ADA claim in California

2022(See Munson v. Del Taco, Inc. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 661, 673 [need not prove intent to establish Unruh Act claim based on ADA violation].) Title III “prohibits discrimination against disabled individuals by private entities.” (SDCCU, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 1059.) It provides: “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” ( 42 U.S.

2021(Munson v. Del Taco, Inc. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 661, 678 .) While we agree that an Unruh Act claimant need not be a client or customer of the covered public accommodation, and that he or she need not prove intentional discrimination upon establishing an ADA violation, we do not agree that an Unruh Act claimant’s intent or motivation for visiting the covered public accommodation is 13 irrelevant to a determination of the merits of his or her claim.

2025Code, § 51, subd. (b); Liapes v. Facebook, Inc. (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 910 , 922 (Liapes); Martinez v. Cot’n Wash, Inc. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 1026 , 1036 [“Unless an [UCRA] claim is based on an ADA violation,” a plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination].) Intentional discrimination requires proof of “‘willful, affirmative misconduct.’” (Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club (2005) 36 Cal.4th 824, 853 (Koebke), quoting Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1172 .) To meet this standard, the plaintiff must show more than the disparate impact of a facially neutral policy on a particular protecte

2025Code, § 51, subd. (b); Liapes v. Facebook, Inc. (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 910 , 922 (Liapes); Martinez v. Cot’n Wash, Inc. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 1026 , 1036 [“Unless an [UCRA] claim is based on an ADA violation,” a plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination].) Intentional discrimination requires proof of “‘willful, affirmative misconduct.’” (Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club (2005) 36 Cal.4th 824, 853 (Koebke), quoting Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1172 .) To meet this standard, the plaintiff must show more than the disparate impact of a facially neutral policy on a particular protecte

2009(Angelucci v. Century Supper Club, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 178, fn. 10 .) 12 A “construction-related accessibility claim” includes a public accommodation access claim brought under the Unruh Civil Rights Act or the Disabled Persons Act for violation of a “construction-related accessibility standard.” (§ 55.52, subd. (a)(1).) The latter term refers to a state or federal standard or regulation for making facilities, whether existing or newly constructed, accessible to persons with disabilities and includes the ADA and the ADA accessibility guidelines. (§ 55.52, subd. (a)(6).) 13 See Senate Commi

2009(Angelucci v. Century Supper Club, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 178, fn. 10 .) 12 A “construction-related accessibility claim” includes a public accommodation access claim brought under the Unruh Civil Rights Act or the Disabled Persons Act for violation of a “construction-related accessibility standard.” (§ 55.52, subd. (a)(1).) The latter term refers to a state or federal standard or regulation for making facilities, whether existing or newly constructed, accessible to persons with disabilities and includes the ADA and the ADA accessibility guidelines. (§ 55.52, subd. (a)(6).) 13 See Senate Commi

2024A. The ADA Claim “Congress enacted the ADA in 1990 to remedy widespread discrimination against disabled individuals.” (PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin (2001) 532 U.S. 661, 674 (Martin).) “After thoroughly investigating the problem, Congress concluded that there was a ‘compelling need’ for a ‘clear and comprehensive national mandate’ to eliminate discrimination against disabled individuals, and to integrate them ‘into the economic and social mainstream of American life.’” (Id. at p. 675.) “To effectuate its sweeping purpose, the ADA forbids discrimination against disabled individuals in major areas of

2024A. The ADA Claim “Congress enacted the ADA in 1990 to remedy widespread discrimination against disabled individuals.” (PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin (2001) 532 U.S. 661, 674 (Martin).) “After thoroughly investigating the problem, Congress concluded that there was a ‘compelling need’ for a ‘clear and comprehensive national mandate’ to eliminate discrimination against disabled individuals, and to integrate them ‘into the economic and social mainstream of American life.’” (Id. at p. 675.) “To effectuate its sweeping purpose, the ADA forbids discrimination against disabled individuals in major areas of

2023(See Stewart v. Happy Herman’s Cheshire Bridge (11th Cir. 1997) 117 F.3d 1278, 1285-1286 [under the ADA, a qualified individual is not entitled to the accommodation of her choice].) 2.

2023(See Stewart v. Happy Herman’s Cheshire Bridge (11th Cir. 1997) 117 F.3d 1278, 1285-1286 [under the ADA, a qualified individual is not entitled to the accommodation of her choice].) 2.

2022But the Legislature went out of its way to incorporate title I of the ADA into FEHA; if Brennon’s interpretation were correct, those changes to FEHA would be rendered “meaningless surplusage.” (Ibid.; see also Bass v. County of Butte (9th Cir. 2006) 458 F.3d 978 , 982 (Bass) [noting that this argument “would create a significant disharmony” 36 BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. between the Unruh Civil Rights Act and FEHA and “create an end-run around the administrative procedures of FEHA solely for disability discrimination claimants”].) We seek to avoid “interpret

2006See Biehl v. C.I.R., 351 F.3d 982, 986 (9th Cir. 2003) (‘Statutory interpretation begins with the plain meaning of the statute’s language.’ (citation and quotation marks omitted)). ‘Because the Unruh Act has adopted the full expanse of the ADA, it must follow, that the same standards for liability apply under both Acts.’ Presta, 16 F.Supp.2d at 1135 .

2009Code, § 3051 by not raising it at sentencing]; People v. Lizarraga (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 689, 691-692 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 865 ] [same].) Second, even if not waived, we have found no authority to support the minor’s novel contention that an ADA claim may be raised in the context of a section 602 dispositional hearing, and that an otherwise valid dispositional order can be reversed on the ground that it violated the ADA.

2009Code, § 3051 by not raising it at sentencing]; People v. Lizarraga (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 689, 691-692 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 865 ] [same].) Second, even if not waived, we have found no authority to support the minor’s novel contention that an ADA claim may be raised in the context of a section 602 dispositional hearing, and that an otherwise valid dispositional order can be reversed on the ground that it violated the ADA.

2009(Cf. People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 351-353, 356 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627 , 885 P.2d 1040 ]; see People v. Planavsky (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1300, 1302, 1310-1312 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 723 ] [convicted narcotics offender waived the issue of failure of court to determine whether he should be committed to the California Rehabilitation Center pursuant to Welf. & Inst.

2009(Cf. People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 351-353, 356 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627 , 885 P.2d 1040 ]; see People v. Planavsky (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1300, 1302, 1310-1312 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 723 ] [convicted narcotics offender waived the issue of failure of court to determine whether he should be committed to the California Rehabilitation Center pursuant to Welf. & Inst.

2009(Cf. People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 351-353, 356 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627 , 885 P.2d 1040 ]; see People v. Planavsky (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1300, 1302, 1310-1312 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 723 ] [convicted narcotics offender waived the issue of failure of court to determine whether he should be committed to the California Rehabilitation Center pursuant to Welf. & Inst.

2009(Cf. People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 351-353, 356 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627 , 885 P.2d 1040 ]; see People v. Planavsky (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1300, 1302, 1310-1312 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 723 ] [convicted narcotics offender waived the issue of failure of court to determine whether he should be committed to the California Rehabilitation Center pursuant to Welf. & Inst.

2008(See Wilson v. PFS, LLC (S.D.Cal. 2007) 493 F.Supp.2d 1122, 1125-1126 ; compare Coronado v. Cobblestone Village Community Rentals (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 831, 840 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 883 ] [intent required for all Act damages claims] with Lentini v. California Center for the Arts (9th Cir. 2004) 370 F.3d 837, 846 [exception to Act intent requirement for ADA violation].) Because the ADA is not at issue in this case, we need not resolve this conflict.

2006(See id. at p. 849.) The court first established that a plaintiff need not show intentional discrimination under the ADA (see Lentini, supra, 370 F.3d at p. 846 [“It is undisputed that a plaintiff need not show intentional discrimination in order to make out a violation of the ADA.”]) and then, in a single paragraph’s analysis, concluded that “regardless of whether Harris may continue to have relevance to other Unruh Act suits, no showing of intentional discrimination is required where the Unruh Act violation is premised on an ADA violation.” (Id. at p. 847.) The Lentini analysis was so short

2025Code, § 51, subd. (b); Liapes v. Facebook, Inc. (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 910 , 922 (Liapes); Martinez v. Cot’n Wash, Inc. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 1026 , 1036 [“Unless an [UCRA] claim is based on an ADA violation,” a plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination].) Intentional discrimination requires proof of “‘willful, affirmative misconduct.’” (Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club (2005) 36 Cal.4th 824, 853 (Koebke), quoting Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1172 .) To meet this standard, the plaintiff must show more than the disparate impact of a facially neutral policy on a particular protecte

2025Code, § 51, subd. (b); Liapes v. Facebook, Inc. (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 910 , 922 (Liapes); Martinez v. Cot’n Wash, Inc. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 1026 , 1036 [“Unless an [UCRA] claim is based on an ADA violation,” a plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination].) Intentional discrimination requires proof of “‘willful, affirmative misconduct.’” (Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club (2005) 36 Cal.4th 824, 853 (Koebke), quoting Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1172 .) To meet this standard, the plaintiff must show more than the disparate impact of a facially neutral policy on a particular protecte

2025(See Koire v. Metro Car Wash (1985) 40 Cal.3d 24 , 32–33 (Koire) [facially discriminatory pricing policies favoring women unlawful under the UCRA]; see also Angelucci v. Century Supper Club (2007) 41 Cal.4th 160 , 175–176 (Angelucci) [pricing policies making facial distinction on the basis of sex violate the UCRA; the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged injury when such a policy was applied to them].) Policies that make a facial distinction based on an unenumerated characteristic may be found unlawful if the distinction constitutes “‘arbitrary, invidious or unreasonable discrimination.’” (Javorsky

2025(See Koire v. Metro Car Wash (1985) 40 Cal.3d 24 , 32–33 (Koire) [facially discriminatory pricing policies favoring women unlawful under the UCRA]; see also Angelucci v. Century Supper Club (2007) 41 Cal.4th 160 , 175–176 (Angelucci) [pricing policies making facial distinction on the basis of sex violate the UCRA; the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged injury when such a policy was applied to them].) Policies that make a facial distinction based on an unenumerated characteristic may be found unlawful if the distinction constitutes “‘arbitrary, invidious or unreasonable discrimination.’” (Javorsky

2022But the Legislature went out of its way to incorporate title I of the ADA into FEHA; if Brennon’s interpretation were correct, those changes to FEHA would be rendered “meaningless surplusage.” (Ibid.; see also Bass v. County of Butte (9th Cir. 2006) 458 F.3d 978 , 982 (Bass) [noting that this argument “would create a significant disharmony” 36 BRENNON B. v. SUPERIOR COURT Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. between the Unruh Civil Rights Act and FEHA and “create an end-run around the administrative procedures of FEHA solely for disability discrimination claimants”].) We seek to avoid “interpret

2020Indeed, in marked contrast to the line of cases on which petitioner relies, the circuit court panel in Bass v. County of Butte (9th Cir. 2006) 458 F.3d 978 (Bass), undertook a thorough examination of each of the areas of inquiry as to which the analyses in the other cases are profoundly deficient.

2009Although no published decision has considered such a proposition with respect to a DJJ commitment order, one court has rejected a similar attempt to raise an ADA claim in an appeal of an order in a juvenile dependency proceeding. ( In re Diamond H. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1127 [ 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 715 ] ( Diamond H. ), *1253 disapproved on another ground in Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 749, fn. 6 [ 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 828 , 28 P.3d 876 ].) (3) In Diamond H. a developmentally disabled mother contended on appeal that the juvenile court's decision to deny reunification services pursuan

2009Although no published decision has considered such a proposition with respect to a DJJ commitment order, one court has rejected a similar attempt to raise an ADA claim in an appeal of an order in a juvenile dependency proceeding. ( In re Diamond H. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1127 [ 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 715 ] ( Diamond H. ), *1253 disapproved on another ground in Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 749, fn. 6 [ 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 828 , 28 P.3d 876 ].) (3) In Diamond H. a developmentally disabled mother contended on appeal that the juvenile court's decision to deny reunification services pursuan

1999(Id. at p. 965.) The court noted that “[a] significant number of federal courts have . . . decided that a person who characterizes herself as ‘totally disabled’ in order to receive state, federal, or even insurance benefits will normally be estopped from proving that she is a qualified individual with a disability within the meaning of the ADA or similar state laws. [Citations.]” (Id. at pp. 961-962.) *957 In Rissetto v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 343 (9th Cir. 1996) 94 F.3d 597 , judicial estoppel was applied in an age discrimination FEHA claim (California Fair Employment and Housing Act

1999(Id. at p. 965.) The court noted that “[a] significant number of federal courts have . . . decided that a person who characterizes herself as ‘totally disabled’ in order to receive state, federal, or even insurance benefits will normally be estopped from proving that she is a qualified individual with a disability within the meaning of the ADA or similar state laws. [Citations.]” (Id. at pp. 961-962.) *957 In Rissetto v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 343 (9th Cir. 1996) 94 F.3d 597 , judicial estoppel was applied in an age discrimination FEHA claim (California Fair Employment and Housing Act

2025(See Sheldon Appel, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 881 [a prospective plaintiff lacks probable cause if his claim alleges facts he knows are untrue]; Soukup, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 292 [a litigant lacks probable cause “ ‘if he relies upon facts which he has no reasonable cause to believe to be true’ ”].) Accordingly, Judge Shaller’s findings are sufficient to raise triable issues of fact 22 on whether Whitaker lacked probable cause to pursue the Unruh Act claim.

2025(See Sheldon Appel, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 881 [a prospective plaintiff lacks probable cause if his claim alleges facts he knows are untrue]; Soukup, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 292 [a litigant lacks probable cause “ ‘if he relies upon facts which he has no reasonable cause to believe to be true’ ”].) Accordingly, Judge Shaller’s findings are sufficient to raise triable issues of fact 22 on whether Whitaker lacked probable cause to pursue the Unruh Act claim.

2025(See Sheldon Appel, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 881 [a prospective plaintiff lacks probable cause if his claim alleges facts he knows are untrue]; Soukup, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 292 [a litigant lacks probable cause “ ‘if he relies upon facts which he has no reasonable cause to believe to be true’ ”].) Accordingly, Judge Shaller’s findings are sufficient to raise triable issues of fact 22 on whether Whitaker lacked probable cause to pursue the Unruh Act claim.

2025(See Sheldon Appel, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 881 [a prospective plaintiff lacks probable cause if his claim alleges facts he knows are untrue]; Soukup, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 292 [a litigant lacks probable cause “ ‘if he relies upon facts which he has no reasonable cause to believe to be true’ ”].) Accordingly, Judge Shaller’s findings are sufficient to raise triable issues of fact 22 on whether Whitaker lacked probable cause to pursue the Unruh Act claim.

2024(Id. at pp. *22-*27 [ 2023 WL 24218 , pp. *7-*8]; see Williams v. Wraxall (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 120, 130, fn. 7 [courts may take judicial notice of “the truth of the results reached … in documents such as orders, statements of decision, and judgments”].) Fourth, the County of Tulare’s motion to dismiss the ADA claim was granted with leave to amend.

2024(Id. at pp. *22-*27 [ 2023 WL 24218 , pp. *7-*8]; see Williams v. Wraxall (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 120, 130, fn. 7 [courts may take judicial notice of “the truth of the results reached … in documents such as orders, statements of decision, and judgments”].) Fourth, the County of Tulare’s motion to dismiss the ADA claim was granted with leave to amend.