ADA claim in Colorado

2025See People in Interest of C.Z., 2015 COA 87, ¶ 9 (addressing an ADA claim raised for the first time in closing argument at the termination hearing).

2025See People in Interest of C.Z., 2015 COA 87, ¶ 9 (addressing an ADA claim raised for the first time in closing argument at the termination hearing).

2025But the ADA is not a defense to termination, People in Interest of T.B., 12 P.3d 1221, 1223 (Colo. App. 2000), and “the requirement to make reasonable accommodations [does not] lower the standards for parents with disabilities,” S.K., ¶ 36. ¶9 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights presents a mixed question of fact and law because it involves the application of the evidentiary facts to the termination statute.

2022People in Interest of T.B., 12 P.3d 1221, 1223 (Colo. App. 2000).

2025See People in Interest of M.B., 2020 COA 13, ¶¶ 23-24, 35 (describing the exception as a “narrow” one and declining to apply it in part because of the lack of necessary findings by the juvenile court); see also S.Z.S., ¶ 21 (“[B]ecause mother never raised the ADA issue . . . either before or during the termination hearing, the juvenile court didn’t make any specific findings about the applicability of the ADA for us to review.

2022See People in Interest of M.B., 2020 COA 13, ¶ 14 (“[A]ppellate courts review only issues presented to and ruled on by the lower court.”). ¶ 12 For the reasons discussed below, we agree with the Department that mother didn’t preserve her ADA claim, and we therefore decline to review it. 1.

2022See Gregory, 747 N.E.2d at 127 ; Terry, 610 N.W.2d at 570-71 .

2015See Lucy J. v. State, Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 244 P.3d 1099, 1115-16 (Alaska 2010) (recognizing that family reunification services are contemplated within Title II of the ADA); In re Adoption of Gregory, 434 Mass. 117 , 747 N.E.2d 120, 126 (2001) (concluding that the ADA requires the department to accommodate a parent's special needs in its provision of services prior to a termination proceeding); In re Terry, 240 Mich.App. 14 , 610 N.W.2d 563, 570 (2000) (determining that reunification services must comply with the ADA even though the termination proceeding was not a service or progr

2022See In re Terry, 610 N.W.2d 563, 570 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000).

2022See Gregory, 747 N.E.2d at 127 ; Terry, 610 N.W.2d at 570-71 .

2016Hannagir v. Utah Dep’t of Corr. , 587 F.3d 1255, 1261 (10th Cir. 2009); see 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (8) (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (m) (2015) (defining "qualified individual"); see also § 2434-402(1)(a) ("[W]ith regard to a disability, it is not a discriminatory . . . practice for an employer to act as provided in this paragraph (a) if there is no reasonable accommodation that the employer can make with regard to the disability, the disability actually disqualifies the person from the job, and the disability has a significant impact on the job."); Cmty. Hosp. v. Fail , 969 P.2d 667, 672 (Colo. 1998)

2016Hannagir v. Utah Dep’t of Corr. , 587 F.3d 1255, 1261 (10th Cir. 2009); see 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (8) (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (m) (2015) (defining "qualified individual"); see also § 2434-402(1)(a) ("[W]ith regard to a disability, it is not a discriminatory . . . practice for an employer to act as provided in this paragraph (a) if there is no reasonable accommodation that the employer can make with regard to the disability, the disability actually disqualifies the person from the job, and the disability has a significant impact on the job."); Cmty. Hosp. v. Fail , 969 P.2d 667, 672 (Colo. 1998)

2016Hannagir v. Utah Dep’t of Corr. , 587 F.3d 1255, 1261 (10th Cir. 2009); see 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (8) (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (m) (2015) (defining "qualified individual"); see also § 2434-402(1)(a) ("[W]ith regard to a disability, it is not a discriminatory . . . practice for an employer to act as provided in this paragraph (a) if there is no reasonable accommodation that the employer can make with regard to the disability, the disability actually disqualifies the person from the job, and the disability has a significant impact on the job."); Cmty. Hosp. v. Fail , 969 P.2d 667, 672 (Colo. 1998)

2016Hannagir v. Utah Dep’t of Corr. , 587 F.3d 1255, 1261 (10th Cir. 2009); see 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (8) (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (m) (2015) (defining "qualified individual"); see also § 2434-402(1)(a) ("[W]ith regard to a disability, it is not a discriminatory . . . practice for an employer to act as provided in this paragraph (a) if there is no reasonable accommodation that the employer can make with regard to the disability, the disability actually disqualifies the person from the job, and the disability has a significant impact on the job."); Cmty. Hosp. v. Fail , 969 P.2d 667, 672 (Colo. 1998)

2000See In Interest of C.M., 526 N.W.2d 562 (Iowa App.1994); In re Angel B., 659 A.2d 277 (Me.1995); In re Welfare of A.J.R., 78 Wash.App. 222 , 896 P.2d 1298 , cert. denied, 127 Wash.2d 1025 , 904 P.2d 1157 (1995).

2000See In Interest of CM., 526 N.W.2d 562 (Iowa App.1994); In re Angel B., 659 A.2d 277 (Me.1995); In re Welfare of AJ.R., 78 Wash App. 222, 896 P.2d 1298 , cert. denied, 127 Wash.2d 1025 , 904 P.2d 1157 (1995).

2025See M.B., ¶ 14; K.L-P., 148 P.3d at 403 ; see also People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133 , ¶ 21 (declining to address an unpreserved ADA claim when the court “didn’t make 4 any specific findings about the applicability of the ADA for [the appellate court] to review”).

2025See M.B., ¶ 14; K.L-P., 148 P.3d at 403 ; see also People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133 , ¶ 21 (declining to address an unpreserved ADA claim when the court “didn’t make 4 any specific findings about the applicability of the ADA for [the appellate court] to review”).

2025Dist. v. Woodcrest Homes, Inc., 2019 CO 51, ¶ 19 ; see also S.Z.S., ¶ 21 (“[B]ecause mother never raised the ADA issue . . . either before or during the termination hearing, the juvenile court didn’t make any specific findings about the applicability of the ADA for us to review.”). ¶ 39 Thus, we will not consider father’s unpreserved ADA and related due process and equal protection claims.

2024See People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133 , ¶ 21 (declining to consider an unpreserved ADA claim because appellate courts “don’t (and, indeed, can’t) make findings of fact” (quoting Carousel Farms Dist. v. Woodcrest Homes, Inc., 2019 CO 51, ¶ 19 )). 7 rights.

2026To prove a “basic ADA violation, [a plaintiff] must show that he: (1) has a disability; (2) was otherwise qualified to get some public program, service, or activity; and (3) was denied that program, service, or activity on the basis of his disability.” Koon v. North Carolina, 50 F.4th 398, 405 (4th Cir. 2022).

2025See People in Interest of E.D., 2025 COA 11 , ¶ 66 n.3 (declining to address an issue not raised before the juvenile court for the first time on appeal).

2022Id. at 338-39.

2022People v. Melendez, 102 P.3d 315, 322 (Colo. 2004) (quoting People v. Syrie, 101 P.3d 219 , 223 n.7 (Colo. 2004)).

2022Nathan v. Muni cipality of Anchorage , 955 P.2d 528, 532-33 (Alaska. 1998) (concl uding that a violation of the ADA did not trigger the exclusionary r ule because it did not necessarily impair a deaf defendant’s ability to exe rcise his constitutional rights); State v. Piddington , 607 N. W.2d 303, 309-10 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000) (same).

2022Nathan v. Muni cipality of Anchorage , 955 P.2d 528, 532-33 (Alaska. 1998) (concl uding that a violation of the ADA did not trigger the exclusionary r ule because it did not necessarily impair a deaf defendant’s ability to exe rcise his constitutional rights); State v. Piddington , 607 N. W.2d 303, 309-10 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000) (same).

2022Nathan v. Muni cipality of Anchorage , 955 P.2d 528, 532-33 (Alaska. 1998) (concl uding that a violation of the ADA did not trigger the exclusionary r ule because it did not necessarily impair a deaf defendant’s ability to exe rcise his constitutional rights); State v. Piddington , 607 N. W.2d 303, 309-10 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000) (same).

2022Nathan v. Muni cipality of Anchorage , 955 P.2d 528, 532-33 (Alaska. 1998) (concl uding that a violation of the ADA did not trigger the exclusionary r ule because it did not necessarily impair a deaf defendant’s ability to exe rcise his constitutional rights); State v. Piddington , 607 N. W.2d 303, 309-10 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000) (same).

2021He asserts that his “impairment and int ellectual disabilities have been exploited by state judges, federal judg es . . . 14 and American Family.” Like the district court, we concl ude that Phan’s ADA cla im fails. ¶ 42 The ADA “forbids discrimination against persons with disabilities in three major areas of public life: employment, which is covered by Title I of the statute; public services, prog rams, and activities, which are the subject of Title II; and publi c accommodations, which are covered by Title III.” Tennessee v. Lane , 541 U.S. 509, 516-17 (2004); see 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112 , 12132,

2021That provision prohibits public entities — including state and local governments, as well as their 15 agencies and instrumentalities — from discriminating against “qualified” persons with disabilities in the provision or op eration of public services, programs, or activities, see Lane , 541 U.S. at 517 .

2015See Lucy J. v. State, Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 244 P.3d 1099, 1115-16 (Alaska 2010) (recognizing that family reunification services are contemplated within Title II of the ADA); In re Adoption of Gregory, 434 Mass. 117 , 747 N.E.2d 120, 126 (2001) (concluding that the ADA requires the department to accommodate a parent's special needs in its provision of services prior to a termination proceeding); In re Terry, 240 Mich.App. 14 , 610 N.W.2d 563, 570 (2000) (determining that reunification services must comply with the ADA even though the termination proceeding was not a service or progr