ADA claim in Massachusetts

2024In re McDonough, 457 Mass. 512, 518 (2010) (applying both art. 114 and Title II of ADA). -31- McDonough, 457 Mass. 512,523 (2010), citing Shedlock v. Department of Corr., 442 Mass. 844, 856 (2004) (it is " incumbent" on a plaintiff alleging art. 114 or ADA violation "to request accommodation in the first instance"); Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254,260 (1st Cir. 2001) (under ADA, "a person normally must make a specific request for the modification in question").

2024In re McDonough, 457 Mass. 512, 518 (2010) (applying both art. 114 and Title II of ADA). -31- McDonough, 457 Mass. 512,523 (2010), citing Shedlock v. Department of Corr., 442 Mass. 844, 856 (2004) (it is " incumbent" on a plaintiff alleging art. 114 or ADA violation "to request accommodation in the first instance"); Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254,260 (1st Cir. 2001) (under ADA, "a person normally must make a specific request for the modification in question").

2024In re McDonough, 457 Mass. 512, 518 (2010) (applying both art. 114 and Title II of ADA). -31- McDonough, 457 Mass. 512,523 (2010), citing Shedlock v. Department of Corr., 442 Mass. 844, 856 (2004) (it is " incumbent" on a plaintiff alleging art. 114 or ADA violation "to request accommodation in the first instance"); Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254,260 (1st Cir. 2001) (under ADA, "a person normally must make a specific request for the modification in question").

2024In re McDonough, 457 Mass. 512, 518 (2010) (applying both art. 114 and Title II of ADA). -31- McDonough, 457 Mass. 512,523 (2010), citing Shedlock v. Department of Corr., 442 Mass. 844, 856 (2004) (it is " incumbent" on a plaintiff alleging art. 114 or ADA violation "to request accommodation in the first instance"); Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254,260 (1st Cir. 2001) (under ADA, "a person normally must make a specific request for the modification in question").

2010Auth. v. Bridge-waters, 452 Mass. 833, 845-848 (2009) (housing authority had notice of tenant’s disability despite lack of express notice from tenant, and although tenant did not request accommodation expressly, tenant’s acts and assertions “amounted to a request for an accommodation”; “[t]o make a reasonable accommodation request, no ‘magic’ words are required”); Robertson v. Las Animas County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 500 E3d 1185, 1197 (10th Cir. 2007), and cases cited (when need of individual with disability for accommodation is “obvious,” individual’s “failure to expressly ‘request’ ” accommodatio

2009Mrs. Grissom’s Salads, Inc., U.S. Ct. App., No. 98-5258 (6th Cir. July 22, 1999) (summary judgment granted because physician’s report for driver’s certification “did not qualify him to drive” in light of the conflicting opinion by physician for motor carrier); EEOC v. Allied Sys., Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 515, 522 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (dismissing driver’s ADA discrimination on summary judgment because driver “failed to obtain” determination from DOT “during the time periods at issue,” that he was not a qualified individual with a disability); Clark vs.

2009Co., 212 F.3d 969, 974 (7th Cir. 2000) (driver’s failure to obtain DOT certification “fatal to his ADA claim”); King vs.

1999See Duffy v. Ireland, 98 F.3d 447 , 455 (9th Cir. 1996); Saunders v. Horn, 959 F.Supp. 689, 697 (E.D.

1999See Duffy v. Ireland, 98 F.3d 447 , 455 (9th Cir. 1996); Saunders v. Horn, 959 F.Supp. 689, 697 (E.D.

1999V.I. 1997) (housing of inmate who used cane, but had no mental illness, with mentally ill inmates posed “unnecessary and unwarranted risk of personal injury” and violated ADA); Saunders, supra, at 697 (plaintiff stated ADA claim when he suffered difficulty in walking due to having been deprived of his orthopedic shoes and in using bathroom facilities which were not designed to reasonably accommodate his disability).