motion to dismiss violation (Colorado) · Go Syfert
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motion to dismiss violation in Colorado

9 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 2002–2026 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (8)

CaseFollowedCited
People v. Glassergreen
coloctapp · 2011 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
1 sentence

2019People v. Glasser, 293 P.3d 68, 76 (Colo. App. 2011).

11
People v. Adolfgreen
coloctapp · 2012 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
2 sentences

2014See People v. Adolf, 2012 COA 60, ¶ 9 , 296 P.3d 251,253 . ¶ 59 Colorado’s speedy trial statute requires dismissal if a defendant is not brought to trial within six months of the entry of a not guilty plea, unless the delay falls into one of the exclusion categories set forth by statute. § 18-1-405(1); see People v. Arledge, 938 P.2d 160, 165 (Colo.1997).

2014See People v. Adolf, 2012 COA 60, ¶ 9 , 296 P.3d 251,253 . ¶ 59 Colorado’s speedy trial statute requires dismissal if a defendant is not brought to trial within six months of the entry of a not guilty plea, unless the delay falls into one of the exclusion categories set forth by statute. § 18-1-405(1); see People v. Arledge, 938 P.2d 160, 165 (Colo.1997).

11
People v. Arledgegreen
colo · 1997 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
1 sentence

2014See People v. Adolf, 2012 COA 60, ¶ 9 , 296 P.3d 251,253 . ¶ 59 Colorado’s speedy trial statute requires dismissal if a defendant is not brought to trial within six months of the entry of a not guilty plea, unless the delay falls into one of the exclusion categories set forth by statute. § 18-1-405(1); see People v. Arledge, 938 P.2d 160, 165 (Colo.1997).

11
Krystkowiak v. W.O. Brisben Companies, Inc.green
colo · 2004 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
2 sentences

2012See Krystkowiak, 90 P.3d at 863 ; see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 , 105 S.Ct, 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) ("Unless the plaintiff's allegations state a. claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of discovery."). 124 In the qualified immunity context, even if the plaintiff's complaint alleges the commission of acts that violated clearly established law, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment if discovery fails to uncover evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue as to whether

2012Brisben Cos., 90 P.3d 859, 862 (Colo.2004) ("We reaffirm POME's holding that a motion to dismiss based on First Amendment immunity is properly decided as a motion for summary judgment."). { 22 And, in Yadon v. Lowry, 126 P.3d 332, 337 (Colo.App.2005), a division of this court applied the POME factors in a purely private lawsuit between private parties, despite law review literature endorsing a more narrow application of those factors. 123 Based on these cases, which de-seribe the First Amendment protection afforded to an abuse of process defendant as a form of "immunity" and the plaintiffs cla

11
People v. Carrgreen
coloctapp · 2009 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
1 sentence

2012People v. Carr, 205 P.3d 471, 473 (Colo.App.2008).

11
People v. Gessgreen
coloctapp · 2010 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
1 sentence

2012People v. Gess, 250 P.3d 734, 736 (Colo.App.2010).

11
Yadon v. Lowrygreen
coloctapp · 2005 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
1 sentence

2012Brisben Cos., 90 P.3d 859, 862 (Colo.2004) ("We reaffirm POME's holding that a motion to dismiss based on First Amendment immunity is properly decided as a motion for summary judgment."). { 22 And, in Yadon v. Lowry, 126 P.3d 332, 337 (Colo.App.2005), a division of this court applied the POME factors in a purely private lawsuit between private parties, despite law review literature endorsing a more narrow application of those factors. 123 Based on these cases, which de-seribe the First Amendment protection afforded to an abuse of process defendant as a form of "immunity" and the plaintiffs cla

11
Mitchell v. Forsythgreen
scotus · 1985 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
2 sentences

2012See Krystkowiak, 90 P.3d at 863 ; see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 , 105 S.Ct, 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) ("Unless the plaintiff's allegations state a. claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of discovery."). 124 In the qualified immunity context, even if the plaintiff's complaint alleges the commission of acts that violated clearly established law, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment if discovery fails to uncover evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue as to whether

2012See Krystkowiak, 90 P.3d at 863 ; see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 , 105 S.Ct, 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) ("Unless the plaintiff's allegations state a. claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of discovery."). 124 In the qualified immunity context, even if the plaintiff's complaint alleges the commission of acts that violated clearly established law, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment if discovery fails to uncover evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue as to whether

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (6)

CaseCitedYears
ck v. McNabb green
coloctapp · 2020
1 sentence

2026See, e.g., Dodge v. Padilla, 2023 COA 67 , ¶ 6; Bilderback v. McNabb, 2020 COA 133, ¶ 1 . 10 resolve whether the accounting claim was subject to the CGIA before the division decided Grand Junction I, and the division specifically instructed the court to resolve that question on remand.

12026–2026
People v. Fleming green
colo · 1995
1 sentence

2025Id. ¶ 26 “We review de novo the district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss for violation of the UMDDA, but we review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s decision to grant a continuance for good cause.” People v. Hines, 2021 COA 45 , ¶ 17, 491 P.3d 578 , 583 (citation omitted).

12025–2025
Stackhouse v. People green
colo · 2015
1 sentence

2019Stackhouse v. People, 2015 CO 48, ¶ 4 . ¶ 15 Finally, where the facts are undisputed, a trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss for violation of the UMDDA is reviewed de novo.

12019–2019
People v. Glaser green
coloctapp · 2010
1 sentence

2013People v. Glaser, 250 P.3d 632 , 636 (Colo.App.2010).

12013–2013
People v. McMurtry green
colo · 2005
1 sentence

2011For example, in People v. McMurtry, 122 P.3d 237 (Colo.2005), we distinguished the general term "jurisdiction," meaning "authority or lack thereof," from the concept of "subject matter jurisdiction" and held that the improper denial of a motion to dismiss for violation of the speedy trial statute does not divest a trial court of subject matter jurisdiction.

12011–2011
Feigin v. Digital Interactive Associates, Inc. green
coloctapp · 1999
1 sentence

2002See § 8-48-8301(2), C.R.S.2001 (petition for review may be filed only if penalty claim is granted or denied); Feigin v. Digital Interactive Assocs., Inc., 987 P.2d 876 (Colo.App.1999) (denial of a motion to dismiss is normally not reviewable because it is not a final order); M & M Mgmt.

12002–2002

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CO § Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-14-102 (3) CO § Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-14-103 (3) CO § Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-14-104 (3) CO § Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-405 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

NY 101 (1899–2026) TX 61 (2001–2023) MA 56 (1977–2026) FL 52 (1934–2026) IL 35 (1948–2026) OH 30 (1936–2026) GA 27 (1912–2025) UT 27 (1993–2026) NC 25 (1986–2023) MO 24 (1968–2025) IA 18 (1975–2022) ME 18 (1999–2023) MD 17 (1989–2026) OR 12 (1988–2026) NM 11 (1970–2019) MS 10 (1994–2024) WA 9 (2006–2020) CO 9 (2002–2026) MT 8 (2007–2016) OK 8 (1997–2023) MN 8 (1989–2025) SC 8 (1941–2022) AL 8 (1983–2026) DE 8 (2014–2026) AR 6 (1998–2019) CA 6 (2008–2024) NJ 6 (1955–2026) IN 6 (1972–2019) CT 6 (1992–2019) AZ 6 (1976–2023) HI 5 (1993–2017) NV 4 (1993–2025) MI 4 (1985–2017) NE 4 (1988–2013) WY 4 (2013–2026) WI 4 (2006–2024) WV 3 (2015–2020) KY 3 (1974–2026) VT 3 (1925–2024) KS 3 (2012–2021) DC 2 (1995–2009) SD 2 (1988–2009) PA 2 (2018–2024) TN 2 (1998–2015)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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