ADA claim in New Jersey

2021Applying a state workers’ compensation law’s exclusivity provision to bar an individual’s ADA claim would violate the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution and seriously diminish the civil rights protection Congress granted to persons with disabilities. [EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Workers’ Compensation and the ADA (Sept. 3, 1996).] Although the Supremacy Clause is not applicable here, we have long held that “our LAD’s broad remedial purposes and the wide scope of its coverage for disabilities as compared to the ADA support an expansive view of protecting rights of persons with disabilities

2021Applying a state workers’ compensation law’s exclusivity provision to bar an individual’s ADA claim would violate the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution and seriously diminish the civil rights protection Congress granted to persons with disabilities. [EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Workers’ Compensation and the ADA (Sept. 3, 1996).] Although the Supremacy Clause is not applicable here, we have long held that “our LAD’s broad remedial purposes and the wide scope of its coverage for disabilities as compared to the ADA support an expansive view of protecting rights of persons with disabilities

2025"Every [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 claim is subject to the [SOL] applicable to personal injury claims in the state where the cause of action arose." Heyert v. Taddese, 431 N.J.

2025"Every [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 claim is subject to the [SOL] applicable to personal injury claims in the state where the cause of action arose." Heyert v. Taddese, 431 N.J.

2022In sum, plaintiff argues the judge erroneously: (1) determined sleep apnea is not a disability by incorrectly applying the ADA standard, and further finding NJ Transit did not perceive plaintiff to have a disability; (2) applied the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973), and incorrectly concluded 5 In March 2017, plaintiff filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, alleging disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 to -12213; the Rehabilitation Act

2022In sum, plaintiff argues the judge erroneously: (1) determined sleep apnea is not a disability by incorrectly applying the ADA standard, and further finding NJ Transit did not perceive plaintiff to have a disability; (2) applied the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973), and incorrectly concluded 5 In March 2017, plaintiff filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, alleging disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 to -12213; the Rehabilitation Act

2017Co., 173 N.J. 1, 16 (2002) (concluding that unlike ADA, disability under LAD need not be “severe” or “immutable”). 21 ADA claim, the LAD claim should have survived the directed- verdict motion, as it was not precluded by CEPA.

2017The Legislature, “[i]n justifying the LAD’s enactment,” declared “abhorrence to [workplace] discrimination in this state.” Rodriguez v. Raymours Furniture Co., 225 N.J. 343, 355 (2016).

2015See Allen, supra, 167 N.J. at 75 (noting that rules of "strict statutory construction" control regarding a statute that may "derogate[] sovereignty"); see also Henebema v. S. Jersey Transp.

2015See Allen, supra, 167 N.J. at 75 (noting that rules of "strict statutory construction" control regarding a statute that may "derogate[] sovereignty"); see also Henebema v. S. Jersey Transp.

2015We conclude that the State's sovereign immunity extends to defendants on plaintiff's ADA claim because defendants are considered an "arm of the State." Alden, supra, 527 U.S. at 756-57 , 119 S. Ct. at 2267-68 , 144 L.

2015We conclude that the State's sovereign immunity extends to defendants on plaintiff's ADA claim because defendants are considered an "arm of the State." Alden, supra, 527 U.S. at 756-57 , 119 S. Ct. at 2267-68 , 144 L.

2015We conclude that the State of New Jersey has immunity from suit under the ADA and that this immunity extends to defendants. 13 A-3357-12T3 i. The United States Supreme Court declared in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 , 121 S. Ct. 955, 967-68 , 148 L.

2015We conclude that the State of New Jersey has immunity from suit under the ADA and that this immunity extends to defendants. 13 A-3357-12T3 i. The United States Supreme Court declared in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 , 121 S. Ct. 955, 967-68 , 148 L.

2015Auth., 219 N.J. 481, 490 (2014) (noting in the context of claims under the TCA that "[g]enerally, immunity prevails over liability to the extent that immunity has become the rule and liability is the exception"). 20 A-3357-12T3 In other words, he would have needed to establish his failure to accommodate claim under the NJLAD or not at all.11 Here, because plaintiff waited until trial to dismiss his NJLAD claim, his proffer to the jury would have been substantially the same even if the ADA claim had been dismissed sooner.

2015Auth., 219 N.J. 481, 490 (2014) (noting in the context of claims under the TCA that "[g]enerally, immunity prevails over liability to the extent that immunity has become the rule and liability is the exception"). 20 A-3357-12T3 In other words, he would have needed to establish his failure to accommodate claim under the NJLAD or not at all.11 Here, because plaintiff waited until trial to dismiss his NJLAD claim, his proffer to the jury would have been substantially the same even if the ADA claim had been dismissed sooner.

2014Mich. 1996) ("With respect to the [Americans with Disabilities Act, (ADA)] claim, the contractual limitation certainly effected a 'practical abrogation' of the right to file an ADA claim and is, therefore unreasonable[.]"); Scott v. Guardsmark Sec., 874 F. Supp. 117, 121 (D.S.C. 1995) (rejecting a six-month contractual limitation period in an ADA case because it was "abhorrent to public policy," "required an employee to waive his or her federal protections," and "reduce[d] the time limits to assert a federal cause of action").

2014Mich. 1996) ("With respect to the [Americans with Disabilities Act, (ADA)] claim, the contractual limitation certainly effected a 'practical abrogation' of the right to file an ADA claim and is, therefore unreasonable[.]"); Scott v. Guardsmark Sec., 874 F. Supp. 117, 121 (D.S.C. 1995) (rejecting a six-month contractual limitation period in an ADA case because it was "abhorrent to public policy," "required an employee to waive his or her federal protections," and "reduce[d] the time limits to assert a federal cause of action").

2014Indeed, the Supreme Court has recently observed that the Legislature has not "amended the LAD to afford rights to the disabled that are different from those found in Section 504 [of the RA] and the ADA . . . ." Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 383, 406 (2010); see also Chisolm v. McManimon, 275 F.3d 315 , 324-25 n.9 (3d Cir. 2001) (analyzing an ADA claim "with the understanding that the principles will apply equally to the [RA] and the [LAD] claims").

2014Indeed, the Supreme Court has recently observed that the Legislature has not "amended the LAD to afford rights to the disabled that are different from those found in Section 504 [of the RA] and the ADA . . . ." Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 383, 406 (2010); see also Chisolm v. McManimon, 275 F.3d 315 , 324-25 n.9 (3d Cir. 2001) (analyzing an ADA claim "with the understanding that the principles will apply equally to the [RA] and the [LAD] claims").

2002Bowers v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 118 F.Supp. 2d 494, 511 (D.N.J.2000) (citation omitted).

2002Bowers v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 118 F.Supp. 2d 494, 511 (D.N.J.2000) (citation omitted).