12 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1930–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Nist v. Tudorgreen2 sentences2018As one pertinent application of the gross negligence standard, the Nist court discussed its decision in Emery v. Milk, 62 Wn.2d 617 , 384 P.2d 133 (1963), in which the court observed that although the host driver demonstrated a number of the elements of care by driving in her proper lane with her lights on, keeping her car under control, we said that failure to stop at a stop sign and yield the right of way in driving through an obstructed intersection provided evidence of gross negligence, creating an issue of fact for the jury. 67 Wn.2d at 328 . 2017As one pertinent application of the gross negligence standard, the Nist court discussed its decision in Emery v. Milk, 62 Wn.2d 617 , 384 P.2d 133 (1963), in which the court observed that although the host driver demonstrated a number of the elements of care by driving in her proper lane with her lights on, keeping her car under control, we said that failure to stop at a stop sign and yield the right of way in driving through an obstructed intersection provided evidence of gross negligence, creating an issue of fact for the jury. 67 Wn.2d at 328 . | 1 | 3 |
Perez v. McConkeygreen1 sentence2017Coomer v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp., 437 S.W.3d 184 , 193 n.3 (Mo. 2014); Kerns v. Hoppe, 128 Nev. 910 , 381 P.3d 630 (2012); Perez v. McConkey, 872 S.W.2d 897, 904 (Tenn. 1994). ¶44 Since express assumption of risk and inherent peril assumption of risk both result in the bar of the plaintiff’s claim and arise from the plaintiff’s voluntary assumption of risk, one might argue that a gross negligence claim should survive assumption of risk by inherent peril if it survives express assumption of risk. | 1 | 1 |
Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Foundation, Inc.green1 sentence2014Id. at 400-01 (lead opinion of Fairhurst, J.), 418 (Chambers, J., concurring). ¶14 The trial court here, as in Eastwood, applied a gross negligence standard to the actions of the board members, although the result, unlike Eastwood, was to find the directors not liable. | 1 | 1 |
Osorio v. Waterman SS Corp.green1 sentence2005Corp., 557 So.2d 999, 1009 (La.App.1990) (court cites Fitzgerald, but ultimately applies a gross negligence standard because that the claim was for punitive damages). [28] 46 U.S.C.A. app. § 183(g) (1996) (emphasis added). [29] Paul, 106 Wash.App. at 418 , 24 P.3d 447 . [30] 643 So.2d 792 (La.App.1994). [31] Id. at 797. [32] Id. at 796. [33] 685 F.Supp. 960 (W.D.La.1988). [34] Id. at 964 ; see also Harrison v. Glendel Drilling Co., 679 F.Supp. 1413, 1420 (W.D.La.1988) (no need for uniform rule for onshore medical treatment of seamen because medical malpractice is a matter of local and state co | 1 | 1 |
Harrison v. Glendel Drilling Co.green1 sentence2005Corp., 557 So.2d 999, 1009 (La.App.1990) (court cites Fitzgerald, but ultimately applies a gross negligence standard because that the claim was for punitive damages). [28] 46 U.S.C.A. app. § 183(g) (1996) (emphasis added). [29] Paul, 106 Wash.App. at 418 , 24 P.3d 447 . [30] 643 So.2d 792 (La.App.1994). [31] Id. at 797. [32] Id. at 796. [33] 685 F.Supp. 960 (W.D.La.1988). [34] Id. at 964 ; see also Harrison v. Glendel Drilling Co., 679 F.Supp. 1413, 1420 (W.D.La.1988) (no need for uniform rule for onshore medical treatment of seamen because medical malpractice is a matter of local and state co | 1 | 1 |
Workman v. Chinchiniangreen1 sentence2005Corp., 557 So.2d 999, 1009 (La.App.1990) (court cites Fitzgerald, but ultimately applies a gross negligence standard because that the claim was for punitive damages). [28] 46 U.S.C.A. app. § 183(g) (1996) (emphasis added). [29] Paul, 106 Wash.App. at 418 , 24 P.3d 447 . [30] 643 So.2d 792 (La.App.1994). [31] Id. at 797. [32] Id. at 796. [33] 685 F.Supp. 960 (W.D.La.1988). [34] Id. at 964 ; see also Harrison v. Glendel Drilling Co., 679 F.Supp. 1413, 1420 (W.D.La.1988) (no need for uniform rule for onshore medical treatment of seamen because medical malpractice is a matter of local and state co | 1 | 1 |
Truck Insurance Exchange v. Tetzlaffgreen1 sentence2005Exchange v. Tetzlaff, 683 F.Supp. 223, 226 (D.Nev.1988) (discussing choice of law between California and Nevada in medical malpractice case). [37] 46 U.S.C.A. app. §§ 761, 762 (2000). [38] Whether other aspects of chapter 7.70 RCW are preempted by DHOSA are issues not before us. | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Reissgreen2 sentences2005Corp., 557 So.2d 999, 1009 (La.App.1990) (court cites Fitzgerald, but ultimately applies a gross negligence standard because that the claim was for punitive damages). [28] 46 U.S.C.A. app. § 183(g) (1996) (emphasis added). [29] Paul, 106 Wash.App. at 418 , 24 P.3d 447 . [30] 643 So.2d 792 (La.App.1994). [31] Id. at 797. [32] Id. at 796. [33] 685 F.Supp. 960 (W.D.La.1988). [34] Id. at 964 ; see also Harrison v. Glendel Drilling Co., 679 F.Supp. 1413, 1420 (W.D.La.1988) (no need for uniform rule for onshore medical treatment of seamen because medical malpractice is a matter of local and state co 2005Corp., 557 So.2d 999, 1009 (La.App.1990) (court cites Fitzgerald, but ultimately applies a gross negligence standard because that the claim was for punitive damages). [28] 46 U.S.C.A. app. § 183(g) (1996) (emphasis added). [29] Paul, 106 Wash.App. at 418 , 24 P.3d 447 . [30] 643 So.2d 792 (La.App.1994). [31] Id. at 797. [32] Id. at 796. [33] 685 F.Supp. 960 (W.D.La.1988). [34] Id. at 964 ; see also Harrison v. Glendel Drilling Co., 679 F.Supp. 1413, 1420 (W.D.La.1988) (no need for uniform rule for onshore medical treatment of seamen because medical malpractice is a matter of local and state co | 1 | 1 |
Wood v. Standard Products Co., Inc.green1 sentence2005Corp., 557 So.2d 999, 1009 (La.App.1990) (court cites Fitzgerald, but ultimately applies a gross negligence standard because that the claim was for punitive damages). [28] 46 U.S.C.A. app. § 183(g) (1996) (emphasis added). [29] Paul, 106 Wash.App. at 418 , 24 P.3d 447 . [30] 643 So.2d 792 (La.App.1994). [31] Id. at 797. [32] Id. at 796. [33] 685 F.Supp. 960 (W.D.La.1988). [34] Id. at 964 ; see also Harrison v. Glendel Drilling Co., 679 F.Supp. 1413, 1420 (W.D.La.1988) (no need for uniform rule for onshore medical treatment of seamen because medical malpractice is a matter of local and state co | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Emery v. Milk
neutral
2 sentences2018As one pertinent application of the gross negligence standard, the Nist court discussed its decision in Emery v. Milk, 62 Wn.2d 617 , 384 P.2d 133 (1963), in which the court observed that although the host driver demonstrated a number of the elements of care by driving in her proper lane with her lights on, keeping her car under control, we said that failure to stop at a stop sign and yield the right of way in driving through an obstructed intersection provided evidence of gross negligence, creating an issue of fact for the jury. 67 Wn.2d at 328 . 2018As one pertinent application of the gross negligence standard, the Nist court discussed its decision in Emery v. Milk, 62 Wn.2d 617 , 384 P.2d 133 (1963), in which the court observed that although the host driver demonstrated a number of the elements of care by driving in her proper lane with her lights on, keeping her car under control, we said that failure to stop at a stop sign and yield the right of way in driving through an obstructed intersection provided evidence of gross negligence, creating an issue of fact for the jury. 67 Wn.2d at 328 . | 2 | 2017–2018 |
Saxe v. Terry
green
2 sentences1930Respondents’ liability to appellant is, under the admitted facts of this case, to be determined by the gross negligence rule, as laid down by this court in the cases of Heiman v. Kloizner, 139 Wash. 655 , 247 Pac. 1034 , Saxe v. Terry, 140 Wash. 503 , 250 Pac. 27 , and many subsequent cases. 1930Respondents’ liability to appellant is, under the admitted facts of this case, to be determined by the gross negligence rule, as laid down by this court in the cases of Heiman v. Kloizner, 139 Wash. 655 , 247 Pac. 1034 , Saxe v. Terry, 140 Wash. 503 , 250 Pac. 27 , and many subsequent cases. | 2 | 1930–1978 |
Heiman v. Kloizner
green
2 sentences1931Heiman v. Kloizner, 139 Wash. 655 , 247 Pac. 1034 , where the gross negligence rule was first announced, was a case tried to the court, and we were there privileged to pass upon the evidence and to determine as a fact that gross negligence had not been established. 1931Heiman v. Kloizner, 139 Wash. 655 , 247 Pac. 1034 , where the gross negligence rule was first announced, was a case tried to the court, and we were there privileged to pass upon the evidence and to determine as a fact that gross negligence had not been established. | 2 | 1930–1931 |
John Coomer v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corporation
green
1 sentence2017Coomer v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp., 437 S.W.3d 184 , 193 n.3 (Mo. 2014); Kerns v. Hoppe, 128 Nev. 910 , 381 P.3d 630 (2012); Perez v. McConkey, 872 S.W.2d 897, 904 (Tenn. 1994). ¶44 Since express assumption of risk and inherent peril assumption of risk both result in the bar of the plaintiff’s claim and arise from the plaintiff’s voluntary assumption of risk, one might argue that a gross negligence claim should survive assumption of risk by inherent peril if it survives express assumption of risk. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Miller v. Griffin-Alexander Drilling Co.
green
2 sentences2005Corp., 557 So.2d 999, 1009 (La.App.1990) (court cites Fitzgerald, but ultimately applies a gross negligence standard because that the claim was for punitive damages). [28] 46 U.S.C.A. app. § 183(g) (1996) (emphasis added). [29] Paul, 106 Wash.App. at 418 , 24 P.3d 447 . [30] 643 So.2d 792 (La.App.1994). [31] Id. at 797. [32] Id. at 796. [33] 685 F.Supp. 960 (W.D.La.1988). [34] Id. at 964 ; see also Harrison v. Glendel Drilling Co., 679 F.Supp. 1413, 1420 (W.D.La.1988) (no need for uniform rule for onshore medical treatment of seamen because medical malpractice is a matter of local and state co 2005Corp., 557 So.2d 999, 1009 (La.App.1990) (court cites Fitzgerald, but ultimately applies a gross negligence standard because that the claim was for punitive damages). [28] 46 U.S.C.A. app. § 183(g) (1996) (emphasis added). [29] Paul, 106 Wash.App. at 418 , 24 P.3d 447 . [30] 643 So.2d 792 (La.App.1994). [31] Id. at 797. [32] Id. at 796. [33] 685 F.Supp. 960 (W.D.La.1988). [34] Id. at 964 ; see also Harrison v. Glendel Drilling Co., 679 F.Supp. 1413, 1420 (W.D.La.1988) (no need for uniform rule for onshore medical treatment of seamen because medical malpractice is a matter of local and state co | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Paul v. All Alaskan Seafoods, Inc.
green
1 sentence2005Corp., 557 So.2d 999, 1009 (La.App.1990) (court cites Fitzgerald, but ultimately applies a gross negligence standard because that the claim was for punitive damages). [28] 46 U.S.C.A. app. § 183(g) (1996) (emphasis added). [29] Paul, 106 Wash.App. at 418 , 24 P.3d 447 . [30] 643 So.2d 792 (La.App.1994). [31] Id. at 797. [32] Id. at 796. [33] 685 F.Supp. 960 (W.D.La.1988). [34] Id. at 964 ; see also Harrison v. Glendel Drilling Co., 679 F.Supp. 1413, 1420 (W.D.La.1988) (no need for uniform rule for onshore medical treatment of seamen because medical malpractice is a matter of local and state co | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Paul v. All Alaskan Seafoods, Inc.
green
1 sentence2005Corp., 557 So.2d 999, 1009 (La.App.1990) (court cites Fitzgerald, but ultimately applies a gross negligence standard because that the claim was for punitive damages). [28] 46 U.S.C.A. app. § 183(g) (1996) (emphasis added). [29] Paul, 106 Wash.App. at 418 , 24 P.3d 447 . [30] 643 So.2d 792 (La.App.1994). [31] Id. at 797. [32] Id. at 796. [33] 685 F.Supp. 960 (W.D.La.1988). [34] Id. at 964 ; see also Harrison v. Glendel Drilling Co., 679 F.Supp. 1413, 1420 (W.D.La.1988) (no need for uniform rule for onshore medical treatment of seamen because medical malpractice is a matter of local and state co | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Dole v. Goebel
green
1 sentence1965Nist v. Tudor, ante p. 322, 407 P.2d 398 (1965) (The driver turned left in front of an oncoming truck); Hansen v. Pauley, ante p. 345, 407 P.2d 811 (1965) (Head-on collision); Dole v. Goebel, ante p. 337, 407 P.2d 807 (1965) (Car in wrong lane). | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Hansen v. Pauley
green
1 sentence1965Nist v. Tudor, ante p. 322, 407 P.2d 398 (1965) (The driver turned left in front of an oncoming truck); Hansen v. Pauley, ante p. 345, 407 P.2d 811 (1965) (Head-on collision); Dole v. Goebel, ante p. 337, 407 P.2d 807 (1965) (Car in wrong lane). | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Dinardi v. Herook
green
2 sentences1965For example, Dinardi v. Herook, 328 Mass. 572 , 105 N.E.2d 197 (1952), attempts to separate gross negligence from ordinary negligence in automobile accidents on the basis of the number of seconds that the driver is guilty of inattention by comparing them with instances showing longer periods of inattention. 1965For example, Dinardi v. Herook, 328 Mass. 572 , 105 N.E.2d 197 (1952), attempts to separate gross negligence from ordinary negligence in automobile accidents on the basis of the number of seconds that the driver is guilty of inattention by comparing them with instances showing longer periods of inattention. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Dahl v. Moore
green
2 sentences1941This court held in Dahl v. Moore, 161 Wash. 503 , 297 Pac. 218 , and Hart v. Hogan, 173 Wash. 598 , 24 P. (2d) 99 , where the gross negligence rule was involved, that a rider in an automobile was not a guest if his carriage conferred a tangible benefit on the driver and operated to their mutual advantage. 1941This court held in Dahl v. Moore, 161 Wash. 503 , 297 Pac. 218 , and Hart v. Hogan, 173 Wash. 598 , 24 P. (2d) 99 , where the gross negligence rule was involved, that a rider in an automobile was not a guest if his carriage conferred a tangible benefit on the driver and operated to their mutual advantage. | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Hart v. Hogan
green
2 sentences1941This court held in Dahl v. Moore, 161 Wash. 503 , 297 Pac. 218 , and Hart v. Hogan, 173 Wash. 598 , 24 P. (2d) 99 , where the gross negligence rule was involved, that a rider in an automobile was not a guest if his carriage conferred a tangible benefit on the driver and operated to their mutual advantage. 1941This court held in Dahl v. Moore, 161 Wash. 503 , 297 Pac. 218 , and Hart v. Hogan, 173 Wash. 598 , 24 P. (2d) 99 , where the gross negligence rule was involved, that a rider in an automobile was not a guest if his carriage conferred a tangible benefit on the driver and operated to their mutual advantage. | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Stewart v. Houk
green
2 sentences1936In Stewart v. Houk, 127 Ore. 589 , 271 Pac. 998 , 61 A. L. 1936In Stewart v. Houk, 127 Ore. 589 , 271 Pac. 998 , 61 A. L. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Adair v. Newkirk
neutral
2 sentences1931Adair v. Newkirk, 148 Wash. 165 , 268 Pac. 153 , was also tried to the court, and we there determined from the evidence as a fact that gross negligence had been established. 1931Adair v. Newkirk, 148 Wash. 165 , 268 Pac. 153 , was also tried to the court, and we there determined from the evidence as a fact that gross negligence had been established. | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.