gross negligence claim in Florida

2018The explicit exclusion of gross negligence from the definition of negligence in this context prevents the release in this case from barring the gross negligence claim. 2 See Hager v. Live Nation Motor Sports, Inc. , 665 F.Supp.2d 1290 , 1294 (S.D.

2018The explicit exclusion of gross negligence from the definition of negligence in this context prevents the release in this case from barring the gross negligence claim. 2 See Hager v. Live Nation Motor Sports, Inc. , 665 F.Supp.2d 1290 , 1294 (S.D.

2025We affirm, holding that: (1) the trial court properly interpreted the parties’ agreement to mean that each agreed to waive their right to a jury trial, and that the waiver of any provision of the agreement must be in writing, see Goodenow v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 305 So. 3d 13 , 14 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019); Rybovich Boat Works, Inc. v. Atkins, 587 So. 2d 519, 521-22 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking Haedo’s demand for jury trial, upon a finding that Signature did not waive the contractual provision, see Wolfe v. Steven A. Smilack, P.A., 166 So. 3d 93

2025We affirm, holding that: (1) the trial court properly interpreted the parties’ agreement to mean that each agreed to waive their right to a jury trial, and that the waiver of any provision of the agreement must be in writing, see Goodenow v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 305 So. 3d 13 , 14 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019); Rybovich Boat Works, Inc. v. Atkins, 587 So. 2d 519, 521-22 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking Haedo’s demand for jury trial, upon a finding that Signature did not waive the contractual provision, see Wolfe v. Steven A. Smilack, P.A., 166 So. 3d 93

2025We affirm, holding that: (1) the trial court properly interpreted the parties’ agreement to mean that each agreed to waive their right to a jury trial, and that the waiver of any provision of the agreement must be in writing, see Goodenow v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 305 So. 3d 13 , 14 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019); Rybovich Boat Works, Inc. v. Atkins, 587 So. 2d 519, 521-22 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking Haedo’s demand for jury trial, upon a finding that Signature did not waive the contractual provision, see Wolfe v. Steven A. Smilack, P.A., 166 So. 3d 93

2024Jurisdiction for actions such as this properly resides in the [PSC].”); Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Velez, 257 So. 3d 1176, 1177 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (“[C]ourts are the appropriate forum for determining whether FPL’s alleged past conduct constituted a breach of contract or gross negligence, and the mere fact that such claims may involve questions of whether FPL failed to meet certain standards established by the PSC does not divest the trial court of its jurisdiction, or vest exclusive jurisdiction in the PSC, to resolve such issues.”). 4 U.S. 244, 274 (1994) (quoting Republic Nat’l Bank of Mia. v

2024Jurisdiction for actions such as this properly resides in the [PSC].”); Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Velez, 257 So. 3d 1176, 1177 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (“[C]ourts are the appropriate forum for determining whether FPL’s alleged past conduct constituted a breach of contract or gross negligence, and the mere fact that such claims may involve questions of whether FPL failed to meet certain standards established by the PSC does not divest the trial court of its jurisdiction, or vest exclusive jurisdiction in the PSC, to resolve such issues.”). 4 U.S. 244, 274 (1994) (quoting Republic Nat’l Bank of Mia. v

2024Co., 587 So. 2d 492, 494 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (“[T]he use of the term ‘shall’ in a statute normally has a mandatory connotation.”). “[J]urisdictional statutes ‘speak to the power of the court rather than to the rights or obligations of the parties.’” Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 2 Prior to the enactment of section 366.98, Florida Statutes, courts had jurisdiction over tort claims and the PSC had “limited authority to conduct administrative fact-finding regarding billing disputes and rates for electric power,” which did “not preclude a trial court’s adjudication of a gross negligence claim f

2024Co., 587 So. 2d 492, 494 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (“[T]he use of the term ‘shall’ in a statute normally has a mandatory connotation.”). “[J]urisdictional statutes ‘speak to the power of the court rather than to the rights or obligations of the parties.’” Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 2 Prior to the enactment of section 366.98, Florida Statutes, courts had jurisdiction over tort claims and the PSC had “limited authority to conduct administrative fact-finding regarding billing disputes and rates for electric power,” which did “not preclude a trial court’s adjudication of a gross negligence claim f

2024Jurisdiction for actions such as this properly resides in the [PSC].”); Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Velez, 257 So. 3d 1176, 1177 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (“[C]ourts are the appropriate forum for determining whether FPL’s alleged past conduct constituted a breach of contract or gross negligence, and the mere fact that such claims may involve questions of whether FPL failed to meet certain standards established by the PSC does not divest the trial court of its jurisdiction, or vest exclusive jurisdiction in the PSC, to resolve such issues.”). 4 U.S. 244, 274 (1994) (quoting Republic Nat’l Bank of Mia. v

2024Co., 587 So. 2d 492, 494 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (“[T]he use of the term ‘shall’ in a statute normally has a mandatory connotation.”). “[J]urisdictional statutes ‘speak to the power of the court rather than to the rights or obligations of the parties.’” Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 2 Prior to the enactment of section 366.98, Florida Statutes, courts had jurisdiction over tort claims and the PSC had “limited authority to conduct administrative fact-finding regarding billing disputes and rates for electric power,” which did “not preclude a trial court’s adjudication of a gross negligence claim f

2010In one case cited by Banco, this Court relied upon and quoted the Supreme Court of Florida’s holding in Faircloth v. Hill, 85 So.2d 870, 872 (Fla.1956): While each separate act involved in the drama might not in and of itself establish gross negligence, nevertheless, the entire course of conduct of the automobile driver under all of the circumstances and in the light of all the related factors taken collectively might well establish the existence of gross negligence-(emphasis added).