ADA claim in New Mexico

2001Inc., 181 F.3d 1220, 1229 (11th Cir.1999) (holding that a thirty-eight day absence from work after a heart attack did not support claim that plaintiff was substantially limited in ability to work); Sanders v. Arneson Prods., Inc., 91 F.3d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that temporary psychological impairment with no residual effects was not of sufficient duration to be a disability under the ADA); Rakestraw v. Carpenter Co., 898 F.Supp. 386, 390 (N.D.Miss.1995) (determining that a back injury of limited duration which was later remedied was not sufficient to constitute a disability); Blant

2001Inc., 181 F.3d 1220, 1229 (11th Cir.1999) (holding that a thirty-eight day absence from work after a heart attack did not support claim that plaintiff was substantially limited in ability to work); Sanders v. Arneson Prods., Inc., 91 F.3d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that temporary psychological impairment with no residual effects was not of sufficient duration to be a disability under the ADA); Rakestraw v. Carpenter Co., 898 F.Supp. 386, 390 (N.D.Miss.1995) (determining that a back injury of limited duration which was later remedied was not sufficient to constitute a disability); Blant

2001Inc., 181 F.3d 1220, 1229 (11th Cir.1999) (holding that a thirty-eight day absence from work after a heart attack did not support claim that plaintiff was substantially limited in ability to work); Sanders v. Arneson Prods., Inc., 91 F.3d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that temporary psychological impairment with no residual effects was not of sufficient duration to be a disability under the ADA); Rakestraw v. Carpenter Co., 898 F.Supp. 386, 390 (N.D.Miss.1995) (determining that a back injury of limited duration which was later remedied was not sufficient to constitute a disability); Blant

2001Inc., 181 F.3d 1220, 1229 (11th Cir.1999) (holding that a thirty-eight day absence from work after a heart attack did not support claim that plaintiff was substantially limited in ability to work); Sanders v. Arneson Prods., Inc., 91 F.3d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that temporary psychological impairment with no residual effects was not of sufficient duration to be a disability under the ADA); Rakestraw v. Carpenter Co., 898 F.Supp. 386, 390 (N.D.Miss.1995) (determining that a back injury of limited duration which was later remedied was not sufficient to constitute a disability); Blant

2001Inc., 181 F.3d 1220, 1229 (11th Cir.1999) (holding that a thirty-eight day absence from work after a heart attack did not support claim that plaintiff was substantially limited in ability to work); Sanders v. Arneson Prods., Inc., 91 F.3d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that temporary psychological impairment with no residual effects was not of sufficient duration to be a disability under the ADA); Rakestraw v. Carpenter Co., 898 F.Supp. 386, 390 (N.D.Miss.1995) (determining that a back injury of limited duration which was later remedied was not sufficient to constitute a disability); Blant

2001Inc., 181 F.3d 1220, 1229 (11th Cir.1999) (holding that a thirty-eight day absence from work after a heart attack did not support claim that plaintiff was substantially limited in ability to work); Sanders v. Arneson Prods., Inc., 91 F.3d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that temporary psychological impairment with no residual effects was not of sufficient duration to be a disability under the ADA); Rakestraw v. Carpenter Co., 898 F.Supp. 386, 390 (N.D.Miss.1995) (determining that a back injury of limited duration which was later remedied was not sufficient to constitute a disability); Blant

2001Inc., 181 F.3d 1220, 1229 (11th Cir.1999) (holding that a thirty-eight day absence from work after a heart attack did not support claim that plaintiff was substantially limited in ability to work); Sanders v. Arneson Prods., Inc., 91 F.3d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that temporary psychological impairment with no residual effects was not of sufficient duration to be a disability under the ADA); Rakestraw v. Carpenter Co., 898 F.Supp. 386, 390 (N.D.Miss.1995) (determining that a back injury of limited duration which was later remedied was not sufficient to constitute a disability); Blant

2001Inc., 181 F.3d 1220, 1229 (11th Cir.1999) (holding that a thirty-eight day absence from work after a heart attack did not support claim that plaintiff was substantially limited in ability to work); Sanders v. Arneson Prods., Inc., 91 F.3d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that temporary psychological impairment with no residual effects was not of sufficient duration to be a disability under the ADA); Rakestraw v. Carpenter Co., 898 F.Supp. 386, 390 (N.D.Miss.1995) (determining that a back injury of limited duration which was later remedied was not sufficient to constitute a disability); Blant

2025Id. at 77, 80-81 .

2025Id. 13 {15} By contrast, in 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009), the United 14 States Supreme Court concluded that the CBA “clearly and unmistakably” required 15 the employees to arbitrate their age discrimination claim under the Age 16 Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), barring their federal lawsuit, because 11 1 the CBA 2 at issue explicitly listed claims arising under the ADEA as being subject 2 to the grievance and arbitration procedure.

2025Plaintiff maintains that “participating in any manner in an investigation of an alleged ADA violation” is engagement in a protected activity and cites Foster v. Mountain Coal Co., 830 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 2016).

2025Plaintiff maintains that “participating in any manner in an investigation of an alleged ADA violation” is engagement in a protected activity and cites Foster v. Mountain Coal Co., 830 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 2016).

2022See, e.g., Johnny S., Sr., 2009-NMCA-032, ¶ 2 (similarly rejecting an ADA challenge, in the context of an appeal from termination of parental rights, where the argument was not preserved). {4} Mother also continues to argue that the Department failed to make reasonable efforts to assist her in adjusting the conditions that rendered her unable to properly care for Child. [MIO 20-22] However, as described at greater length in the notice of proposed summary disposition, [CN 3-4] over the course of a three-year period the Department made extensive efforts to assist Mother, [RP 917-37] well beyond

2022See, e.g., Johnny S., Sr., 2009-NMCA-032, ¶ 2 (similarly rejecting an ADA challenge, in the context of an appeal from termination of parental rights, where the argument was not preserved). {4} Mother also continues to argue that the Department failed to make reasonable efforts to assist her in adjusting the conditions that rendered her unable to properly care for Child. [MIO 20-22] However, as described at greater length in the notice of proposed summary disposition, [CN 3-4] over the course of a three-year period the Department made extensive efforts to assist Mother, [RP 917-37] well beyond

2003See id.; see also Harding v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 907 F.Supp. 386, 390 (MD.Fla.1995) (“[A]n entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits is a privilege of employment subject to the antidiscrimination provisions of the ADA.”). {16} Employer/Insurer essentially argues that Workers do not have standing to bring an ADA claim.

2003See id.; see also Harding v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 907 F.Supp. 386, 390 (MD.Fla.1995) (“[A]n entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits is a privilege of employment subject to the antidiscrimination provisions of the ADA.”). {16} Employer/Insurer essentially argues that Workers do not have standing to bring an ADA claim.

1997See, e.g., Stone v. Daviess County Div. of Children & Family Servs., 656 N.E.2d 824, 830-31 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (where state statute required state to provide services to parents before terminating parental rights, an ADA violation would be grounds for attacking the termination, but where the statute providing grounds for termination does not include a duty to provide services, an ADA discrimination claim cannot be the basis to attack a termination order).

1997See, e.g., Stone v. Daviess County Div. of Children & Family Servs., 656 N.E.2d 824, 830-31 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (where state statute required state to provide services to parents before terminating parental rights, an ADA violation would be grounds for attacking the termination, but where the statute providing grounds for termination does not include a duty to provide services, an ADA discrimination claim cannot be the basis to attack a termination order).

1997Cf. In re Torrance P., 187 Wis.2d 10 , 522 N.W.2d 243, 245-46 (1994) (whether state made diligent effort to provide parents with court-ordered services as required by state statute was separate inquiry from the question of whether state made reasonable accommodations under ADA). 18.

1997Cf. In re Torrance P., 187 Wis.2d 10 , 522 N.W.2d 243, 245-46 (1994) (whether state made diligent effort to provide parents with court-ordered services as required by state statute was separate inquiry from the question of whether state made reasonable accommodations under ADA). 18.