12 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In re the Marriage of Castrogreen2 sentences2016See Castro and Castro, 51 Or App 707, 710 , 626 P2d 950 (1981) (“ORCP 54 B(2) is the rule allowing a motion to dismiss to test the sufficiency of evidence at the close of plaintiffs case in nonjury cases; ORCP 60 allows a motion for directed verdict to test the sufficiency of the evidence at the close of plaintiffs case in jury cases.”). 2016See Castro and Castro, 51 Or App 707, 710 , 626 P2d 950 (1981) (“ORCP 54 B(2) is the rule allowing a motion to dismiss to test the sufficiency of evidence at the close of plaintiffs case in nonjury cases; ORCP 60 allows a motion for directed verdict to test the sufficiency of the evidence at the close of plaintiffs case in jury cases.”). | 1 | 2 |
Beck v. City of Portlandgreen2 sentences2014See Hale v. State of Oregon, 259 Or App 379, 383 , 314 P3d 345 (2013), rev den, 354 Or 840 (2014) (“Courts cannot exercise jurisdiction over nonjusticiable controversies because a court cannot render advisory opinions.”); Beck v. City of Portland, 202 Or App 360, 367-68 , 122 P3d 131 (2005) (“[w]here a defendant brings a motion to dismiss a claim for declaratory relief* * * on the ground that the claim is not justiciable, the defendant is, in fact, asserting that the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction[.]”). 2014See Hale v. State of Oregon, 259 Or App 379, 383 , 314 P3d 345 (2013), rev den, 354 Or 840 (2014) (“Courts cannot exercise jurisdiction over nonjusticiable controversies because a court cannot render advisory opinions.”); Beck v. City of Portland, 202 Or App 360, 367-68 , 122 P3d 131 (2005) (“[w]here a defendant brings a motion to dismiss a claim for declaratory relief* * * on the ground that the claim is not justiciable, the defendant is, in fact, asserting that the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction[.]”). | 1 | 1 |
Hale v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See Hale v. State of Oregon, 259 Or App 379, 383 , 314 P3d 345 (2013), rev den, 354 Or 840 (2014) (“Courts cannot exercise jurisdiction over nonjusticiable controversies because a court cannot render advisory opinions.”); Beck v. City of Portland, 202 Or App 360, 367-68 , 122 P3d 131 (2005) (“[w]here a defendant brings a motion to dismiss a claim for declaratory relief* * * on the ground that the claim is not justiciable, the defendant is, in fact, asserting that the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction[.]”). 2014See Hale v. State of Oregon, 259 Or App 379, 383 , 314 P3d 345 (2013), rev den, 354 Or 840 (2014) (“Courts cannot exercise jurisdiction over nonjusticiable controversies because a court cannot render advisory opinions.”); Beck v. City of Portland, 202 Or App 360, 367-68 , 122 P3d 131 (2005) (“[w]here a defendant brings a motion to dismiss a claim for declaratory relief* * * on the ground that the claim is not justiciable, the defendant is, in fact, asserting that the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction[.]”). | 1 | 1 |
Dotson v. Smithgreen2 sentences2007See Dotson v. Smith, 307 Or 132, 137-38 , 764 P2d 540 (1988) (allegations in claim against one defendant may not be used to support a motion to dismiss a claim against a different defendant under ORCP 21 A(9)); cf. ORCP 16 B and D (providing that separate claims must be stated separately but that parties may incorporate by reference allegations from one claim in another). 2007See Dotson v. Smith, 307 Or 132, 137-38 , 764 P2d 540 (1988) (allegations in claim against one defendant may not be used to support a motion to dismiss a claim against a different defendant under ORCP 21 A(9)); cf. ORCP 16 B and D (providing that separate claims must be stated separately but that parties may incorporate by reference allegations from one claim in another). | 1 | 1 |
Boothby v. D.R. Johnson Lumber Co.green2 sentences2007In Boothby , however, the defendant never had any right to control nor did it ever exercise any control over the independent contractor whose negligence harmed the plaintiff. 341 Or. at 41, 46 , 137 P.3d 699 . 2007In Boothby , however, the defendant never had any right to control nor did it ever exercise any control over the independent contractor whose negligence harmed the plaintiff. 341 Or. at 41, 46 , 137 P.3d 699 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hernandez v. Catholic Health Initiatives
green
2 sentences2026Hernandez v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 311 Or App 70, 72 , 490 P3d 166 (2021). 2026Hernandez v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 311 Or App 70, 72 , 490 P3d 166 (2021). | 2 | 2026–2026 |
Fowler v. Cooley
green
2 sentences2016We review the trial court’s denial of that motion, “‘[v]iewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it in the light most favorable to plaintiff.’” Fowler v. Cooley, 239 Or App 338, 344 , 245 P3d 155 (2010) (quoting Thorson v. Dept. of Justice, 171 Or App 704, 710 , 15 P3d 1005 (2000)). 2016We review the trial court’s denial of that motion, “‘[v]iewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it in the light most favorable to plaintiff.’” Fowler v. Cooley, 239 Or App 338, 344 , 245 P3d 155 (2010) (quoting Thorson v. Dept. of Justice, 171 Or App 704, 710 , 15 P3d 1005 (2000)). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Thorson v. State
green
2 sentences2016We review the trial court’s denial of that motion, “‘[v]iewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it in the light most favorable to plaintiff.’” Fowler v. Cooley, 239 Or App 338, 344 , 245 P3d 155 (2010) (quoting Thorson v. Dept. of Justice, 171 Or App 704, 710 , 15 P3d 1005 (2000)). 2016We review the trial court’s denial of that motion, “‘[v]iewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it in the light most favorable to plaintiff.’” Fowler v. Cooley, 239 Or App 338, 344 , 245 P3d 155 (2010) (quoting Thorson v. Dept. of Justice, 171 Or App 704, 710 , 15 P3d 1005 (2000)). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State Ex Rel. Osborne v. Cook
green
2 sentences2010Relator replies that, consistently with State ex rel Osborne v. Cook, 185 Or App 317, 325 , 59 P3d 531 (2002), a motion to dismiss an alternative writ of mandamus is the functional equivalent of a motion to dismiss a claim under ORCP 21 A(8) for failure to state a claim and that this court will not consider an argument made for the first time on appeal as an alternative basis for affirmance of a trial court’s dismissal of an alternative writ. 2010Relator replies that, consistently with State ex rel Osborne v. Cook, 185 Or App 317, 325 , 59 P3d 531 (2002), a motion to dismiss an alternative writ of mandamus is the functional equivalent of a motion to dismiss a claim under ORCP 21 A(8) for failure to state a claim and that this court will not consider an argument made for the first time on appeal as an alternative basis for affirmance of a trial court’s dismissal of an alternative writ. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Poddar v. Clatsop County
green
1 sentence2005Nonetheless, we concluded that, despite the defendant's abandonment of its justiciability argument on appeal, we were obliged to address the issue on our own "because it affect[ed] the trial court's jurisdiction to enter the judgments." Id. at 164, 2 P.3d 929 . [3] Thus, where a defendant brings a motion to dismiss a claim for declaratory relief for failure to state a claim on the ground that the claim is not justiciable, the defendant is, in fact, asserting that the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, which presents an issue under ORCP 21 A(1) rather than ORCP 21 A(8). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Scholes v. Sipco Services & Marine, Inc.
green
2 sentences1999Scholes v. Sipco Services & Marine, Inc., 103 Or App 503, 506 , 798 P2d 694 (1990). 1999Scholes v. Sipco Services & Marine, Inc., 103 Or App 503, 506 , 798 P2d 694 (1990). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Morast v. Lance
green
1 sentence1994It is difficult to perceive how the defendants could thus have acted as third parties in removing plaintiff from both positions of employment.” Morast v. Lance, supra, 631 F Supp at 482 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Buchler v. Oregon Corrections Div.
green
2 sentences1993The majority's analysis is legally sound when it declines to apply a motion to dismiss standard to a summary judgment case, 316 Or. at 511 , 853 P.2d at 804 , but not when, in so doing, the majority sets up Kimbler [1] as a straw man to overrule by declining to apply Kimbler 's motion to dismiss analysis in this summary judgment case, 316 Or. at 509-514 , 853 P.2d at 803-806 . 1993The majority's analysis is legally sound when it declines to apply a motion to dismiss standard to a summary judgment case, 316 Or. at 511 , 853 P.2d at 804 , but not when, in so doing, the majority sets up Kimbler [1] as a straw man to overrule by declining to apply Kimbler 's motion to dismiss analysis in this summary judgment case, 316 Or. at 509-514 , 853 P.2d at 803-806 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
G. L. v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Inc.
green
2 sentences1988No. 1J, 303 Or 1 , 734 P2d 1326 (1987), and related decisions by the Supreme Court and this court, the trial court should not have dismissed this negligence claim at the pleading stage on the basis of Simpson’s contention that she had no duty “to the adverse party.” Although Fazzolari and its sequelae have come to loom large in recent Oregon tort law, they have not become the exclusive determinant in all tort cases, see G.L. v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Inc., 306 Or 54 , 757 P2d 1347 (1988), and we do not perceive how they have anything to do with the negligence claim against Simpson. 1988No. 1J, 303 Or 1 , 734 P2d 1326 (1987), and related decisions by the Supreme Court and this court, the trial court should not have dismissed this negligence claim at the pleading stage on the basis of Simpson’s contention that she had no duty “to the adverse party.” Although Fazzolari and its sequelae have come to loom large in recent Oregon tort law, they have not become the exclusive determinant in all tort cases, see G.L. v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Inc., 306 Or 54 , 757 P2d 1347 (1988), and we do not perceive how they have anything to do with the negligence claim against Simpson. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Fazzolari v. Portland School District No. 1J
green
2 sentences1988No. 1J, 303 Or 1 , 734 P2d 1326 (1987), and related decisions by the Supreme Court and this court, the trial court should not have dismissed this negligence claim at the pleading stage on the basis of Simpson’s contention that she had no duty “to the adverse party.” Although Fazzolari and its sequelae have come to loom large in recent Oregon tort law, they have not become the exclusive determinant in all tort cases, see G.L. v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Inc., 306 Or 54 , 757 P2d 1347 (1988), and we do not perceive how they have anything to do with the negligence claim against Simpson. 1988No. 1J, 303 Or 1 , 734 P2d 1326 (1987), and related decisions by the Supreme Court and this court, the trial court should not have dismissed this negligence claim at the pleading stage on the basis of Simpson’s contention that she had no duty “to the adverse party.” Although Fazzolari and its sequelae have come to loom large in recent Oregon tort law, they have not become the exclusive determinant in all tort cases, see G.L. v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Inc., 306 Or 54 , 757 P2d 1347 (1988), and we do not perceive how they have anything to do with the negligence claim against Simpson. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.