motion to dismiss rule in Minnesota

2014Subdivision 6 mandates that a motion to dismiss hearing must be set “at least 45 days from the date of service of the motion,” and the curative affidavits must be provided “before the hearing.” Minn. Stat. § 145.682 , subd. 6(c); see also Wesely, 806 N.W.2d at 41-42 (“[T]he safe-harbor period is an automatic, 45-day delay before the court hears any arguments or makes any decisions regarding deficiencies in the affidavit.”).

2014Subdivision 6 mandates that a motion to dismiss hearing must be set “at least 45 days from the date of service of the motion,” and the curative affidavits must be provided “before the hearing.” MinmStat. § 145.682, subd. 6(c); see also Wesely, 806 N.W.2d at 41-42 (“[T]he safe-harbor period is an automatic, 45-day delay before the court hears any arguments or makes any decisions regarding deficiencies in the affi davit.”).

2025In reviewing a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under rule 12.02(e), an appellate court should “construe the complaint to allow the claim to go forward unless there is no way to construe the alleged facts—and the inferences drawn from those facts—in support of the claim.” Demskie v. U.S. Bank N.A., 7 N.W.3d 382, 386 (Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted).

2016On review of a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under rule 12.02(e), “we consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, accepting those facts as true.” Sipe v. STS Mfg., Inc., 834 N.W.2d 683, 686 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted).

2016A claim is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss “if it is possible on any evidence which might be produced, consistent with the pleader’s theory, to grant the relief demanded.” N. States Power Co. v. Franklin, 265 Minn. 391, 395 , 122 N.W.2d 26, 29 (1963); see also Bahr v. Capella Univ., 788 N.W.2d 76, 80 (Minn. 2010).

2016A claim is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss “if it is possible on any evidence which might be produced, consistent with the pleader’s theory, to grant the relief demanded.” N. States Power Co. v. Franklin, 265 Minn. 391, 395 , 122 N.W.2d 26, 29 (1963); see also Bahr v. Capella Univ., 788 N.W.2d 76, 80 (Minn. 2010).

2016A claim is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss “if it is possible on any evidence which might be produced, consistent with the pleader’s theory, to grant the relief demanded.” N. States Power Co. v. Franklin, 265 Minn. 391, 395 , 122 N.W.2d 26, 29 (1963); see also Bahr v. Capella Univ., 788 N.W.2d 76, 80 (Minn. 2010).

2014In Superior Edge, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., the Minnesota federal district court denied a motion to dismiss a claim under the MUTSA and granted a motion to dismiss a conversion claim when “there [was] no information that [plaintiff] allege[d] was converted that it [did] not also allege is a trade secret.” 964 F.Supp.2d 1017, 1039-40 (D.

2014See Bodah, 663 N.W.2d at 553 , (stating that in reviewing 12.02(e) dismissal, appellate courts “consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, accepting those facts as true and must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party”).