gross negligence rule in Virginia

2014Although we review the trial court’s decision 2 McBride initially filed a gross negligence claim but later amended her complaint, withdrawing the gross negligence claim and proceeding on a claim of simple negligence. 3 de novo, we also recognize that, when evidence is presented “on [a] plea ore tenus, the circuit court’s factual findings are accorded the weight of a jury finding and will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are plainly wrong or without evidentiary support.” Hawthorne v. VanMarter, 279 Va. 566 , 577, 692 S.E.2d 226, 233 (2010).

2014Although we review the trial court’s decision 2 McBride initially filed a gross negligence claim but later amended her complaint, withdrawing the gross negligence claim and proceeding on a claim of simple negligence. 3 de novo, we also recognize that, when evidence is presented “on [a] plea ore tenus, the circuit court’s factual findings are accorded the weight of a jury finding and will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are plainly wrong or without evidentiary support.” Hawthorne v. VanMarter, 279 Va. 566 , 577, 692 S.E.2d 226, 233 (2010).

2024ANALYSIS On appeal, Howard challenges the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for Harris on the illegality defense and the gross-negligence claim. “[S]ummary judgment ‘[may] not be entered’ unless no ‘material fact is genuinely in dispute’ on a controlling issue or issues and the moving party is entitled to such judgment as a matter of law.” Mount Aldie, LLC v. Land Trust of Va., Inc., 293 Va. 190, 196 (2017) (quoting Rule 3:20). “[I]n an appeal of a decision awarding summary judgment, the trial court’s determination that no genuinely disputed material facts exist and its application of la

2024ANALYSIS On appeal, Howard challenges the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for Harris on the illegality defense and the gross-negligence claim. “[S]ummary judgment ‘[may] not be entered’ unless no ‘material fact is genuinely in dispute’ on a controlling issue or issues and the moving party is entitled to such judgment as a matter of law.” Mount Aldie, LLC v. Land Trust of Va., Inc., 293 Va. 190, 196 (2017) (quoting Rule 3:20). “[I]n an appeal of a decision awarding summary judgment, the trial court’s determination that no genuinely disputed material facts exist and its application of la

2024“A factual issue is genuinely in dispute when reasonable factfinders could ‘draw different conclusions from the evidence,’ not only from the facts asserted but also from the reasonable inferences arising from those facts.” AlBritton v. Commonwealth, 299 Va. 392 , 403 (2021) (citation omitted) (quoting Fultz v. Delhaize Am., Inc., 278 Va. 84, 88 (2009)). “[W]e review the record applying the same standard a trial court must adopt in reviewing a motion for summary judgment, accepting as true those inferences from the facts that are most favorable to the nonmoving party, unless the inferences are

2024“A factual issue is genuinely in dispute when reasonable factfinders could ‘draw different conclusions from the evidence,’ not only from the facts asserted but also from the reasonable inferences arising from those facts.” AlBritton v. Commonwealth, 299 Va. 392 , 403 (2021) (citation omitted) (quoting Fultz v. Delhaize Am., Inc., 278 Va. 84, 88 (2009)). “[W]e review the record applying the same standard a trial court must adopt in reviewing a motion for summary judgment, accepting as true those inferences from the facts that are most favorable to the nonmoving party, unless the inferences are

2016See Whitley v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 482, 300-01 (2000) (concluding that the elements of collateral estoppel were present for the individual defendants and that the Commonwealth was in privity with the individual defendants).

2000However, the result that the trial court reached, holding that the present gross negligence claim was barred against the Commonwealth, is correct for the reason that collateral estoppel barred the claim based on the Commonwealth’s privity with its defendant employees. * See Kesler v. Fentress, 223 Va. 14, 16-17 , 286 S.E.2d 156, 157 (1982); Nero v. Ferris, 222 Va. 807, 813 , 284 S.E.2d 828, 832 (1981).

2000However, the result that the trial court reached, holding that the present gross negligence claim was barred against the Commonwealth, is correct for the reason that collateral estoppel barred the claim based on the Commonwealth’s privity with its defendant employees. * See Kesler v. Fentress, 223 Va. 14, 16-17 , 286 S.E.2d 156, 157 (1982); Nero v. Ferris, 222 Va. 807, 813 , 284 S.E.2d 828, 832 (1981).

2000However, the result that the trial court reached, holding that the present gross negligence claim was barred against the Commonwealth, is correct for the reason that collateral estoppel barred the claim based on the Commonwealth’s privity with its defendant employees. * See Kesler v. Fentress, 223 Va. 14, 16-17 , 286 S.E.2d 156, 157 (1982); Nero v. Ferris, 222 Va. 807, 813 , 284 S.E.2d 828, 832 (1981).

2000However, the result that the trial court reached, holding that the present gross negligence claim was barred against the Commonwealth, is correct for the reason that collateral estoppel barred the claim based on the Commonwealth’s privity with its defendant employees. * See Kesler v. Fentress, 223 Va. 14, 16-17 , 286 S.E.2d 156, 157 (1982); Nero v. Ferris, 222 Va. 807, 813 , 284 S.E.2d 828, 832 (1981).