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26 North Carolina opinions name it 4 courts 1986–2026 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Turner v. Hammocks Beach Corp.green2 sentences2020Defendants next argue the trial court’s interlocutory Motion to Dismiss Order affects a substantial right where the Order “was based in part on [the trial court’s] rejection of the defense of collateral estoppel raised by each of the Defendants.” It is well established “the denial of a motion to dismiss a claim for relief affects a substantial right when the motion to dismiss makes a colorable assertion that the -9- claim is barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.” Turner v. Hammocks Beach Corp., 363 N.C. 555, 558 , 681 S.E.2d 770, 773 (2009). 2020Defendants next argue the trial court’s interlocutory Motion to Dismiss Order affects a substantial right where the Order “was based in part on [the trial court’s] rejection of the defense of collateral estoppel raised by each of the Defendants.” It is well established “the denial of a motion to dismiss a claim for relief affects a substantial right when the motion to dismiss makes a colorable assertion that the -9- claim is barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.” Turner v. Hammocks Beach Corp., 363 N.C. 555, 558 , 681 S.E.2d 770, 773 (2009). | 3 | 5 |
Pinewood Homes, Inc. v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2026This Court has previously stated the following regarding the “without justification” element of a claim for tortious interference with existing contract: “A motion to dismiss a claim of tortious interference is properly granted where the complaint shows the interference was justified[.]” Pinewood Homes, Inc. v. Harris, 184 N.C. App. 597, 605 (2007) (citing Peoples Sec. 2021“A motion to dismiss a claim of tortious interference is properly granted where the complaint shows the interference was justified[.]” Pinewood Homes, Inc. v. Harris, 184 N.C. App. 597, 605 (2007) (citing Peoples Sec. | 2 | 2 |
Domingue v. NEHEMIAH II, INC.green2 sentences2021See Domingue v. Nehemiah II, Inc., 208 N.C. App. 429, 435 , 703 S.E.2d 462, 466 (2010) (declining to review the plaintiff’s breach of implied warranty of habitability argument when the complaint and the transcript of the motion to dismiss hearing revealed this theory of relief was not raised by the plaintiff or addressed by the trial court). 2021See Domingue v. Nehemiah II, Inc., 208 N.C. App. 429, 435 , 703 S.E.2d 462, 466 (2010) (declining to review the plaintiff’s breach of implied warranty of habitability argument when the complaint and the transcript of the motion to dismiss hearing revealed this theory of relief was not raised by the plaintiff or addressed by the trial court). | 2 | 2 |
Foster v. Crandellgreen2 sentences2020Nevertheless, we have also recognized “[i]ncantation of the [doctrine of collateral estoppel] does not, however, automatically entitle a party to an interlocutory appeal of an order rejecting [that defense].” Foster v. Crandell, 181 N.C. App. 152, 162 , 638 S.E.2d 526, 534 (2007). 2020Nevertheless, we have also recognized “[i]ncantation of the [doctrine of collateral estoppel] does not, however, automatically entitle a party to an interlocutory appeal of an order rejecting [that defense].” Foster v. Crandell, 181 N.C. App. 152, 162 , 638 S.E.2d 526, 534 (2007). | 2 | 2 |
Bruce v. Brucegreen2 sentences2023Bruce v. Bruce, 79 N.C. App. 579, 583 , 339 S.E.2d 855, 858 (1986). 2023Bruce v. Bruce, 79 N.C. App. 579, 583 , 339 S.E.2d 855, 858 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
Fox v. City of Greensborogreen1 sentence2021Fox v. City of Greensboro, 807 F. Supp.2d 476, 480 (M.D.N.C. 2011). | 1 | 1 |
Morris v. PLYLER PAPER STOCK CO., INC.green1 sentence2021A motion to dismiss a claim for declaratory judgment is “seldom appropriate.” Morris v. Plyler Paper Stock Co., 89 N.C. | 1 | 1 |
North Carolina Consumers Power, Inc. v. Duke Power Co.green1 sentence2021Consumers Power, Inc. v. Duke Power Co., 285 N.C. 434, 439 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
United Laboratories, Inc. v. Kuykendallgreen2 sentences2020See United Labs., Inc. v. Kuykendall, 322 N.C. 643, 665 , 370 S.E.2d 375, 389 (1988) (noting that tortious interference with contract may support a claim for unfair or deceptive trade practices). 2020See United Labs., Inc. v. Kuykendall, 322 N.C. 643, 665 , 370 S.E.2d 375, 389 (1988) (noting that tortious interference with contract may support a claim for unfair or deceptive trade practices). | 1 | 1 |
Brooks v. Brooksgreen2 sentences2018App. 44, 47 , 418 S.E.2d 534, 536 (1992). 2018A motion to dismiss a claim or case on such grounds “is a preliminary motion of the type enumerated in Rule 12(b)(2)–(5) and the time for filing such motion is governed by that rule.” Brooks v. Brooks, 107 N.C. | 1 | 1 |
Lawrence v. Umlic-Five Corp.green1 sentence2015Lawrence v. UMLIC-Five Corp., 2007 NCBC 20 ¶ 39 (N.C. | 1 | 1 |
Smith-Price v. Charter Behavioral Health Systemsgreen2 sentences2012App. 349 , 354–55, 595 S.E.2d 778, 783 (2004) (quoting Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club Co., 79 N.C. 2012On a motion to dismiss a claim for IIED “[t]he determination of whether the alleged conduct is considered extreme and outrageous is a question of law for the trial judge, however, the jury must determine whether the conduct is ‘sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in liability.’” Smith-Price v. Charter Behavioral Health Sys., 164 N.C. | 1 | 1 |
Meyer v. Wallsgreen2 sentences2008Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6) (2007) the trial court must deny a motion to dismiss a claim if, “as a matter of law, the allegations of the complaint, treated as true, are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under some legal theory.” Newberne v. Dep’t of Crime Control and Public Safety, 359 N.C. 782, 788 , 618 S.E.2d 201, 206 (2005) (quoting Meyer v. Walls, 347 N.C. 97, 111 , 489 S.E.2d 880, 888 (1997). 2008Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6) (2007) the trial court must deny a motion to dismiss a claim if, “as a matter of law, the allegations of the complaint, treated as true, are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under some legal theory.” Newberne v. Dep’t of Crime Control and Public Safety, 359 N.C. 782, 788 , 618 S.E.2d 201, 206 (2005) (quoting Meyer v. Walls, 347 N.C. 97, 111 , 489 S.E.2d 880, 888 (1997). | 1 | 1 |
Newberne v. DEPT. OF CRIME CONTROLgreen2 sentences2008Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6) (2007) the trial court must deny a motion to dismiss a claim if, “as a matter of law, the allegations of the complaint, treated as true, are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under some legal theory.” Newberne v. Dep’t of Crime Control and Public Safety, 359 N.C. 782, 788 , 618 S.E.2d 201, 206 (2005) (quoting Meyer v. Walls, 347 N.C. 97, 111 , 489 S.E.2d 880, 888 (1997). 2008Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6) (2007) the trial court must deny a motion to dismiss a claim if, “as a matter of law, the allegations of the complaint, treated as true, are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under some legal theory.” Newberne v. Dep’t of Crime Control and Public Safety, 359 N.C. 782, 788 , 618 S.E.2d 201, 206 (2005) (quoting Meyer v. Walls, 347 N.C. 97, 111 , 489 S.E.2d 880, 888 (1997). | 1 | 1 |
Block v. County of Persongreen2 sentences2008“The complaint must be liberally construed, and the court should not dismiss the complaint unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff could not prove any set of facts to support his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Block v. County of Person, 141 N.C. 2008"The complaint must be liberally construed, and the court should not dismiss the complaint unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff could not prove any set of facts to support his claim which would entitle him to relief." Block v. County of Person, 141 N.C.App. 273, 277-78 , 540 S.E.2d 415, 419 (2000). | 1 | 1 |
Sterner v. Penngreen2 sentences2004Id. at 632 , 583 S.E.2d at 674 (“We conclude, therefore, that the complaint, taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, alleges simply that defendants benefitted by earning commissions on the sales transactions ordered by [the agent]. 2004Id. at 632 , 583 S.E.2d at 674 (“We conclude, therefore, that the complaint, taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, alleges simply that defendants benefitted by earning commissions on the sales transactions ordered by [the agent]. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club Co.
green
2 sentences2012App. 349 , 354–55, 595 S.E.2d 778, 783 (2004) (quoting Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club Co., 79 N.C. 2011Defendants asserted that this is a claim for sexual harassment and that the Workers' Compensation Act does not cover emotional injuries resulting from sexual harassment, citing to Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club Co. , 79 N.C. | 2 | 2011–2012 |
Calumet Capital Partners LLC v. Victory Park Capital Advisors LLC
green
1 sentence2026Advisors, LLC, 353 A.3d 88 , 112 (Del. Ch. 2026) (denying a motion to dismiss a claim for breach of fiduciary duty because “the [p]reserving [l]anguage create[d] a contractual obligation not to engage in ‘fraud or willful misconduct[ ]’ ”); In re Simplexity, LLC, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 1506 , at *6-7 (Bankr. D. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Gunter
green
1 sentence2018Id. at __, __ S.E.2d at __. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
King v. Grindstaff
green
2 sentences2018Our Supreme Court agreed with the defendant, and explained that "[u]nder the collateral estoppel doctrine, 'parties and parties in privity with them are precluded from retrying fully litigated issues that were decided in any prior determination and were necessary to the prior determination.' " Id. (quoting King v. Grindstaff , 284 N.C. 348 , 356, 200 S.E.2d 799 , 805 (1973) ) (internal citations omitted) (alteration omitted). 2018Our Supreme Court agreed with the defendant, and explained that "[u]nder the collateral estoppel doctrine, 'parties and parties in privity with them are precluded from retrying fully litigated issues that were decided in any prior determination and were necessary to the prior determination.' " Id. (quoting King v. Grindstaff , 284 N.C. 348 , 356, 200 S.E.2d 799 , 805 (1973) ) (internal citations omitted) (alteration omitted). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Yeager v. Yeager
green
1 sentence2017Yeager v. Yeager, 228 N.C. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
North Carolina Department of Correction v. North Carolina Medical Board
green
2 sentences2011The superior court heard oral arguments from the parties in October 2008, but deferred ruling upon the issues presented until this Court issued its decision in North Carolina Department of Correction v. North Carolina Medical Board, 363 N.C. 189 , 675 S.E.2d 641 (2009). 2011The superior court heard oral arguments from the parties in October 2008, but deferred ruling upon the issues presented until this Court issued its decision in North Carolina Department of Correction v. North Carolina Medical Board, 363 N.C. 189 , 675 S.E.2d 641 (2009). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
White v. Consolidated Planning, Inc.
green
2 sentences2011"This Court [has] held . . ., however, that an allegation of the payment of commissions for transactions actually performed is not sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss a claim for constructive fraud." Id. 2011“This Court [has] held . . ., however, that an allegation of the payment of commissions for transactions actually performed is not sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss a claim for constructive fraud.” Id. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Harris v. Maready
green
2 sentences1989In Harris v. Maready, 311 N.C. 536 , 319 S.E. 2d 912 (1984), the Supreme Court reversed this court’s decision holding that the trial court must grant a motion to dismiss for violation of Rule 8(a)(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 1989In Harris v. Maready, 311 N.C. 536 , 319 S.E. 2d 912 (1984), the Supreme Court reversed this court’s decision holding that the trial court must grant a motion to dismiss for violation of Rule 8(a)(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Henry v. Deen
green
2 sentences1986We believe that pursuant to Henry v. Deen, 310 N.C. 75 , 310 S.E. 2d 326 (1984) the plaintiff has alleged enough to withstand a motion to dismiss the claim for willful or wanton negligence. 1986We believe that pursuant to Henry v. Deen, 310 N.C. 75 , 310 S.E. 2d 326 (1984) the plaintiff has alleged enough to withstand a motion to dismiss the claim for willful or wanton negligence. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.