immediate instruction in District of Columbia

14 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1972–2011 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (14)

Case	Followed	Cited
Peyton v. United Statesgreen dc · 1998 · cited in 2 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2001–2002 2 sentences 2002Moreover, the actual language of the instruction given here was crafted by defense counsel and contained a stern warning to the jurors, directing them not to “let the topic come up in your thinking or in your discussions.” Because defense counsel wrote this instruction and because we must presume that the jury followed it, see Peyton, 709 A.2d at 72 , we cannot say that it was insufficient to cure any prejudice. 2001In this case, however, the trial judge’s prompt, thorough and effective admonition to the jury minimized the possibility of such prej-udicet.]” 709 A.2d at 65-66 (emphasis added). 9 These cases, when taken together, suggest that, short of a mistrial, an immediate instruction may be required, on request, in certain circumstances when highly prejudicial and inadmissible testimony regarding the defendant comes before the jury, albeit accidentally.	1	2
Aaron Jones v. United Statesgreen cadc · 1967 · cited in 2 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1976–1978 2 sentences 1976The court in Dixon observed . . . the situation which confronted the court in Coleman [ Coleman v. U. S., 125 U.S.App.D.C. 246 , 371 F.2d 343 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 , 87 S. Ct. 979 , 17 L.Ed.2d, 875 (1967)], Jones [ Jones v. U. S., U.S.App.D.C. 36, 385 F. 2d 296 (1967)], and Lofty justified an immediate instruction sua sponte by the trial court because jury confusion undoubtedly occurred where trial counsel suddenly claimed surprise at his own witness's testimony, and was then allowed to introduce . . . a prior [inconsistent] statement . . .. [ 287 A.2d at 99 .] There was no elemen 1976The court in Dixon observed . the situation which confronted the court in Coleman [Coleman v. U. S., 125 U.S.App.D.C. 246 , 371 F.2d 343 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 , 87 S. Ct. 979 , 17 L.Ed.2d, 875 (1967)], Jones [Jones v. U. S., U.S.App.D.C. 36, 385 F. 2d 296 (1967)], and Lofty justified an immediate instruction sua sponte by the trial court because jury confusion undoubtedly occurred where trial counsel suddenly claimed surprise at his own witness’s testimony, and was then allowed to introduce ... a prior [inconsistent] statement . . . . [ 287 A.2d at 99 .] There was no element of su	1	2
Brown v. United Statesgreen dc · 2009 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011 1 sentence 2011While this court recognizes that Heller found the District’s firearm regulatory scheme to be unconstitutional — to the extent that there was an absolute ban on an entire class of firearms — we also recognize that “Heller did not, however, invalidate any of the District’s individual gun control laws.... ” Brown v. United States, 979 A.2d 630, 638 (D.C.2009) (emphasis added).	1	1
Johnson v. United Statesgreen dc · 1996 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001 1 sentence 2001(William) Johnson v. United States, 683 A.2d 1087, 1092 (D.C.1996) (quoting Drew, 118 U.S.App.D.C. at 15-16 , 331 F.2d at 89-90 ) (emphasis in original). 2 The ordinary concern about the admission of any type of other crimes evidence is significantly elevated in the case now before us, where the testimony related to the commission by the defendant of the exact same offense at the exact same location on (it could be interpreted) at least two previous occasions, and was testified to by appellant’s own sister, a strong mark of veracity. 3 *302 A trial court, presented with a situation where inadm	1	1
Douglas v. United Statesgreen dc · 1985 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000 1 sentence 2000See, e.g., Witherspoon v. United States, 557 A.2d 587, 590 (D.C.1989); Singley v. United States, 548 A.2d 780, 786 (D.C.1988); Douglas v. United States, 488 A.2d 121, 136 (D.C.1985).	1	1
Witherspoon v. United Statesgreen dc · 1989 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000 1 sentence 2000See, e.g., Witherspoon v. United States, 557 A.2d 587, 590 (D.C.1989); Singley v. United States, 548 A.2d 780, 786 (D.C.1988); Douglas v. United States, 488 A.2d 121, 136 (D.C.1985).	1	1
Singley v. United Statesgreen dc · 1988 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000 1 sentence 2000See, e.g., Witherspoon v. United States, 557 A.2d 587, 590 (D.C.1989); Singley v. United States, 548 A.2d 780, 786 (D.C.1988); Douglas v. United States, 488 A.2d 121, 136 (D.C.1985).	1	1
Veix v. Sixth Ward Building & Loan Assn. of Newarkgreen scotus · 1940 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994 2 sentences 1994As a measure of contractual expectations, one factor to be considered in determining the extent of the impairment is “whether the industry the complaining party has entered has been regulated in the past.” Energy Reserves, supra, 459 U.S. at 411 , 103 S.Ct. at 704 ; see Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan 734 Ass’n, 310 U.S. 32, 38 , 60 S.Ct. 792, 794-95 , 84 L.Ed. 1061 (1940). 1994As a measure of contractual expectations, one factor to be considered in determining the extent of the impairment is “whether the industry the complaining party has entered has been regulated in the past.” Energy Reserves, supra, 459 U.S. at 411 , 103 S.Ct. at 704 ; see Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan 734 Ass’n, 310 U.S. 32, 38 , 60 S.Ct. 792, 794-95 , 84 L.Ed. 1061 (1940).	1	1
Rink v. United Statesgreen dc · 1978 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1984–1984 1 sentence 1984See Rink v. United States, 388 A.2d 52, 57 (D.C.1978).	1	1
United States v. Anthony A. Freemangreen cadc · 1975 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1978–1978 2 sentences 1978See generally United States v. Freeman, 169 U.S.App.D.C. 73 , 514 F.2d 1314 (1975); United States v. Leonard, 161 U.S.App.D.C. 36 , 494 F.2d 955 (1974); Jones v. United States, 128 U.S.App.D.C. 36, 40 , 385 F.2d 296, 300 (1967); Coleman v. United States, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 246 , 371 F.2d 343 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 , 87 S.Ct. 979 , 17 L.Ed.2d 875 (1967). 1978See generally United States v. Freeman, 169 U.S.App.D.C. 73 , 514 F.2d 1314 (1975); United States v. Leonard, 161 U.S.App.D.C. 36 , 494 F.2d 955 (1974); Jones v. United States, 128 U.S.App.D.C. 36, 40 , 385 F.2d 296, 300 (1967); Coleman v. United States, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 246 , 371 F.2d 343 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 , 87 S.Ct. 979 , 17 L.Ed.2d 875 (1967).	1	1
Lee v. Peoplegreen colo · 1969 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1972–1972 1 sentence 1972See Lee v. People, 460 P.2d 796, 800 (Colo.1969); People v. Stanworth, 71 Cal.2d 820 , 80 Cal.Rptr. 49, 63-64 , 457 P.2d 889, 903 (1969) and the discussion of the constitutionality of the general use of prior convictions in section 1 of this opinion. 28 .	1	1
People v. Stanworthgreen cal · 1969 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1972–1972 2 sentences 1972See Lee v. People, 460 P.2d 796, 800 (Colo.1969); People v. Stanworth, 71 Cal.2d 820 , 80 Cal.Rptr. 49, 63-64 , 457 P.2d 889, 903 (1969) and the discussion of the constitutionality of the general use of prior convictions in section 1 of this opinion. 28 . 1972See Lee v. People, 460 P.2d 796, 800 (Colo.1969); People v. Stanworth, 71 Cal.2d 820 , 80 Cal.Rptr. 49, 63-64 , 457 P.2d 889, 903 (1969) and the discussion of the constitutionality of the general use of prior convictions in section 1 of this opinion. 28 .	1	1
Luther O. Troublefield v. United Statesgreen cadc · 1967 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1972–1972 1 sentence 1972See generally United States v. Howard, 139 U.S.App.D.C. 347, 351 , 433 F.2d 505, 509 (1970); Troublefield v. United States, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 339 , 346, 372 F.2d 912, 919 (1966). 29 .	1	1
United States v. Charles R. Howardgreen cadc · 1970 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1972–1972 2 sentences 1972See generally United States v. Howard, 139 U.S.App.D.C. 347, 351 , 433 F.2d 505, 509 (1970); Troublefield v. United States, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 339 , 346, 372 F.2d 912, 919 (1966). 29 . 1972See generally United States v. Howard, 139 U.S.App.D.C. 347, 351 , 433 F.2d 505, 509 (1970); Troublefield v. United States, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 339 , 346, 372 F.2d 912, 919 (1966). 29 .	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (13)

Case	Cited	Years
Johnson v. United States green dc · 1978 2 sentences 1979In our decision in Johnson v. United States, D.C.App., 387 A.2d 1084 (1978) (en banc), we restricted the holding in Lofty to a situation in which a party is surprised by its own witness and must therefore impeach that witness’ testimony. 1979In our decision in Johnson v. United States, D.C.App., 387 A.2d 1084 (1978) (en banc), we restricted the holding in Lofty to a situation in which a party is surprised by its own witness and must therefore impeach that witness' testimony.	2	1979–1979
James S. Coleman v. United States green cadc · 1967 2 sentences 1976The court in Dixon observed . . . the situation which confronted the court in Coleman [ Coleman v. U. S., 125 U.S.App.D.C. 246 , 371 F.2d 343 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 , 87 S. Ct. 979 , 17 L.Ed.2d, 875 (1967)], Jones [ Jones v. U. S., U.S.App.D.C. 36, 385 F. 2d 296 (1967)], and Lofty justified an immediate instruction sua sponte by the trial court because jury confusion undoubtedly occurred where trial counsel suddenly claimed surprise at his own witness's testimony, and was then allowed to introduce . . . a prior [inconsistent] statement . . .. [ 287 A.2d at 99 .] There was no elemen 1976The court in Dixon observed . the situation which confronted the court in Coleman [Coleman v. U. S., 125 U.S.App.D.C. 246 , 371 F.2d 343 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 , 87 S. Ct. 979 , 17 L.Ed.2d, 875 (1967)], Jones [Jones v. U. S., U.S.App.D.C. 36, 385 F. 2d 296 (1967)], and Lofty justified an immediate instruction sua sponte by the trial court because jury confusion undoubtedly occurred where trial counsel suddenly claimed surprise at his own witness’s testimony, and was then allowed to introduce ... a prior [inconsistent] statement . . . . [ 287 A.2d at 99 .] There was no element of su	2	1976–1978
Bogart v. Reagan green scotus · 1967 2 sentences 1976The court in Dixon observed . . . the situation which confronted the court in Coleman [ Coleman v. U. S., 125 U.S.App.D.C. 246 , 371 F.2d 343 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 , 87 S. Ct. 979 , 17 L.Ed.2d, 875 (1967)], Jones [ Jones v. U. S., U.S.App.D.C. 36, 385 F. 2d 296 (1967)], and Lofty justified an immediate instruction sua sponte by the trial court because jury confusion undoubtedly occurred where trial counsel suddenly claimed surprise at his own witness's testimony, and was then allowed to introduce . . . a prior [inconsistent] statement . . .. [ 287 A.2d at 99 .] There was no elemen 1976The court in Dixon observed . the situation which confronted the court in Coleman [Coleman v. U. S., 125 U.S.App.D.C. 246 , 371 F.2d 343 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 , 87 S. Ct. 979 , 17 L.Ed.2d, 875 (1967)], Jones [Jones v. U. S., U.S.App.D.C. 36, 385 F. 2d 296 (1967)], and Lofty justified an immediate instruction sua sponte by the trial court because jury confusion undoubtedly occurred where trial counsel suddenly claimed surprise at his own witness’s testimony, and was then allowed to introduce ... a prior [inconsistent] statement . . . . [ 287 A.2d at 99 .] There was no element of su	2	1976–1978
Lewis v. United States green scotus · 1967 2 sentences 1976The court in Dixon observed . . . the situation which confronted the court in Coleman [ Coleman v. U. S., 125 U.S.App.D.C. 246 , 371 F.2d 343 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 , 87 S. Ct. 979 , 17 L.Ed.2d, 875 (1967)], Jones [ Jones v. U. S., U.S.App.D.C. 36, 385 F. 2d 296 (1967)], and Lofty justified an immediate instruction sua sponte by the trial court because jury confusion undoubtedly occurred where trial counsel suddenly claimed surprise at his own witness's testimony, and was then allowed to introduce . . . a prior [inconsistent] statement . . .. [ 287 A.2d at 99 .] There was no elemen 1976The court in Dixon observed . the situation which confronted the court in Coleman [Coleman v. U. S., 125 U.S.App.D.C. 246 , 371 F.2d 343 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 , 87 S. Ct. 979 , 17 L.Ed.2d, 875 (1967)], Jones [Jones v. U. S., U.S.App.D.C. 36, 385 F. 2d 296 (1967)], and Lofty justified an immediate instruction sua sponte by the trial court because jury confusion undoubtedly occurred where trial counsel suddenly claimed surprise at his own witness’s testimony, and was then allowed to introduce ... a prior [inconsistent] statement . . . . [ 287 A.2d at 99 .] There was no element of su	2	1976–1978
District of Columbia v. Heller green scotus · 2008 2 sentences 2011Appellant argues that the trial court erred in holding that the Second Amendment only guarantees the right to self-defense in the home, and that it erred by interpreting that Heller’s holding was limited to “the possession of firearms in one’s home for the purpose of immediate self-defense.” Appellant asserts that Heller holds that Second Amendment rights “extend beyond the immediate defense of hearth and home,” and that one may carry weapons “in case of confrontation.” Id. at 592 , 128 S.Ct. 2783 . 2011Appellant argues that the trial court erred in holding that the Second Amendment only guarantees the right to self-defense in the home, and that it erred by interpreting that Heller’s holding was limited to “the possession of firearms in one’s home for the purpose of immediate self-defense.” Appellant asserts that Heller holds that Second Amendment rights “extend beyond the immediate defense of hearth and home,” and that one may carry weapons “in case of confrontation.” Id. at 592 , 128 S.Ct. 2783 .	1	2011–2011
Graham & the Title Guaranty & Surety Co. v. United States green scotus · 1913 1 sentence 2008Even though the reference to the polygraph test was improper and should not have been made, we conclude that the trial judge did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial in light of the trial judge’s immediate instruction, the fact that the reference to the polygraph was a “single, isolated statement,” id. at 70 , and the strength of the government’s case against Coleman.	1	2008–2008
Benjamin E. White v. United States green cadc · 1962 2 sentences 2005Nevertheless, the trial court denied the defense motion for a mistrial, did not provide an immediate instruction to the jury, and made no reference to the challenged remark, although subsequently, the court correctly instructed them on the law. 114 U.S.App.D.C. at 241 , 314 F.2d at 246 . 2005Nevertheless, the trial court denied the defense motion for a mistrial, did not provide an immediate instruction to the jury, and made no reference to the challenged remark, although subsequently, the court correctly instructed them on the law. 114 U.S.App.D.C. at 241 , 314 F.2d at 246 .	1	2005–2005
Nathan L. Drew v. United States green cadc · 1964 2 sentences 2001(William) Johnson v. United States, 683 A.2d 1087, 1092 (D.C.1996) (quoting Drew, 118 U.S.App.D.C. at 15-16 , 331 F.2d at 89-90 ) (emphasis in original). 2 The ordinary concern about the admission of any type of other crimes evidence is significantly elevated in the case now before us, where the testimony related to the commission by the defendant of the exact same offense at the exact same location on (it could be interpreted) at least two previous occasions, and was testified to by appellant’s own sister, a strong mark of veracity. 3 302 A trial court, presented with a situation where inadm 2001(William) Johnson v. United States, 683 A.2d 1087, 1092 (D.C.1996) (quoting Drew, 118 U.S.App.D.C. at 15-16 , 331 F.2d at 89-90 ) (emphasis in original). 2 The ordinary concern about the admission of any type of other crimes evidence is significantly elevated in the case now before us, where the testimony related to the commission by the defendant of the exact same offense at the exact same location on (it could be interpreted) at least two previous occasions, and was testified to by appellant’s own sister, a strong mark of veracity. 3 302 A trial court, presented with a situation where inadm	1	2001–2001
United States v. Allen S. Bussey green cadc · 1970 1 sentence 2001In United States v. Bussey, 139 U.S.App.D.C. 268 , 432 F.2d 1330 (1970), the court stated that the failure to give an immediate Drew limiting instruction was error, even though such an instruction was given in the final instructions.	1	2001–2001
Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co. green scotus · 1983 2 sentences 1994As a measure of contractual expectations, one factor to be considered in determining the extent of the impairment is “whether the industry the complaining party has entered has been regulated in the past.” Energy Reserves, supra, 459 U.S. at 411 , 103 S.Ct. at 704 ; see Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan 734 Ass’n, 310 U.S. 32, 38 , 60 S.Ct. 792, 794-95 , 84 L.Ed. 1061 (1940). 1994As a measure of contractual expectations, one factor to be considered in determining the extent of the impairment is “whether the industry the complaining party has entered has been regulated in the past.” Energy Reserves, supra, 459 U.S. at 411 , 103 S.Ct. at 704 ; see Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan 734 Ass’n, 310 U.S. 32, 38 , 60 S.Ct. 792, 794-95 , 84 L.Ed. 1061 (1940).	1	1994–1994
Briggs v. United States green dc · 1987 2 sentences 1992In Briggs, supra, the court identified the factors triggering a Frendak inquiry: appellant’s bizarre pretrial behavior evoking genuine trial court concern about productivity, the expert testimonial evidence of appellant’s long-term mental illness giving substance to that concern, and appellant’s resistance to an insanity defense barring an immediate inquiry into productivity.... 525 A.2d at 594 . 12 . 1992In Briggs, supra, the court identified the factors triggering a Frendak inquiry: appellant’s bizarre pretrial behavior evoking genuine trial court concern about productivity, the expert testimonial evidence of appellant’s long-term mental illness giving substance to that concern, and appellant’s resistance to an insanity defense barring an immediate inquiry into productivity.... 525 A.2d at 594 . 12 .	1	1992–1992
United States v. Irie E. Leonard, United States of America v. James L. Sarvis green cadc · 1974 2 sentences 1978See generally United States v. Freeman, 169 U.S.App.D.C. 73 , 514 F.2d 1314 (1975); United States v. Leonard, 161 U.S.App.D.C. 36 , 494 F.2d 955 (1974); Jones v. United States, 128 U.S.App.D.C. 36, 40 , 385 F.2d 296, 300 (1967); Coleman v. United States, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 246 , 371 F.2d 343 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 , 87 S.Ct. 979 , 17 L.Ed.2d 875 (1967). 1978See generally United States v. Freeman, 169 U.S.App.D.C. 73 , 514 F.2d 1314 (1975); United States v. Leonard, 161 U.S.App.D.C. 36 , 494 F.2d 955 (1974); Jones v. United States, 128 U.S.App.D.C. 36, 40 , 385 F.2d 296, 300 (1967); Coleman v. United States, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 246 , 371 F.2d 343 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 , 87 S.Ct. 979 , 17 L.Ed.2d 875 (1967).	1	1978–1978
Dixon v. United States green dc · 1972 2 sentences 1976The court in Dixon observed . . . the situation which confronted the court in Coleman [ Coleman v. U. S., 125 U.S.App.D.C. 246 , 371 F.2d 343 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 , 87 S. Ct. 979 , 17 L.Ed.2d, 875 (1967)], Jones [ Jones v. U. S., U.S.App.D.C. 36, 385 F. 2d 296 (1967)], and Lofty justified an immediate instruction sua sponte by the trial court because jury confusion undoubtedly occurred where trial counsel suddenly claimed surprise at his own witness's testimony, and was then allowed to introduce . . . a prior [inconsistent] statement . . .. [ 287 A.2d at 99 .] There was no elemen 1976The court in Dixon observed . the situation which confronted the court in Coleman [Coleman v. U. S., 125 U.S.App.D.C. 246 , 371 F.2d 343 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 , 87 S. Ct. 979 , 17 L.Ed.2d, 875 (1967)], Jones [Jones v. U. S., U.S.App.D.C. 36, 385 F. 2d 296 (1967)], and Lofty justified an immediate instruction sua sponte by the trial court because jury confusion undoubtedly occurred where trial counsel suddenly claimed surprise at his own witness’s testimony, and was then allowed to introduce ... a prior [inconsistent] statement . . . . [ 287 A.2d at 99 .] There was no element of su	1	1976–1976

Where else courts name it

NY 87 (1902–2025) TX 28 (1964–2025) FL 24 (1952–2023) CA 23 (1910–2026) IL 21 (1913–2026) PA 19 (1943–2025) DC 14 (1972–2011) CT 14 (1980–2015) GA 11 (1979–2017) NJ 9 (1986–2019) OR 9 (1970–2021) MD 8 (1913–2019) WI 8 (1978–2020) AL 7 (1985–2001) MI 6 (1972–2023) DE 6 (1980–2018) NC 6 (1892–2009) OH 5 (1930–2025) TN 4 (2000–2026) MA 4 (1963–1995) WA 4 (1913–2017) CO 4 (1958–2011) ME 4 (1976–2026) LA 3 (1928–1994) AZ 3 (1992–2013) MN 3 (1985–1993) KS 3 (1890–2009) NH 3 (1993–2020) RI 3 (1992–2003) NV 2 (1958–1992) ND 2 (1893–1997) MT 2 (1979–2021) IA 2 (1908–1998) NM 2 (1984–2015) WY 2 (1980–1991) WV 2 (1987–2020) SC 2 (2007–2012) OK 2 (2017–2017) MO 2 (1940–1983) IN 2 (1971–1972) VA 2 (1986–1991) HI 2 (2008–2020)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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