motion to dismiss hearing in Georgia

2025See Jefferson v. Stripling, 316 Ga. App. 197, 201 (3) ( 728 SE2d 826 ) (2012); see also Metzler v. Rowell, 248 Ga. App. 596, 598 (1) ( 547 SE2d 311 ) (2001) (OCGA § 9-11-11.1 “provides for a motion to dismiss and hearing on this issue”).

2025See Jefferson v. Stripling, 316 Ga. App. 197, 201 (3) ( 728 SE2d 826 ) (2012); see also Metzler v. Rowell, 248 Ga. App. 596, 598 (1) ( 547 SE2d 311 ) (2001) (OCGA § 9-11-11.1 “provides for a motion to dismiss and hearing on this issue”).

2025See Backensto v. Ga. Dept. of Transp., 291 Ga. App. 293, 293-294 ( 661 SE2d 647 ) (2008) (affirming trial court’s finding of actual prejudice to support a motion to dismiss since the plaintiff failed to include an evidentiary transcript of the motion hearing); Graham v. Haley, 224 Ga. 498, 500 (3) ( 162 SE2d 346 ) (1968) (finding a transcript of the condemnation proceeding was critical for the appellate court to determine whether the trial court should have directed a verdict rather than submitting the case to a jury).

2025See Backensto v. Ga. Dept. of Transp., 291 Ga. App. 293, 293-294 ( 661 SE2d 647 ) (2008) (affirming trial court’s finding of actual prejudice to support a motion to dismiss since the plaintiff failed to include an evidentiary transcript of the motion hearing); Graham v. Haley, 224 Ga. 498, 500 (3) ( 162 SE2d 346 ) (1968) (finding a transcript of the condemnation proceeding was critical for the appellate court to determine whether the trial court should have directed a verdict rather than submitting the case to a jury).

2018Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the claim under the Industrial Loan Act, see id. at 411 (2), 802 S.E.2d 865 , and it reversed the denial of the motion to dismiss the claim under the Payday Lending Act.

2018Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the claim under the Industrial Loan Act, see id. at 411 (2), and it reversed the denial of the motion to dismiss the claim under the Payday Lending Act.

2015See Plumides v. American Engines & Transmissions, 227 Ga. App. 885 ( 490 SE2d 552 ) (1997) (trial court authorized to find delay inexcusable; trial court’s order reflected that although appellant claimed he could not afford transcript, appellant admitted he did not qualify as a pauper).

2015See Plumides v. American Engines & Transmissions, 227 Ga. App. 885 ( 490 SE2d 552 ) (1997) (trial court authorized to find delay inexcusable; trial court’s order reflected that although appellant claimed he could not afford transcript, appellant admitted he did not qualify as a pauper).

2025See Backensto v. Ga. Dept. of Transp., 291 Ga. App. 293, 293-294 ( 661 SE2d 647 ) (2008) (affirming trial court’s finding of actual prejudice to support a motion to dismiss since the plaintiff failed to include an evidentiary transcript of the motion hearing); Graham v. Haley, 224 Ga. 498, 500 (3) ( 162 SE2d 346 ) (1968) (finding a transcript of the condemnation proceeding was critical for the appellate court to determine whether the trial court should have directed a verdict rather than submitting the case to a jury).

2025See Backensto v. Ga. Dept. of Transp., 291 Ga. App. 293, 293-294 ( 661 SE2d 647 ) (2008) (affirming trial court’s finding of actual prejudice to support a motion to dismiss since the plaintiff failed to include an evidentiary transcript of the motion hearing); Graham v. Haley, 224 Ga. 498, 500 (3) ( 162 SE2d 346 ) (1968) (finding a transcript of the condemnation proceeding was critical for the appellate court to determine whether the trial court should have directed a verdict rather than submitting the case to a jury).

2025See Jefferson v. Stripling, 316 Ga. App. 197, 201 (3) ( 728 SE2d 826 ) (2012); see also Metzler v. Rowell, 248 Ga. App. 596, 598 (1) ( 547 SE2d 311 ) (2001) (OCGA § 9-11-11.1 “provides for a motion to dismiss and hearing on this issue”).

2025See Jefferson v. Stripling, 316 Ga. App. 197, 201 (3) ( 728 SE2d 826 ) (2012); see also Metzler v. Rowell, 248 Ga. App. 596, 598 (1) ( 547 SE2d 311 ) (2001) (OCGA § 9-11-11.1 “provides for a motion to dismiss and hearing on this issue”).

2025“In 2002, the Georgia legislature enacted OCGA § 36-92-1 et seq., an Act titled ‘Waiver of Immunity for Motor Vehicle Claims.’” Gwinnett County v. Sargent, 321 Ga. App. 191, 195 (2) ( 738 SE2d 716 ) (2013).

2025“In 2002, the Georgia legislature enacted OCGA § 36-92-1 et seq., an Act titled ‘Waiver of Immunity for Motor Vehicle Claims.’” Gwinnett County v. Sargent, 321 Ga. App. 191, 195 (2) ( 738 SE2d 716 ) (2013).

2025This construction 3 comports with our Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor v. Public Convalescent Svc., 245 Ga. 805, 806 (2) ( 267 SE2d 242 ) (1980), which held in another context that statutory language providing that an issue “shall be heard and determined by the court” establishes a “clear . . . mandate for a hearing.” See also Boyd v. JohnGalt Holdings, 318 Ga. App. 866, 869 (2) ( 736 SE2d 459 ) (2012) (citing Taylor and noting in that context that “[t]he Supreme Court of Georgia has interpreted this language to mean that a hearing is required”).

2025This construction 3 comports with our Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor v. Public Convalescent Svc., 245 Ga. 805, 806 (2) ( 267 SE2d 242 ) (1980), which held in another context that statutory language providing that an issue “shall be heard and determined by the court” establishes a “clear . . . mandate for a hearing.” See also Boyd v. JohnGalt Holdings, 318 Ga. App. 866, 869 (2) ( 736 SE2d 459 ) (2012) (citing Taylor and noting in that context that “[t]he Supreme Court of Georgia has interpreted this language to mean that a hearing is required”).

2025This construction 3 comports with our Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor v. Public Convalescent Svc., 245 Ga. 805, 806 (2) ( 267 SE2d 242 ) (1980), which held in another context that statutory language providing that an issue “shall be heard and determined by the court” establishes a “clear . . . mandate for a hearing.” See also Boyd v. JohnGalt Holdings, 318 Ga. App. 866, 869 (2) ( 736 SE2d 459 ) (2012) (citing Taylor and noting in that context that “[t]he Supreme Court of Georgia has interpreted this language to mean that a hearing is required”).

2025This construction 3 comports with our Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor v. Public Convalescent Svc., 245 Ga. 805, 806 (2) ( 267 SE2d 242 ) (1980), which held in another context that statutory language providing that an issue “shall be heard and determined by the court” establishes a “clear . . . mandate for a hearing.” See also Boyd v. JohnGalt Holdings, 318 Ga. App. 866, 869 (2) ( 736 SE2d 459 ) (2012) (citing Taylor and noting in that context that “[t]he Supreme Court of Georgia has interpreted this language to mean that a hearing is required”).

2024Forms v. Forsyth County, 317 Ga. 636, 644 (2) ( 893 SE2d 32 ) (2023) (citations and punctuation omitted).

2023See also BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. v. Wedereit, 297 Ga. 313, 314 ( 773 SE2d 711 ) (2015) (to grant summary judgment to a party sua sponte, “the trial court must ensure that the party against whom summary judgment is rendered is given full and fair notice and opportunity to respond prior to entry of summary judgment”) (citation and 6 punctuation omitted); Hames v. Hames, 263 Ga. 752, 752-753 ( 438 SE2d 630 ) (1994) (where trial court issued ruling on party’s modification of child support claim at a hearing that was scheduled for unrelated matter, party did not receive proper notice that he

2023See also BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. v. Wedereit, 297 Ga. 313, 314 ( 773 SE2d 711 ) (2015) (to grant summary judgment to a party sua sponte, “the trial court must ensure that the party against whom summary judgment is rendered is given full and fair notice and opportunity to respond prior to entry of summary judgment”) (citation and 6 punctuation omitted); Hames v. Hames, 263 Ga. 752, 752-753 ( 438 SE2d 630 ) (1994) (where trial court issued ruling on party’s modification of child support claim at a hearing that was scheduled for unrelated matter, party did not receive proper notice that he

2023See also BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. v. Wedereit, 297 Ga. 313, 314 ( 773 SE2d 711 ) (2015) (to grant summary judgment to a party sua sponte, “the trial court must ensure that the party against whom summary judgment is rendered is given full and fair notice and opportunity to respond prior to entry of summary judgment”) (citation and 6 punctuation omitted); Hames v. Hames, 263 Ga. 752, 752-753 ( 438 SE2d 630 ) (1994) (where trial court issued ruling on party’s modification of child support claim at a hearing that was scheduled for unrelated matter, party did not receive proper notice that he

2023See also BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. v. Wedereit, 297 Ga. 313, 314 ( 773 SE2d 711 ) (2015) (to grant summary judgment to a party sua sponte, “the trial court must ensure that the party against whom summary judgment is rendered is given full and fair notice and opportunity to respond prior to entry of summary judgment”) (citation and 6 punctuation omitted); Hames v. Hames, 263 Ga. 752, 752-753 ( 438 SE2d 630 ) (1994) (where trial court issued ruling on party’s modification of child support claim at a hearing that was scheduled for unrelated matter, party did not receive proper notice that he

2022See Jarrard v. United States Parcel Service, Inc., 242 Ga. App. 58, 61-62 ( 529 SE2d 144 ) (2000) (finding no element of outrageousness where employer, who knew of employee’s emotional problems, conducted single brutal job evaluation of employee); Harris v. Leader, 231 Ga. App. 709, 712 (1) (b) ( 499 SE2d 374 (1998) (finding psychiatrist who expressed 13 through discovery would be relevant to the conduct about which Mayorga actually complains – the words as written on the death certificate.17 Indeed, this conduct must be viewed in isolation because Mayorga does not complain of any other acts o

2022See Jarrard v. United States Parcel Service, Inc., 242 Ga. App. 58, 61-62 ( 529 SE2d 144 ) (2000) (finding no element of outrageousness where employer, who knew of employee’s emotional problems, conducted single brutal job evaluation of employee); Harris v. Leader, 231 Ga. App. 709, 712 (1) (b) ( 499 SE2d 374 (1998) (finding psychiatrist who expressed 13 through discovery would be relevant to the conduct about which Mayorga actually complains – the words as written on the death certificate.17 Indeed, this conduct must be viewed in isolation because Mayorga does not complain of any other acts o

2022See Jarrard v. United States Parcel Service, Inc., 242 Ga. App. 58, 61-62 ( 529 SE2d 144 ) (2000) (finding no element of outrageousness where employer, who knew of employee’s emotional problems, conducted single brutal job evaluation of employee); Harris v. Leader, 231 Ga. App. 709, 712 (1) (b) ( 499 SE2d 374 (1998) (finding psychiatrist who expressed 13 through discovery would be relevant to the conduct about which Mayorga actually complains – the words as written on the death certificate.17 Indeed, this conduct must be viewed in isolation because Mayorga does not complain of any other acts o

2022See Jarrard v. United States Parcel Service, Inc., 242 Ga. App. 58, 61-62 ( 529 SE2d 144 ) (2000) (finding no element of outrageousness where employer, who knew of employee’s emotional problems, conducted single brutal job evaluation of employee); Harris v. Leader, 231 Ga. App. 709, 712 (1) (b) ( 499 SE2d 374 (1998) (finding psychiatrist who expressed 13 through discovery would be relevant to the conduct about which Mayorga actually complains – the words as written on the death certificate.17 Indeed, this conduct must be viewed in isolation because Mayorga does not complain of any other acts o

2022See Jarrard v. United States Parcel Service, Inc., 242 Ga. App. 58, 61-62 ( 529 SE2d 144 ) (2000) (finding no element of outrageousness where employer, who knew of employee’s emotional problems, conducted single brutal job evaluation of employee); Harris v. Leader, 231 Ga. App. 709, 712 (1) (b) ( 499 SE2d 374 (1998) (finding psychiatrist who expressed 13 through discovery would be relevant to the conduct about which Mayorga actually complains – the words as written on the death certificate.17 Indeed, this conduct must be viewed in isolation because Mayorga does not complain of any other acts o

2022See Jarrard v. United States Parcel Service, Inc., 242 Ga. App. 58, 61-62 ( 529 SE2d 144 ) (2000) (finding no element of outrageousness where employer, who knew of employee’s emotional problems, conducted single brutal job evaluation of employee); Harris v. Leader, 231 Ga. App. 709, 712 (1) (b) ( 499 SE2d 374 (1998) (finding psychiatrist who expressed 13 through discovery would be relevant to the conduct about which Mayorga actually complains – the words as written on the death certificate.17 Indeed, this conduct must be viewed in isolation because Mayorga does not complain of any other acts o

2022See Jarrard v. United States Parcel Service, Inc., 242 Ga. App. 58, 61-62 ( 529 SE2d 144 ) (2000) (finding no element of outrageousness where employer, who knew of employee’s emotional problems, conducted single brutal job evaluation of employee); Harris v. Leader, 231 Ga. App. 709, 712 (1) (b) ( 499 SE2d 374 (1998) (finding psychiatrist who expressed 13 through discovery would be relevant to the conduct about which Mayorga actually complains – the words as written on the death certificate.17 Indeed, this conduct must be viewed in isolation because Mayorga does not complain of any other acts o

2022See Jarrard v. United States Parcel Service, Inc., 242 Ga. App. 58, 61-62 ( 529 SE2d 144 ) (2000) (finding no element of outrageousness where employer, who knew of employee’s emotional problems, conducted single brutal job evaluation of employee); Harris v. Leader, 231 Ga. App. 709, 712 (1) (b) ( 499 SE2d 374 (1998) (finding psychiatrist who expressed 13 through discovery would be relevant to the conduct about which Mayorga actually complains – the words as written on the death certificate.17 Indeed, this conduct must be viewed in isolation because Mayorga does not complain of any other acts o

2022See Jarrard v. United States Parcel Service, Inc., 242 Ga. App. 58, 61-62 ( 529 SE2d 144 ) (2000) (finding no element of outrageousness where employer, who knew of employee’s emotional problems, conducted single brutal job evaluation of employee); Harris v. Leader, 231 Ga. App. 709, 712 (1) (b) ( 499 SE2d 374 (1998) (finding psychiatrist who expressed 13 through discovery would be relevant to the conduct about which Mayorga actually complains – the words as written on the death certificate.17 Indeed, this conduct must be viewed in isolation because Mayorga does not complain of any other acts o

2022See Jarrard v. United States Parcel Service, Inc., 242 Ga. App. 58, 61-62 ( 529 SE2d 144 ) (2000) (finding no element of outrageousness where employer, who knew of employee’s emotional problems, conducted single brutal job evaluation of employee); Harris v. Leader, 231 Ga. App. 709, 712 (1) (b) ( 499 SE2d 374 (1998) (finding psychiatrist who expressed 13 through discovery would be relevant to the conduct about which Mayorga actually complains – the words as written on the death certificate.17 Indeed, this conduct must be viewed in isolation because Mayorga does not complain of any other acts o

2022See Jarrard v. United States Parcel Service, Inc., 242 Ga. App. 58, 61-62 ( 529 SE2d 144 ) (2000) (finding no element of outrageousness where employer, who knew of employee’s emotional problems, conducted single brutal job evaluation of employee); Harris v. Leader, 231 Ga. App. 709, 712 (1) (b) ( 499 SE2d 374 (1998) (finding psychiatrist who expressed 13 through discovery would be relevant to the conduct about which Mayorga actually complains – the words as written on the death certificate.17 Indeed, this conduct must be viewed in isolation because Mayorga does not complain of any other acts o

2022See Jarrard v. United States Parcel Service, Inc., 242 Ga. App. 58, 61-62 ( 529 SE2d 144 ) (2000) (finding no element of outrageousness where employer, who knew of employee’s emotional problems, conducted single brutal job evaluation of employee); Harris v. Leader, 231 Ga. App. 709, 712 (1) (b) ( 499 SE2d 374 (1998) (finding psychiatrist who expressed 13 through discovery would be relevant to the conduct about which Mayorga actually complains – the words as written on the death certificate.17 Indeed, this conduct must be viewed in isolation because Mayorga does not complain of any other acts o

2020See Dove v. Ty Cobb Healthcare Systems, 316 Ga. App. 7, 11 (2) ( 729 SE2d 58 ) (2012); see also Ndlovu, 314 Ga. App. at 342-343 (“[T]o ascertain whether something is alleged, with specificity, by motion to dismiss, we need look no further than the active practice or teaching requirements for such experts, which must be met at the time the act or omission is alleged to have occurred.

2020See Dove v. Ty Cobb Healthcare Systems, 316 Ga. App. 7, 11 (2) ( 729 SE2d 58 ) (2012); see also Ndlovu, 314 Ga. App. at 342-343 (“[T]o ascertain whether something is alleged, with specificity, by motion to dismiss, we need look no further than the active practice or teaching requirements for such experts, which must be met at the time the act or omission is alleged to have occurred.

2020See Orange v. State, 319 Ga. App. 516, 519 (3) ( 736 SE2d 477 ) (2013) (where no hearing transcript is included in the record on appeal, this Court assumes “the evidence supported the trial court’s findings of fact which in turn support the judgment.”) (punctuation and footnote omitted).

2020See Orange v. State, 319 Ga. App. 516, 519 (3) ( 736 SE2d 477 ) (2013) (where no hearing transcript is included in the record on appeal, this Court assumes “the evidence supported the trial court’s findings of fact which in turn support the judgment.”) (punctuation and footnote omitted).

2020William Goldberg & Co., Inc. v. Cohen, 219 Ga. App. 628, 635 (4) ( 466 SE2d 872 ) (1995).

2020William Goldberg & Co., Inc. v. Cohen, 219 Ga. App. 628, 635 (4) ( 466 SE2d 872 ) (1995).

2020See ServiceMaster Co. v. Martin, 252 Ga. App. 751, 757 (2) (c) ( 556 SE2d 517 ) (2001) (trial court erred by failing to grant a motion to dismiss a claim for punitive damages when the only cause of action was for breach of contract). 4 The trial court’s order further connects the punitive damages to the breach of contract claim, stating that “[j]udgment is also entered for [Father] on his claim for punitive damages and attorney’s fees and costs due to the unjustified and brazen manner in which Defendant, without a valid legal defense, has refused all payments and has been stubbornly litigious

2020See ServiceMaster Co. v. Martin, 252 Ga. App. 751, 757 (2) (c) ( 556 SE2d 517 ) (2001) (trial court erred by failing to grant a motion to dismiss a claim for punitive damages when the only cause of action was for breach of contract). 4 The trial court’s order further connects the punitive damages to the breach of contract claim, stating that “[j]udgment is also entered for [Father] on his claim for punitive damages and attorney’s fees and costs due to the unjustified and brazen manner in which Defendant, without a valid legal defense, has refused all payments and has been stubbornly litigious

2020See Dove v. Ty Cobb Healthcare Systems, 316 Ga. App. 7, 11 (2) ( 729 SE2d 58 ) (2012); see also Ndlovu, 314 Ga. App. at 342-343 (“[T]o ascertain whether something is alleged, with specificity, by motion to dismiss, we need look no further than the active practice or teaching requirements for such experts, which must be met at the time the act or omission is alleged to have occurred.

2019Burger v. Krueger , 224 Ga. App. 179 , 179-80, 480 S.E.2d 230 (1996) ; see Rogers v. Norris , 262 Ga. App. 857 , 857 (1), 586 S.E.2d 747 (2003) ("[Appellee] argues that the absence of the motion to dismiss hearing transcript in the appellate record makes the error harmless, in that we must presume the evidence supported the trial court's actions.

2019Burger v. Krueger , 224 Ga. App. 179 , 179-80, 480 S.E.2d 230 (1996) ; see Rogers v. Norris , 262 Ga. App. 857 , 857 (1), 586 S.E.2d 747 (2003) ("[Appellee] argues that the absence of the motion to dismiss hearing transcript in the appellate record makes the error harmless, in that we must presume the evidence supported the trial court's actions.

2019Even presuming the evidence supported the trial court's actions, we must first have the required findings of fact for review so that we know that the court considered the correct factors in exercising its discretion."); see also Johnson v. Johnson , 242 Ga. 339 , 339-40, 249 S.E.2d 22 (1978) ("Without a transcript of the proceedings below, we must assume that the evidence supports the trial court's 'Findings of Fact.' These findings adequately support the trial court's judgment as to the award of alimony." (citation omitted)); Marsh v. White , 185 Ga. App. 642 , 644 (1), 365 S.E.2d 464 (1988)

2019Even presuming the evidence supported the trial court's actions, we must first have the required findings of fact for review so that we know that the court considered the correct factors in exercising its discretion."); see also Johnson v. Johnson , 242 Ga. 339 , 339-40, 249 S.E.2d 22 (1978) ("Without a transcript of the proceedings below, we must assume that the evidence supports the trial court's 'Findings of Fact.' These findings adequately support the trial court's judgment as to the award of alimony." (citation omitted)); Marsh v. White , 185 Ga. App. 642 , 644 (1), 365 S.E.2d 464 (1988)

2019"Without a transcript, we have no way of knowing what issues [the appellant] actually raised in the court below[.]" Steve A. Martin Agency , 297 Ga. App. at 784 (2), 678 S.E.2d 186 (punctuation and footnote omitted). 6 See OCGA § 32-10-61 ("The State Tollway Authority shall continue to be a body corporate and politic and an instrumentality and public corporation of the state known as the 'State Road and Tollway Authority.' It shall have perpetual existence.

2019"Without a transcript, we have no way of knowing what issues [the appellant] actually raised in the court below[.]" Steve A. Martin Agency , 297 Ga. App. at 784 (2), 678 S.E.2d 186 (punctuation and footnote omitted). 6 See OCGA § 32-10-61 ("The State Tollway Authority shall continue to be a body corporate and politic and an instrumentality and public corporation of the state known as the 'State Road and Tollway Authority.' It shall have perpetual existence.

2009At the motion to dismiss hearing, defense counsel stated that Arbegast’s mother would testify that the child victim was comfortable visiting her home after he claimed that Arbegast sexually assaulted him. 29 As previously noted, Arbegast was released on bond following his arrest, but his bond was revoked (resulting in his extended pretrial incarceration) as a result of numerous arrests unrelated to this case. 30 (Punctuation omitted.) Brannen, 274 Ga. at 457 . 31 (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Brannen v. State, 262 Ga. App. 719, 721 ( 586 SE2d 383 ) (2003). 32 See Williams, 277 Ga. at 601

2009At the motion to dismiss hearing, defense counsel stated that Arbegast’s mother would testify that the child victim was comfortable visiting her home after he claimed that Arbegast sexually assaulted him. 29 As previously noted, Arbegast was released on bond following his arrest, but his bond was revoked (resulting in his extended pretrial incarceration) as a result of numerous arrests unrelated to this case. 30 (Punctuation omitted.) Brannen, 274 Ga. at 457 . 31 (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Brannen v. State, 262 Ga. App. 719, 721 ( 586 SE2d 383 ) (2003). 32 See Williams, 277 Ga. at 601