gross negligence claim in Texas

2018Co., 181 S.W.3d 905, 914 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2006, no pet.) (“The threshold inquiry regarding a gross negligence claim is whether a legal duty existed.”). 3.

2015Co., 181 S.W.3d 905, 914 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2006, no pet.) (“The threshold inquiry regarding a gross negligence claim is whether a legal duty existed.”).

1997Under these circumstances it cannot be said that a fact issue has been raised that appellants had the “actual” conscious indifference necessary to fulfill the subjective prong of the gross negligence test under Moriel, supra. We hold that under the undisputed evidence in this case there is not a scintilla of evidence to show both that the act was likely to result in serious harm and that the defendant (Bourg) was consciously indifferent to the risk of harm.

1994The court in Moriel declared that its decision “represents a substantial clarification of the gross negligence standard that will apply in all cases[.]” Id. at 13 .

2021Id. at 626–27 (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 220 , 229–31). 4 Without citing any portion of the record, Ukpong maintains that “[t]he dead tree in this case would not have been obvious to a trail-runner.” Apart from belying the evidence from her own expert, we do not think that a recreational user should be owed some additional duty merely because she fails to appreciate the obvious conditions in her surroundings.

2009See Miranda , 133 S.W.3d at 226 ; Floyd , 150 S.W.3d at 228. 9: The Preliminary Report states that of the two operational submersible pumps, one was “assumed to be offline to meet the TCEQ requirements.” 10: Regarding the McDonalds’s gross negligence claim, gross negligence differs from ordinary negligence in that a grossly negligent defendant must proceed with “conscious indifference,” and his conduct must “involve an extreme degree of risk.” See Tex. Civ.

2013Co., 181 S.W.3d 905, 914-16 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.) (holding that, because claimant offered no evidence that electric utility owed a negligence duty the gross negligence claim failed as a matter of law); Wortham v. Dow Chemical Co., 179 S.W.3d 189 , 202-03 & n. 16 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (stating that a claimant who cannot support a negligence claim cannot succeed on a gross-negligence claim and concluding that there was no evidence raising a fact issue as to plaintiffs negligence claims); Shell Oil Co. v. Humphrey, 880 S.W.2d 170, 174-78 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th

2013Co., 181 S.W.3d 905 , 914–16 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.) (holding that, because claimant offered no evidence that electric utility owed a negligence duty the gross negligence claim failed as a matter of law); Wortham v. Dow Chemical Co., 179 S.W.3d 189 , 202–03 & n.16 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (stating that a claimant who cannot support a negligence claim cannot succeed on a gross-negligence claim and concluding that there was no evidence raising a fact issue as to plaintiff’s negligence claims); Shell Oil Co. v. Humphrey, 880 S.W.2d 170 , 174–78 (Tex. App.—Houston [1

2025See id. at 921–22.

2013See Mobil Oil Corp., 968 S.W.2d at 921 .

2025Boerjan v. Rodriguez, 436 S.W.3d 307, 311 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam); Tex. Civ.

2020Boerjan v. Rodriguez, 436 S.W.3d 307, 311 (Tex. 2014); Barnes v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 395 S.W.3d 165, 176 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. denied); see also Godines v. Precision Drilling Co., No. 11-16-00110-CV, 2018 WL 2460302 , at *6 (Tex. App.—Eastland May 31, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“A plaintiff must prove all the elements of negligence as a prerequisite to a gross negligence claim.”). 16 Related to appellees’ products liability claim, a product may be unreasonably dangerous because of a defect in marketing, design, or manufacturing.

2023It then noted that the supreme court had not yet addressed whether a gross-negligence claim could survive a negligence claim’s defeat by the pre-injury release and that “courts of appeals have reached different conclusions.” Id. at 921 .

2013See also Van Voris v. Team Chop Shop, LLC, 402 S.W.3d 915, 924-26 (TexApp.-Dallas 2013, no pet.) (holding that a gross-negligence claim did not fail, even though the negligence claim was barred by an enforceable pre-injury release).

2019See Hogue, 271 S.W.3d at 248 .

2018See Hogue, 271 S.W.3d at 248 .

2008A defendant "cannot be grossly negligent without being negligent." Trevino v. Lightning Laydown, Inc ., 782 S.W.2d 946, 949 (Tex. App.--Austin 1990, writ denied); see Shell Oil Co. v. Humphrey , 880 S.W.2d 170, 174 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied).

2008A defendant “cannot be grossly negligent without being negligent.” Trevino v. Lightning Laydown, Inc., 782 S.W.2d 946, 949 (Tex.App.-Austin 1990, writ denied); see Shell Oil Co. v. Humphrey, 880 S.W.2d 170, 174 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied).

2004Op. at 35 (citation omitted). 10: Admiral has not argued that public policy would be violated by allowing Westchester, as a Stowers plaintiff, to recover excess on a gross negligence claim, only that it was against public policy to insure punitive damages on or before 1995. 11: Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shores , 128 S.W.3d 718, 722 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (op. on reh’g). 12: Id. 13: Maj.

2004Op. at 35 (citation omitted). 10: Admiral has not argued that public policy would be violated by allowing Westchester, as a Stowers plaintiff, to recover excess on a gross negligence claim, only that it was against public policy to insure punitive damages on or before 1995. 11: Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shores , 128 S.W.3d 718, 722 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (op. on reh’g). 12: Id. 13: Maj.

2024See Kownslar, 654 S.W.3d at 476–77 (“[I]f the relevant evidence . . . failed to raise a fact question on the gross negligence standard, the governmental entity must have ‘knowledge that the dangerous condition existed at the time of the accident.’” (quoting City of Corsicana v. Stewart, 249 S.W.3d 412 , 414–15 (Tex. 2008)).

2015To satisfy the subjective-knowledge component of the gross negligence standard, the governmental entity must have “knowledge that the dangerous condition existed at the time of the accident.” City of Corsicana v. Stewart, 249 S.W.3d 412, 414-15 (Tex.2008).

2014Gross negligence is “an act or omission involving subjective awareness of an extreme degree of risk, indicating conscious indifference to the 13 rights, safety, or welfare of others.” Shumake, 199 S.W.3d at 287 (citing Transp.

2013See Shumake, 199 S.W.3d at 288 (citing Cavazos, 811 S.W.2d at 234-35 ).

2026But again, we have never framed the specific jurisdiction inquiry as always requiring proof of causation—i.e., proof that the plaintiff’s claim came about because of the defendant’s in-state conduct. 6 Austin also asserts a gross negligence claim against “all defendants,” alleging that “Defendants’ acts and/or omissions, as previously described, were committed with complete and reckless disregard for, and with willful, wanton and actual conscious indifference to the rights, safety and welfare of Plaintiff and the general public.” 19 Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at 362 (internal citation omitted).

2022See Luciano, 625 S.W.3d at 14 (citing Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1026 ). 21 Here, the issue of whether Turner Specialty’s failure to properly train Justin and his crewmates caused or contributed to his death is an operative fact of the Horns’ gross negligence claim against Turner Specialty, and the safety training that Turner Specialty provided to Justin and his crewmates in Texas is directly related to that claim.

2025See Suarez, 465 S.W.3d at 631–32.

2024See Suarez v. City of Tex. City, 465 S.W.3d 623, 634 (Tex. 2015) (“To satisfy the subjective-knowledge component of the 9 Alaina next argues that in the two months prior to Alaina’s injury, Missouri City’s Director of Parks and Recreation presented a “site redevelopment plan” where he stated that the sports fields at the park at issue were “dilapidated.” Alaina argues that this is an admission of actual knowledge of the alleged dangerous condition because the fields were generally “dilapidated.” However, the knowledge that a dangerous condition could develop over time is insufficient to prove

2023See id. at 326 .

2023See id. at 326 .

2023This evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury’s finding of the objective-and-subjective-awareness prongs of the gross negligence test. 22 See Rayner, 501 S.W.3d at 150–52; see also USA Truck, Inc. v. West, 189 S.W.3d 904, 909 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, pet. denied) (“Given that [the driver] testified he was aware his actions posed a risk, and given the extreme circumstances surrounding his actions, the jury could have reasonably concluded that [the driver] was not only aware his actions created a risk, but that he was also aware of the magnitude of that risk.”).

2023This evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury’s finding of the objective-and-subjective-awareness prongs of the gross negligence test. 22 See Rayner, 501 S.W.3d at 150–52; see also USA Truck, Inc. v. West, 189 S.W.3d 904, 909 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, pet. denied) (“Given that [the driver] testified he was aware his actions posed a risk, and given the extreme circumstances surrounding his actions, the jury could have reasonably concluded that [the driver] was not only aware his actions created a risk, but that he was also aware of the magnitude of that risk.”).

2013See id. at 214-15 .

2013See id.

2013See Lee Lewis Const., Inc. v. Harrison, 70 S.W.3d 778, 785 (Tex.2001) (gross negligence elements); Landers, 257 S.W.3d at 746 ; Roventini, 111 S.W.3d at 724 . a.

2013See Lee Lewis Const., Inc. v. Harrison, 70 S.W.3d 778, 785 (Tex. 2001) (gross negligence elements); Landers, 257 S.W.3d at 746 ; Roventini, 111 S.W.3d at 724 . - 37 - 04-11-00550-CV a.

2007Co. , 181 S.W.3d 905, 914 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2006, no pet.) ("The threshold inquiry regarding a gross negligence claim is whether a legal duty existed.") (citing Thapar v. Zezulka , 994 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tex. 1999)).

2006See Thapar v. Zezulka, 994 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tex.1999).

2007Guided by this Court’s decision in State of Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t v. Morris, 129 S.W.3d 804, 807-10 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2004, no pet.), the Morrises amended their petition on March 30, 2004, to include a gross negligence claim.

2007Guided by this Court's decision in State of Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep't v. Morris , 129 S.W.3d 804, 807-10 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2004, no pet.), the Morrises amended their petition on March 30, 2004, to include a gross negligence claim.

2004See Mosser v. Darrow , 341 U.S. 267, 274 , 71 S. Ct. 680, 683 (1951); see also Dodson v. Huff ( In re Smyth ), 207 F.3d 758, 761 (5th Cir. 2000) (adopting a gross negligence standard of care for the personal liability of a bankruptcy trustee).

2004See Mosser v. Darrow , 341 U.S. 267, 274 , 71 S. Ct. 680, 683 (1951); see also Dodson v. Huff ( In re Smyth ), 207 F.3d 758, 761 (5th Cir. 2000) (adopting a gross negligence standard of care for the personal liability of a bankruptcy trustee).

2023See Tesoro Petroleum Corp. v. Nabors Drilling USA, Inc., 106 S.W.3d 118 , 126–27 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied); Newman v. Tropical Visions, Inc., 891 S.W.2d 713, 722 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1994, writ denied); cf. McCloskey, 2017 WL 6502444 , at *4 (concluding no error in granting no-evidence motion for summary judgment filed on gross-negligence claim when appellant provided no evidence that any of the appellees had an actual, subjective awareness of the risk and proceeded with conscious indifference).

2013Id. at 126-27 ; Newman, 891 S.W.2d at 721-22 .

2023See Tesoro Petroleum Corp. v. Nabors Drilling USA, Inc., 106 S.W.3d 118 , 126–27 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied); Newman v. Tropical Visions, Inc., 891 S.W.2d 713, 722 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1994, writ denied); cf. McCloskey, 2017 WL 6502444 , at *4 (concluding no error in granting no-evidence motion for summary judgment filed on gross-negligence claim when appellant provided no evidence that any of the appellees had an actual, subjective awareness of the risk and proceeded with conscious indifference).

2013Id. at 126-27 ; Newman, 891 S.W.2d at 721-22 .

2021This limitation has a direct bearing on the gross negligence claim in the Allens’ pleadings because a defendant may be directly liable for punitive damages related to a breach of “the non-delegable duty . . . to furnish safe machinery and instrumentalities.” Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911 , 923– 24 (Tex. 1981); see also Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P., 465 S.W.3d 193, 199 (Tex. 2015) (“It is well established that an employer has certain nondelegable and continuous duties to his employees,” including “the duty to furnish reasonably safe instrumentalities with which employees are to work.

2002In discussing the subjective component of the gross negligence standard, the supreme court in Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Andrade, 19 S.W.3d 245 (Tex.1999) explained that “what separates ordinary negligence from gross negligence is the defendant’s state of mind; in other words, the plaintiff must show that the defendant knew about the peril, but his acts or omissions demonstrate that he did not care.” Id. at 246-47 (citing Williams v. Steves Indus., Inc., 699 S.W.2d 570, 573 (Tex.1985) and Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911, 922 (Tex.1981)).

2002In discussing the subjective component of the gross negligence standard, the supreme court in Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Andrade, 19 S.W.3d 245 (Tex.1999) explained that “what separates ordinary negligence from gross negligence is the defendant’s state of mind; in other words, the plaintiff must show that the defendant knew about the peril, but his acts or omissions demonstrate that he did not care.” Id. at 246-47 (citing Williams v. Steves Indus., Inc., 699 S.W.2d 570, 573 (Tex.1985) and Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911, 922 (Tex.1981)).

2002In discussing the subjective component of the gross negligence standard, the supreme court in Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Andrade, 19 S.W.3d 245 (Tex.1999) explained that “what separates ordinary negligence from gross negligence is the defendant’s state of mind; in other words, the plaintiff must show that the defendant knew about the peril, but his acts or omissions demonstrate that he did not care.” Id. at 246-47 (citing Williams v. Steves Indus., Inc., 699 S.W.2d 570, 573 (Tex.1985) and Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911, 922 (Tex.1981)).