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23 California opinions name it 2 courts 1910–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Haskel, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2011It obligates the insurer, unless no part of any claim is potentially covered, to fund a defense to minimize the insured’s liability. [Citation.]” (State of California v. Pacific Indemnity Co. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1535, 1546 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 69 ].) “To defend meaningfully, the insurer must defend immediately. [Citation.]” (Buss, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 49.) “Imposition of an immediate duty to defend is necessary to afford the insured what it is entitled to: the full protection of a defense on its behalf. [Citation.]” (Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court (1993) 6 Cal.4th 287, 295 [ 24 Cal 2011It obligates the insurer, unless no part of any claim is potentially covered, to fund a defense to minimize the insured’s liability. [Citation.]” (State of California v. Pacific Indemnity Co. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1535, 1546 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 69 ].) “To defend meaningfully, the insurer must defend immediately. [Citation.]” (Buss, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 49.) “Imposition of an immediate duty to defend is necessary to afford the insured what it is entitled to: the full protection of a defense on its behalf. [Citation.]” (Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court (1993) 6 Cal.4th 287, 295 [ 24 Cal | 3 | 3 |
Peretto v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen2 sentences2026(See Peretto v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 461 [“when a driver is entitled to an immediate hearing, the presence or absence of a hardship provision is simply not significant in a due process analysis”].) 11 In sum, balancing all three factors we conclude there was no due process violation. 1994(Peretto v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 449, 460 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 392 ]; Mackey v. Montrym (1979) 443 U.S. 1, 10 [ 61 L.Ed.2d 321, 329 , 99 S.Ct. 2612 ].) In Montrym , the United States Supreme Court upheld a statute that provided for an immediate hearing upon request after surrender of the license without a presuspension hearing. ( 443 U.S. 1,10 [ 61 L.Ed.2d 321, 329 ].) The assessment order here was served by mail and contained the warning that failure to appeal would result in enforcement of the penalty assessment as a judgment. | 2 | 2 |
MacKey v. Montrymgreen2 sentences1994(Peretto v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 449, 460 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 392 ]; Mackey v. Montrym (1979) 443 U.S. 1, 10 [ 61 L.Ed.2d 321, 329 , 99 S.Ct. 2612 ].) In Montrym , the United States Supreme Court upheld a statute that provided for an immediate hearing upon request after surrender of the license without a presuspension hearing. ( 443 U.S. 1,10 [ 61 L.Ed.2d 321, 329 ].) The assessment order here was served by mail and contained the warning that failure to appeal would result in enforcement of the penalty assessment as a judgment. 1994(Peretto v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 449, 460 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 392 ]; Mackey v. Montrym (1979) 443 U.S. 1, 10 [ 61 L.Ed.2d 321, 329 , 99 S.Ct. 2612 ].) In Montrym , the United States Supreme Court upheld a statute that provided for an immediate hearing upon request after surrender of the license without a presuspension hearing. ( 443 U.S. 1,10 [ 61 L.Ed.2d 321, 329 ].) The assessment order here was served by mail and contained the warning that failure to appeal would result in enforcement of the penalty assessment as a judgment. | 2 | 2 |
State of California v. Pacific Indemnity Co.green1 sentence2011It obligates the insurer, unless no part of any claim is potentially covered, to fund a defense to minimize the insured’s liability. [Citation.]” (State of California v. Pacific Indemnity Co. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1535, 1546 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 69 ].) “To defend meaningfully, the insurer must defend immediately. [Citation.]” (Buss, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 49.) “Imposition of an immediate duty to defend is necessary to afford the insured what it is entitled to: the full protection of a defense on its behalf. [Citation.]” (Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court (1993) 6 Cal.4th 287, 295 [ 24 Cal | 1 | 1 |
Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2011It obligates the insurer, unless no part of any claim is potentially covered, to fund a defense to minimize the insured’s liability. [Citation.]” (State of California v. Pacific Indemnity Co. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1535, 1546 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 69 ].) “To defend meaningfully, the insurer must defend immediately. [Citation.]” (Buss, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 49.) “Imposition of an immediate duty to defend is necessary to afford the insured what it is entitled to: the full protection of a defense on its behalf. [Citation.]” (Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court (1993) 6 Cal.4th 287, 295 [ 24 Cal 2011It obligates the insurer, unless no part of any claim is potentially covered, to fund a defense to minimize the insured’s liability. [Citation.]” (State of California v. Pacific Indemnity Co. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1535, 1546 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 69 ].) “To defend meaningfully, the insurer must defend immediately. [Citation.]” (Buss, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 49.) “Imposition of an immediate duty to defend is necessary to afford the insured what it is entitled to: the full protection of a defense on its behalf. [Citation.]” (Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court (1993) 6 Cal.4th 287, 295 [ 24 Cal | 1 | 1 |
Mathews v. Eldridgegreen2 sentences1991(Id., at p. 10 [ 61 L.Ed.2d at p. 329 ].) The court reiterated that the determination of what process is due requires identification and balancing of three distinct factors: (1) the private interest affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government’s intérest, including the function involved and the financial and administrative burdens which would be entailed by additional safeguards. ( 443 U.S. at p. 10 [ 61 L.Ed.2d at 1991(Id., at p. 10 [ 61 L.Ed.2d at p. 329 ].) The court reiterated that the determination of what process is due requires identification and balancing of three distinct factors: (1) the private interest affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government’s intérest, including the function involved and the financial and administrative burdens which would be entailed by additional safeguards. ( 443 U.S. at p. 10 [ 61 L.Ed.2d at | 1 | 1 |
Jacobs v. Bd. of Supervisors of S.F.green1 sentence1974Civil Code section 12 and Code of Civil Procedure section 15 provide: “Words giving a joint authority to three or more public officers or other persons are construed as giving such authority to a majority of them, unless it is otherwise expressed in the Act giving the authority.” (See People v. Hecht, 105 Cal. 621, 627 [ 38 P. 941 ]; Jacobs v. Board of Supervisors, 100 Cal. 121, 132 [ 34 P. 630 ]; People v. Coghill, 47 Cal. 361, 363 .) Accordingly, unless it is otherwise expressed in the act giving authority, the authority, although joint where given to three or more, can be exercised by the m | 1 | 1 |
People ex rel. Hoffman v. Hechtgreen1 sentence1974Civil Code section 12 and Code of Civil Procedure section 15 provide: “Words giving a joint authority to three or more public officers or other persons are construed as giving such authority to a majority of them, unless it is otherwise expressed in the Act giving the authority.” (See People v. Hecht, 105 Cal. 621, 627 [ 38 P. 941 ]; Jacobs v. Board of Supervisors, 100 Cal. 121, 132 [ 34 P. 630 ]; People v. Coghill, 47 Cal. 361, 363 .) Accordingly, unless it is otherwise expressed in the act giving authority, the authority, although joint where given to three or more, can be exercised by the m | 1 | 1 |
Mattox v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1969By cross-examination “the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief. ’ ’ (Mattox v. United States (1894) 156 U.S. 237, 242-243 [ 39 L.Ed. 409, 411 , 15 S.Ct. 337 ].) It is because demeanor—attitude and manner—is a significant factor- in weighing testimonial evidence that it is axiomatic the trier of fact, before whom th 1969By cross-examination “the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief. ’ ’ (Mattox v. United States (1894) 156 U.S. 237, 242-243 [ 39 L.Ed. 409, 411 , 15 S.Ct. 337 ].) It is because demeanor—attitude and manner—is a significant factor- in weighing testimonial evidence that it is axiomatic the trier of fact, before whom th | 1 | 1 |
People v. Gracegreen2 sentences1960(People v. Grace, 77 Cal.App. 752, 759 [ 247 P. 585 ].) Although the court later vacated its order that an immediate hearing be held as to the issue of defendant’s present sanity, the record does not indicate that the doubt which had arisen in the mind of the trial judge had been dispelled. 1960(People v. Grace, 77 Cal.App. 752, 759 [ 247 P. 585 ].) Although the court later vacated its order that an immediate hearing be held as to the issue of defendant’s present sanity, the record does not indicate that the doubt which had arisen in the mind of the trial judge had been dispelled. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jamesgreen2 sentences1952All four matters, if they were as alleged, were known at the time (People v. Adamson, supra) and the remedy then available was a motion to quash the information (In re Ted-ford, 31 Cal.2d 693, 694-695 [ 192 P.2d 3 ] ; People v. James, 99 Cal.App.2d 476, 484 [ 222 P.2d 117 ] ; see, also, People v. Coates, 95 Cal.App.2d 78, 80 [ 212 P.2d 263 ] ; People v. Bailey, 105 Cal.App.2d 150, 153-154 [ 232 P.2d 518 ]). 1952All four matters, if they were as alleged, were known at the time (People v. Adamson, supra) and the remedy then available was a motion to quash the information (In re Ted-ford, 31 Cal.2d 693, 694-695 [ 192 P.2d 3 ] ; People v. James, 99 Cal.App.2d 476, 484 [ 222 P.2d 117 ] ; see, also, People v. Coates, 95 Cal.App.2d 78, 80 [ 212 P.2d 263 ] ; People v. Bailey, 105 Cal.App.2d 150, 153-154 [ 232 P.2d 518 ]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Coatesgreen2 sentences1952All four matters, if they were as alleged, were known at the time (People v. Adamson, supra) and the remedy then available was a motion to quash the information (In re Ted-ford, 31 Cal.2d 693, 694-695 [ 192 P.2d 3 ] ; People v. James, 99 Cal.App.2d 476, 484 [ 222 P.2d 117 ] ; see, also, People v. Coates, 95 Cal.App.2d 78, 80 [ 212 P.2d 263 ] ; People v. Bailey, 105 Cal.App.2d 150, 153-154 [ 232 P.2d 518 ]). 1952All four matters, if they were as alleged, were known at the time (People v. Adamson, supra) and the remedy then available was a motion to quash the information (In re Ted-ford, 31 Cal.2d 693, 694-695 [ 192 P.2d 3 ] ; People v. James, 99 Cal.App.2d 476, 484 [ 222 P.2d 117 ] ; see, also, People v. Coates, 95 Cal.App.2d 78, 80 [ 212 P.2d 263 ] ; People v. Bailey, 105 Cal.App.2d 150, 153-154 [ 232 P.2d 518 ]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Baileygreen2 sentences1952All four matters, if they were as alleged, were known at the time (People v. Adamson, supra) and the remedy then available was a motion to quash the information (In re Ted-ford, 31 Cal.2d 693, 694-695 [ 192 P.2d 3 ] ; People v. James, 99 Cal.App.2d 476, 484 [ 222 P.2d 117 ] ; see, also, People v. Coates, 95 Cal.App.2d 78, 80 [ 212 P.2d 263 ] ; People v. Bailey, 105 Cal.App.2d 150, 153-154 [ 232 P.2d 518 ]). 1952All four matters, if they were as alleged, were known at the time (People v. Adamson, supra) and the remedy then available was a motion to quash the information (In re Ted-ford, 31 Cal.2d 693, 694-695 [ 192 P.2d 3 ] ; People v. James, 99 Cal.App.2d 476, 484 [ 222 P.2d 117 ] ; see, also, People v. Coates, 95 Cal.App.2d 78, 80 [ 212 P.2d 263 ] ; People v. Bailey, 105 Cal.App.2d 150, 153-154 [ 232 P.2d 518 ]). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Tedfordgreen2 sentences1952All four matters, if they were as alleged, were known at the time (People v. Adamson, supra) and the remedy then available was a motion to quash the information (In re Ted-ford, 31 Cal.2d 693, 694-695 [ 192 P.2d 3 ] ; People v. James, 99 Cal.App.2d 476, 484 [ 222 P.2d 117 ] ; see, also, People v. Coates, 95 Cal.App.2d 78, 80 [ 212 P.2d 263 ] ; People v. Bailey, 105 Cal.App.2d 150, 153-154 [ 232 P.2d 518 ]). 1952All four matters, if they were as alleged, were known at the time (People v. Adamson, supra) and the remedy then available was a motion to quash the information (In re Ted-ford, 31 Cal.2d 693, 694-695 [ 192 P.2d 3 ] ; People v. James, 99 Cal.App.2d 476, 484 [ 222 P.2d 117 ] ; see, also, People v. Coates, 95 Cal.App.2d 78, 80 [ 212 P.2d 263 ] ; People v. Bailey, 105 Cal.App.2d 150, 153-154 [ 232 P.2d 518 ]). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ernst v. Searle
green
2 sentences2013(Cf. Ernst v. Searle (1933) 218 Cal. 233 , 240–241 [“A party is not permitted to change his position and adopt a new and different theory on appeal. 2013(Cf. Ernst v. Searle (1933) 218 Cal. 233 , 240–241 [―A party is not permitted to change his position and adopt a new and different theory on appeal. | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Young v. Hoagland
green
1 sentence2021(Young v. Hoagland (1931) 212 Cal. 426 , 430–432 [restitution affirmed where company’s outgoing board levied an invalid assessment and plaintiff shareholder paid under protest to avoid a sale of the shares].) Substantial evidence in support of the restitution award Based on its factual determination that the parties had no agreement to renew the Loan, the court found in favor of Respondents on their restitution claim. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Durell v. Sharp Healthcare
green
1 sentence2021In such cases, the plaintiff may choose not to sue in tort, but instead to seek restitution on a quasi-contract theory . . . . [Citations.] In such cases, where appropriate, the law will imply a contract (or rather, a quasi-contract), without regard to the parties’ intent, in order to avoid unjust enrichment.’ [Citation.]” (Durell, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 1370 .) According to section 35 of the Restatement Third of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, “If one party to a contract demands from the other a performance that is not in fact due by the terms of their agreement, under circumstances | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Southern California Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Commission
green
2 sentences2016A showing of substantial contribution shall include, but need not be limited to, a demonstration that the Commission’s order or decision has adopted factual contention(s), legal contention(s), and/or specific recommendation(s) presented by the participant.” (Oil 100 Regs., rule 76.26, italics added.) The 011 100 Regulations drew an immediate challenge from a group of utilities in Southern Cal. Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Com. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 64 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 99 , 695 P.2d 186 ] (Southern California Gas) on the ground that the CPUC’s assertion of regulatory authority to provide for interveno 2016A showing of substantial contribution shall include, but need not be limited to, a demonstration that the Commission’s order or decision has adopted factual contention(s), legal contention(s), and/or specific recommendation(s) presented by the participant.” (Oil 100 Regs., rule 76.26, italics added.) The 011 100 Regulations drew an immediate challenge from a group of utilities in Southern Cal. Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Com. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 64 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 99 , 695 P.2d 186 ] (Southern California Gas) on the ground that the CPUC’s assertion of regulatory authority to provide for interveno | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Pacific Indem. Co.
green
1 sentence2011It obligates the insurer, unless no part of any claim is potentially covered, to fund a defense to minimize the insured’s liability. [Citation.]” (State of California v. Pacific Indemnity Co. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1535, 1546 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 69 ].) “To defend meaningfully, the insurer must defend immediately. [Citation.]” (Buss, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 49.) “Imposition of an immediate duty to defend is necessary to afford the insured what it is entitled to: the full protection of a defense on its behalf. [Citation.]” (Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court (1993) 6 Cal.4th 287, 295 [ 24 Cal | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Imperial Casualty & Indemnity Co.
green
2 sentences2010If, under the terms of the policy, the insured would have a reasonable expectation that the insurer would provide a defense, any limitation on the insurer's defense obligation must be conspicuous, plain and clear. ( Haynes, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1204 ; Gray, supra, 65 Cal.2d at pp. 272-273.) Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Imperial Casualty & Indemnity Co. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 356 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 44 ] ( Montgomery Ward ) is instructive. 2010If, under the terms of the policy, the insured would have a reasonable expectation that the insurer would provide a defense, any limitation on the insurer's defense obligation must be conspicuous, plain and clear. ( Haynes, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1204 ; Gray, supra, 65 Cal.2d at pp. 272-273.) Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Imperial Casualty & Indemnity Co. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 356 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 44 ] ( Montgomery Ward ) is instructive. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Haynes v. Farmers Insurance Exchange
green
1 sentence2010If, under the terms of the policy, the insured would have a reasonable expectation that the insurer would provide a defense, any limitation on the insurer's defense obligation must be conspicuous, plain and clear. ( Haynes, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1204 ; Gray, supra, 65 Cal.2d at pp. 272-273.) Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Imperial Casualty & Indemnity Co. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 356 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 44 ] ( Montgomery Ward ) is instructive. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Regan Roofing Co. v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2006Regan Roofing Co. v. Superior Court (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 425 , 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 413 ( Regan Roofing ), is a construction defect case involving mass-produced residences. 2006Regan Roofing Co. v. Superior Court (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 425 , 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 413 ( Regan Roofing ), is a construction defect case involving mass-produced residences. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
People v. Superior Court (Lavi)
green
1 sentence1997As our Supreme Court has noted, the general rule is that “a challenge of a judge is permitted under section 170.6 any time before the commencement of a trial or hearing.” (People v. Superior Court ((Lavi), supra, 4 Cal.4th 1164, 1171 .) Subdivision (2) of section 170.6 establishes three exceptions to the general rule: the master calendar rule, the “10-day/5-day” rule, and the “all-purpose assignment” rule. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
People v. Hill
green
1 sentence1975(People v. Hill, supra, 12 Cal.3d 731, 761 .) The immediate inquiry is whether Miss Simmons was a person who fell in the category of a “citizen-informant” at the time of her statement to Roxon. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
People v. Coghill
neutral
1 sentence1974Civil Code section 12 and Code of Civil Procedure section 15 provide: “Words giving a joint authority to three or more public officers or other persons are construed as giving such authority to a majority of them, unless it is otherwise expressed in the Act giving the authority.” (See People v. Hecht, 105 Cal. 621, 627 [ 38 P. 941 ]; Jacobs v. Board of Supervisors, 100 Cal. 121, 132 [ 34 P. 630 ]; People v. Coghill, 47 Cal. 361, 363 .) Accordingly, unless it is otherwise expressed in the act giving authority, the authority, although joint where given to three or more, can be exercised by the m | 1 | 1974–1974 |
People v. Greene
green
1 sentence1974Civil Code section 12 and Code of Civil Procedure section 15 provide: “Words giving a joint authority to three or more public officers or other persons are construed as giving such authority to a majority of them, unless it is otherwise expressed in the Act giving the authority.” (See People v. Hecht, 105 Cal. 621, 627 [ 38 P. 941 ]; Jacobs v. Board of Supervisors, 100 Cal. 121, 132 [ 34 P. 630 ]; People v. Coghill, 47 Cal. 361, 363 .) Accordingly, unless it is otherwise expressed in the act giving authority, the authority, although joint where given to three or more, can be exercised by the m | 1 | 1974–1974 |
In re Estate of Bates
green
1 sentence1974Civil Code section 12 and Code of Civil Procedure section 15 provide: “Words giving a joint authority to three or more public officers or other persons are construed as giving such authority to a majority of them, unless it is otherwise expressed in the Act giving the authority.” (See People v. Hecht, 105 Cal. 621, 627 [ 38 P. 941 ]; Jacobs v. Board of Supervisors, 100 Cal. 121, 132 [ 34 P. 630 ]; People v. Coghill, 47 Cal. 361, 363 .) Accordingly, unless it is otherwise expressed in the act giving authority, the authority, although joint where given to three or more, can be exercised by the m | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Jackson v. Indiana
green
2 sentences1973(See Jackson v. Indiana, supra, 406 U.S. 715, 740 , and fn. 27 [ 32 L.Ed.2d 435, 451-452 ].) Yet in the instant cases, in view of the availability to petitioners of an immediate hearing on the question of their progress toward competence, we think that an outright dismissal of the pending charges would be unwarranted. 1973(See Jackson v. Indiana, supra, 406 U.S. 715, 740 , and fn. 27 [ 32 L.Ed.2d 435, 451-452 ].) Yet in the instant cases, in view of the availability to petitioners of an immediate hearing on the question of their progress toward competence, we think that an outright dismissal of the pending charges would be unwarranted. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Frey & Horgan Corp. v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1963This same question was posed in Frey & Horgan Corp. v. Superior Court (1936) 5 Cal.2d 401 [ 55 P.2d 203 ], wherein the parties had entered into a contract containing the identical arbitration provisions as in the instant case, and providing for submission to arbitration before the very same committee of the Foreign Commerce Association of the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce. 1963This same question was posed in Frey & Horgan Corp. v. Superior Court (1936) 5 Cal.2d 401 [ 55 P.2d 203 ], wherein the parties had entered into a contract containing the identical arbitration provisions as in the instant case, and providing for submission to arbitration before the very same committee of the Foreign Commerce Association of the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce. | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Caminetti v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance
green
2 sentences1962Co., 23 Cal.2d 94 [ 142 P.2d 741 ], where the Supreme Court described *478 them as “somewhat analogous to a breach by anticipatory repudiation.’’ ( 23 Cal.2d at p. 104 .) This breach, occurring when the old company ceased to do business, gave rise to an immediate claim for money damages. 1962Co., 23 Cal.2d 94 [ 142 P.2d 741 ], where the Supreme Court described *478 them as “somewhat analogous to a breach by anticipatory repudiation.’’ ( 23 Cal.2d at p. 104 .) This breach, occurring when the old company ceased to do business, gave rise to an immediate claim for money damages. | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| Bate v. Jolin green | 1 | 1932–1932 |
| Hale v. San Bernardino Valley Traction Co. green | 1 | 1932–1932 |
| Mohn v. Tingley green | 1 | 1932–1932 |
| Martin v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. green | 1 | 1932–1932 |
| Dow v. State Bank of Sleepy Eye green | 1 | 1910–1910 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.