motion to dismiss rule in Massachusetts

2024The current motion to dismiss standard, Iannacchino v. 3 Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008), is more demanding, and thus dismissal would be proper under that standard as well. 4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority. 4

2012Here, as indicated supra, the complaint alleges, in conclusory fashion and without further detail, that the plaintiff “has complied with demand requirements as provided in G.L.c. 93A, §9(3).” That bare conclusion might have sufficed under the motion to dismiss standard in effect prior to Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. at 636 , and Bell Atl.

2024Out of an abundance of caution, the Superior Court judge applied the motion to dismiss standard applicable when the plaintiff filed his complaint in 2000, which was set by Nader v. Citron, 372 Mass. 96 (1977).

2024See Nader, supra. "A motion to dismiss under rule 12 (b) (6) is an appropriate vehicle for raising" a statute of limitations defense.

2026Schaer v. Brandeis Univ., 432 Mass. 474, 477 (2000).

2025Schaer v. Brandeis Univ., 432 Mass. 474, 477 (2000).

2024See Lynch, supra. "[T]he denial of a motion to dismiss on immunity grounds is always collateral to the rights asserted in the underlying action because it 'is conceptually distinct from the merits of the plaintiff's claim that his rights have been violated.'" Kent v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 312, 317 (2002), quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 , 527–529 (1985).

2014Wall, Workers’ Compensation § 26.1, at 313 (3d ed. 2003). “[T]he denial of a motion to dismiss on immunity grounds is always collateral to the rights asserted in the underlying action because it ‘is conceptually distinct from the merits of the plaintiff’s claim that his rights have been violated.’ ” Kent v. Commonwealth, supra at 317, quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527-529 (1985).

2024See Lynch, supra. "[T]he denial of a motion to dismiss on immunity grounds is always collateral to the rights asserted in the underlying action because it 'is conceptually distinct from the merits of the plaintiff's claim that his rights have been violated.'" Kent v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 312, 317 (2002), quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 , 527–529 (1985).

2018See Estate of Moulton v. Puopolo , 467 Mass. 478 , 485, 5 N.E.3d 908 (2014), quoting Kent v. Commonwealth , 437 Mass. 312 , 317, 771 N.E.2d 770 (2002) ("[T]he denial of a motion to dismiss on immunity grounds is always collateral to the rights asserted in the underlying action because it 'is conceptually distinct from the merits of the plaintiff's claim that his rights have been violated' ").

2000L. c. 139, § 20, and that the building “has also been secured by the Building Department.” 3 In reviewing the disposition of a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6), we take the allegations in the complaint and inferences drawn therefrom in a plaintiff’s favor as true, and consider the complaint sufficient “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Warner-Lambert Co. v. Execuquest Corp., 427 Mass. 46, 47 (1998), quoting from Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).

1982A motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6) should not be allowed “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).

2018See Curtis v. Herb Chambers I-95, Inc. , 458 Mass. 674 , 676 (2011).

2012See Curtis v. Herb Chambers I-95, Inc., 458 Mass. 674, 676 (2011); Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 635-636 (2008).

2009See id. at 47-50 .

2000L. c. 139, § 20, and that the building “has also been secured by the Building Department.” 3 In reviewing the disposition of a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6), we take the allegations in the complaint and inferences drawn therefrom in a plaintiff’s favor as true, and consider the complaint sufficient “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Warner-Lambert Co. v. Execuquest Corp., 427 Mass. 46, 47 (1998), quoting from Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).

2009Ginther v. Commissioner of Ins., 427 Mass. 319, 322 (1998).

2006In reviewing a motion to dismiss under rule 12 (b) (1) or (6), “we accept the factual allegations in the plaintiffs’ complaint, as well as any favorable inferences reason ably drawn from them, as true.” Ginther v. Commissioner of Ins., 427 Mass. 319, 322 (1998).

2012Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 .

2012Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (Twombly).

2009“We think it desirable, and in the future we may require, that a judge who allows a motion to dismiss under rule 10(c) make an explicit finding of ‘excusable neglect’ and set forth the specific facts relied on by him in support of that conclusion.” Tammaro v. Colarusso, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 44 , 47 n.7 (1980).

1983See Tammaro v. Colarusso, 11 Mass. App. Ct. at 47 n.7, in which we said: “We think it desirable, and in the future we may require, that a judge who allows a motion to dismiss under rule 10(c) make an explicit finding of ‘inexcusable neglect’ and set forth the specific facts relied on by him in support of that conclusion.” It is appropriate to reiterate the utility, in cases such as these, of some statement, however concise, of the specific facts which led to the finding that the neglect was inexcusable.

2026The case that Doe cited for that proposition, Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 381 Mass. 545, 548 (1980), does not appear to shed further light on the issue.

2025Second, the defendant's reliance on Commonwealth v. Bettencourt, 447 Mass. 631, 633 (2006), is misplaced.

2025Co. v. City of Boston, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 550, 555 (2008). 3 that MOSES, SMITH, MARKEY AND WALSH did have counsel responsibilities to complete the work for which they were hired." In a supplemental affidavit dated August 9, 2019, Hyman and her husband further alleged that Stanford "intended to actively harm his own clients" by failing to take certain actions in the litigation and asked that the court appoint Markey as their counsel.

2024Epstein v. Seigel, 396 Mass. 278, 279 (1985).

2023The Commonwealth argues that the evidence was sufficient to support the two charges of attempt to burn a public building and asserts that the juvenile did not raise the issue of specific intent before the judge at trial.14 Commonwealth v. Raposo, 453 Mass. 739, 743 (2009) (generally we do "not . . . decide constitutional questions 'unless they must necessarily be reached'"). 14The juvenile raised the issue of intent explicitly at the motion to dismiss hearing; at trial, in his argument for a directed verdict, he focused on the lack of a showing of malice, but mentioned that there was insuffici

2021Cf. Indeck Maine Energy, LLC v. Commissioner of Energy Resources, 454 Mass. 511, 516 (2009) (“Standing is an issue of subject matter jurisdiction that is properly challenged by way of a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(1)” of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure). [5]“Parens patriae means literally ‘parent of the country.’ ” Alfred L.

2018See Estate of Moulton v. Puopolo , 467 Mass. 478 , 485, 5 N.E.3d 908 (2014), quoting Kent v. Commonwealth , 437 Mass. 312 , 317, 771 N.E.2d 770 (2002) ("[T]he denial of a motion to dismiss on immunity grounds is always collateral to the rights asserted in the underlying action because it 'is conceptually distinct from the merits of the plaintiff's claim that his rights have been violated' ").

2018See Estate of Moulton v. Puopolo , 467 Mass. 478 , 485, 5 N.E.3d 908 (2014), quoting Kent v. Commonwealth , 437 Mass. 312 , 317, 771 N.E.2d 770 (2002) ("[T]he denial of a motion to dismiss on immunity grounds is always collateral to the rights asserted in the underlying action because it 'is conceptually distinct from the merits of the plaintiff's claim that his rights have been violated' ").

2013See Brum v. Dartmouth, supra, and cases cited. “[T]he denial of a motion to dismiss on immunity grounds is always collateral to the rights asserted in the underlying action because it ‘is conceptually distinct from the merits of the plaintiff’s claim that his rights have been violated.’ ” Kent v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 312, 317 (2002), quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, supra. See Boxford v. Massachusetts Highway Dep’t, supra. The erroneous convictions statute, which provides “Compen sation for Certain Erroneous Felony Convictions,” waives sovereign immunity “for an erroneous felony conviction,” G.

2012He has essentially alleged a theory of fraudulent inducement, which requires evidence of “misrepresentation of a material fact, made to induce action, and reasonable reliance on the false statement to the detriment of the person relying.” Commerce Bank & Trust v. Hayeck, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 687, 692 (1999), quoting from Hogan v. Riemer, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 360, 365 (1993).

2012He has essentially alleged a theory of fraudulent inducement, which requires evidence of “misrepresentation of a material fact, made to induce action, and reasonable reliance on the false statement to the detriment of the person relying.” Commerce Bank & Trust v. Hayeck, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 687, 692 (1999), quoting from Hogan v. Riemer, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 360, 365 (1993).

2011In order for a defendant to succeed on a motion to dismiss a claim based on the assertion of an affirmative defense, two strict requirements must be met: 1) “the facts that establish the defense must be definitively ascertainable"; and 2) the facts “must conclusively establish the affirmative defense.” In Re Colonial Mortgage Bankers Corp., 324 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 2003). 1.

2011Graphic Arts Finishers v. Boston Redevelopment Authority, 357 Mass. 40, 44 (1970), quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts §525.

2011III.Claims Under the Civil Rights Act, G.L.c. 12, §111 To survive a motion to dismiss a claim under the state Civil Rights Act, G.L.c. 12, §1II, a plaintiff must allege “that (1) his exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of either the United States or of the Commonwealth, (2) has been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, and (3) that the interference or attempted interference was by threats, intimidation or coercion." Bally v. Northeastern University, 403 Mass. 713, 717 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2009Okerman v. VA Software Corp., 69 Mass. App. Ct. 771, 774 (2007).

2006See Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 24 (Del.Ch. 2002).