immediate instruction in Texas

2011Smith v. State, 653 S.W.2d 835, 841 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1982, aff’d; pending on motion for rehearing).

2011Smith v. State , 653 S.W.2d 835, 841 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1982, aff’d; pending on motion for rehearing).

2008“We have consistently held that argument that strikes at a defendant over the shoulders of defense counsel is improper.” Gallo v. State, 239 S.W.3d 757, 767 (Tex. Crim.

2008"We have consistently held that argument that strikes at a defendant over the shoulders of defense counsel is improper." Gallo v. State , 239 S.W.3d 757, 767 (Tex. Crim.

2002Williams v. State, 712 S.W.2d 835, 838 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1986); 1 see Hoover v. State, 107 Tex.Crim. 600 , 298 S.W. 488 , 441 (1927) (op. on reh’g) (figurative language used by prosecutor in jury argument referring to the defendant as a “worm” and a “serpent” was held harmless).

2001Williams v. State , 712 S.W.2d 835, 838 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986); (1) see Hoover v. State , 107 Tex. Crim. 600 , 298 S.W. 438, 441 (1927) (op. on reh'g) (figurative language used by prosecutor in jury argument referring to the defendant as a "worm" and a "serpent" was held harmless).

2002Williams v. State, 712 S.W.2d 835, 838 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1986); 1 see Hoover v. State, 107 Tex.Crim. 600 , 298 S.W. 488 , 441 (1927) (op. on reh’g) (figurative language used by prosecutor in jury argument referring to the defendant as a “worm” and a “serpent” was held harmless).

2001Williams v. State , 712 S.W.2d 835, 838 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986); (1) see Hoover v. State , 107 Tex. Crim. 600 , 298 S.W. 438, 441 (1927) (op. on reh'g) (figurative language used by prosecutor in jury argument referring to the defendant as a "worm" and a "serpent" was held harmless).

1999In a similar situation, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stated, “Even assuming that the statements did indirectly refer to appellant’s failure to testify, we find that the trial court’s immediate instruction to disregard was sufficient to cure the error, if any.” Jackson v. State, 745 S.W.2d 4, 15 (Tex.Crim.App.1988).

1989Jackson v. State, 745 S.W.2d 4 (Tex.Cr.App.1988).

2025On December 19, 2024, Richardson filed a notice of appeal, in which he requests that this court exonerate him, set an immediate hearing, and release him “from his wrongful conviction in [sic] from custody.” “A timely notice of appeal is necessary to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court.” Taylor v. State, 424 S.W.3d 39, 43 (Tex. Crim.

2023See Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 49 (Tex. 1998) (op. on reh’g) (explaining that Texas recognizes two measures of damages for 19 common law fraud, including “the benefit-of-the-bargain measure,” which “computes the difference between the value as represented and the value received”).

2019See Colburn v. State, 966 S.W.2d 511, 520 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998)(holding that the jury is presumed 35 to follow the court’s instructions); Martin v. State, 176 S.W.3d 887, 898 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 2005, no pet.)(holding that jury is presumed to follow the instructions set forth in the trial court’s charge); Amaro v. State, 08-14-00052-CR, 2016 WL 3344568 , at *6 (Tex.App.--El Paso June 14, 2016, no pet.)(not designated for publication)(prosecutor’s inadvertent misstatement that the oath was “to convict” rather than to follow “the law” was cured by instruction).

2019The temporal requirement on a trial court to rule on a pending motion is only that the judge rule within a “reasonable time.” In re Chavez, 62 S.W.3d 225, 228 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, orig. proceeding); In re Ramirez, 994 S.W.2d 682, 683 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, orig. proceeding).

2019See Colburn v. State, 966 S.W.2d 511, 520 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998)(holding that the jury is presumed 35 to follow the court’s instructions); Martin v. State, 176 S.W.3d 887, 898 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 2005, no pet.)(holding that jury is presumed to follow the instructions set forth in the trial court’s charge); Amaro v. State, 08-14-00052-CR, 2016 WL 3344568 , at *6 (Tex.App.--El Paso June 14, 2016, no pet.)(not designated for publication)(prosecutor’s inadvertent misstatement that the oath was “to convict” rather than to follow “the law” was cured by instruction).

2019App. P. 33.1(a); Wells v. State, 241 S.W.3d 172, 179 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2007, pet. ref’d).

2019The temporal requirement on a trial court to rule on a pending motion is only that the judge rule within a “reasonable time.” In re Chavez, 62 S.W.3d 225, 228 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, orig. proceeding); In re Ramirez, 994 S.W.2d 682, 683 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, orig. proceeding).

2018Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 115 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); Amaro v. State, 08-14-00052-CR, 2016 WL 3344568 , at *6 (Tex.App.--El Paso June 14, 2016, no pet.)(not designated for publication).

2017Pursuant to Powell v. Hocker, 516 S.W.3d 488, 491-94 (Tex. Crim.

2015Under the facts of this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the mistrial because the trial court’s immediate instruction for the jury to disregard the answer was sufficient to cure any prejudice resulting from the improper testimony, and the improper testimony was not “highly prejudicial” or “incurable.” See Ocon, 284 S.W.3d at 884 ; Herrero v. State, 124 S.W.3d 827, 836-37 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (holding trial court did not - 11 - 04-15-00067-CR abuse its discretion in denying motion for mistrial because curative instruction was sufficient to

2014The decision to deny a fnotion for new trial is reviewed under the standard of abused discretion, Holden v. State, 201 S.W.3d 761, 768 (Tex.Crim.App.2009), as is the decision to further instruct jurors once they have retired to deliberate.

2014App. 2006); Dekneef v. State, 379 S.W.3d 423, 433 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, pet. ref’d).

2013See Ladd, 3 S.W.3d at 567 (prosecution’s improper question asking whether witness was aware defendant was smoking crack cocaine on night of offense did not warrant mistrial when question did not actually assert defendant was smoking cocaine and trial court could have reasonably concluded question was not so inflammatory as to be incurable).

2007See Richardson v. State , 624 S.W.2d 912, 914-15 (Tex. Crim.

1990In his fifth point of error appellant maintains the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the prosecutor’s final argument at punishment which “asked the jury to speculate as to the possibility of an extraneous offense.” He relies upon Darden v. State, 629 S.W.2d 46, at 51-52 (Tex.Cr.App.1982).

1989See Anderson v. State, 633 S.W.2d 851, 855 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1982).

1989See Anderson v. State, 633 S.W.2d 851, 855 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1982).

1988Hawkins v. State, 660 S.W.2d 65, 79 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); Thompson v. State, 537 S.W.2d 732, 734-35 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), Alvarez v. State, 478 S.W.2d 450, 452 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); see also Gardner v. State, supra, at 700 n. 13.

1988Hawkins v. State, 660 S.W.2d 65, 79 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); Thompson v. State, 537 S.W.2d 732, 734-35 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), Alvarez v. State, 478 S.W.2d 450, 452 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); see also Gardner v. State, supra, at 700 n. 13.

1988Hawkins v. State, 660 S.W.2d 65, 79 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); Thompson v. State, 537 S.W.2d 732, 734-35 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), Alvarez v. State, 478 S.W.2d 450, 452 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); see also Gardner v. State, supra, at 700 n. 13.

1988Hawkins v. State, 660 S.W.2d 65, 79 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); Thompson v. State, 537 S.W.2d 732, 734-35 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), Alvarez v. State, 478 S.W.2d 450, 452 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); see also Gardner v. State, supra, at 700 n. 13.

1988Hawkins v. State, 660 S.W.2d 65, 79 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); Thompson v. State, 537 S.W.2d 732, 734-35 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), Alvarez v. State, 478 S.W.2d 450, 452 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); see also Gardner v. State, supra, at 700 n. 13.

1988Hawkins v. State, 660 S.W.2d 65, 79 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); Thompson v. State, 537 S.W.2d 732, 734-35 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), Alvarez v. State, 478 S.W.2d 450, 452 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); see also Gardner v. State, supra, at 700 n. 13.

1983Compare the motion opposing the continuance in Waites v. Sondock, supra. There, in an attempt to have an immediate hearing on her contempt motion to compel her former husband to comply with a child support order, the relator filed a written motion setting out specific factual allegations that, if true, demonstrated that substantial existing rights of her children would be defeated or abridged by any delay in the proceedings.