12 New York opinions name it 6 courts 1992–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Green v. City of New Yorkgreen2 sentences2023Unlike the situation in Green v City of New York ( 465 F3d 65, 78-79 [2d Cir 2006]) — upon which Supreme Courtrelied — this is not a circumstance where an individual is bringing an ADA claim against a private entity. 2023Unlike the situation in Green v City of New York ( 465 F3d 65, 78-79 [2d Cir 2006]) — upon which Supreme Courtrelied — this is not a circumstance where an individual is bringing an ADA claim against a private entity. | 2 | 2 |
Matter of Lacee L. (Dekodia L.)green2 sentences2020He did not show his health issues constituted a disability for ADA purposes or that the court actually denied him an opportunity to participate, when his counsel was present and actively participated on his behalf ( Matter of Lacee L. [Stephanie L.], 32 NY3d 219, 227 [2018]). 2020He did not show his health issues constituted a disability for ADA purposes or that the court actually denied him an opportunity to participate, when his counsel was present and actively participated on his behalf ( Matter of Lacee L. [Stephanie L.], 32 NY3d 219, 227 [2018]). | 1 | 2 |
In re the Claim of Theurergreen2 sentences2025For Children, Inc. , 2020 WL 2309468, *5, 2020 US Dist LEXIS 81077, *16 [CD KY, May 8, 2020, No. 5:18-CV-548-REW-MAS] [denying defendant's summary judgment motion where plaintiff alleged in complaint "that breast cancer substantially impaired normal cell growth" and "testified that, at the time of the challenged employment action, she had been diagnosed with a 'very aggressive' form of . . . breast cancer."]; Coker v Enhanced Senior Living, Inc. , 897 F Supp 2d 1366, 1375 [ND GA 2012] [granting plaintiff partial summary judgment finding breast cancer meets the definition of "disability" under 2025For Children, Inc. , 2020 WL 2309468 , *5, 2020 US Dist LEXIS 81077 , *16 [CD KY, May 8, 2020, No. 5:18-CV-548-REW-MAS] [denying defendant's summary judgment motion where plaintiff alleged in complaint "that breast cancer substantially impaired normal cell growth" and "testified that, at the time of the challenged employment action, she had been diagnosed with a 'very aggressive' form of . . . breast cancer."]; Coker v Enhanced Senior Living, Inc. , 897 F Supp 2d 1366, 1375 [ND GA 2012] [granting plaintiff partial summary judgment finding breast cancer meets the definition of "disability" unde | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. . Supreme Lodge, Knights of Honorgreen2 sentences2025For Children, Inc. , 2020 WL 2309468, *5, 2020 US Dist LEXIS 81077, *16 [CD KY, May 8, 2020, No. 5:18-CV-548-REW-MAS] [denying defendant's summary judgment motion where plaintiff alleged in complaint "that breast cancer substantially impaired normal cell growth" and "testified that, at the time of the challenged employment action, she had been diagnosed with a 'very aggressive' form of . . . breast cancer."]; Coker v Enhanced Senior Living, Inc. , 897 F Supp 2d 1366, 1375 [ND GA 2012] [granting plaintiff partial summary judgment finding breast cancer meets the definition of "disability" under 2025For Children, Inc. , 2020 WL 2309468 , *5, 2020 US Dist LEXIS 81077 , *16 [CD KY, May 8, 2020, No. 5:18-CV-548-REW-MAS] [denying defendant's summary judgment motion where plaintiff alleged in complaint "that breast cancer substantially impaired normal cell growth" and "testified that, at the time of the challenged employment action, she had been diagnosed with a 'very aggressive' form of . . . breast cancer."]; Coker v Enhanced Senior Living, Inc. , 897 F Supp 2d 1366, 1375 [ND GA 2012] [granting plaintiff partial summary judgment finding breast cancer meets the definition of "disability" unde | 1 | 1 |
Coker v. Enhanced Senior Living, Inc.green2 sentences2025For Children, Inc. , 2020 WL 2309468, *5, 2020 US Dist LEXIS 81077, *16 [CD KY, May 8, 2020, No. 5:18-CV-548-REW-MAS] [denying defendant's summary judgment motion where plaintiff alleged in complaint "that breast cancer substantially impaired normal cell growth" and "testified that, at the time of the challenged employment action, she had been diagnosed with a 'very aggressive' form of . . . breast cancer."]; Coker v Enhanced Senior Living, Inc. , 897 F Supp 2d 1366, 1375 [ND GA 2012] [granting plaintiff partial summary judgment finding breast cancer meets the definition of "disability" under 2025For Children, Inc. , 2020 WL 2309468 , *5, 2020 US Dist LEXIS 81077 , *16 [CD KY, May 8, 2020, No. 5:18-CV-548-REW-MAS] [denying defendant's summary judgment motion where plaintiff alleged in complaint "that breast cancer substantially impaired normal cell growth" and "testified that, at the time of the challenged employment action, she had been diagnosed with a 'very aggressive' form of . . . breast cancer."]; Coker v Enhanced Senior Living, Inc. , 897 F Supp 2d 1366, 1375 [ND GA 2012] [granting plaintiff partial summary judgment finding breast cancer meets the definition of "disability" unde | 1 | 1 |
Joanie Alston v. Park Pleasant Incgreen2 sentences2025"The determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity requires an individualized assessment." (28 CFR 35.108 [d] [1] [vi]; 29 CFR 1630.2 [j] [1] [iv] [same]; Alston , 679 Fed Appx at 172 ["Although the ADAAA makes the individualized assessment 'particularly simple and straightforward' for diseases like cancer, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii), an individualized assessment must still take place."]; Hoffer v Inch , 382 F Supp 3d 1288, 1297, 1298 n 6 [ND FL 2019], revd on other grounds 973 F3d 1263 [11th Cir 2020] [decertifying class as to an ADA claim, because "an AD 2025"The determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity requires an individualized assessment." (28 CFR 35.108 [d] [1] [vi]; 29 CFR 1630.2 [j] [1] [iv] [same]; Alston , 679 Fed Appx at 172 ["Although the ADAAA makes the individualized assessment 'particularly simple and straightforward' for diseases like cancer, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii), an individualized assessment must still take place."]; Hoffer v Inch , 382 F Supp 3d 1288, 1297, 1298 n 6 [ND FL 2019], revd on other grounds 973 F3d 1263 [11th Cir 2020] [decertifying class as to an ADA claim, because "an AD | 1 | 1 |
Sharp v. Kosmalskigreen1 sentence2024In general, "[t]o impose a constructive trust upon real property, a plaintiff must prove (1) a confidential or fiduciary relationship, (2) a promise, express or implied, (3) a transfer in reliance on that promise, and (4) unjust enrichment" ( Keane v Keane , 193 AD3d 838, 839 ; see Sharp v Kosmalski , 40 NY2d 119, 121 ). | 1 | 1 |
C.L. v. Scarsdale Union Free School Districtgreen1 sentence2019Given that the three statutes are related, a plaintiff may assert an RA and ADA claim, in conjunction with an IDEA claim, on the theory that the disabled student has been denied access to a FAPE ( see R.B ., 99 F Supp 2d at 419 ; see also C.L., 744 F3d at 841 ) [FN10] . | 1 | 1 |
Matthew Staron, Jennifer Champagne, Brandon Naples, and Linda Ravenell v. McDonald Corporation and Burger King Corporationgreen2 sentences2018Moreover, the ADA contains no fixed time period for compliance, and the reasonableness of efforts to provide an accommodation will vary with the facts of each case ( Staron v McDonald's Corp. , 51 F3d 353, 356 [2d Cir 1995] ["Although neither the ADA nor the courts have defined the precise contours of the test for reasonableness, it is clear that the determination of whether a particular modification is 'reasonable' involves a fact-specific, case-by-case inquiry that considers, among other factors, the effectiveness of the modification in light of the nature of the disability in question and t 2018Moreover, the ADA contains no fixed time period for compliance, and the reasonableness of efforts to provide an accommodation will vary with the facts of each case ( Staron v McDonald's Corp. , 51 F3d 353, 356 [2d Cir 1995] ["Although neither the ADA nor the courts have defined the precise contours of the test for reasonableness, it is clear that the determination of whether a particular modification is 'reasonable' involves a fact-specific, case-by-case inquiry that considers, among other factors, the effectiveness of the modification in light of the nature of the disability in question and t | 1 | 1 |
Christoper T. Duvall v. County Of Kitsapgreen1 sentence2018The ADA's "reasonable accommodations" test is often a time- and fact-intensive process with multiple layers of inquiry ( Duvall v County of Kitsap , 260 F3d 1124, 1136 [9th Cir 2001] [court adjudicating ADA claim charged with the "duty to gather sufficient information from the disabled individual and qualified experts" (internal quotation marks omitted)]). | 1 | 1 |
Emel Realty Corp. v. Careygreen1 sentence2005Credible Excusable Reason for Tenant’s Absence A tenant’s underutilization of a rent-regulated premises “may not alone suffice for a finding of nonprimary residence, at least in circumstances where the tenant’s absence is attributable to a credible, excusable reason.” (Emel Realty Corp. v Carey, 188 Misc 2d 280, 282 [App Term, 1st Dept 2001, per curiam], affd 288 AD2d 163 [1st Dept 2001, per curiam].) Despite the Appellate Term’s statement in the majority opinion in petitioner’s appeal that “the psychological underpinnings of tenant’s occupancy status is of little, if any, relevance to the out | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Carl Hoffer v. Secretary, Florida Department Corrections
green
2 sentences2025"The determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity requires an individualized assessment." (28 CFR 35.108 [d] [1] [vi]; 29 CFR 1630.2 [j] [1] [iv] [same]; Alston , 679 Fed Appx at 172 ["Although the ADAAA makes the individualized assessment 'particularly simple and straightforward' for diseases like cancer, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii), an individualized assessment must still take place."]; Hoffer v Inch , 382 F Supp 3d 1288, 1297, 1298 n 6 [ND FL 2019], revd on other grounds 973 F3d 1263 [11th Cir 2020] [decertifying class as to an ADA claim, because "an AD 2025"The determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity requires an individualized assessment." (28 CFR 35.108 [d] [1] [vi]; 29 CFR 1630.2 [j] [1] [iv] [same]; Alston , 679 Fed Appx at 172 ["Although the ADAAA makes the individualized assessment 'particularly simple and straightforward' for diseases like cancer, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii), an individualized assessment must still take place."]; Hoffer v Inch , 382 F Supp 3d 1288, 1297, 1298 n 6 [ND FL 2019], revd on other grounds 973 F3d 1263 [11th Cir 2020] [decertifying class as to an ADA claim, because "an AD | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Keane v. Keane
green
1 sentence2024In general, "[t]o impose a constructive trust upon real property, a plaintiff must prove (1) a confidential or fiduciary relationship, (2) a promise, express or implied, (3) a transfer in reliance on that promise, and (4) unjust enrichment" ( Keane v Keane , 193 AD3d 838, 839 ; see Sharp v Kosmalski , 40 NY2d 119, 121 ). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Soscia v. Soscia
green
1 sentence2024A party has standing to assert a cause of action to quiet title only where he or she has an estate or interest in the property ( see Soscia v Soscia , 35 AD3d 841, 843 ). "'To maintain an equitable quiet title claim, a plaintiff must allege actual or constructive possession of the property and the existence of a removable cloud on the property, which is an apparent title, such as a deed or other instrument, that is actually invalid or inoperative'" ( Amex Dev., LLC v Aljohn Group, Inc. , 209 AD3d 808, 811 , quoting Carbone v Deutsche Bank Natl. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Amex Dev., LLC v. Aljohn Group, Inc.
neutral
1 sentence2024A party has standing to assert a cause of action to quiet title only where he or she has an estate or interest in the property ( see Soscia v Soscia , 35 AD3d 841, 843 ). "'To maintain an equitable quiet title claim, a plaintiff must allege actual or constructive possession of the property and the existence of a removable cloud on the property, which is an apparent title, such as a deed or other instrument, that is actually invalid or inoperative'" ( Amex Dev., LLC v Aljohn Group, Inc. , 209 AD3d 808, 811 , quoting Carbone v Deutsche Bank Natl. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Gordon v. Means
green
1 sentence2019Standards for recovery under the ADA and the RA "are generally the same" ( Henrietta D. v Bloomberg , 331 F3d 261 , 272 [2d Cir 2003], cert denied 541 US 936 [2004]). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
RB Ex Rel. LB v. BOARD OF EDUC. OF CITY
green
1 sentence2019Given that the three statutes are related, a plaintiff may assert an RA and ADA claim, in conjunction with an IDEA claim, on the theory that the disabled student has been denied access to a FAPE ( see R.B ., 99 F Supp 2d at 419 ; see also C.L., 744 F3d at 841 ) [FN10] . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Henrietta v. Bloomberg
green
1 sentence2019Standards for recovery under the ADA and the RA "are generally the same" ( Henrietta D. v Bloomberg , 331 F3d 261 , 272 [2d Cir 2003], cert denied 541 US 936 [2004]). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Allen
green
1 sentence2010Both the prosecution and the defense argued on the record and the court reserved decision and requested case law authority from the ADA and the defense attorney. 5 Batson requires a three-part test for the court to find a violation: first, that the persons peremptorily dismissed from the jury panel are a cognizable and protected class of people and were dismissed solely on that basis; second, the accused party must set forth a neutral reason or reasons for each challenged striking of a juror; and third, whether the neutral reason to strike is a mere pretext to the “Batson violation.” (See Peop | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Emel Realty Corp. v. Carey
green
1 sentence2005Credible Excusable Reason for Tenant’s Absence A tenant’s underutilization of a rent-regulated premises “may not alone suffice for a finding of nonprimary residence, at least in circumstances where the tenant’s absence is attributable to a credible, excusable reason.” (Emel Realty Corp. v Carey, 188 Misc 2d 280, 282 [App Term, 1st Dept 2001, per curiam], affd 288 AD2d 163 [1st Dept 2001, per curiam].) Despite the Appellate Term’s statement in the majority opinion in petitioner’s appeal that “the psychological underpinnings of tenant’s occupancy status is of little, if any, relevance to the out | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Horwitz v. L & J.G. Stickley, Inc.
green
2 sentences2003Stickley, Inc., 122 F Supp 2d 350 [2000], affd 20 Fed Appx 76 [2d Cir 2001]). * Plaintiff then initiated this action, claiming that defendant violated the Human Rights Law. 2003Stickley, Inc., 122 F Supp 2d 350 [2000], affd 20 Fed Appx 76 [2d Cir 2001]). * Plaintiff then initiated this action, claiming that defendant violated the Human Rights Law. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Horwitz v. L. & J.G. Stickley, Inc.
green
2 sentences2003Stickley, Inc., 122 F Supp 2d 350 [2000], affd 20 Fed Appx 76 [2d Cir 2001]). * Plaintiff then initiated this action, claiming that defendant violated the Human Rights Law. 2003Stickley, Inc., 122 F Supp 2d 350 [2000], affd 20 Fed Appx 76 [2d Cir 2001]). * Plaintiff then initiated this action, claiming that defendant violated the Human Rights Law. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Stone v. DAVIESS CTY. DIV. CHILD SERV.
green
2 sentences2002However, a Texas court, while rejecting an ADA defense on procedural grounds, suggested that the ADA might apply to termination proceedings. 16 And an Indiana court in the case of Stone v Daviess County Div. of Children & Family Servs. ( 656 NE2d 824 [Ind 1995]) rejected an ADA defense because Indiana does not require unification efforts, but stated that if Indiana required such efforts they would have to comply with ADA standards. 2002However, a Texas court, while rejecting an ADA defense on procedural grounds, suggested that the ADA might apply to termination proceedings. 16 And an Indiana court in the case of Stone v Daviess County Div. of Children & Family Servs. ( 656 NE2d 824 [Ind 1995]) rejected an ADA defense because Indiana does not require unification efforts, but stated that if Indiana required such efforts they would have to comply with ADA standards. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
People v. Alonso
green
1 sentence1992We have recently determined in People v Rodriguez ( 184 AD2d 317 ), that a trial court properly exercised its discretion with respect to voir dire. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.