3d 1038 , 1040 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 865 [2014]).

2014“Where, as here, governmental activity is being challenged, the immediate inquiry is whether the challenge could have been advanced in a CPLR article 78 proceeding” (Spinney at Pond View, LLC v Town Bd. of the Town of Schodack, 99 AD3d 1088 , 1089 [2012] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; accord Thrun v Cuomo, 112 AD3d 1038 , 1040 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 865 [2014]).

2014Petitioners are not challenging any legislation, but are instead challenging the determinations of an administrative agency applying such legislation, rendering this the type of challenge that should be brought under CPLR article 78 (see Walton v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 8 NY3d 186, 194 [2007]; Matter of Grand Manor Nursing Home Health Related Facility, Inc. v Novello, 39 AD3d 1062, 1064 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 812 [2007]).

2014Petitioners are not challenging any legislation, but are instead challenging the determinations of an administrative agency applying such legislation, rendering this the type of challenge that should be brought under CPLR article 78 (see Walton v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 8 NY3d 186, 194 [2007]; Matter of Grand Manor Nursing Home Health Related Facility, Inc. v Novello, 39 AD3d 1062, 1064 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 812 [2007]).

2014Petitioners are not challenging any legislation, but are instead challenging the determinations of an administrative agency applying such legislation, rendering this the type of challenge that should be brought under CPLR article 78 (see Walton v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 8 NY3d 186, 194 [2007]; Matter of Grand Manor Nursing Home Health Related Facility, Inc. v Novello, 39 AD3d 1062, 1064 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 812 [2007]).

2014Petitioners are not challenging any legislation, but are instead challenging the determinations of an administrative agency applying such legislation, rendering this the type of challenge that should be brought under CPLR article 78 (see Walton v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 8 NY3d 186, 194 [2007]; Matter of Grand Manor Nursing Home Health Related Facility, Inc. v Novello, 39 AD3d 1062, 1064 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 812 [2007]).

2024"Where, as here, governmental activity is being challenged, the immediate inquiry is whether the challenge could have been advanced in a CPLR article 78 proceeding". ( Spinney at Pond View, LLC v Town Bd. of the Town of Schodack , 99 AD3d 1088 , 1089 [2012] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted].

2024"Where, as here, governmental activity is being challenged, the immediate inquiry is whether the challenge could have been advanced in a CPLR article 78 proceeding". ( Spinney at Pond View, LLC v Town Bd. of the Town of Schodack , 99 AD3d 1088 , 1089 [2012] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted].

2013Corp. v McBarnette, 84 NY2d 194, 201 [1994]).

2013Corp. v McBarnette, 84 NY2d 194, 201 [1994]).

2014Center-Uihlein v Daines, 119 AD3d 1175 , 1176 [2014] [emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted]; accord Thrun v Cuomo, 112 AD3d 1038 , 1040 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 865 [2014]; Spinney at Pond View, LLC v Town Bd. of the Town of Schodack, 99 AD3d 1088 , 1089 [2012]; see Bango v Gouverneur Volunteer Rescue Squad, Inc., 101 AD3d 1556, 1557 [2012]).

2014Center-Uihlein v Daines, 119 AD3d 1175 , 1176 [2014] [emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted]; accord Thrun v Cuomo, 112 AD3d 1038 , 1040 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 865 [2014]; Spinney at Pond View, LLC v Town Bd. of the Town of Schodack, 99 AD3d 1088 , 1089 [2012]; see Bango v Gouverneur Volunteer Rescue Squad, Inc., 101 AD3d 1556, 1557 [2012]).

2012Co. v Town Bd. of Town of Thompson, 252 AD2d 928, 929 [1998]; see New York City Health & Hosps.

2012Co. v Town Bd. of Town of Thompson, 252 AD2d 928, 929 [1998]; see New York City Health & Hosps.

2025Plaintiff is correct “[d]efendants’ recalcitrant worker defense, predicated on plaintiff’s failure to [stand clear of the excavator], is unavailing, . . . there being no evidence that plaintiff was given an immediate instruction” to do so (Olszewski v Park Terrace Gardens, Inc., 306 AD2d 128, 128-29 [1st Dept 2003]; Vitucci v Durst Pyramid LLC, 205 AD3d 441 , 444 [1st Dept 2022] [defendants “failed to make a showing that plaintiff deliberately refused to obey a direct and immediate instruction to . . . not stand on the edge of the bathtub so as to invoke the recalcitrant worker defense”]).

2004While defendant acknowledged that a general safety instruction was given to plaintiff approximately three weeks before the incident, it is firmly established in this Department that an immediate instruction is a requisite of the “recalcitrant worker” defense (see Olszewski v Park Terrace Gardens, 306 AD2d 128 [2003]; DePalma v Metropolitan Transp.

2017The Family Court’s determination to award custody of the parties’ four children to the father has a sound and substantial basis in the record (see Eschbach v Eschbach, 56 NY2d 167, 173-174 [1982]).

2001The record supports the motion court’s finding that the mother has not willfully interfered with the father’s relationship with the child and that her continued custody of the child is otherwise in the child’s best interests (see, Eschbach v Eschbach, 56 NY2d 167, 173-174 ).

2006We should avoid this dilemma by authorizing an immediate test of the compulsion through prohibition, in the light of the gravity of the possible harm to the individual, the length of time an appeal from a conviction would endure, and the fact that the compulsion may indeed implicate a serious invasion of the individual’s constitutional rights, if not corrected at once.” In support of his motion pursuant to Matter of Abe A. (supra), the District Attorney was required to demonstrate, inter alia, that there was a “clear indication” that relevant material evidence will be found from the requested

1989More recently, this court has held, in the context of a directive that a suspect in a sexual abuse case provide samples of his head and pubic hairs, that "a proceeding in the nature of prohibition is a remedy which may be availed by a suspect who seeks review of a court order directing him to furnish bodily samples to the People” (Matter of William D. v Rohl, 148 AD2d 706, 707 ).

1990Ordinarily, an attorney who is discharged without cause is entitled to a hearing to determine the amount of attorney’s fees when the client needs the files in the attorney’s possession to continue with an action (see, Teichner v W & J Holsteins, 64 NY2d 977, 979 ; Ventola v Ventola, 112 AD2d 291, 292 ; Rosen v Rosen, 97 AD2d 837, 838 ).

1989The appellant is entitled to an immediate hearing to determine these issues (see, Rosen v Rosen, supra, at 837).

1981Under the circumstances of this case and in view of the serious nature of defendant’s allegations concerning the negotiation and execution of the stipulation of settlement, it was improper for Special Term to have denied her motion on conflicting affidavits without conducting an evidentiary hearing (see Pisano v Pisano, 71 AD2d 670 ; see, also, Christian v Christian, 42 NY2d 63 ).

1979In view of our liberal policy with respect to vacating defaults in matrimonial actions (Levy v Levy, 67 AD2d 998 ; Hewlett v Hewlett, 63 AD2d 977 ), even where only limited relief may be warranted (see, e.g., Rutledge v Rutledge, 60 AD2d 646 ; Rizzo v Rizzo, 50 AD2d 915 ), it is our belief that under the circumstances of this particular case and in view of the serious nature of defendant’s allegations concerning his execution, without the benefit of independent counsel, of the totally one-sided stipulation of settlement (which stipulation was incorporated but not merged into the judgment of di

2020Although the court could have held an immediate hearing and found defendant in violation of the terms of his plea agreement if it determined that there was a legitimate basis for the arrest (see People v Outley, 80 NY2d 702, 713 [1993]), the court agreed to further adjourn sentencing until prosecution of the new indictment concluded.

2020Inasmuch as claimant relied upon Schlehr's treatment and advice to stay out of work from May 2018 to September 2018, and the record before us contains no apparent "false statement or representation" made by claimant to obtain indemnity benefits (Workers' Compensation Law § 114-a), the Board's finding that claimant did not make a misrepresentation of a material fact to obtain workers' compensation benefits is supported by substantial evidence and will not be disturbed ( see Matter of Roberts v Eastman Kodak Co. , 185 AD3d 1124, 1126 [2020]; Matter of Sidiropoulos v Nassau Intercounty Express ,

2016The grandmother did not testify at the fact-finding hearing or any of the permanency hearings held in relation to the termination proceedings against the mother, and was therefore never afforded the right to be heard on the issues (cf. Matter of Brendan N. [Arthur N.J, 79 AD3d 1175, 1179 [2010]; Matter of Gerald BB., 51 AD3d 1081, 1085-1086 [2008]).

2016While the grandmother was not entitled to an immediate hearing on her custody petition prior to the determination made at the conclusion of the fact-finding hearing in the termination proceedings against the mother (see Matter of Donna KK. v Barbara I., 32 AD3d 166, 168-169 [2006]), the proper procedural course would have been for the Family Court to consider her custody petition in the context of a dispositional hearing in the underlying termination proceedings, wherein the court would determine the best interests of the child (see Matter of Carolyn S. v Tompkins County Dept. of Social Servs.

2016While the grandmother was not entitled to an immediate hearing on her custody petition prior to the determination made at the conclusion of the fact-finding hearing in the termination proceedings against the mother (see Matter of Donna KK. v Barbara I., 32 AD3d 166, 168-169 [2006]), the proper procedural course would have been for the Family Court to consider her custody petition in the context of a dispositional hearing in the underlying termination proceedings, wherein the court would determine the best interests of the child (see Matter of Carolyn S. v Tompkins County Dept. of Social Servs.

2016While the grandmother was not entitled to an immediate hearing on her custody petition prior to the determination made at the conclusion of the fact-finding hearing in the termination proceedings against the mother (see Matter of Donna KK. v Barbara I., 32 AD3d 166, 168-169 [2006]), the proper procedural course would have been for the Family Court to consider her custody petition in the context of a dispositional hearing in the underlying termination proceedings, wherein the court would determine the best interests of the child (see Matter of Carolyn S. v Tompkins County Dept. of Social Servs.

2016While the grandmother was not entitled to an immediate hearing on her custody petition prior to the determination made at the conclusion of the fact-finding hearing in the termination proceedings against the mother (see Matter of Donna KK. v Barbara I., 32 AD3d 166, 168-169 [2006]), the proper procedural course would have been for the Family Court to consider her custody petition in the context of a dispositional hearing in the underlying termination proceedings, wherein the court would determine the best interests of the child (see Matter of Carolyn S. v Tompkins County Dept. of Social Servs.