61 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 2001–2023 11 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Herrera v. Seton Northwest Hospitalgreen2 sentences2010See Herrera, 212 S.W.3d at 457 (“If a claimant fails to serve the report with the curriculum vitae on or before the statutory deadline, and the affected physician or health care provider files a motion to dismiss the claim under section 74.351(b), the court has no alternative but to dismiss the claim with prejudice.”). 2010See Herrera, 212 S.W.3d at 457 ("If a claimant fails to serve the report with the curriculum vitae on or before the statutory deadline, and the affected physician or health care provider files a motion to dismiss the claim under section 74.351(b), the court has no alternative but to dismiss the claim with prejudice."). | 5 | 5 |
Jernigan v. Langleygreen2 sentences2022Jernigan v. Langley, 195 S.W.3d 91, 93 (Tex. 2006); Am. 2021See Jernigan v. Langley, 195 S.W.3d 91, 93 (Tex. 2006); Am. | 4 | 4 |
Guajardo v. Stategreen2 sentences2014The State cites a prior opinion from this court, Guajardo v. State, 999 S.W.2d 566 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. refd), in which we affirmed the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss for violation of the right to speedy trial after a delay of less than five years. 2002Guajardo v. State , 999 S.W.2d 566, 570 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref'd). | 3 | 4 |
Wilson N. Jones Memorial Hospital v. Ammonsgreen2 sentences2019See Wilson N. Jones Mem’l Hosp. v. Ammons, 266 S.W.3d 51, 55 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. –2– denied). 2012See Wilson N. Jones Mem’l Hosp. v. Ammons, 266 S.W.3d 51, 55 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008, pet. denied). | 3 | 3 |
Lewis v. Funderburk Ex Rel. Funderburkgreen2 sentences2008See id. § 74.351(a)-(b). 2008See id. § 74.351(a)-(b). | 3 | 3 |
Vernco Construction, Inc. v. David Nelson, Individually and D/B/A Collective Contracting, a Sole Proprietorship And E.E. Hood & Sons, Inc.green2 sentences2019See Vernco Constr., Inc. v. Nelson, 460 S.W.3d 145, 149 (Tex. 2015) (holding trial courts may rule on jurisdictional plea by submission or after evidentiary hearing); see also TEX. 2019See Vernco Constr., Inc. v. Nelson, 460 S.W.3d 145, 149 (Tex. 2015) (holding trial courts may rule on jurisdictional plea by submission or after evidentiary hearing); see also TEX. | 2 | 2 |
Baylor Medical Center at Waxahachie v. Wallacegreen2 sentences2015Ctr. at Waxahachie v. Wallace, 278 S.W.3d 552, 555 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2009, no pet.). 2015Ctr. at Waxahachie v. Wallace, 278 S.W.3d 552, 555 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2009, no pet.). | 2 | 2 |
Texas Laurel Ridge Hospital, L.P. D/B/A Laurel Ridge Treatment Center v. Dora Almazangreen2 sentences2013Texas Laurel Ridge Hosp., L.P. v. Almazan, 374 S.W.3d 601, 604 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2012, no pet.) (citing Am. 2013Texas Laurel Ridge Hosp., L.P. v. Almazan, 374 S.W.3d 601, 604 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, no pet.) (citing Am. | 2 | 2 |
Boothe v. Dixongreen2 sentences2006Id . § 74.351(b) (emphasis added); see also Boothe v. Dixon , 180 S.W.3d 915, 918 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2005, no pet.). 2006Id. § 74.351(b) (emphasis added); see also Boothe v. Dixon, 180 S.W.3d 915, 918 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.). | 2 | 2 |
Earl Mangin, Jr., M.D. and Zbigniew Wojciechowski, M.D. v. Melissa Wendt, Individually, and as of the Estate of Donald Wendt, and Erin Wendtgreen2 sentences2019Mangin v. Wendt, 480 S.W.3d 701, 705 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.). 2018Mangin, 480 S.W.3d at 705 . | 1 | 3 |
Rosemond v. Al-Lahiq, M.D.green1 sentence2023Rosemond v. Al–Lahiq, 331 S.W.3d 764, 766 (Tex. 2011). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. MacDonaldgreen1 sentence2023United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 850 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Delbertgreen1 sentence2022See Ex parte Delbert, 582 S.W.2d 145 , 145–46 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Hampton v. Stategreen1 sentence2022See Hampton v. State, 86 S.W.3d 603, 612 (Tex. 3 The evidence shows that Garcia told Lieutenant Meissner that is how she received the bite; however, Garcia was not under oath when she made that claim. 9 Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Estate of Veale v. Teledyne Industries, Inc.green1 sentence2021See Minor v. Stone, No. 04-17-00561-CV, 2018 WL 6069870 , at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 21, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The appellant has the burden to present a record to the appellate court that shows the error about which the appellant complains.”); see also Estate of Veale v. Teldyne Indus., Inc., 899 S.W.2d 239, 242 (Tex. App—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ denied) (stating “the burden is on the -5- 04-20-00483-CV ruling on the motion for limited discovery prior to the court’s dismissal of the case. | 1 | 1 |
Art Institute of Chicago v. Integral Hedging L.P.green1 sentence2021See Art Inst. of Chicago v. Integral Hedging, L.P., 129 S.W.3d 564, 570 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.) (rejecting argument that, because application for temporary injunction seeking to enjoin use of partnership assets for payment of attorney’s fees had been filed, interlocutory order directing court-appointed receiver to pay attorney’s fees out of receivership assets was appealable as order denying request for temporary injunction where “the form of the order [was] a direction or authorization to the receiver” not order denying temporary injunction and trial court did not complete temporary | 1 | 1 |
City of Dallas v. Diane Sanchez, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Matthew Sanchez, and Arnold Sanchezgreen1 sentence2021City of Dallas v. Sanchez, 494 S.W.3d 722, 724 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam). | 1 | 1 |
In the Estate of Chapmangreen1 sentence2020While a proceeding challenging standing in probate may be referred to as an “in limine proceeding” because it is a preliminary, pre-trial proceeding, a motion to dismiss a claim in a probate proceeding for lack of standing is properly called a “motion to dismiss for lack of standing,” rather than a “motion in limine.” 2 In re Estate of Chapman, 315 S.W.3d 162, 164 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2010, no pet.). | 1 | 1 |
City of Austin v. Liberty Mutual Insurancegreen1 sentence2020Ins., 431 S.W.3d 817, 822 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, no pet.) (stating that because the city’s rule 91a motion challenged the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, section 51.014(a)(8) of the civil practice and remedies code granted the city the right to an interlocutory appeal of the denial of its rule 91a motion to dismiss). | 1 | 1 |
Texas Department of Transportation v. City of Sunset Valleygreen1 sentence2019A. Standard of Review “As a component of subject matter jurisdiction, we review a claimant’s standing de novo.” Texas Dept. of Transp. v. City of Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637, 646 (Tex. 2004). | 1 | 1 |
Baty v. Olga Futrell, Crna, & Complete Anesthesia Care, P.C.green1 sentence2019See id. § 74.351(a), (b), (r)(6); Baty v. Futrell, 543 S.W.3d 689, 692 (Tex. 2018). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Munozgreen | 1 | 1 |
Cantu v. Stategreen1 sentence2017See Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 286 (evidence of defendant’s generalized anxiety, although relevant, “is not sufficient proof of prejudice under the Barker test, especially when it is no greater anxiety or concern beyond the level normally associated with a criminal charge or investigation”); McGregor, 394 S.W.3d at 116 (prejudice factor weighed against dismissal where appellant did not demonstrate prejudice due to faded memories and appellant “presented no evidence that he suffered from any anxiety greater than that normally experienced by defendants facing criminal prosecution”); see also Munoz, 99 | 1 | 1 |
Edward George McGregor v. Stategreen1 sentence2017See Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 286 (evidence of defendant’s generalized anxiety, although relevant, “is not sufficient proof of prejudice under the Barker test, especially when it is no greater anxiety or concern beyond the level normally associated with a criminal charge or investigation”); McGregor, 394 S.W.3d at 116 (prejudice factor weighed against dismissal where appellant did not demonstrate prejudice due to faded memories and appellant “presented no evidence that he suffered from any anxiety greater than that normally experienced by defendants facing criminal prosecution”); see also Munoz, 99 | 1 | 1 |
| Taylor v. Books a Million, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Jelinek v. Casasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Davis v. Dallas County, Tex.green | 1 | 1 |
| Isaiah Russell Jones Robert Sparks, Jr. Herman Parks, Jr. v. Alcoa, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Gregson v. Zurich American Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Nationwide Bi-Weekly Administration, Inc. v. Belo Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Banda v. Garcia Ex Rel. Garciagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Constancio v. Braygreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Phillip Kent Palmer, Joseph Philip Silverman, Ernest Smith, Freddie Daniel Milton, Edward Earl Dillingham and Wayne Franklin Deangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Meyer v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Schmitz v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
American Transitional Care Centers of Texas, Inc. v. Palacios
green
2 sentences2010Bowie, 79 S.W.3d at 52 ; Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 878 . 2003Thus, application of the analytical framework used by the majority will lead to complicated and statutorily unintended results. 7: The record from the motion to dismiss hearing indicates that Mrs. Windsor herself is a nurse, that she was awake during the procedure, and that because she had not yet been deposed at the time the expert report was due, she executed an affidavit setting forth the events that occurred during the procedure and provided that affidavit to Dr. Jones for him to rely upon in making his report. 8: Ischemia is “a low oxygen state usually due to obstruction of the arterial b | 5 | 2003–2010 |
Bowie Memorial Hospital v. Wright
green
2 sentences2010Bowie, 79 S.W.3d at 52 ; Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 878 . 2009Bowie, 79 S.W.3d at 52 ; Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 878 . | 4 | 2008–2010 |
Villasan v. O'ROURKE
green
2 sentences2010Id. 2009Id. | 2 | 2009–2010 |
Quigley v. Rosenthal
green
1 sentence2022Cf. Quigley v. Rosenthal, 327 F.3d 1044 , 1059–61 (10th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that although an allegation of discrimination may be a matter of public concern, here the allegation of religious and ethnic discrimination made by a non-media defendant about private parties, and not involving any concern that members of the public were likely to be harmed or discriminated against, was not a matter of public concern). 18 Accordingly, appellants did not meet their burden to show that the TCPA applies to Li’s amended defamation claim, and the trial court did not err by denying the motion to dismiss | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Cities of Abilene v. PUBLIC UTILITY COM'N OF TEXAS
green
1 sentence2022Contrary to the Commission’s assertion, the joint motion is not “a thinly disguised seventh motion for continuance reliant upon the Agreement as evidence.” 5 And the ALJ’s power includes “‘the power to accept and act upon an agreement between the parties that removes from dispute and litigation a subsidiary issue of fact or law,’” and “[w]ielding this power is not only a judge’s right, but a judge’s responsibility.” Shamrock Psychiatric Clinic, 540 S.W.3d at 562 (quoting Cities of Abilene, 146 S.W.3d at 747 ) (emphasis added). 5 The Commission argues that “[n]o unambiguous request to enforce [ | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Shamrock Psychiatric Clinic, P.A. v. Tex. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.
green
1 sentence2022Contrary to the Commission’s assertion, the joint motion is not “a thinly disguised seventh motion for continuance reliant upon the Agreement as evidence.” 5 And the ALJ’s power includes “‘the power to accept and act upon an agreement between the parties that removes from dispute and litigation a subsidiary issue of fact or law,’” and “[w]ielding this power is not only a judge’s right, but a judge’s responsibility.” Shamrock Psychiatric Clinic, 540 S.W.3d at 562 (quoting Cities of Abilene, 146 S.W.3d at 747 ) (emphasis added). 5 The Commission argues that “[n]o unambiguous request to enforce [ | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Carroll v. State
green
1 sentence2020Wilson N. Jones Mem’l Hosp. v. Ammons, 266 S.W.3d 1 Ross v. St. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Levinson Alcoser Associates, L. P. and Levinson Associates, Inc. v. El Pistolon II, Ltd. green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Benson v. Vernon green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| William Carl Wooley v. Randy Schaffer green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Gravano v. Arizona green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| In Re Nationsmart Corporation Securities Litigation green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.