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21 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1913–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2017See, e.g., id. (defendant not prejudiced by prosecutor’s argument shifting burden of proof where argument was brief and isolated, court immediately told jury that defendant did not need to testify, and jury was properly instructed on burden of proof and right to testify, even though “the trial court did not sustain defense counsel’s objection” (emphasis in original)). ¶ 165 In this case, defense counsel objected to the prosecutor’s improper remarks. 2016See, e.g., id. at 116 (defendant not prejudiced by prosecutor’s argument shifting burden of proof where argument was brief and isolated, court immediately told jury that defendant did not need to testify, and jury was properly instructed on burden of proof and right to testify, even though “the trial court did not sustain defense counsel’s objection” (emphasis in original)). ¶ 165 In this case, defense counsel objected to the prosecutor’s improper remarks. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Armstronggreen2 sentences2000Instead, the State asserts that any prejudice resulting from this statement was cured by defendant’s prompt objection, the circuit court’s sustaining of this objection, and the court’s immediate instruction to the jury that “The only thing you are deciding ladies and gentlemen, is the eligible [sic] for the death penalty as I told you numerous times.” Prosecutors are given wide latitude in making closing arguments (People v. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 330 (1998)), and a reviewing court will not reverse a jury verdict based on improper remarks unless they result in substantial prejudice to the 2000Instead, the State asserts that any prejudice resulting from this statement was cured by defendant’s prompt objection, the circuit court’s sustaining of this objection, and the court’s immediate instruction to the jury that “The only thing you are deciding ladies and gentlemen, is the eligible [ sic ] for the death penalty as I told you numerous times.” Prosecutors are given wide latitude in making closing arguments ( People v. Williams , 181 Ill. 2d 297, 330 (1998)), and a reviewing court will not reverse a jury verdict based on improper remarks unless they result in substantial prejudice to | 2 | 2 |
People v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2000Instead, the State asserts that any prejudice resulting from this statement was cured by defendant’s prompt objection, the circuit court’s sustaining of this objection, and the court’s immediate instruction to the jury that “The only thing you are deciding ladies and gentlemen, is the eligible [sic] for the death penalty as I told you numerous times.” Prosecutors are given wide latitude in making closing arguments (People v. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 330 (1998)), and a reviewing court will not reverse a jury verdict based on improper remarks unless they result in substantial prejudice to the 2000Instead, the State asserts that any prejudice resulting from this statement was cured by defendant's prompt objection, the circuit court's sustaining of this objection, and the court's immediate instruction to the jury that "The only thing you are deciding ladies and gentlemen, is the eligible [ sic ] for the death penalty as I told you numerous times." Prosecutors are given wide latitude in making closing arguments ( People v. Williams, 181 Ill.2d 297, 330 , 229 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Enisgreen2 sentences2000“As a general rule, reversal and remandment are unnecessary where the trial court has sustained a defense objection, thereby curing the potential for improper influence from the comment, especially where the jury is instructed that closing argument of the attorneys should not be considered as evidence in the case.” People v. Enis, 163 Ill. 2d 367, 407 (1994). 2000“As a general rule, reversal and remandment are unnecessary where the trial court has sustained a defense objection, thereby curing the potential for improper influence from the comment, especially where the jury is instructed that closing argument of the attorneys should not be considered as evidence in the case.” People v. Enis , 163 Ill. 2d 367, 407 (1994). | 2 | 2 |
Buckholtz v. MacNeal Hospitalgreen1 sentence2026“A jury is presumed to have followed the court’s instruction to disregard testimony.” Buckholtz v. MacNeal Hospital, 337 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Champaign County Nursing Home v. Petry Roofing, Inc.
green
2 sentences1988(See Champaign County Nursing Home v. Petry Roofing, Inc. (1983), 117 Ill. 1988(See Champaign County Nursing Home v. Petry Roofing, Inc. (1983), 117 Ill. | 2 | 1988–1988 |
Leonard v. Garland
neutral
2 sentences1938In Leonard v. Garland, 252 Ill. 300 , there had been a delay of eight months, and the complainants being in court and objecting to a dismissal of their bill, it was held that the action of the court could not be sustained on the alleged ground of a failure to prosecute the suit with due diligence. 1913In Leonard v. Garland, 252 Ill. 300 , there had been a delay of eight months, and the complainants being in court and objecting to a dismissal of their bill, it was held that the action of the court could not be sustained on the alleged ground of a failure to prosecute the suit with due diligence. | 2 | 1913–1938 |
People v. Jackson
green
1 sentence2025“This forfeiture rule also prevents criminal defendants from sitting idly by and knowingly allowing an irregular proceeding to go forward only to seek reversal due to the error when the outcome of the proceeding is not favorable.” Id. ¶ 23 In this case, although defendant objected to a continuance, as opposed to an immediate hearing pursuant to section 110-6.1(c)(2) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110- 6.1(c)(2) (West 2022)), he did not object to the continued hearing’s timeliness, i.e., that the circuit court was scheduling the continued hearing more than 48 hours after defendant’s first appearance ( | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Piatkowski
green
1 sentence2025He acknowledges that this is the first time this argument has been raised but urges this court to consider it under second-prong plain-error review, as the trial court allegedly misapplied the law resulting in his detention, affecting his fundamental right to liberty. “[T]he plain-error doctrine allows a reviewing court to consider unpreserved error when (1) a clear or obvious error occurs and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error occurs | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Hyche
green
2 sentences1986(See, e.g., People v. Davis (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 1 ; People v. Hyche (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 229 ; People v. Harris (1979), 74 Ill. 2d 472 .) An immediate investigation, quite apart from the saving of judicial resources, best serves to correctly resolve the claim of bias. 1986(See, e.g., People v. Davis (1983), 95 Ill.2d 1 ; People v. Hyche (1979), 77 Ill.2d 229 ; People v. Harris (1979), 74 Ill.2d 472 .) An immediate investigation, quite apart from the saving of judicial resources, best serves to correctly resolve the claim of bias. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
People v. Davis
green
2 sentences1986(See, e.g., People v. Davis (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 1 ; People v. Hyche (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 229 ; People v. Harris (1979), 74 Ill. 2d 472 .) An immediate investigation, quite apart from the saving of judicial resources, best serves to correctly resolve the claim of bias. 1986(See, e.g., People v. Davis (1983), 95 Ill.2d 1 ; People v. Hyche (1979), 77 Ill.2d 229 ; People v. Harris (1979), 74 Ill.2d 472 .) An immediate investigation, quite apart from the saving of judicial resources, best serves to correctly resolve the claim of bias. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
People v. Harris
green
2 sentences1986(See, e.g., People v. Davis (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 1 ; People v. Hyche (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 229 ; People v. Harris (1979), 74 Ill. 2d 472 .) An immediate investigation, quite apart from the saving of judicial resources, best serves to correctly resolve the claim of bias. 1986(See, e.g., People v. Davis (1983), 95 Ill.2d 1 ; People v. Hyche (1979), 77 Ill.2d 229 ; People v. Harris (1979), 74 Ill.2d 472 .) An immediate investigation, quite apart from the saving of judicial resources, best serves to correctly resolve the claim of bias. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Oliver v. Civil Service Commission
green
1 sentence1983App. 2d 329 , 224 N.E.2d 671 ), in view of our findings, the Board will be able to grant a full and immediate hearing on the objections. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Galvin v. Galvin
green
2 sentences1983(See Galvin v. Galvin (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 113 , 378 N.E.2d 510 (venue challenged by special appearance in trial court and pursued on appeal).) When an immediate challenge is made the parties are well aware that their affairs have not been finally settled, and they can conduct their lives accordingly. 1983(See Galvin v. Galvin (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 113 , 378 N.E.2d 510 (venue challenged by special appearance in trial court and pursued on appeal).) When an immediate challenge is made the parties are well aware that their affairs have not been finally settled, and they can conduct their lives accordingly. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Coolidge v. New Hampshire
green
2 sentences1982Defendant concedes that the police were lawfully searching the car and could properly seize evidence in “plain view.” (Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S. 443 , 29 L. 1982Defendant concedes that the police were lawfully searching the car and could properly seize evidence in “plain view.” (Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S. 443 , 29 L. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
People v. Beksel
green
1 sentence1980People v. Beksel (1973), 10 Ill. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.
green
2 sentences1979The court noted that other procedures in the statute, such as the requirements that the affidavit in support of the sequestration states facts and that there would be an immediate hearing after the seizure, effected a “constitutional accommodation of the conflicting interests of the parties.” 416 U.S. 600, 607 , 40 L. 1979The court noted that other procedures in the statute, such as the requirements that the affidavit in support of the sequestration states facts and that there would be an immediate hearing after the seizure, effected a “constitutional accommodation of the conflicting interests of the parties.” 416 U.S. 600, 607 , 40 L. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
People v. Watson
green
1 sentence1978(People v. Watson (1977), 47 Ill. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
The PEOPLE v. Robinson
green
2 sentences1976For the above reasons, we conclude further that defendant had a right to an immediate hearing on his motion to suppress the identification testimony of Matthews (see People v. Robinson (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 229 , 263 N.E.2d 57 ), and that it was error for the trial court to deny the said hearing. 1976For the above reasons, we conclude further that defendant had a right to an immediate hearing on his motion to suppress the identification testimony of Matthews (see People v. Robinson (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 229 , 263 N.E.2d 57 ), and that it was error for the trial court to deny the said hearing. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
City of Chicago v. Zik
green
2 sentences1974(See City of Chicago v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 12 Ill.App.3d 808 , 299 N.E.2d 57 ; People v. Thompson, 101 Ill.App.2d 104 , 242 N.E.2d 49 ; City of Chicago v. Zik, 63 Ill.App.2d 445 , 211 N.E.2d 545 ; Wert v. Burke, 47 Ill.App.2d 453 , 197 N.E.2d 717 .) The order denying the petition to intervene completely adjudicated the only immediate claim brought before the comt by Illinois Bell, and in our view it is a “final judgment” within the meaning of Supreme Court Rule 301. 1974(See City of Chicago v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 12 Ill.App.3d 808 , 299 N.E.2d 57 ; People v. Thompson, 101 Ill.App.2d 104 , 242 N.E.2d 49 ; City of Chicago v. Zik, 63 Ill.App.2d 445 , 211 N.E.2d 545 ; Wert v. Burke, 47 Ill.App.2d 453 , 197 N.E.2d 717 .) The order denying the petition to intervene completely adjudicated the only immediate claim brought before the comt by Illinois Bell, and in our view it is a “final judgment” within the meaning of Supreme Court Rule 301. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
City of Chicago v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank
green
2 sentences1974(See City of Chicago v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 12 Ill.App.3d 808 , 299 N.E.2d 57 ; People v. Thompson, 101 Ill.App.2d 104 , 242 N.E.2d 49 ; City of Chicago v. Zik, 63 Ill.App.2d 445 , 211 N.E.2d 545 ; Wert v. Burke, 47 Ill.App.2d 453 , 197 N.E.2d 717 .) The order denying the petition to intervene completely adjudicated the only immediate claim brought before the comt by Illinois Bell, and in our view it is a “final judgment” within the meaning of Supreme Court Rule 301. 1974(See City of Chicago v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 12 Ill.App.3d 808 , 299 N.E.2d 57 ; People v. Thompson, 101 Ill.App.2d 104 , 242 N.E.2d 49 ; City of Chicago v. Zik, 63 Ill.App.2d 445 , 211 N.E.2d 545 ; Wert v. Burke, 47 Ill.App.2d 453 , 197 N.E.2d 717 .) The order denying the petition to intervene completely adjudicated the only immediate claim brought before the comt by Illinois Bell, and in our view it is a “final judgment” within the meaning of Supreme Court Rule 301. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Wert v. Burke
green
2 sentences1974(See City of Chicago v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 12 Ill.App.3d 808 , 299 N.E.2d 57 ; People v. Thompson, 101 Ill.App.2d 104 , 242 N.E.2d 49 ; City of Chicago v. Zik, 63 Ill.App.2d 445 , 211 N.E.2d 545 ; Wert v. Burke, 47 Ill.App.2d 453 , 197 N.E.2d 717 .) The order denying the petition to intervene completely adjudicated the only immediate claim brought before the comt by Illinois Bell, and in our view it is a “final judgment” within the meaning of Supreme Court Rule 301. 1974(See City of Chicago v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 12 Ill.App.3d 808 , 299 N.E.2d 57 ; People v. Thompson, 101 Ill.App.2d 104 , 242 N.E.2d 49 ; City of Chicago v. Zik, 63 Ill.App.2d 445 , 211 N.E.2d 545 ; Wert v. Burke, 47 Ill.App.2d 453 , 197 N.E.2d 717 .) The order denying the petition to intervene completely adjudicated the only immediate claim brought before the comt by Illinois Bell, and in our view it is a “final judgment” within the meaning of Supreme Court Rule 301. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
People v. Thompson
neutral
2 sentences1974(See City of Chicago v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 12 Ill.App.3d 808 , 299 N.E.2d 57 ; People v. Thompson, 101 Ill.App.2d 104 , 242 N.E.2d 49 ; City of Chicago v. Zik, 63 Ill.App.2d 445 , 211 N.E.2d 545 ; Wert v. Burke, 47 Ill.App.2d 453 , 197 N.E.2d 717 .) The order denying the petition to intervene completely adjudicated the only immediate claim brought before the comt by Illinois Bell, and in our view it is a “final judgment” within the meaning of Supreme Court Rule 301. 1974(See City of Chicago v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 12 Ill.App.3d 808 , 299 N.E.2d 57 ; People v. Thompson, 101 Ill.App.2d 104 , 242 N.E.2d 49 ; City of Chicago v. Zik, 63 Ill.App.2d 445 , 211 N.E.2d 545 ; Wert v. Burke, 47 Ill.App.2d 453 , 197 N.E.2d 717 .) The order denying the petition to intervene completely adjudicated the only immediate claim brought before the comt by Illinois Bell, and in our view it is a “final judgment” within the meaning of Supreme Court Rule 301. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Anderson v. Anderson
green
1 sentence1965In Anderson v. Anderson, 4 Ill App2d 330, 124 NE2d 66 , the defendant alleged in his petition to vacate that he had called at the office of plaintiff’s attorney to sign some papers, but did not understand that one paper was an appearance and waiver of service of summons and consent to the immediate hearing of a cause; that subsequently he found he had signed an answer, the contents of which he did not know; and that when he first realized that the plaintiff intended to file divorce proceedings, “his grief and shock so overwhelmed him he did not have free use of his faculties, he felt he did no | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.