gross negligence claim in New York

2025In affirming the Supreme Court's dismissal of this cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211, the Appellate Division, Third Department held that the gross negligence claim "consists of nothing more than bare legal conclusions with no factual specificity, which do not suffice to withstand a motion to dismiss" ( see Whitehead v Pine Haven Operating LLC , 222 AD3d 104 , 110-111 [3d Dept 2023]).

2025In affirming the Supreme Court's dismissal of this cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211, the Appellate Division, Third Department held that the gross negligence claim "consists of nothing more than bare legal conclusions with no factual specificity, which do not suffice to withstand a motion to dismiss" ( see Whitehead v Pine Haven Operating LLC , 222 AD3d 104, 110-111 [3d Dept 2023]).

2024In addition, in toxic tort cases, the New York Court of Appeals has adopted a gross negligence standard for the purposes of punitive damages, holding that punitive damages are warranted when "the actor has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow and has done so with conscious indifference to the outcome." r Wesringhouse Corp., 89 NY2d 955, 956-957 (1997)(internal quotations omitted).

1999Corp. ( 89 NY2d 955 ), advised that it had adopted a gross negligence standard with respect to conduct required to establish “reckless disregard for the safety of others.” Specifically, the Court wrote: “In Saarinen v Kerr ( 84 NY2d 494 ) we addressed the level of conduct required to establish ‘reckless disregard for the safety of others’ under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (e).

2025No. 11816-VCMR]; see Smith v Van Gorkom , 488 A2d 858, 872-873 [Del]).

2025No. 11816-VCMR]; see Smith v Van Gorkom , 488 A2d 858, 872-873 [Del]).

2024We affirm so much of the order as dismissed the fourth cause of action, for gross negligence, as plaintiff abandoned her appeal with respect to the gross negligence claim by failing to make any argument addressing its dismissal in either of her appellate briefs, notwithstanding that the omission was pointed out in defendant's brief opposing the appeal ( see Tribbs v 326-338 E. 100th LLC , 215 AD3d 480, 481 [1st Dept 2023]; Gad v Almod Diamonds Ltd. , 147 AD3d 417, 418 [1st Dept 2017]; Carey & Assoc.

2024We affirm so much of the order as dismissed the fourth cause of action, for gross negligence, as plaintiff abandoned her appeal with respect to the gross negligence claim by failing to make any argument addressing its dismissal in either of her appellate briefs, notwithstanding that the omission was pointed out in defendant's brief opposing the appeal ( see Tribbs v 326-338 E. 100th LLC , 215 AD3d 480 , 481 [1st Dept 2023]; Gad v Almod Diamonds Ltd. , 147 AD3d 417, 418 [1st Dept 2017]; Carey & Assoc.

2019On a motion for summary judgment the court's role is "to determine whether there is a material factual issue to be tried, not to resolve it" ( Sommer v Federal Signal Corp. , 79 NY2d 540, 554 [1992]).

2019Thus, a gross negligence claim will be sustained where a party's conduct "evinces a reckless disregard for the rights of others or smacks' of intentional wrongdoing" ( Colnaghi, U.S.A. , 81 NY2d at 823-824 ; see Food Pageant Inc. v Consolidated Edison Co. , 54 NY2d 167, 172 [1981] [gross negligence established by evidence of a party's "failure to exercise even slight care"]; see also Restatement [Second] of Contracts § 195[1] [intentional or reckless conduct vitiates contractual term limiting liability]).

2019The majority's attempt to differentiate between the reliance element of the promissory estoppel cause of action and that of the gross negligence claim, by emphasizing plaintiff's forbearance from asserting certain legal rights in alleging the former, ignores that a negligence claim can, as here, be grounded on a plaintiff's reliance on another party's actions such that she is lulled into a false sense of security ( id. at 72-73 , citing Nallan v Helmsley-Spear, Inc. , 50 NY2d 507, 522 [1980]).

2017Co., 87 NY2d 308 , 316 [1995]; Pacnet Network Ltd. v KDDI Corp., 78 AD3d 478, 479 [1st Dept 2010]).

2016Corp. v Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 105 AD3d 412 , 413 [1st Dept 2013].) In Morgan Stanley, the First Department held “that, consistent with [Nomura], defendant’s alleged breach of its contractual duty to notify the Trustee of defective loans gives rise to an independent, separate claim for breach of the parties’ agreements.” (See Morgan Stanley, 143 AD3d at 3-4 [emphasis added].) That Court also held that the sole remedy clause, which might otherwise have precluded a failure to notify claim, was not a ground for dismissal on a CPLR 3211 motion because the trustee’s gross negligence claim, i

2015Thus, regardless of the number of plaintiff’s allegations, it has not met its burden to establish that any of defendant’s actions “went beyond ordinary negligence and satisfied the gross negligence standard” (Princetel, LLC v Buckley, 95 AD3d 855, 856 [2012], lv dismissed 20 NY3d 994 [2013]).

2010With respect to the - issue of whether plaintiffs tort claims duplicate the contract claims, neither the breach of fiduciary duty claim nor the gross negligence claim is duplicative of the contract claim (id.; Rodin Props.-Shore Mall v Ullman, 264 AD2d 367, 368-369 [1999]).

2010The motion court also correctly dismissed the gross negligence claim relating to defendant’s selection of the laser diodes and delay in performing its warranty obligations, since “claims based on negligent or grossly negligent performance of a contract are not cognizable” (City of New York v 611 W. 152nd St., 273 AD2d 125, 126 [2000]), and plaintiff does not allege a breach of a duty independent of the contract (see Clark-Fitzpatrick, Inc. v Long Is.

2001(Ross v Maumee City Schools, supra, 103 Ohio App 3d, at 65, 66, 658 NE2d, at 805, 806 .) It has further been suggested that cases of school violence may lend themselves to analysis under a gross negligence standard, to wit: “ ‘the intentional, conscious failure to do something which one ought to do’ ” or “ ‘the absence of care that is necessary under the circumstances.’ ” (See, School Violence: Is It Time to Hold School Districts Responsible For Inadequate Safety Measures?, op. cit., at 552.) In New York, the courts have found gross negligence to require a showing of deliberate indifference or

2001(Ross v Maumee City Schools, supra, 103 Ohio App 3d, at 65, 66, 658 NE2d, at 805, 806 .) It has further been suggested that cases of school violence may lend themselves to analysis under a gross negligence standard, to wit: “ ‘the intentional, conscious failure to do something which one ought to do’ ” or “ ‘the absence of care that is necessary under the circumstances.’ ” (See, School Violence: Is It Time to Hold School Districts Responsible For Inadequate Safety Measures?, op. cit., at 552.) In New York, the courts have found gross negligence to require a showing of deliberate indifference or